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As demand for natural resources increases due to the rise in world population and 
living standards, conflicts over their access and control are becoming more prevalent. 
This book critically assesses different approaches to and conceptualizations of 
resource fairness and justice and applies them to the analysis of resource conflicts.
 Approaches addressed include cosmopolitan liberalism, political economy and 
political ecology. These are applied at various scales (local, national, international) 
and to initiatives and instruments in public and private resource governance, such 
as corporate social responsibility instruments, certification schemes, international 
law and commodity markets. In doing so, the contributions contrast existing 
approaches to fairness and justice and extend them by taking into account the 
interplay between political scales, regions, resources and power structures in ‘glo-
calized’ resource politics.
 Various case studies are included concerning agriculture, agrofuels, land grab-
bing, water resources, mining and biodiversity. The volume adds to the academic 
and policy debate by bringing together a variety of disciplines and perspectives in 
order to advance both a research and policy agenda that puts notions of resource 
fairness and justice centre- stage.
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1 Fairness and justice in natural 
resource politics
An introduction
Melanie Pichler, Cornelia Staritz, 
Karin Küblböck, Christina Plank,  
Werner Raza, and Fernando Ruiz Peyré
Approaching resource fairness and justice
In March 2011, a devastating civil war started in Syria that forced more 
than four million people to flee their homes, mainly to the neighbouring 
countries of Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey (UNHCR, 2015). Little 
discussed in media reports, the worst drought in Syrian history, that forced 
over 1.5 million farmers to migrate from the countryside to the cities of 
Aleppo, Damascus, or Homs, preceded the civil war (Gleick, 2014; 
Meynen and Temper, 2014). Drought related water shortage, crop failure 
linked to climate change, and subsequent internal migration contributed to 
urban unemployment and social unrest in the advent of the civil war 
(Gleick, 2014). Historically, disputes over the (re)distribution of water 
resources have been an important line of conflict in one of the driest 
regions in the world, mainly through the construction and control of water 
infrastructure (at least 46 dams in the Tigris- Euphrates basin). Currently, 
hydrological control is also an important factor in war activities. In 2012, 
for example, Syrian rebels captured the Tishrin dam and in 2013 the 
Islamic State captured the Tabqa dam that serves as the most important 
source of irrigation for the surrounding farmlands in Syria and Iraq as well 
as of electricity supply for the second largest city of Aleppo (Gleick, 2014; 
Meynen and Temper, 2014).
 In November 2013, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Ecuador fined 
the multinational petroleum corporation Chevron (formerly Texaco) 9.5 
million US dollars as financial compensation for social and environmental 
damage in the Ecuadorian Amazon (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2015). 
Petroleum is Ecuador’s most important natural resource and has brought 
wealth and prosperity to Ecuadorians and international companies. At the 
same time, petroleum extraction has been an important source for political 
mobilization of oil workers, Amazonian settlers, and indigenous peoples 
over the distribution of benefits from the nation’s natural resources (Valdi-
via, 2008). Since 1964, the former Texaco Petroleum Company extracted 
crude oil from up to 350 oil wells on a 1.5 million hectare concession in 
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the Amazon, spilling over 60 billion litres of toxic waste and 650,000 
barrels of oil (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2015). The contamination of 
the land and the water led to the dispossession and marginalization of 
thousands of indigenous peoples and peasants dependent on forests, agri-
cultural land, and the environment more generally as well as to serious 
health risks such as rising cancer rates, birth defects, and spontaneous mis-
carriages (Chevron Toxico, 2015).
 In August 2015, about 1,500 climate activists occupied an opencast 
brown coal mine of the multinational energy corporation RWE in the 
German Rhineland to shut down one of Europe’s biggest CO2 emission 
sites (Jordan, 2015). Globally, coal is the single biggest driver of climate 
change through the associated greenhouse gas emissions, and scientists 
argue that 80 per cent of coal deposits need to be kept in the ground in 
order to prevent the most devastating effects of climate change (McGlade 
and Ekins, 2015). In Germany, despite efforts in renewable energy produc-
tion to drastically reduce CO2 emissions (German Renewable Energy Act), 
45 per cent of electricity is still produced from coal (Statistisches Bunde-
samt, 2015). The temporary shutdown of the mine constituted an 
important focal point for the transnational climate movement in the run- up 
to the international climate negotiations in Paris and called on Germany’s 
responsibility for global climate justice, that is, to immediately cut emis-
sions from fossil fuels in line with international obligations (Darby, 2015).
 These three examples illustrate the multiple causes and sites of resource 
conflicts and justice claims (e.g. local environmental destruction and health 
impacts, uneven distribution of natural resources and related benefits, 
climate change). At the same time, the examples shed light on the diverse 
forms of resistance to resource injustice as well as the instruments used to 
claim and access fairness and justice (e.g. legal means, migration, sabotage, 
occupation of extraction sites).
 Although political, scientific, and media debates regularly refer to fair-
ness and justice when it comes to resource politics, the applied conceptions 
and underlying meanings are diverse, vague, and often contradictory. In 
the academic literature, explicit conceptions of resource fairness and justice 
have been mostly advanced based upon liberal global justice and inter-
national (human rights) law. These approaches suggest an agreed- upon 
and universal understanding of justice that often fails to materialize in 
practice. Case studies from different social science backgrounds show that 
in concrete resource conflicts different notions of fairness and justice often 
compete with each other; that is, the very definition of justice is at stake. In 
other words, apart from economic (distributional) aspects, environmental 
and social concerns, questions of inclusion and democracy, references to 
sacredness, or cultural and aesthetic values may be brought forward (Mar-
tínez-Alier et al., 2010).
 This edited volume on Fairness and Justice in Natural Resource Politics 
aims to contribute to the debate on resource politics from a fairness and 
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justice perspective. The volume critically assesses different approaches to 
and conceptualizations of resource fairness and justice (e.g. liberal global 
justice, political economy, political ecology) and applies them to resource 
conflicts (e.g. conflicts over agriculture, biodiversity, mining, water) at 
various scales (local, national, international). In doing so, the contributions 
critically assess initiatives and instruments in public and private resource 
governance (e.g. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), private standards, 
international conventions, commodity derivative markets) and take into 
account the interplay between political scales, regions, resources, and 
power relations in glocalized resource politics.
Historical development of resource politics
Access to natural resources has been a contested political arena for centu-
ries and a key motive for the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule 
in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. After decolonization, the unequal 
appropriation of resources and commodity earnings was increasingly put 
on the international agenda. In 1962, the UN Declaration on Permanent 
Sovereignty over Natural Resources stated that natural resources should be 
used in the interest of national development and the well- being of the 
people, subordinating foreign capital used for resource exploration to these 
conditions (United Nations, 1962). Furthermore, the UN Declaration 
for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (United 
Nations, 1974) confirmed the full and permanent sovereignty of all states 
over their natural resources and the right of developing countries to form 
cartels and extend existing commodity agreements. National control over 
natural resources was seen as an important pillar in development strat-
egies. Nationalization of extraction and production as well as requirements 
for foreign investors in resource sectors (e.g. know- how transfer and profit 
sharing) were widespread. Natural resources were meant to raise public 
revenues and contribute to the diversification of the economy with, 
however, often limited sustainable success.
 Besides debates on resource sovereignty, the discussion on sustainable 
resource use and development started in the 1970s. The scenarios of the 
Club of Rome (Meadows et al., 1972) on the increasing scarcity of non- 
renewable resources fuelled this debate. Their publication Limits to Growth 
challenged both population growth and the unlimited use of natural 
resources (especially land and fossil energy) that would lead to resource scar-
city and environmental destruction within the next 50 to 100 years. In the 
run- up to the first UN environmental conference in Stockholm in 1972, the 
Club of Rome called for the establishment of international institutions to 
deal with these global problems and a radical change in unequal North–
South relations. Although the scenarios did not materialize in reality as pre-
dicted, resource scarcity, environmental destruction, and climate change 
have since then shaped and influenced (international) resource politics.
4  M. Pichler et al.
 The discovery of new raw material deposits, the oil price crises and the 
related fall in other commodity prices, as well as the debt crisis of the 
1980s significantly weakened the position of resource- rich countries in 
international politics. Hence, resource- based development strategies and 
resource politics more broadly largely disappeared from the (international) 
agenda. In the following two decades, resource policies were shaped by a 
withdrawal of the state and the creation of favourable conditions for 
foreign investors (e.g. fiscal and financial incentives, investment protection 
measures). The pressure of international financial institutions and their 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), as well as the global policy 
shift towards neoliberalism, contributed to these developments. In this 
context, the roles, rights, and responsibilities of states and corporations 
changed significantly. This can be seen in the development of international 
investment policies that shifted from protecting states to limiting their 
policy space and promoting foreign investors. From the perspective of most 
resource- rich developing countries, the impact of this policy shift on public 
revenue, local employment, diversification of the economy, and develop-
ment more broadly was disappointing (Campbell, 2010; UNECA and AU, 
2011; Besada and Martin, 2015).
 From the turn of the millennium, natural resources have again become a 
key issue in local, national, and international politics. This is due to a 
number of factors, including the increasing demand for resources by 
emerging economies (most importantly, China), the generalization and 
intensification of resource- based modes of living (e.g. meat consumption, 
use of cars and electronics), the scarcity of some critical natural resources 
(e.g. magnesite, tungsten), and the (related) commodity price boom accom-
panied by high price volatility. Competition for access to and control of 
resources has thus intensified, and so have conflicts over the exploration, 
production, and consumption of natural resources and the distribution of 
economic, social, and environmental benefits and costs.
 Current resource politics is dominated by diverse actors and strategies. 
Resource importers, that is, largely industrialized and emerging economies, 
are mainly motivated by resource security concerns and strive for ‘undis-
torted’ access to raw materials. For this purpose, several of these countries, 
such as the US, Japan, Korea, and the EU, have formulated raw material 
strategies in recent years (Küblböck, 2013; Mildner and Howard, 2013). 
In the case of the EU, access to raw materials has become a priority in 
negotiating trade agreements with non- EU countries. The EU has also used 
WTO accession negotiations to establish bans on export restrictions in the 
resources sector that go beyond WTO rules and has employed different 
instruments of development policy in order to promote access to raw 
materials (European Commission, 2013; European Commission 2014).
 On the other hand, the competition for access to natural resources and 
the price boom of the 2000s have increased the political space for negoti-
ation in resource- rich countries. Debates about the unequal distribution of 
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benefits from natural resources and the potential of resource- based devel-
opment in the Global South have intensified and governments have taken 
action to increase public revenue from the resource sector to improve its 
contribution to local economic development. Some have also initiated link-
ages and local content policies to further local added value and economic 
diversification (Küblböck, 2015; for Africa, see African Union, 2009; 
UNECA and AU, 2013). However, governments of resource- exporting 
countries too often implement resource policies without respecting the 
rights of affected local communities and fail to use resource revenues for 
social and productive investment. The recent commodity price decline has 
also challenged resource- based development strategies more generally, once 
more shifting the power away from resource exporting countries.
 Transnational companies play a key role in extractive industries. In 
recent years, they have been increasingly subject to criticism and resistance 
against their business strategies and the social and environmental impacts 
of resource extraction. As a response, they developed CSR programmes in 
order to acquire or maintain their “social licence to operate” (Moffat and 
Zhang, 2014). A main challenge is the voluntary and often unilateral char-
acter of these activities and their diversion from the companies’ core busi-
ness that limit their transformative potential from the onset. At the trans- and 
international level, the general trend towards soft law and privatization of 
resource regulation has fostered voluntary self- regulatory initiatives to 
resource governance (e.g. roundtables, guidelines, certification schemes). 
However, as far as transparency of financial flows is concerned, the US and 
the EU have more recently introduced binding legislation on the disclosure 
of payments from companies to governments of resource- exporting coun-
tries (Küblböck, 2015).
 The often dramatic environmental and social impacts of extractive 
industries and natural resource politics have intensified socio- ecological 
conflicts and encouraged social movements to reflect on alternatives to 
resource- based development and mechanisms for fairness and justice in 
resource politics. Especially in Latin America, social movements and civil 
society actors increasingly question the very basis of current resource 
extraction patterns in the context of capitalist production and development 
under the term post- extractivism (Monge et al., 2011; Gudynas, 2013). 
They stress that social and environmental costs are externalized while 
resource- based benefits accrue to a small group of people only. Most 
importantly, they criticize the fact that a majority of actors are excluded 
from decision- making processes in resource politics. These debates and 
struggles (e.g. on buen vivir in Latin America, Ubuntu in Africa, or climate 
justice in international climate politics) denounce existing power relations 
regarding the appropriation, control, and distribution of natural resources 
and call for alternative and democratic resource politics.
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Major themes
Academic research on fairness and justice in resource politics has so far 
mainly focused upon particular issues and case studies. These include, for 
example, the analysis of local resource conflicts (Selfa, 2004; Gross, 2007; 
Bebbington and Williams, 2008), resource geopolitics (Le Billon, 2004), reg-
ulatory instruments and initiatives (Campbell, 2010; Besada and Martin, 
2015), or different resource- based value chains (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; 
Reed, 2009). Research has focused on justice implications for specific 
resources (e.g. Hunt and Haider, 2001 for forestry; Weinhold et al., 2013 
for agriculture; Gross, 2014 for water; or Bryceson et al., 2014 for mining), 
analysed from specific disciplines and theoretical or conceptual approaches 
(e.g. Lawrence et al., 1997 from a legal perspective or Bullard, 1990 from an 
environmental justice approach). This volume brings together scholars from 
a variety of disciplines and combines and contrasts their approaches in order 
to advance both a research and policy agenda that puts notions of fairness 
and justice centre- stage. Three major themes are identified:
 First, the contributions draw on different conceptualizations of resource 
fairness and justice. The first part of the volume introduces three concep-
tual approaches, namely liberal global justice, a political ecology and a 
political economy perspective on resource fairness and justice. In line with 
the disciplinary and institutional logics of knowledge creation, these 
approaches have been developed more or less in isolation from each other. 
Based on this insight, the volume promotes an exchange between different 
approaches to resource fairness and justice. Such an interdisciplinary 
approach highlights the different perspectives, interrelations, and contra-
dictions between the disciplinary debates on resource politics. These con-
ceptual approaches are referred to and partly built upon in the subsequent, 
more empirically focused chapters of the volume that deal with specific 
aspects or cases of resource conflicts, fairness/justice, and governance.
 A liberal global justice perspective draws mainly on Rawlsian justice prin-
ciples, and applies them to global natural resource management. Rawls 
([1971] 2003) developed social justice from two basic principles: that is, the 
equal rights principle (referring to equal basic liberties) and the difference 
principle postulating that “social and economic equalities are to be arranged 
so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (266). Based 
on this originally national framework, liberal philosophers have conceptual-
ized resource justice as a global challenge and call for the redistribution of 
natural resources based on an abstract moral justice ‘compass’. The distribu-
tion of natural resources is seen as morally arbitrary over the earth’s surface, 
resembling a natural resource lottery (Beitz, [1979] 1999). Accordingly, 
liberal global justice representatives call for an increase in foreign aid (Beitz, 
[1979] 1999), the introduction of a global resource dividend (Pogge, 2001), 
or other global funds (Hayward, 2006) to redistribute the economic benefits 
derived from excessive natural resource use. In this volume, Shmuel Nili 
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introduces basic arguments of liberal global justice and contrasts some of the 
philosophical paradigm’s assumptions with social scientific findings on 
natural resource production, consumption, and distribution.
 In developing an abstract moral justice compass, liberal global justice 
neglects conflicts, power relations, and the historical development of 
current resource distribution patterns. A political ecology perspective on 
fairness and justice in turn emanates from conflicts over access to and 
control of nature and natural resources to reflect on explicitly political 
dimensions of resource justice. Therefore, political ecology challenges 
abstract redistribution principles and directs attention to questions of 
“who has the power to impose decisions on resource extraction, land use, 
pollution levels, biodiversity loss, and more importantly, who has the 
power to determine the procedures to impose such decisions” (Martínez-
Alier et al., 2010: 154). In other words, the redistribution of natural 
resources – among humans, social groups, and states – requires the inclu-
sion of all potentially affected people and the control over decision- making 
power and problem- solving as well as the recognition of diverse modes of 
living (Schlosberg, 2004). In this volume, Melanie Pichler conceptualizes 
justice from a political ecology perspective that explicitly highlights power 
relations and inequalities and elaborates on the political dimensions of 
socio- ecological justice. In doing so, the chapter reverses the line of argu-
ment from abstract moral justice principles to socio- ecological conflicts as 
a starting point for thinking about resource justice.
 Political economy approaches to resource fairness typically focus on the 
distribution of the economic benefits and costs of resource extraction 
(Barma et al., 2012; Morris et al., 2012). Furthermore, these approaches 
have analysed why resource abundance often does not promote economic 
development, referring to rent- seeking, the ‘resource curse’, or the ‘Dutch 
disease’ (Rosser, 2006; Collier, 2010). These (mainstream) approaches are 
lacking in some important dimensions. Usually, questions of power are 
marginalized, and the social and environmental costs of resource extrac-
tion are either sidelined or dealt with by neoclassical welfare economics, 
neglecting issues such as fundamental uncertainty and incommensurability. 
Furthermore, the analysis is typically centred upon the national level even 
though politics of scale has doubtlessly become more important in the era 
of globalization. In this volume, Werner Raza offers an alternative political 
economy approach to resource fairness, building on Fraser’s theory of 
justice and extending it by Kapp’s concept of social costs and a dynamic 
understanding of natural resource development inspired by the American 
Institutionalist School. Raza argues that resource politics should not only 
manage the short- term distribution of benefits and costs, but strive at 
building institutions that allow for a dynamic process of ‘resource- creation’ 
by way of economic diversification and technological upgrading.
 Second, the chapters analyse resource conflicts at various scales as well 
as the interplay of global, national, and local dynamics in resource politics. 
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The access, control, use, and distribution of natural resources are global 
challenges that are manifested in competition and conflicts on various 
scales as well as in diverse public and private initiatives to resource politics 
and governance. The focus on case studies and the analysis of justice claims 
raised in local resource conflicts are a well- established way of dealing with 
fairness and justice in resource politics (e.g. Syme et al., 1999; Smith and 
McDonough, 2001; Selfa, 2004; Gross, 2007). Since the 1980s, globaliza-
tion processes have intensified the interplay of global and local dynamics 
through international trade and investment relations and their implications 
for transnational conceptions of fairness and justice. The phenomenon of 
geographical disjuncture of production and consumption sites has, 
however, been discussed since colonial expansion and the industrial revolu-
tion. For example, the Marxist ecologist John Bellamy Foster (1999) con-
ceptualizes this spatial disconnect between production and consumption 
with the concept of the metabolic rift and Haberl et al. (2009) use the term 
‘teleconnections’ derived from climate and land use research. In specifically 
highlighting power relations, Brand and Wissen (2013) introduce the 
concept of the imperial mode of living to point to “prevailing patterns of 
production and consumption that disproportionately rely on global labour 
power, resources and sinks” (690). The imperial mode of living mainly 
refers to practices in the Global North, but is increasingly spreading among 
the middle classes and elites in emerging countries.
 In this volume, on a local case study level Tobias Schmitt critically 
assesses participation processes in water distribution conflicts in the 
context of integrated water resources management in the Brazilian state of 
Ceará. By applying Fraser’s concept of social justice, the contribution chal-
lenges the assumed positive relation between existing participation mecha-
nisms and social justice and points to dominant power relations and 
existing inequalities that current participation mechanisms fail to question. 
Also referring to Fraser’s concept of social justice, Melanie Coni- Zimmer, 
Annegret Flohr, and Andreas Jacobs analyse a mining conflict in the Peru-
vian Moquegua region and the local justice claims put forward by the 
conflict parties. The chapter argues that the governance mechanism 
developed to respond to the mining conflict does not appropriately take 
into account local communities’ justice claims, focussing mainly on 
recognition- based claims. Johanna Sydow compares the local perspectives 
on and reactions to the implementation of CSR mechanisms to manage 
company– community relations by the transnational company Newmont in 
mining conflicts in Peru and Ghana. While Newmont’s CSR concept is 
highly standardized, the contribution finds that it has differing impacts at 
different sites, depending on local contexts, agency, and counter- conduct.
 From a national perspective, Gordon Crawford and Gabriel Botchwey 
conceptualize resource fairness in the Ghanaian small- scale gold mining 
sector. They examine the impact of foreign involvement, particularly from 
China, in this sector and the consequences for resource fairness in terms 
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of resource sovereignty, state revenue, distribution of benefits, and environ-
mental degradation, finding irrevocable changes to indigenous mining 
practices and negative externalities. Lars Buur and Celso Monjane explore 
resource fairness in relation to linkage development programmes in 
Mozambique’s extractive sector, stressing the importance of a political 
economy perspective. They show that linkage formation has been monopo-
lized by the ruling elite, which is engaged in ‘linkage patronage’, leaving 
few avenues for a more fair distribution of potential benefits from natural 
resource exploitation.
 Framing resource conflicts on an international level, Ina Lehmann ana-
lyses the Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) and assesses responsibil-
ities for financing biodiversity conservation from a normative global justice 
perspective. While the CBD generally reflects the normative argument that 
developed countries should bear most of the costs of biodiversity conserva-
tion, the chapter applies the contributor pays principle and the ability to pay 
principle to argue that more recent developments with regard to financing 
the international biodiversity regime have shifted responsibilities to develop-
ing countries and therefore countervail global justice principles.
 Dealing with the interplay of various scales, Jutta Kister and Fernando 
Ruiz Peyré reflect on consumer–producer relations in fairtrade initiatives. 
The chapter discusses opportunities and limitations of private standards in 
supporting ‘fairer’ global value chains, comparing the well- established 
Fairtrade system for agricultural products with experiences of ‘fair’ stand-
ards in the mining sector. They focus on governance structures, power 
relations, and cross- regional influences in a qualitative actor- centred 
approach of value chain analysis. Robert Hafner and Martin Coy analyse 
the local consequences of export- oriented soy production in the Brazilian 
Mato Grosso and the Argentine Chaco. The contribution draws on an 
environmental justice perspective to argue that universal conceptions of 
fairness and justice need to incorporate regional characteristics and local 
perspectives. Axel Anlauf reflects on the imperial mode of living through 
the analysis of high- tech and green growth strategies in Europe (e.g. elec-
tromobility, smartphones, notebooks) and their consequences for lithium 
mining conflicts in Jujuy, Argentina. The chapter argues that without 
addressing power asymmetries, ‘green’ technologies do not promote socio- 
ecological justice as they rely on the exclusive access to resources and 
externalize costs to both marginalized actors and nature. Cornelia Staritz, 
Bernhard Tröster, and Karin Küblböck focus on the interplay between 
international and national dynamics through the analysis of price setting in 
global commodity trade. Global processes of financialization are connected 
to national market structures and local outcomes on the distribution of 
price risks in the coffee sector in Ethiopia and the cotton sector in Burkina 
Faso, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Christina Plank analyses the trans-
national implications of the agrofuels project driven by EU policies and 
national and foreign agribusiness interests for agrarian justice in Ukraine. 
10  M. Pichler et al.
Ukrainian oligarchs, highly intertwined with the Ukrainian state, increas-
ingly capture large- scale agriculture through agrofuel exports to the EU 
with negative impacts on rural development.
 Third, a crosscutting theme of the volume is the analysis of different 
actors, instruments and initiatives, as well as responsibilities in resource pol-
itics. In other words, the chapters refer to the question of who is responsible 
for guaranteeing and implementing resource fairness and justice. Since the 
neoliberal turn in the 1980s, responsibility for fairness and justice in resource 
politics has gradually shifted from states to markets. This shift from state- 
based government to market- and network- based governance was accom-
panied by a “denationalization” at both the sub national (through 
decentralization) and the supranational level (through economic integration 
and global governance mechanisms) (Jessop, 1997: 573–576). In resource 
and environmental politics, these transformations include, for example, the 
rise of private and mostly voluntary standards and certification schemes (e.g. 
Giovannucci and Ponte, 2005; Tallontire, 2007; Pichler, 2013; Küblböck, 
2015) and the increasing delegation of state responsibilities to private enter-
prises, including service delivery and rule setting and implementation (Camp-
bell, 2010) which is closely linked to a further weakening of state legitimacy. 
On the international level, these transformations are interlinked with the 
establishment of multi- level or global governance mechanisms in climate, 
biodiversity, or water politics (e.g. Conca, 2006; Okereke et al., 2009) where 
transnational companies often play a key role. These shifts in responsibility 
imply that fairness and justice claims tend to move away from central state 
institutions to direct negotiations between, for example, communities and 
companies in so- called multi- stakeholder processes.
 In this volume, Schmitt elaborates on the exclusion mechanisms in 
decentralized River Basin Committees and Users’ Commissions in Brazil 
that were introduced within the global framework of Integrated Water 
Resources Management. Coni- Zimmer et al. analyse justice implications 
through the installation of Dialogue Tables (Mesas de diálogo) in mining 
conflicts in Peru, usually set up between a local community, a company, 
and local government authorities. Sydow compares the different effects of 
standardized CSR initiatives of the mining company Newmont in the local 
contexts of mining regions in Ghana and Peru. Hafner and Coy highlight 
the increasing importance of voluntary certification schemes in Latin 
America’s soy production, which is, however, predominantly an act of 
marketing rather than an actual improvement towards fairer production. 
In dealing with explicitly transnational phenomena, Kister and Ruiz 
Peyré assess the fairness assumptions and power relations in fairtrade 
standards in the agricultural and mining sector. Staritz et al. analyse the 
distributional effects of commodity price setting through derivative 
markets and contrast them with national price stabilization schemes. Also 
on a supranational level, Lehmann discusses financial responsibilities in 
international biodiversity governance. In explicitly challenging neoliberal 
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governance, Crawford calls on the state to develop viable and effective 
institutions to guarantee national resource sovereignty for the benefits of 
all Ghanaian citizens. Buur and Monjane, in turn, show the problematic 
outcomes of national linkages and local content policies in the extractive 
sector in Mozambique that led to ‘linkage patronage’ by the ruling elite, 
stressing the importance of taking into account power relations and polit-
ical economy aspects in implementing national policies. In a similar vein, 
Plank highlights moments of conflict and cooperation between the Ukrain-
ian oligarchs and different EU actors with their common support for agri-
business decisively shaping the conditions for resource (in)justice and 
policies in Ukraine. The contribution also shows the responsibility of EU 
regulation (i.e. agrofuel policies) for transnational justice implications in 
other countries (i.e. Ukraine), a theme also taken up in Anlauf ’s chapter on 
the implications of the green growth strategies of the Global North on 
mining conflicts in Argentina.
 In sum, the volume shows that the very conception of fairness and justice 
in natural resource politics is contested. Furthermore, although often refer-
ring to some abstract principles, fairness and justice are typically context- 
sensitive and developed in societal struggles. The contributions help to 
reach a better understanding of different concepts, notions, and perspectives 
of resource fairness and justice at the local, national, and international level 
in order to design adequate resource policies and governance mechanisms. 
The chapters also shed light on the power relations that shape resource pol-
itics and prevent these reforms. Hence, a multi- dimensional and multi- scalar 
perspective on resource fairness and justice is required, that includes eco-
nomic, social, and environmental redistribution as well as questions of 
inclusion, representation, and recognition. Shifts in resource politics 
towards fairness and justice will not come about without resistance from 
powerful groups that benefit from current resource politics and will there-
fore only evolve from resource conflicts and struggles that question these 
power asymmetries and inequalities.
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Conceptual approaches 
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My aim in this contribution is to ask how both the findings and the limita-
tions of social science should inform the debate on global economic justice 
among liberal political philosophers. I shall focus on the central place that 
this debate has allocated to political and economic aspects of natural 
resource wealth. Furthermore, I shall also try to provide a broader intro-
duction to some key liberal discussions of global justice.
 In the process of pursuing this agenda, I will advance three main claims. 
First, I will show that social science research casts doubt on key premises 
of important liberal global justice theories. However, second, I will also 
suggest that empirical questions pivotal to these theories bring to the fore 
important limitations inherent to social science work on global issues. 
These limitations will lead me to argue, third, that new normative concerns 
should feature in liberal discussions about global justice.
 I commence my argument with introductory remarks concerning the 
liberal debate on global justice (section 1). I emphasize the debate’s endur-
ing roots in John Rawls’ (1999) ideas, particularly concerning (1) the 
moral arbitrariness of natural endowments, and (2) the significance of the 
socio- economic structures that form the background of interactions among 
agents. I move to introduce social science into the discussion, first by 
asking how it can inform Rawlsian claims, initiated by Charles Beitz 
(1979), concerning the moral arbitrariness of societies’ natural resource 
endowments (section 2). I then ask a parallel question regarding Thomas 
Pogge’s (2002) extension of the Rawlsian concept of a “basic structure” to 
global politics (section 3). Both Beitz’s and Pogge’s arguments turn out to 
hinge on causal claims that currently lack social- scientific support, but that 
also seem extremely difficult to evaluate through social- scientific tools. I 
therefore end by asking (in section 4) what should be our normative posi-
tion concerning global reforms that hinge on social- scientific confidence 
that we not only lack at present, but also seem unlikely to attain in the 
future.
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Global justice in liberal political philosophy
Questions of economic justice across borders began to appear on the 
radars of liberal political philosophy only in the 1970s. This development 
– like many of the other developments that occurred in liberal political 
philosophy during and since that decade – was heavily indebted to John 
Rawls’ work. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1999) seeks a public criterion 
of social justice that can regulate a liberal democracy’s “basic structure” – 
its “major institutions”, including “the political constitution and the prin-
cipal economic and social arrangements” (6). Rawls derives this criterion 
from the contractual thought- experiment of the “original position”, the 
parties to which represent democratic citizens. These parties know “general 
facts about human society” (such as “the principles of economic theory 
[. . .], the basis of social organization and the laws of human psychology” 
(Rawls, 1999: 119)). However, a “veil of ignorance” deprives them of any 
knowledge of the particular individuals they represent and thus ensures 
that morally irrelevant (in Rawls’ language, “morally arbitrary”) features 
do not influence their decision. Rawls argues that, so situated, the parties 
will opt for two principles of justice over other alternatives (most impor-
tantly, utilitarian alternatives). The first principle demands that all citizens 
will be accorded equal basic rights and liberties. The second principle, 
alongside fair equality of opportunity in attaining “offices and positions” 
in society, contains Rawls’ famous difference principle – the demand that 
“social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged” (Rawls, 1999: section 46).
 Though explicitly designed for an idealized, “closed” (Rawls, 1999: 67) 
domestic society, Rawls’ theory seemed to have at least two important 
global parallels. First, some philosophers have argued that global economic 
interdependence generates a global basic structure that is a subject of justice 
in much the same way as the domestic basic structure. Rawls held that the 
major institutions that comprise the domestic basic structure, such as a soci-
ety’s property and legal system, should be the main focus of a theory of 
justice, given their pervasive impact on individuals’ “life prospects, what 
they can expect to be and how well they can hope to do” (Rawls, 1999: 
6–7). Some of Rawls’ main interlocutors have held that the same ought to 
be true, analogously, for global economic institutions. To introduce a key 
example, Thomas Pogge (2003), a prominent Rawls student and one of the 
pioneers of the global justice debate, has considered it simply
undeniable that, today and in the foreseeable future, there is a global 
institutional order that importantly affects the options and incentives 
societies and their rulers face in their relations with one another and 
even affects profoundly the domestic institutions and cultures of espe-
cially the smaller and weaker societies.
(1751–1752)
Liberal global justice and social science  19
According to the ambitious version of this reasoning, if one endorses 
Rawls’ domestic theory, one ought to replicate it globally and endorse a 
global difference principle, holding that global inequalities ought to be 
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the (globally) least 
advantaged (Pogge, 1994). According to the more minimal version (based 
on basic human rights), even if the demands of global justice fall short of a 
global difference principle, substantive duties of justice (rather than mere 
charity) still apply to the global economic order.
 A second important global parallel that Rawls’ interlocutors have drawn 
from his domestic theory concerns the idea of moral arbitrariness. At the 
domestic level, Rawls held that the “veil of ignorance” should prevent the 
distortion of justice by morally arbitrary features – that is, unchosen fea-
tures that are irrelevant to the assessment of agents’ moral worth, such as 
their birth into a certain social class and their natural talents. These fea-
tures reflect nothing but a “natural lottery”, and should therefore not be 
allowed to determine individuals’ income and wealth (Rawls, 1999: 64). 
Charles Beitz (1979), another key figure in the global justice debate, has 
applied this idea to the global level, and argued that the different natural 
resource endowments of different societies, being a paradigmatic example 
of “the natural lottery”, ought not to be allowed to determine societies’ 
income and wealth. Insofar as Rawls (1999) regards “the distribution of 
natural abilities in some respects as a collective asset” (156), Rawlsians 
must similarly regard the global distribution of natural resources as a col-
lective asset, and redistribute these resources in accordance with a global 
difference principle (Beitz, 1979: 137–143).
 The enduring significance of Beitz’s and Pogge’s accounts is interesting 
from the perspective of social science, since both of these accounts seem – 
initially, at least – amenable to social- scientific research. Accordingly, I now 
turn to examine how each of these arguments interacts with social science.
Social science and the natural resource lottery
Let us begin with Beitz’s argument from a “natural resource lottery”, and 
its relation to prevalent political norms regarding natural resource owner-
ship. Sovereign peoples currently claim exclusive original rights to the 
value of natural resources found within their territories, and particularly to 
resources traded as commodities in global markets, from oil through coal 
to diamonds. According to this claim, all revenue from the oil within Can-
ada’s territory, for example, originally belongs to the Canadian people. 
The same claim could be made for every nation in the world: the people 
can legitimately transfer their rights over natural resources to internal or 
external actors, but only they are originally entitled to the value – to all of 
the value – of these resources.
 One way to understand Beitz’s view is to see it as challenging this pre-
valent idea of national ownership in the name of cosmopolitan ownership, 
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according to which the earth’s natural resources are, in some sense that has 
practical significance at present, the common property of humankind: 
“The fact that someone happens to be located advantageously with respect 
to natural resources does not provide a reason why he or she should be 
entitled to exclude others from the benefits that might be derived from 
them” (Beitz, 1979: 138).2 Such exclusion is morally problematic because
some areas are rich in resources, and societies established in such areas 
can be expected to exploit their natural riches and prosper. Other soci-
eties do not fare so well, and despite the best efforts of their members, 
they may attain only a meager level of well- being because of resource- 
scarcities.
(Beitz, 1979: 137)
This thought, in turn, gives rise to a “resource redistribution principle” – 
redistributing natural resource wealth across nations in order to correct the 
accidental fact that “natural resources are distributed unevenly across the 
earth’s surface” (Beitz, 1979: 137). Something like a resource redistribu-
tion principle will only achieve something significant, however, if Beitz’s 
empirical claim is correct – that inequality in natural resource endowments 
is a significant contributor to global economic inequality. In turn, from the 
perspective of liberal normative individualism – that is, a perspective that 
sees only individuals as the ultimate units of moral concern – global 
economic inequality is a moral problem only insofar as it bears on indi-
vidual prospects. This means that for Beitz’s argument to work, it must be 
shown that inequalities in societies’ natural resource endowments are a 
significant contributor to inequalities in the life- prospects of their indi-
vidual members.
 Yet, the problem is that it is in fact extremely hard to show that natural 
resource endowments make such a contribution. Individuals’ life- prospects 
in today’s world are, to be sure, dramatically influenced by their country 
of birth. But there is no evidence suggesting that individuals’ prospects are 
positively correlated with the level of their country’s natural resource 
endowments. In fact, the social science debate regarding societies’ natural 
resource endowments focuses on the exact opposite claim – namely, that a 
negative relationship exists between resource abundance and individual 
prospects. As Leif Wenar (2008) notes, economists have repeatedly found 
that “many countries rich with natural resources are full of very poor 
people” (3). Poverty significantly correlates with natural resource wealth. 
Yet, there is practically no discussion of societal resource abundance as 
causing individual wealth or societal resource scarcity as causing individual 
poverty.
 Those who believe that natural resource abundance tends to cause 
poor economic performance – a ‘resource curse’ – often emphasize two 
dynamics. The first dynamic, which has become known as the ‘Dutch 
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Disease’, concerns the effects of natural resource exports on other sectors 
of a country’s economy. Especially in already- poor countries that rely on 
foreign expertise, capital, and labour to extract resources, natural resource 
extraction does little to advance domestic skills, capital or labour, meaning 
that growth of natural resource exports only rarely has positive ripple 
effects advancing the growth of other parts of the country’s economy. 
However, a growing resource sector does have negative effects on other 
sectors in a way that threatens the economy’s performance. Thus, for 
example, natural resource revenue inflates the country’s exchange rate, 
since it comes in the form of foreign currency. As a result, agricultural and 
industrial imports become more attractive, while the country’s agricultural 
and industrial exports become less competitive. In such ways, a dominant 
natural resource sector can shrink other sectors of the economy, making it 
less diversified, and more dependent on (often volatile) global demand for 
a specific natural resource (Ross, 2012: 48–49). The second dynamic 
emphasized by proponents of the resource curse concerns the fact that 
poverty in resource- rich countries is typically connected to specific patterns 
of authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement. Here the thought is 
that the political and economic destitution of many societies can be traced 
partly to an abundance of natural resources that frees autocrats from the 
need to tax their population, and thus from the need to elicit its 
cooperation or develop the foundations of a viable economy. Instead, not 
shackled by democratic elections and rule of law (Maravall and Przewor-
ski, 2003), resource- rich autocrats can systematically embezzle state 
revenue, buy off or forcibly silence potential or actual opposition, and 
neglect – often intentionally – the modernization and diversification of the 
country’s economy (Ross, 2001).
 The resource curse thesis has critics. However, these critics do not 
emphasize the idea that a positive link necessarily exists between a society’s 
resources and its members’ fortunes. Rather, their focus is quite different. 
A key ingredient of the resource curse connection between political and 
economic outcomes is (arguably) the idea that at least in the long run, 
authoritarianism hinders economic performance in comparison to demo-
cracy. If natural resource wealth harms economic growth, it will frequently 
do so indirectly, by promoting authoritarianism (Gerring et al., 2005: 
336). It is only the last clause – the claim that natural resources necessarily 
promote authoritarianism – that the critics contest. But none of the critics 
focuses on arguing that natural resource abundance necessarily makes a 
contribution (let alone a significant one) to individuals’ economic pro-
spects. Rather, the main argument is that there is no significant link 
between resource endowments and individuals’ prospects: social and polit-
ical institutions are considered far more crucial.
 At this point, a critic might raise the following objection. Even if it is the 
case that social and political institutions are much more significant determi-
nants of economic prospects, it might still be true that, given ‘good’ social 
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and political institutions, a significant increase in natural resources endow-
ments translates into a significant improvement in individuals’ economic 
circumstances (Beitz, 2005). There are several reasons why this objection 
misses the mark, but we can begin with just one. The objection is mislead-
ing in asking how would resource abundance influence individual prospects 
given ‘good’ institutions, since abundant natural resources will frequently 
produce self- reinforcing pressures against having such institutions from the 
outset – or at least, such pressures arise, as many scholars emphasize, if the 
institutions that exist prior to the discovery of natural resources are inimical 
to “accountability and state competence” (Robinson et al., 2006: 450; see 
also Boschini et al., 2007; Haber and Menaldo, 2011). Since in such cir-
cumstances natural resource abundance can cause vicious cycles, perpetu-
ating ‘bad’ institutions, there are many countries with regard to which it 
seems irrelevant to simply assume ‘good’ institutions (Ross, 2012: 1). More-
over, once we focus exclusively on those countries that have favourable 
institutions preceding the discovery of natural resources, this only puts 
further emphasis on how institutions, rather than the morally arbitrary 
endowments of natural resources, are the source of natural resource wealth. 
If social and political institutions are far more crucial determinants of a 
nation’s fortunes than its natural endowments, and if the former in fact 
shape whether the latter are a blessing or a ‘curse’, then the very idea that 
natural resource wealth is morally arbitrary receives a serious blow.
 Finally, the more one emphasizes the decisive economic role of social 
and political institutions, the more one is likely to be sceptical of the claim 
that, setting institutions to one side, significant differences in countries’ 
natural resource endowments translate into significant differences in their 
members’ economic prospects. Not only is there no empirical backing for 
this claim, more fundamentally, it is not clear that such empirical backing 
could ever be provided. This is because it is extremely hard to show that 
abundant natural resources independently yield significant increases in 
citizens’ economic prospects that the ‘proper’ institutions would not have 
obtained even without abundant natural resources. We may be able to see 
well- governed resource- abundant countries putting their natural endow-
ments to good use in increasing the affluence of their citizens. But we 
cannot see – nor can we disprove the possibility – that these countries 
would have been able to similarly increase affluence through development 
of human capital, were they more resource- scarce. And this is a possibility 
that anyone who grants a decisive impact of social and political institu-
tions on economic performance ought to take seriously. Suppose that a 
country with stable, accountable, and transparent institutions discovers 
valuable minerals at time T. Two generations later (T + 50), the ordinary 
citizens of the country are tangibly better off. How can we know whether 
they would not have been just as (or nearly as) better off at T + 50 even if 
no natural resources were discovered at T? How can we disprove the pos-
sibility that the country’s institutions would have led to the development 
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of human capital that would have compensated for the lack of natural 
capital (see also Haber and Menaldo, 2011)?
 In order to assess whether ordinary citizens of a resource- rich country 
with ‘good’ institutions would have indeed achieved a similar level of afflu-
ence even without abundant natural resources, social scientists would need 
to be able to assess what potential sources of revenue that are ‘crowded 
out’ by natural resource rent would come to the fore in its absence. Yet, it 
is far from clear that social scientists can construct reliable models here. 
Consider, for example, the case of Norway. The rise in the living standards 
of the ordinary Norwegian has centrally involved oil revenue, ever since 
Norway discovered oil in the late 1960s. If this rise was only possible due 
to the backdrop of institutions of the right kind, it does not seem implaus-
ible to think that these institutions would have generated a tangible rise in 
affluence even if there was no such resource- abundance – a rise based, as 
in the Japanese case for example, on the development of human capital. 
But it is not clear what social scientists can do to provide reliable answers 
regarding the fate of such a hypothetical Norway.
 This point alerts us to two social- scientific problems that are particu-
larly acute in the context of the global economy – the sheer number of 
potential causal levers involved, and the fact that we are not truly able to 
compare our world as a whole to any other world. Both of these problems, 
I will argue below, have significant implications for global political philo-
sophy. In order to properly set up these problems, however, we need to go 
through an additional stage of our discussion. Having discussed what 
social science can say about Beitz’s notion of a natural resource lottery, I 
now turn to ask what social science can say about Pogge’s notion of a 
global basic structure.
Social science and the global basic structure
Since the beginning of the millennium, Pogge has been using the idea of a 
global basic structure to make the claim that global economic institutions 
ought to prevent the global poor from dropping below the threshold set by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). What makes this 
claim both dramatic and interesting from a social science perspective, 
however, is the nature of Pogge’s concomitant moral accusation. Since the 
1970s, scholars have conceived democracies’ global duties primarily as 
positive duties to help the global poor (e.g. Singer, 1972; Patten, 2005). 
Yet Pogge argues that much before helping, citizens of affluent countries – 
and particularly citizens of affluent democracies through our elected gov-
ernments – are harming the world’s deprived. Through global economic 
institutions, we not merely fail to help but actively contribute to 50,000 
daily deaths from poverty related- causes (Pogge, 2007: 30).
 This provocative claim has left few global justice theorists indifferent. 
Some supporters of Pogge’s views, and even certain critics, have characterized 
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his arguments as “groundbreaking” (Risse, 2005: 9). Others, however, 
insist that it is implausible to attribute to citizens of affluent countries such 
“barbaric” crimes (Cohen 2010: 28). Empirical issues are at the heart of 
the heated ‘Pogge debate’, and these issues will occupy us in a moment. 
Before we turn to them, however, we need to note two things. The first 
concerns the moral significance of the distinction between negative duties 
not to harm and positive duties to help. One reason why Pogge wishes to 
recast the problem of poverty as a matter of negative duties not to harm is 
that doing so prevents conflict between the demand to ameliorate poverty 
and “the grain of the Anglo- American moral and legal tradition, in which 
it is often denied that persons have duties to protect and aid other persons 
in distress” (Pogge, 1989: 34). Another reason, specifically with regard to 
global poverty, is that the negative duties strategy bypasses the dilution 
through distance that afflicts positive duties – that is, the idea that our 
positive duties to help become weaker the more we move “outward”, away 
from our near and dear and to “distant” others (Pogge, 2010: 20–21).
 Second, in order to see why these advantages of negative over positive 
duties depend on empirical considerations, we also need to note Pogge’s 
actual argument connecting negative duties to poverty and global institu-
tions. Pogge begins this argument by claiming that persons have negative 
duties to enact and comply with just institutions, since the full content of 
individual rights and duties cannot be known solely through rules of per-
sonal conduct, apart from institutions. Even if I wish merely to satisfy my 
negative duties not to violate your rights, I cannot do so outside of an insti-
tutional framework specifying what your full rights are and what is there-
fore actually required by my negative duties to respect them (Pogge, 2002: 
137). This, in turn, means that my duty to enact and support just institu-
tions can itself be understood as a negative one. Since we clearly “need 
shared institutions to avoid invading one another’s freedom”, we “have a 
negative duty to comply with such existing institutions, whenever non- 
compliance can succeed only if like non- compliance by others is con-
strained” (Pogge, 2002: 137). Once individuals have a negative rather than 
positive duty towards institutions, they also become right- bearers – and 
therefore also bearers of negative duties to respect rights – by virtue of 
cooperating with others under a shared coercive institutional order (Pogge, 
2002: 64). Pogge believes this institutional understanding of rights and 
correlative duties must be replicated at the global level, among other things 
since he considers it evident, as noted above, that a coercive institutional 
global order exists. Specifically, Pogge sees global organizations, from the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) through the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF ) to the Group of 8 (G8), as the main 
foundations of this institutional order, skewing it in favour of the global 
rich against the global poor, in ways ranging from the rules allocating 
control over natural resources, through regulations of intellectual property 
rights, to “quotas, tariffs, anti- dumping duties, export credits, and huge 
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subsidies to domestic producers [. . .] that poor countries are not permitted, 
or cannot afford, to match” (Pogge, 2007: 44). According to Pogge, global 
institutions limit the poor’s access to UDHR provisions, thus sharing much 
of the blame for the poverty- related death toll that “matches, every three 
years, the entire death toll of World War II, concentration camps and 
gulags included” (Pogge, 2007: 30). Pogge insists that “minor modifica-
tions in the global order that would entail at most slight reductions in the 
incomes of the affluent” (Pogge, 2007: 30, my italics) will suffice to 
generate very different outcomes for the global poor, and secure their 
access to UDHR provisions. Our failure to engage in such reform violates 
our negative institutional duties of justice.
 This background should make clear how Pogge wishes to connect global 
institutions, global poverty, and negative duties. This thesis, however, faces 
two key social- scientific problems, paralleling the issues that were apparent 
in our discussion of the natural resource lottery. The first problem is that 
there is a gap in social- scientific knowledge. Social scientists simply do not 
know enough about the impact that global rules have or might have on 
extreme poverty. Pogge himself, it is important to note, is keenly aware of 
this gap, emphasizing that evidence on the causal role of global institutions 
with regard to global inequality is “sorely lacking today” (2010: 181). 
Indeed, he explicitly sees his arguments as potential motivators for social 
scientists who might address the gap: “One practical aim of my work” as 
he put it recently, “is to stimulate more serious social- science research into 
the impact of global institutional design decisions upon the massive persist-
ence of severe poverty” (Pogge, 2010: 181). However, just as in the case of 
the natural resource lottery, the second problem is that it is not clear that 
social scientists can fill the empirical gaps of the normative argument.
 Pogge’s argument hinges on the question of how extreme poverty would 
have evolved, had different global institutions been in place. Yet it is far 
from clear that social science can assess this huge counterfactual (Risse, 
2005). Arguably, the most important difficulty here is what we might call 
the one world problem. We only have one set of global institutions in place 
at any given time. This means that we cannot compare existing global 
institutions to another set of global institutions while holding everything 
else constant. Pogge is again aware of the issue: “There being only this one 
world to observe, it is hard to obtain solid evidence about how the overall 
incidence of poverty would have evolved differently if this or that global 
factor had been different” (Pogge, 2002: 17). But how to solve the issue 
remains unclear, and in the lack of a solution, we remain unable to make 
confident judgments concerning the causal relationship between global 
institutions and poverty trends.
 We can see this problem at play when we examine specific central issues, 
such as the relationship between global and domestic institutions. Argu-
ably, in order for Pogge’s argument to work, it must be the case that 
reforms in global institutions will significantly increase the likelihood of 
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reforms in poor countries’ domestic institutions. But it is far from obvious 
that this is indeed the case. In an essay titled ‘Philosophy, Social Science, 
Global Poverty’, Joshua Cohen (2010), for example, insists that there is 
“no reason to accept the claim” that
changes in global rules would suffice to lift most of the terrible poverty 
that so many people suffer from. In particular, I see no case for the 
claim that such changes will suffice holding domestic institutions fixed, 
and no reason to think that they will suffice by changing incentives 
and opportunities in ways that induce poverty- alleviating changes in 
domestic institutions.
(20–21)3
My point here, however, is not to endorse Cohen’s criticism as such. 
Rather, I merely wish to point out that it is extremely difficult for social 
science to construct reliable models that will support either Cohen’s pess-
imism or Pogge’s optimism regarding the causal force of global institu-
tions. The enormous number of potentially confounding factors involved 
in the global economy poses structural difficulties towards creating such 
models.
 More specifically, the combination between the one world problem and 
the ever- growing complexity of the global economy yields at least three 
obstacles to social- scientific analysis, all of which are evident when we ask 
how global institutions impact domestic ones. First, even if we could be 
confident that certain global institutions have a negative impact on the 
domestic institutions of poor countries, it is very hard to assess their rel-
ative weight in comparison to many other likely causes. Thus, for example, 
many global dynamics that are in principle independent of global institu-
tions, and are not always completely amenable to institutional interven-
tions (such as dramatic fluctuations in the supply and demand for certain 
valuable commodities), can themselves be a significant cause of institu-
tional crises in poor countries. Yet it is hard to assess their relative weight 
in comparison to global institutional factors.
 Second, and very much related, global institutional reforms necessarily 
interact with an extraordinary number of causal levers, which in turn 
interact amongst themselves in unknown and potentially undesirable ways. 
This makes the effects of global institutional changes extremely difficult to 
predict.
 Finally, all of these problems are compounded by the fact that not only 
existing global institutions might be novel: certain proposals for global 
reforms might be even more novel – indeed, unprecedented. One of Pogge’s 
reform proposals, for instance, involves ending the ability of odious 
regimes to borrow funds and sell natural resources in their peoples’ 
name (Pogge, 2005). This proposal (which will also occupy us below) in 
effect requires an extraordinary number of countries – all of the world’s 
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democracies – to sanction a very large number of regimes. Predicting what 
would be the result of such reform is extremely difficult not only because 
of the number of factors that might be involved, but also because such a 
global policy has never been carried out before: We have even less com-
parative evidence to work with in such a case than we do in other global 
contexts. The combination of one world, multiple factors, and unpreced-
ented change is especially difficult for social scientists to assess.
What ought to be done? Reform under uncertainty
All of this brings us to a practical question, which applies both to Beitz’s 
proposal of global resource redistribution and to Pogge’s charge of global 
harm: What ought global justice theorists to do when they not only lack 
social- scientific evidence that seems necessary to motivate certain reforms, 
but also face serious obstacles in attaining such evidence?
 One answer that may initially seem appealing is that global justice theo-
rists should retain the reform proposals that suffer from social- scientific 
uncertainty. The thought here would be that it is worthwhile to pursue 
some reforms even given deep uncertainty, whether because of the mere 
chance that they would achieve important gains for the world’s poor and 
oppressed or because of the hope that these reforms would be worthwhile 
even if their benefits were limited. Thus, for instance, even if a global redis-
tribution of natural resource wealth, or reform of the WTO, will not 
achieve much by way of combating global poverty, it would still achieve 
something.
 I do not wish to deny that this strategy will make sense in some cases. 
But we should be cognizant of its important limitations. One limitation 
concerns, again, the distinctive structural circumstances of global politics, 
and specifically the structural problem of global collective action. In the 
enduring lack of a global sovereign, no state can have assurance that other 
states will join it in undertaking reforms meant to improve the condition of 
the world’s poor and oppressed. This structural fact makes the deep uncer-
tainty regarding the impact of many global reforms particularly burden-
some, since it allows each state to excuse itself from initiating collective 
action. This is true even where there is reasonable certainty that joint efforts 
by multiple states will actually achieve important moral aims. Even under 
such happy circumstances, each state may try to exempt itself from initiat-
ing collective action – from leading by example – by claiming that, lacking 
credible commitment from other states, its solitary sacrifice would be inef-
fective. But when there is deep social- scientific uncertainty as to whether 
important moral aims will be realized even in the best- case scenario of full 
cooperation by a critical mass of states, it is especially easy for each state to 
provide moral excuses for its refusal to take action (Nili, 2014).
 Moreover, alongside the issue of global collective action, there is also 
the matter of opportunity costs. Because there are always opportunity costs 
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to prioritizing any given reform proposal over others, the mere hope that 
some reform might have limited benefits for the world’s poor and 
oppressed is often not a sufficiently compelling empirical foundation on 
which to base a normative call for political action. In such a case, the 
normative political theorist (at least one who is practically inclined) is 
better off shifting focus elsewhere, to discuss moral principles related to 
different potential reforms that have a greater chance of making a tangible 
real world impact. Furthermore, a strategy that settles on the hope for 
limited global gains ignores not only practical but, for lack of a better 
term, ideational opportunity costs. There are ideational opportunity costs 
involved in pushing for reforms that rely on certain moral principles if 
other potential reforms that rely on conflicting principles can be more 
effective.
 To make these claims (especially the latter) concrete, consider the con-
flicting moral principles underlying, on the one hand, Beitz’s proposal for a 
global redistribution of natural resource wealth, and on the other hand, 
the various proposals made in recent years to end the essentially neocolo-
nial practice under which dictators enjoy customary rights to sell their 
state’s natural resources to any willing buyer (Pogge, 2002: Chapter 6; 
Nili, 2011a, 2011b; Wenar, 2011). There are clearly conflicting normative 
principles at play here: The reform of dictators’ “resource privilege” 
(Pogge, 2001) emphasizes the idea of national ownership over natural 
resources, an idea that the Beitzian argument wishes to undermine. The 
key thought underlying recent philosophical discussions of dictators’ 
trading privileges is that a state’s resources belong to its people rather than 
to rulers, and that dictators (and corporations) who are transacting in state 
resources without obtaining proper consent from their people are therefore 
violating national property rights. Rather than contrasting the claim of 
national ownership with the claims of humanity as a whole, reform of dic-
tators’ trading privileges focuses on the contrast between the claims of 
sovereign peoples and the claims of those who wield effective political 
power. Insofar as the grounding rationales for these two proposals are in 
tension with one another, pursuing a global redistribution of natural 
resource wealth has a clear philosophical opportunity cost in undermining 
the normative case for national resource reform.
 In light of these difficulties, I would like to propose, in lieu of a conclu-
sion, an alternative normative strategy for dealing with the structural 
uncertainty of global social science. This strategy sees the problems of 
global social science as an important reason to examine normative argu-
ments for global reform that are far more independent of empirical and 
predictive uncertainty. These arguments, in turn, focus on self- referring 
moral reasons that liberal polities have against entanglement in certain 
foreign practices.
 Two examples should suffice to give a sense of what such self- referring 
reasons can look like. First, consider the divestment of almost all liberal 
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democracies from Apartheid, culminating in the late 1980s. Divestment 
could have been justified through consequentialist reasoning, as a way to 
precipitate the collapse of the regime. But it is difficult to prove that Apart-
heid would not have collapsed at about the same time as it actually did, 
even if the regime were less isolated (as was desired, for example, by the 
Reagan administration preaching “constructive engagement”) (Waldmeir, 
1997). This difficulty provides a further reason to examine an alternative, 
self- referring moral perspective on disengagement from Apartheid. One 
might argue that liberal democracies had moral reasons pertaining to their 
own integrity to divest from a blatantly racist regime, independently of the 
social- scientific question as to whether divestment would be effective in 
precipitating Apartheid’s demise.
 A second example has to do, once more, with dictators’ resource privi-
lege. One way to see an end to dictators’ ability to sell their peoples’ 
natural resources is simply as a means to destabilize dictators’ grip on 
power. But this perspective once again brings us to extremely complex 
social- scientific questions, such as whether even a wide- scale boycott of 
dictators’ resource exports can indeed be effective in weakening them, 
instead of simply producing ‘rallying behind the flag’, and imposing costs 
primarily on the population, as the sanctions literature often warns. A self- 
referring perspective, however, would emphasize the thought that demo-
cracies have a principled reason to end their own complicity in dictators’ 
theft of their peoples’ resources, independently of the social- scientific 
uncertainty over whether doing so will also destabilize the regime. One 
could argue that even if political and economic circumstances in most 
dictatorships will remain the same as a result of liberal democracies pro-
hibiting natural resource transactions, such a prohibition would still be 
morally required, just as ending colonialism would have been morally 
required even if one could not prove that doing so would make the victims 
of colonialism better off (Ypi, 2013). To prevent misunderstanding, I 
should emphasize that taking seriously such principled reasons for global 
reform does not mean adopting an indifference towards the consequences 
of reform. Rather, the claim is that such reasons warrant independent 
attention: that the moral reasons for global reform are not exhausted by 
consequentialist considerations.
 There are likely to be normative theorists who will find even this 
moderate approach to be overly self- absorbed and too removed from the 
practical needs of the world’s poor and oppressed. But this likelihood only 
makes it all the more necessary to debate the normative questions that self- 
referring moral arguments trigger. It is important, in particular, to discuss 
the way in which a society’s global conduct may or may not derive from 
‘moral duties to itself ’, from its own integrity, or ‘clean hands’.
 Global justice theorists have yet to undertake such a discussion. Recog-
nition of the deep limitations of global reforms dependent on (structurally 
limited) social science should provide an important reason to pursue it. 
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It is worthwhile, in turn, to note both some of the practical pay- offs that 
will arise if the discussion will vindicate self- referring reforms, and the new 
kinds of normative questions that will have to take centre- stage in this 
discussion.
 One important practical pay- off of self- referring global reforms is their 
dissolving of the aforementioned collective action problems endemic to 
international politics. Hinging reform of dictators’ trading privileges, for 
instance, on the ability to destabilize them, also means making such reform 
dependent on successful collective action by multiple boycotting countries. 
If the goal is to destabilize the dictatorships basing their rule on natural 
resource revenue, each state can exempt itself from any duty to take soli-
tary action by claiming ineffective sacrifice – pointing out that the moral 
gains from such action will be miniscule unless others join, but the cost (in 
terms of lost access to valuable resources) will be significant. Furthermore, 
were that state to act alone, it will only incur absolute and relative costs in 
relation to its competitors (Pogge, 2002: Chapter 5). Yet, when reform of 
dictators’ trading privileges is justified through a prohibition on complicity 
in theft, such collective action excuses disappear. To take the analogy, 
one’s duty not to steal from the person next door, for example, holds inde-
pendently of the possibility that other neighbours will be stealing from that 
person (even if these neighbours are also competitors) as well as of the pos-
sibility that one’s clean hands will not alter the neighbourhood’s overall 
condition.
 These advantages may still not convince those philosophers who have 
very strong intuitions against self- referring moral concerns. However, with 
normative political philosophy as with empirical social science, mere intu-
ition is not enough. An actual in- depth discussion is necessary, and such 
discussion will have to cover multiple sets of questions.
 One set of questions has to do with whether and why there is a differ-
ence in the moral force of self- referring moral reasons in different contexts. 
For instance, if, as I suspect is the case, many philosophers would be 
willing to concede that liberal democracies had a duty to divest from 
Apartheid for the sake of their own moral integrity, but far fewer philo-
sophers will say the same about a duty to disengage from kleptocrats, what 
argument can justify this difference?
 Another set of questions has to do with the relationship between per-
sonal and political morality. Philosophers who resist ‘clean hands’ global 
reforms will be hard- pressed to deny that when the agent in question is an 
individual person, the duty not to steal a victim’s property, for example, is 
independent of what other agents do. What, then, (if anything) is different 
when the property belongs to a people and is effectively stolen by a corpo-
ration colluding with a dictator in a process legalized by a state? If my 
claims here have been cogent, then such questions should receive far more 
attention from global political philosophers.
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Notes
1 This essay is a revised and abbreviated version of an article from the Review of 
International Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2016). Thanks to Thad Dunning, Shan Ge, 
Lisa Herzog, Thomas Pogge, Michael Ross, and Ian Shapiro for comments and 
discussions. Thanks also to three anonymous RIS reviewers for helpful and gen-
erous feedback. Finally, I am particularly grateful to Elisabeth Wood and to 
participants at her comparative politics seminar at Yale for excellent critiques – 
especially Consuelo Amat Matus, Alyssa Battistoni, Natasha Chichilnisky- Heal, 
Elizabeth Krontiris, and Paul Linden- Retek.
2 I am assuming here that Beitz has in mind, primarily if not solely, extractable 
natural resources.
3 Among other things, Cohen and Pogge provide radically conflicting estimates as 
to how much the elimination of protectionist trade barriers will (by itself, inde-
pendently of other structural changes) benefit the global poor (Cohen, 2010: 27; 
Pogge, 2010: 182–184).
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Current notions of fairness and justice in resource politics are mainly influ-
enced by liberal political philosophy. Such ideas adopt a Rawlsian under-
standing of distributive justice so as to develop a liberal cosmopolitan 
framework (Wapner, 1997; Beitz, 1999; Pogge, 2001, 2008; Held, 2002; 
Hayward, 2006; Nili, in this volume). This liberal approach conceptualizes 
resource production, distribution, and consumption as a global challenge 
and calls for the redistribution of natural resources based on an abstract 
moral justice ‘compass’ (Nili, in this volume). While such a framework 
supports the redistribution of natural resources from a global egalitarian 
perspective, it lacks an adequate conceptualization of the specific political- 
economic and socio- cultural relations that characterize the current patterns 
of access, control, and distribution of natural resources. In other words, a 
liberal framework fails to link global justice principles with power rela-
tions, inequalities, and concrete socio- ecological conflicts.
 Based on a political ecology perspective, this chapter develops a multi-
dimensional conception of resource justice – that is, socio- ecological justice 
– that explicitly incorporates power relations and inequalities in the access 
to and distribution of nature and natural resources on different scales. 
Accordingly, such a conception explicitly stresses political dimensions of 
socio- ecological justice and links them to claims for a democratization of 
societal nature relations (gesellschaftliche Naturverhältnisse). In doing so, 
the chapter reverses the line of argument from abstract moral justice prin-
ciples to socio- ecological conflicts as a starting point for resource justice.
 As a heterogeneous and interdisciplinary research field, political ecology 
analyses the appropriation and control of natural resources (e.g. land, 
water) and links them to social configurations and power relations. Socio- 
ecological conflicts, then, evolve from unequal power relations and injus-
tices that constitute the access to and control over resources (Bryant and 
Bailey, 1997: 38–39). So far, political ecology has rather implicitly than 
explicitly referred to principles and dimensions of justice and democracy 
(Bryant and Jarosz, 2004; for activist debates on environmental justice, see 
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Schlosberg, 2004). I argue that a conceptualization of socio- ecological 
justice benefits from a link to democracy theories that – like political 
ecology research – emanate from conflict and contestation, therefore expli-
citly highlighting political dimensions of socio- ecological justice that 
exceed mere distributional aspects. In line with radical democracy theories 
(e.g. Chantal Mouffe, Jacques Rancière), I understand democracy not 
necessarily as a form of government with a specific set of criteria and indic-
ators (e.g. elections, rule of law, and division of powers) but as an eman-
cipatory process that builds on the historical genesis of social struggles. 
With regard to the control of natural resources, socio- ecological conflicts 
emphasize the challenge of existing societal nature relations based on 
enclosure, valorization, and a shrinking of the public sphere. Emanating 
from such a conflict- oriented, yet limited, perspective with regard to the 
specific qualitative relation between justice and democracy, I further elabo-
rate on political dimensions for rearranging societal nature relations. These 
dimensions evolve both from social movements and activism as well as 
political theory.
 The chapter proceeds as follows: The next section critically examines 
the assumptions of liberal global justice, and is followed by a section intro-
ducing political ecology. The understanding gained from these discussions 
helps to develop an understanding of socio- ecological conflicts that serves 
as a point of reference for the subsequent elaboration in the third section 
on democratizing societal nature relations. The fourth section, then, links 
socio- ecological conflicts to a conflictual understanding of democracy, 
which paves the way for an elaboration on some explicit political dimen-
sions of socio- ecological justice in the final section.
Challenging moral assumptions of liberal global justice
The cosmopolitan liberal framework to global justice emanates from a 
Rawlsian theory of justice (Nili, in this volume). From a moral contractar-
ian perspective, Rawls’ theory is based on two principles. The equal rights 
principle demands “equal basic liberties” for all citizens (Rawls, [1971] 
2003: 53) and the difference principle postulates that “social and economic 
equalities are to be arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged” (Rawls, [1971] 2003: 266). Based on these basic and 
abstract principles, a number of liberal philosophers have applied this 
moral theory of justice to both the global sphere and the distribution of 
natural resources and environmental risks.
 Charles Beitz ([1979] 1999) points to the uneven and morally arbitrary 
distribution of natural resources over the earth’s surface that resembles a 
natural resource lottery. Accordingly, he calls for the global redistribution 
of these resources “that would give each society a fair chance to develop 
just political institutions and an economy capable of satisfying its members 
basic needs” (141). Based on these moral concerns for justice, the approach 
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argues for an increase in foreign aid as a means for redistributive justice 
(Beitz, [1979] 1999: 172).
 Emanating from similar assumptions, Thomas Pogge (2001, 2008) con-
demns affluent countries as mainly responsible for world poverty and the 
unequal distribution of natural resources. International organizations like 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF ), or the G7 reproduce the unequal distribution of natural resources 
and impose inequality on less- affluent countries (Pogge, 2001: 61). Accord-
ingly, global institutional reform based on moral grounds is seen as a 
pressing means for global justice. As minor changes in the structure of the 
world order with modest economic losses for wealthier countries would 
already have substantial effects on poverty reduction and global justice, 
Pogge suggests a Global Resource Dividend (GRD), so that “those who 
make more extensive use of our planet’s resources should compensate 
those who, involuntarily, use very little” (Pogge, 2001: 66).
 Drawing on ecological economics, Tim Hayward (2006) uses the 
concept of ecological space to account not only for the unequal distribu-
tion of natural resources but for “all human interactions with the natural 
world – our use of resources and our environmental impacts” (359). Fol-
lowing global footprint calculations, he demands “globally equal per 
capita right to ecological space” (Hayward, 2006: 368) to be recognized, 
and calls – similarly to Pogge – for a global fund to redistribute the eco-
nomic benefits derived from excessive natural resource use.
 These conceptions of global justice share the following assumptions: 
First, a liberal global justice perspective suggests an ahistorical and uni-
versal ‘compass’ for global justice without addressing the genesis of 
resource injustices. Such injustices are linked to geopolitical constellations, 
colonial legacies, and globally uneven capitalist expansion, all of which 
call for a historicized perspective on justice principles. Second, liberal 
global justice focuses mainly on abstract distributional aspects of justice at 
the expense of other, more political dimensions. Accordingly, the concrete 
conflicts and struggles, power asymmetries and relations of inequality as 
well as the competing notions of justice disappear from the research scope. 
Third, cosmopolitan liberalism traces the reason for an unequal and unjust 
distribution of nature and natural resources back to unfair institutions, 
and lacks a more complex understanding of the socio- economic and polit-
ical relations that constitute unequal resource appropriation and control. 
Furthermore, it does not provide a social scientific conceptualization of the 
role of (state) institutions for the control of natural resources. Fourth, the 
proposals for institutional reform and political strategy prioritize global, 
cosmopolitan institutions at the expense of more local or regional ones. At 
the same time, they neglect the interplay of different scales that may be 
explanatory for the obstacles and blockades of global institutional reform. 
Fifth, liberal global justice principles are based on individuals rather than 
on states, communities, or social groups. Accordingly, these analyses and 
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suggestions disregard collective and therefore more political justice claims 
(e.g. of indigenous peoples, affected communities, workers, peasants) that 
exceed individual entitlements.
 To summarize, cosmopolitan liberalism fails to relate global justice to 
unequal power relations and the political- economic patterns of current 
resource politics. In other words, while “theories of distributive justice 
offer models and procedures by which distribution may be improved, none 
of them thoroughly examine the social, cultural, symbolic, and institu-
tional conditions underlying poor distributions in the first place” (Schlos-
berg, 2004: 518). Taking these conditions into account, I propose a 
conceptual understanding of justice that, instead of emanating from 
abstract and universal philosophical principles of justice, is founded upon 
concrete socio- ecological conflicts. A political ecology approach such as 
this highlights the political rather than the moral dimension of current 
socio- ecological conflicts and traces it to patterns of access to and control 
over nature and natural resources.
 The following section briefly introduces the research field of political 
ecology and develops an understanding of socio- ecological conflicts that 
serves as a point of reference for the subsequent discussion on political and 
democratic dimensions of socio- ecological justice.
Political ecology, power relations, and socio- ecological 
conflicts
The basic tenets of political ecology highlight the socio- economic and 
political reasons for unequal resource distribution and the ecological crisis, 
and link them to unequal power relations that foster socio- ecological con-
flicts. Rather than focusing solely on apolitical and moral assumptions to 
lead (global) natural resource distribution, the heterogeneous research per-
spective shares an understanding of a reciprocal relationship between 
society and nature that “encompasses the shifting dialectic between society 
and land- based resources, and also within classes and groups within society 
itself ” (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 17). Political ecology analyses the 
appropriation of nature and natural resources as an explicitly political 
process that is linked to social relations of ownership and control 
(Neumann, 2005: 6). In capitalist societal nature relations, the accumula-
tion of capital is a major driver of this appropriation process. In this 
context, the valorization of nature conceptualizes the complex process of 
enclosure that incorporates commonly held natural resources into the capi-
talist mode of production, and subsequently enables the accumulation of 
capital (Görg, 2004; Pichler, 2015: 511). This process of “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Harvey, 2005) draws boundaries around nature and territ-
ories, assigns ownership rights, defines the utilization of natural resources, 
and excludes actors with competing claims from these territories (Altvater, 
1993; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Brad et al., 2015: 101). The starting 
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point for political ecology research, then, is “the appropriation of nature 
that is necessarily historical [. . .] and social (the appropriation of Nature is 
determined by social relations, particularly relations of ownership and 
control)” (Peluso and Watts, 2001: 27).
 The complex process of resource appropriation and valorization is linked 
to power relations associated with the distribution of nature and natural 
resources. Based on Bryant and Bailey (1997), I conceptualize power as the 
“ability of an actor to control” (39) the access to nature and natural 
resources as well as the access of other actors to these resources. Power is, 
then, the control that one person, social group, or state has over the access 
to nature and natural resources of another person, social group, or state – 
both in material (e.g. control of access to land, natural resources, and 
environmental risks) and symbolic terms (e.g. control of access to knowledge 
systems, and environmental discourses) (Bryant and Bailey, 1997: 39–42).
 Power asymmetries associated with the appropriation of nature and 
natural resources foster socio- ecological conflicts to reclaim access and 
control over these resources (Hall et al., 2011: 170–171).2 According to 
Matthew Turner (2004), publicly expressed – compared to latent – socio- 
ecological conflicts serve “as important moments when underlying struc-
tures of power and real interests are most revealed” (864). The focus on 
conflicts, then, offers a conceptual starting point to elaborate on an under-
standing of justice that encompasses real world resource politics and the 
power relations associated with these politics.
 From these basic assumptions, political ecology researchers have 
developed complementary conceptions of socio- ecological conflicts. In 
general terms, Turner (2004) associates “resource- related conflict [. . .] with 
both struggles to gain access to natural resources and struggles resulting 
from the use of natural resources” (864). Joan Martínez-Alier (2002: 70) 
describes the very field of political ecology as the study of ecological distri-
bution conflicts: that is, conflicts over the distribution of environmental 
resources and/or services. From a postcolonial political ecology perspective, 
Arturo Escobar (2006) draws on this definition and highlights the eco-
nomic, ecological, and cultural dimension of such distribution conflicts, 
incorporating not only economic distribution but also the neglect of ecolo-
gical processes outside monetary terms and cultural domination. Together, 
these approaches show that socio- ecological conflicts combine both 
material (e.g. struggles over the redistribution of land) and symbolic 
dimensions (e.g. struggles over the cultural meaning of land) of resource 
appropriation and are mainly concerned with the unjust distribution of 
ecological benefits and risks. Injustice, from this perspective, however, does 
not refer to a universal understanding of justice. Rather, different notions 
of justice often compete with each other in concrete socio- ecological con-
flicts: that is, the very definition of justice is at stake.
 These conceptions mostly refer to power relations and different dimen-
sions of socio- ecological conflicts but neglect the institutional dimension 
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of resource appropriation and control. In recent years, critical scholars, 
mainly in the context of the German- language debate on ‘societal nature 
relations’ (gesellschaftliche Naturverhältnisse), have combined political 
ecology with critical reflections on the role of the state in the appropria-
tion and control of nature and natural resources (Brand et al., 2010; 
Brand and Wissen, 2012; Pichler, 2015). This research has shown that 
processes of valorization and accumulation depend on the materialization 
of (state) institutions and authorities. According to critical state theory 
and hegemony theory, (state) institutions are social relations that ‘con-
dense’ power relations and conflicts regarding the appropriation, distribu-
tion, and control of land and natural resources in state structures and 
processes, that is, in laws, regulations, administrative procedures, or 
everyday practices. Conflicting interests materialize in (state) institutions 
through state strategies that are bundled in hegemonic projects (Gramsci, 
1971; Poulantzas, [1978] 2000; Jessop, 1990: 268). In hegemonic pro-
jects, particular groups of actors are able to generalize their particular 
interests (e.g. exclusive use of natural resources through ownership rights) 
and embed them in institutional structures and processes. This generaliza-
tion of interests is not necessarily enacted through coercion but through 
consensus, which means that the particular interests of a dominant group 
are accepted by the majority of other social groups (Gramsci, 1971: 161, 
see also Schmitt, in this volume). Hegemonic projects therefore require 
alliances between dominant groups (e.g. extractive industries) and sub-
altern groups (e.g. local communities, miners, plantation workers, indi-
genous peoples) as well as (material) concessions to (partially) meet the 
interests of the latter. These (material) concessions evolve from justice 
claims in the course of specific socio- ecological conflicts and may include, 
for example, the increase of wages, compensation for environmental 
harm, or the provision of social infrastructure such as housing, health 
care, and education.
 Socio- ecological conflicts allow for the challenge and transformation of 
hegemonic relations and the rupture of institutions. However, the argu-
ments illustrated above show that conflicts take place in or are structured 
through given constellations of power that are reflected through (state) 
institutions and practices, and that pre- structure the possibilities and con-
ditions for justice claims in socio- ecological conflicts. Accordingly, Brand 
(2010) distinguishes conflicts within a hegemonic constellation and con-
flicts over a hegemonic project. Based on this distinction, many current 
socio- ecological conflicts evolve around material concessions within a 
given hegemonic constellation (e.g. compensation for past environmental 
and social harm, increase in wages, see Coni- Zimmer et al., in this volume) 
but do not tackle the very basis of unequal appropriation, distribution, and 
control of natural resources (see Schmitt, in this volume).
 In sum, “Political ecology provides tools for thinking about the conflicts 
and struggles engendered by the forms of access to and control over 
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resources” (Peluso and Watts, 2001: 24–25). (State) institutions support 
these unequal social relations but also provide a terrain to fight for altern-
ative societal nature relations. Based on these political ecology assump-
tions, I start to converge from a moral universal (global) justice framework 
to more political dimensions of socio- ecological justice in linking conflict-
ing societal nature relations to democratization processes.
Socio- ecological conflicts and democratization
Democracy is a contested term. Commonly accepted (static) perspectives 
conceptualize democracy as a form of government comprising, among 
other things, regular elections, division of powers, and the rule of law. 
More process- oriented models of democracy, in turn, emphasize the 
process of decision making and focus on the role of democratic institutions 
and the emergence of a public sphere. Deliberative democracy, for 
example, highlights discussion and dialogue as the foundational principles 
that lead to reasonable consensus and agreed- upon policies (Young, 2000: 
21–25; Eckersley, 2004: 115–119). Whereas the consensual idea of delib-
erative democracy reveals important dimensions of justice (e.g. inclusion, 
political equality, and social learning), the above elaborated reflections on 
the contested access to and control over natural resources and the associ-
ated socio- ecological conflicts imply an equally conflict- oriented starting 
point for the conception of democracy:
In a society where there are social group differences and significant 
injustice, democratic politics ought to be a process of struggle. [. . .] 
Because disadvantaged and excluded sectors cannot wait for the 
process to become fair, because there are often so many contending 
interests and issues, oppressed and disadvantaged groups have no 
alternative but to struggle for greater justice under conditions of 
inequality.
(Young, 2000: 50)
A number of political theorists (e.g. Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mouffe) 
have elaborated on such a conflict- oriented and radical understanding of 
democracy. In the following, I refer to these theories and link them to the 
appropriation of nature and the analysis of socio- ecological conflicts.3
 Against defining democracy as a form of society or government, Jacques 
Rancière (1999, 2009) conceptualizes democracy as a process of contesta-
tion through distinguishing between the police and politics. Police encom-
pass the existing order of things, that is, “the organization of powers, the 
distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distri-
bution” (Rancière, 1999: 28). Politics, in contrast, is associated with the 
disruption of this existing order and the struggle of those people and places 
that claim a share in the order of things:
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As soon as governments are obliged to represent themselves as 
instances of the common of the community, separated from the sole 
logic of relations of authority immanent to the reproduction of the 
social body, there is a public sphere, which is a sphere of encounters 
and conflicts between two opposed logics of police and politics. [. . .] 
The spontaneous practices of any government tend to shrink this 
public sphere, making it into its own private affair and, in so doing, 
relegating the interventions and sites of intervention of non- State 
actors to the private domain. Democracy, then, far from being the 
form of life of individuals dedicated to their private pleasure, is a 
process of struggle against this privatization, the process of enlarging 
this sphere.
(Rancière, 2009: 55)
Democracy (a term which Rancière mostly uses synonymously with pol-
itics) describes the enlargement of the public sphere and includes both the 
“recognition, as equals and as political subjects” of those that have had no 
part, and “the recognition of the public character of types of spaces and 
relations that were left to the discretion of the power of wealth” (Rancière, 
2009: 55).
 Applied to societal nature relations in general and natural resource pol-
itics more specifically, such a conceptualization of democracy refers to 
both the recognition of marginalized people and those outside the public 
sphere of conflict (e.g. indigenous people, peasants, landless, urban poor, 
and workers) as well as to the reopening of places (e.g. territories and 
natural resources subject to enclosure, valorization, and accumulation pro-
cesses) for public contestation and democratic negotiation.
 In a similar tradition, feminist scholar Val Plumwood (1995: 155–156) 
links the process of shrinking the public sphere and the failure to equally 
address issues of natural resources and the environment to a dualism of 
both public/private and nature/reason in liberal democracies. These separa-
tions exclude the household and the economy, as well as other people and 
places associated with ‘nature’, from political contestation. The political 
sphere is confined to a narrow set of social relations that leaves questions 
of justice in resource access and control to the private sphere of the market. 
Radical democracy, in turn,
would tend in the opposite direction, to maximise the recognition of 
political relationships and subjects and to recognise the plurality and 
pervasiveness of power relationships [. . .], as appearing for example in 
the sphere of gender relationships, in the household, in economic 
areas, in formations of knowledge, culture and identity, and in rela-
tionships with nature and animals.
(Plumwood, 1995: 156)
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With reference to Gramscian hegemony theory, Chantal Mouffe and 
Ernesto Laclau (1985) also introduce democracy as a struggle for the 
extension of the political into more areas of the social, emanating from a 
conflictual democratic framework. In her conception of the political, 
Mouffe (1993) explicitly criticizes Rawls’ conception of justice for not 
taking into account the conflictual nature of politics and democracy that 
lead to a moral instead of a political conception of justice:
Conflicts, antagonisms, relations of power, forms of subordination and 
repression simply disappear and we are faced with a typically liberal 
vision of a plurality of interests [. . .]. To think politics in terms of 
moral language, as Rawls does, necessarily leads to neglect of the role 
played by conflict, power and interest.
(Mouffe, 1993: 49)
Accordingly, Mouffe’s (2013) conception of democracy departs from the 
existing order of things that “is always the expression of a particular 
configuration of power relations” (2) and of what is deemed ‘natural’ in 
a certain period of time. Such a hegemonic order, however, is contested 
and the political indicates the “dimension of antagonism”, that is, the 
terrain of political contestation and conflict essential for politics (Mouffe, 
2013: 2). Democracy, then, is “the confrontation between conflicting hege-
monic projects” (Mouffe, 2013: 17) that try to change the existing order 
and establish an alternative hegemony. Like Rancière, Mouffe directs her 
attention to the disruptive moment of politics as a major factor of demo-
cratic politics that “require[s] making a choice between conflicting altern-
atives” (2013: 3).
 Explicitly elaborating on the relationship between democracy and socio- 
ecological conflicts, Erik Swyngedouw (2009) also draws on a conflict- 
oriented conception of democracy. Democracy arises when, “in the name 
of equality, those who are not equally included in the existing socio- 
political order, demand their ‘right to equality’ ”, disrupt the given order of 
societal nature relations, and claim a share in the ordering of things (Swyn-
gedouw, 2009: 606). In democratic struggles and conflicts, the marginal-
ized and excluded reject the given arrangements of ownership and control 
over nature and natural resources and claim a say in the reordering of 
these relations. Democracy, then, refers to a terrain for expressing socio- 
ecological conflicts, “for nurturing agonistic debate and disagreement, and, 
most importantly, for the naming of different possible socio- environmental 
futures” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 229).
 A radical democracy perspective on socio- ecological justice emanates 
from specific conflicts that challenge existing societal nature relations and 
call for a rearrangement of these relations in the course of an alternative 
hegemonic project (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985), based on a more just and 
equal access to nature and natural resources. Such a conflict- oriented 
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perspective on democracy can be substantiated with the above- mentioned 
political ecology perspective on the role of accumulation and valorization 
processes as well as (state) institutions for hegemonic projects. Accord-
ingly, a radical democracy perspective on socio- ecological justice exceeds 
conflicts within the current hegemonic constellation of resource enclosure 
and valorization. Rather, it draws attention to conflicts that both challenge 
the root causes of current societal nature relations and demand a demo-
cratic control of nature and natural resources as well as the establishment 
of alternative institutions to enable this.
 To start from such a conflict- oriented framework reveals a more realis-
tic and political perspective on socio- ecological justice. At the same time, 
however, radical democracy as a mere challenge to existing relations of 
access to and control over nature runs the danger of focusing solely on 
deconstruction and contestation without elaborating more specifically on 
some substantial political dimensions for democratically rearranging soci-
etal nature relations.
Political dimensions of socio- ecological justice
The following section develops some political dimensions of socio- 
ecological justice with explicit focus on aspects of democratization. In 
doing so, I refer both to claims from social movements that deal with the 
appropriation of nature and natural resources as well as insights from 
political and democracy theory. The illustrations of the social movements 
literature deal with the activist concepts of environmental justice and food 
sovereignty.
 Historically, the environmental justice movement emerged in the 1970s 
from the struggles against the unequal distribution of environmental risks 
(through the location of polluting industries and the dumping of toxic 
waste) to mainly black and poor neighbourhoods in the United States. 
Now- infamous examples and widely accepted origins for the movement 
include the dumping of toxic waste in Love Canal and a hazardous landfill 
in Warren County (Bullard, 1990; Schlosberg, 2003). The subsequently 
emerging antitoxics movement and the movement against environmental 
racism made a scandal of the disproportionate share of environmental risk 
that poor African- Americans were confronted with, and called for distri-
butional justice, mainly through legal means (Schlosberg, 2003).
 In recent years, activists and scholars have widened the urban and US- 
centred focus of the environmental justice movement to include global 
dimensions of justice (e.g. the discourse on climate justice) as well as socio- 
ecological conflicts in rural areas, mainly in the Global South. For example, 
Stallworthy (2009) elaborates on the global environmental justice implica-
tions of climate change and discusses multijurisdictional aspects of climate 
justice. Lohmann (2008) calls for climate justice against the background of 
the failure of carbon trading, and diverse networks around the world take 
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climate justice to the streets and demand real changes in climate policies 
(Ende Gelände, 2015; Global Justice Ecology Project, 2015). Middleton 
(2012) also transcends the national scale and analyses the transnational 
dimensions of distributional and procedural environmental justice in 
energy trade between Laos and Thailand. The EJOLT project, in turn, has 
compiled a large database, including an atlas of environmental justice con-
flicts around the world, to systematize the common roots of diverse local 
environmental distribution conflicts (http://ejatlas.org/). Challenging the 
human- centred focus of the debate, Low and Gleeson (1998) differentiate 
between environmental justice and ecological justice to include non- human 
nature in the equation. Whereas environmental justice refers to the fair dis-
tribution of nature and natural resources among humans, ecological justice 
extends the question of justice to non- human nature. The ‘Universal Decla-
ration of the Rights of Mother Earth’ (2010), for example, incorporates 
such an ecological justice concept.
 Referencing the link between democracy and justice, environmental 
justice conceptions inspired by political ecology are not only concerned 
with distributional justice and the rule of law but likewise emphasize 
the political dimension of justice, referring to recognition and self- 
determination as major principles of justice:
Justice, to these movements, is not just simply about categorizing 
environmental goods, or debating whether they should be included in 
a calculus of distributive justice, rather, at issue is the preservation of a 
way of life that relates to nature in a particular way. It is self- 
determination that is most often raised here.
(Schlosberg, 2004: 529)
Whereas redistribution of environmental goods and bads has been a major 
concern, activists realized that such a redistribution “will simply not 
happen without a broader cultural recognition of the victims of environ-
mental injustice and their inclusion in problem solving and policymaking” 
(Schlosberg, 2003: 94, italics added).
 Similarly to environmental justice, the food sovereignty movement has 
evolved from diverse and transnational socio- ecological struggles for self- 
determination, with a specific focus on food production and agricultural 
politics (Patel, 2005, 2009; Wittman et al., 2010; Ehlert and Voßemer, 
2015). The movement has critically assessed the food security approach 
proposed by UN organizations that has accompanied globalized and 
corporate food production and led to both the dispossession of peasants 
and other small- scale food producers as well as to the environmental 
destruction of livelihoods. The international peasant movement La Vía 
Campesina is the leading protagonist of the food sovereignty network and 
calls for the sovereign control of land, water, seeds, and natural resources 
(Vía Campesina, 1996). According to the movement, food sovereignty is 
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“directly linked to democracy and justice” (Vía Campesina 1996, cited in 
Wittman et al., 2010: 3) as it challenges power politics and structural 
inequalities in the production and distribution of food and agricultural 
resources:
Critically, the definition of food security avoided discussing the social 
control of the food system. As far as the terms of food security go, it is 
entirely possible for people to be food secure in prison or under a 
dictatorship. [. . .] The first exposition of food sovereignty recognised 
this ab initio, that the power politics of the food system needed very 
explicitly to feature in the discussion.
(Patel, 2009: 665, italics added)
Although the concept remains unclear about the actual sovereign subject 
(nation states, communities, people, household) (Patel, 2005: 81–82), the 
food sovereignty movement stresses – similarly to environmental justice – 
the social control over nature and natural resources instead of mere distri-
butional dimensions that can too easily end up in authoritarian resource 
distribution without any attempt for democratic control.
 Both the environmental justice and food sovereignty movement have 
evolved from the politicization of day- to-day conflicts over the access and 
control of natural resources and environmental risks. At the same time, 
these political concepts entered academic discourses and benefited from an 
exchange between research and activism. In the following, I discuss some 
political dimensions of socio- ecological justice that have emerged from 
political and democracy theory (Young, 1997; Schlosberg, 2003, 2004; 
Baumgärtner et al., 2006; Fraser, 2010; Petersen and Schiller, 2011; 
Tronto, 2013; see also Coni- Zimmer et al. and Schmitt, in this volume). 
Apart from distributional aspects, these include (1) the dimension of polit-
ical representation, decision making or participation, (2) the dimension of 
cultural recognition or cultural meaning, and (3) the relational dimension 
of responsibility. Alongside the discussion of this democratic extension to 
justice, I also reflect on the scalar dimensions of socio- ecological justice 
and the interplay of different scales.
 Political representation refers to the intrinsic link between democracy 
and justice and comprises both the ‘who’ and ‘how’ of socio- ecological 
justice. It therefore establishes the arena for the inclusion or exclusion in a 
political community and sets the rules and procedures for democratic 
contestation (Fraser, 2010: 16–18). In qualifying political injustice, Fraser 
distinguishes between misrepresentation and misframing (2010: 18–21). 
Whereas both dimensions exclude people from their right to democratic 
self- determination, the latter specifically elaborates on the spatial mismatch 
between those who democratically control rules and procedures and those 
who are affected by them. This ‘deeper form’ of misrepresentation is espe-
cially visible in globalization processes that distribute people and resources 
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around the world without any adequate arena for democratic control 
outside the frame of the nation state:
Increasingly subject to contestation, the Keynesian- Westphalian frame 
is now considered by many to be a major vehicle of injustice, as it par-
titions political space in ways that block many who are poor and 
despised from challenging the forces that oppress them. Channeling 
their claims into the domestic political spaces of relatively powerless, if 
not wholly failed, states, this frame insulates offshore powers from cri-
tique and control. Among those shielded from the reach of justice are 
more powerful predator states and transnational private power, 
including foreign investors and creditors, international currency specu-
lators, and transnational corporations. Also protected are the govern-
ance structures of the global economy, which set exploitative terms of 
interaction and then exempt them from democratic control.
(Fraser, 2010: 20)
In line with liberal global justice, such a transnational perspective on socio-
 ecological justice challenges the nation state as the arena of political repres-
entation. However, instead of proposing a universal global justice 
‘compass’ that lacks any chance of realization, a politically and demo-
cratically oriented conception of justice derives from particular trans-
national conflicts. According to Robyn Eckersley (2004), an ecological 
democracy approach to justice starts from local socio- ecological attach-
ments to improve the conditions for democratic control over nature and 
natural resources,
yet it is impossible to arrest the growing gap between those who 
generate ecological problems and those who suffer the consequences, 
along with the increasing dis- embeddedness brought about by the pro-
cesses of economic globalization, without developing sympathetic 
solidarity with environmental victims wherever they may be located.
(Eckersley, 2004: 190)
A multidimensional perspective on justice therefore claims the “practical 
negotiation of principles in tension in response to particular transnational 
problems, rather than a priori” (Eckersley, 2004: 192). That is, trans-
national justice departs from concrete local, national or transnational 
socio- ecological conflicts and cases of injustice to struggle for more 
democratic and sovereign international relations to preclude abstract 
models of transnational distribution that too easily link with colonial and 
imperial trajectories of resource exploitation and control.
 Besides political representation, cultural recognition refers to the recog-
nition of identity and difference (e.g. culturally diverse modes of living) as 
a precondition for socio- ecological justice and the actual representation of 
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people in decision- making procedures (Young, 1997: 153; Schlosberg, 
2004; Fraser, 2010: 16). Against liberal justice principles that only refer to 
individual prospects as a basis for the evaluation of (economic) inequal-
ities, recognition is concerned with both individuals and social groups 
(Young, 1990: 42–48; Schlosberg, 2004: 522). Cultural recognition chal-
lenges universalization claims of specific social groups related to historical 
trajectories of colonial domination and cultural imperialism, and demands 
the recognition of alternative forms of knowledge, economics, and value 
systems (Young, 1990: 58–60). With regard to the appropriation and 
control of nature and natural resources, the recognition of particular social 
groups (e.g. indigenous peoples or peasants) and their respective cultural 
practices, forms of knowledge, and ways of living (e.g. customary land 
rights, shifting cultivation, subsistence farming) has proven to be of utmost 
importance (Schlosberg, 2004).
 The dimension of responsibility adds an explicitly reciprocal category – 
between humans as well as between humans and nature – to the demo-
cratic dimensions of socio- ecological justice. In conceptualizing the link 
between care and democracy, feminist scholar Joan Tronto (2013) stresses 
responsibility as a foundational pillar of justice to balance the reciprocal 
principles of autonomy and dependency in social interactions (31). 
Whereas normative ideas of responsibility – especially in moral philosophy 
– describe responsibility as an individual and, eventually, voluntary and 
altruistic disposition vis- à-vis other individuals, an explicitly political con-
ception of responsibility insists on the a priori relations among people in 
social life. That is, responsibility is “by nature relational, existing in the 
relationships among people [and between society and nature] rather than 
in individuals themselves” (Tronto, 2013: 50). A political reading of 
responsibility therefore stresses the “power allocation in exchanges about 
responsibility” (Tronto, 2013: 55). To add responsibility to a multidimen-
sional conception of socio- ecological justice is to highlight the dependence 
between society and nature and to ask the basic democratic question of 
‘Who is responsible for deciding on what?’ Responsible politics, then, 
require specifying “who will participate in the decision- making process” 
(Toronto, 2013: 57) and “what people will decide when they come 
together to allocate responsibility” (Toronto, 2013: 59), that is, what is 
actually open for political contestation. The latter question links respons-
ibility to the abovementioned feminist critique of minimizing the public 
sphere through the exclusion of substantial domains of responsibility 
allocation (e.g. household, market, transnational sphere) from democratic 
contestation and control. Therefore, socio- ecological justice is about politi-
cally challenging unequally allocated responsibilities (e.g. environmental 
risks to future generations, pollution sites to marginalized people in the 
Global South) and about democratically negotiating responsibilities – 
between people, social groups, and states as well as in relation to nature 
and natural resources – in specific socio- ecological conflicts.
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 To sum up, a multidimensional conception of socio- ecological justice 
has to highlight the political and specifically democratic dimensions of 
self- determination and equality in the access to and control over nature 
and natural resources. This requires the recognition of diverse modes of 
living, the inclusion in and the control over decision- making power and 
problem- solving (that require representation), and the democratic alloca-
tion of responsibility to challenge the existing order, enlarge the public 
sphere, and only then enable the redistribution of nature and natural 
resources – among humans, social groups, and states. These struggles 
for  democratic societal nature relations can, however, only evolve from 
socio- ecological conflicts on different scales that challenge historically 
evolved injustices and envision alternative and democratic socio- ecological 
futures.
Conclusion
Against a liberal framework of (global) justice, I have developed a multi-
dimensional conception of justice that emanates from socio- ecological con-
flicts over the appropriation of nature and natural resources. “Justice, from 
this perspective, disappears from the terrain of the moral and enters the 
space of the political under the name of equality” (Swyngedouw, 2009: 
605). Socio- ecological conflicts arise from the unequal access to and 
control over nature, and the exclusion of people and places from demo-
cratic control. Based on conflict- oriented democracy theories, I have argued 
that socio- ecological conflicts serve as a means for justice as they challenge 
the existing order of things – that is, the distribution and position of people 
and resources – and point to alternative socio- ecological futures.
 With reference to the identified gaps and weaknesses of liberal global 
justice, a political ecology perspective on fairness and justice contributes to 
a focus on the political and democratic dimensions of socio- ecological 
justice that stress power relations and inequalities. First, the departure 
from specific socio- ecological conflicts challenges an ahistorical and 
abstract justice perspective. Second, the focus on democratically challeng-
ing existing societal nature relations emphasizes political dimensions of 
socio- ecological justice in addition to mere distributional aspects. These 
evolve from the combined and contested democratic principles of self- 
determination and equality that comprise the recognition of marginalized 
people and places, the sovereign control of decision- making processes, 
and the democratic allocation of responsibilities. Third, a political ecology 
perspective on resource conflicts develops a comprehensive and historical 
understanding of (state) institutions based on complex socio- economic 
processes of enclosure and accumulation that materialize in state strategies 
and hegemonic projects. Fourth, the elaborated socio- ecological justice 
conception questions the a priori location of justice claims on the global 
level even though natural resource flows and environmental crises 
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phenomena definitely transcend existing borders. Rather, justice is founded 
upon concrete transnational realities and conflicts to struggle for more 
democratic and sovereign international relations that are cautious of repro-
ducing colonial and imperial trajectories of foreign resource control. Fifth, 
the elaborated conception of justice not only locates justice claims and 
entitlements with individuals but includes social groups as important 
claimants of injustice based, for example, on class, gender, race, or 
ethnicity.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Brigitte Bargetz, Ulrich Brand, and Tobias Boos for valu-
able feedback on an earlier version of the manuscript. I also appreciate the com-
ments from two reviewers of the chapter.
2 The term socio- ecological conflict highlights the complexity of dimensions at 
stake in conflicts over nature and natural resources and indicates that such con-
flicts always encompass, if only implicitly, the distribution of social and environ-
mental concerns.
3 As in other democracy theories, socio- ecological concerns have been of negligible 
importance for existing conceptualizations of radical democracy.
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4 Social costs and resource creation
Essential elements of a political 




The concept of sustainable development has been popularized since the 
late 1980s as a way of synthesizing the seemingly juxtaposed exigencies of 
socio- economic development and protection of the natural environment 
(WCED, 1987). However, the debate on how to implement models of 
socio- economic development while safeguarding the stability of eco- 
systems for current and future generations has remained highly controver-
sial and essentially unresolved (for an overview see Jacobs, 1999). The 
global ecological situation has worsened considerably since the Rio Summit 
in 1992, which was heralded by many – both in governments and civil 
society – as the beginning of the era of global environmental governance. 
The climate crisis has become much more acute, biodiversity loss has accel-
erated, and the exploitation of natural resources has substantially intensi-
fied, the latter caused by increasing demand from industrialized and, more 
recently, also high- growth emerging countries (see Dittrich et al., 2012). 
Against this background, the debate on how to reconcile socio- economic 
development with the ecological integrity of the planet has become more 
polarized. While with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2015, the concept of 
sustainable development has on paper become the guiding principle for the 
international development agenda of the coming decade, the trade- off 
between economic development and ecological sustainability has not been 
addressed, as indeed no consensus exists how to reconcile economic devel-
opment with environmental protection.
 Two poles have emerged in the recent debate on environmental sustain-
ability: one calling for a socio- ecological transformation towards a 
degrowth society (see Jackson, 2009), and the other believing in the pos-
sibility of ‘greening’ capitalism or ‘ecological modernization’ via the mone-
tization of nature and technological innovation without necessarily 
abandoning economic growth (Mol et al., 2009). Under the latter 
approach, the path towards ecological modernization is portrayed as a 
technical process supported by sound science and effective economic 
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policy- making. Socio- ecological conflicts are typically seen as temporary 
and solvable via monetary compensation, the main impetus needed is 
determined political leadership by governments (e.g. OECD, 2011; UNEP, 
2011). Against this, governments in the Global South stress their right to 
development and, hence, the priority of economic growth over environ-
mental protection. The responsibility of implementing policies against 
climate change and other threats to the integrity of ecosystems is passed to 
industrialized countries, since the current state of environmental problems 
is attributed to the development trajectories of the industrialized countries 
during the last 200 years. Here again, environmental protection is implic-
itly understood as essentially a technical problem that can be resolved with 
appropriate policies.
 In contrast, I shall argue in the remainder of this chapter that at the core 
of this debate lies a fundamental societal conflict – not just of short- term 
benefits and costs, but of modes of production and consumption. On the 
one hand, there is a conflict between actors in the Global North and South 
who argue in favour of continuing a growth- oriented development trajec-
tory – complemented by selective environmental policies – and those that 
reject the idea of ‘greening’ capitalism and aim at breaking with the growth 
paradigm and establishing alternative economic and social models that 
reconcile human life with natural limits. On the other hand, there is a con-
flict within the ‘developmentalist camp’, that is, between social actors and 
governments in the Global North, who aim at maintaining the “imperial 
mode of living” of the advanced industrialized countries (Brand and 
Wissen, 2012), and actors in the Global South, particularly in the emerging 
economics, who strive towards levels of material welfare akin to the 
advanced industrialized countries by way of high- growth late development 
trajectories. With limited planetary resources, access to resources in order 
to maintain and pursue high growth trajectories becomes a matter of com-
petition. Under these conditions, conceptions of what constitutes fairness 
in terms of access and utilization of resources is not straightforward, since 
all actors typically refer to some a priori plausible normative claims.
 In this chapter I, first, give an overview of the debate on socio- economic 
development and environmental protection, juxtaposing environmentalist 
and developmentalist approaches that are both legitimated with normative 
claims. The profound differences between these approaches are the main 
reasons for the limited progress in international environmental politics. I 
challenge the discussion from a fairness perspective, as both perspectives 
tend to shy away from explicitly discussing lines of conflict at different 
levels which crucially impact on fairness outcomes. I proceed by, second, 
introducing an alternative framework for resource fairness based on the 
work of Nancy Fraser. Third, this framework is adapted for the purpose of 
resources with the help of two concepts from institutional economics 
in order to account for the peculiar qualities of resource extraction. 
These concepts are Karl William Kapp’s notion of social costs and Erich 
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Zimmermann’s functional theory of resources. In the conclusion, I finalize 
the discussion by making suggestions on what would constitute steps 
towards a fairer distribution of the benefits and costs of resource extrac-
tion from the perspective of political economy. For matters of simplifica-
tion, I follow Rawls (1958) in using the terms ‘fairness’ and ‘justice’ 
interchangeably.
The debate on socio- economic development and 
environmental protection
In the polarized debate on reconciling socio- economic development with 
environmental protection, two main poles have emerged. The one calls for 
a re- politicization of environmentalism and aims at a socio- ecological 
transformation towards alternative forms of post- capitalist societies (e.g. 
degrowth (Jackson, 2009); buen vivir (Acosta, 2015); solidarity economy 
(Miller, 2010)), based on models of development that steadily reduce their 
absolute intake of materials and energy and, concomitantly, their emissions 
and wastes. This would entail the establishment of different and more sus-
tainable production models, a return to local and/or regional production 
and consumption systems, and the development of alternative consump-
tion norms (Kallis et al., 2012; Kallis, 2015). The other pole believes in the 
possibility of ‘greening’ capitalism via the monetization of nature and 
technological innovation that is expected to dramatically increase energy 
and material efficiency. Here, the free market system as well as economic 
globalization is considered necessary for and compatible with economic 
growth (OECD, 2011; UNEP, 2011).
 Based on these lines of thought, environmentalists argue that the eco-
nomic development model of the Global North has to drastically change 
and should not be repeated by the countries of the Global South, as this 
would overstretch the ecological capacities of planet Earth, both in terms 
of natural resources needed as inputs to production processes and in terms 
of the absorption capacities of ecosystems. Nonetheless, some authors 
concede that in many countries of the Global South which are still plagued 
by high levels of extreme poverty, living standards and material well- being 
need to be increased, which entails some increase in economic production 
and, inevitably, environmental degradation. They further argue that 
degrowth in the Global North is not only an imperative, but can also 
provide ecological space in the Global South by, for instance, reducing 
destructive resource extraction by transnational corporations, leaving 
room for alternative cosmovisions and practices in the South (Kallis, 
2015).
 Proponents of the ‘green economy’ stress the importance of improving 
energy and resource efficiency by advances in technology. They call for 
market- based solutions to environmental problems, for instance, through 
the monetization of nature, and argue in favour of the promotion of 
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research and innovation policies in order to facilitate a model of develop-
ment that is less resource intensive and environmentally damaging than 
previous processes of economic production and consumption but retains 
the principal focus on improving material well- being via economic growth 
(UNIDO, 2015). These lines of arguments are met with criticism and 
resistance, respectively. Governments in the Global South, particularly in 
emerging economies, stress their right to development. Hence, environmen-
talist degrowth positions are mostly brushed aside as disguised Northern 
protectionism by Southern governments, whereas the proposals for a 
‘green economy’ are challenged by requests for additional funding and 
technology transfer. Needless to say, industrialized countries’ willingness 
to supply such funding has been notoriously low (Climate Change News, 
2015).
 In most cases, the right to development boils down to introducing and 
promoting a model of late capitalist development. While country- specific 
models differ with respect to sector specializations and policy orientations, 
the general prime objective is to achieve high rates of economic growth, 
hence, mimicking the prevailing growth orientation of industrialized coun-
tries. Obviously, this orientation has implications in terms of requirements 
for material and energetic inputs, atmospheric pollution, and, thus, 
environmental costs. Unsurprisingly, the rapid economic development of 
the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) over the 
last 20 years has substantially increased global demand for raw materials 
and energy. In consequence, commodity- exporting countries have seen 
their revenues soar with prices reaching new heights at international com-
modity markets during the 2000s, although more recently prices have 
fallen again substantially. However, it is far from clear whether this – and 
earlier – resource bonanzas have contributed to sustainable economic 
development (see Staritz et al., in this volume). For sure, these develop-
ments have triggered responses from the European Union (EU) and other 
industrialized countries. For fear of losing out, in particular to China, the 
EU and other industrialized countries have formulated raw material strat-
egies, which seek to maintain access to cheap raw material supplies for 
their respective manufacturing industries (Küblböck, 2014).
 With political priorities firmly based on economic development, any 
international responsibilities for safeguarding the environment are usually 
rejected by the governments of emerging and developing countries. The 
basic ethical argument is that developmental imperatives carry a higher 
social weight in situations of extreme poverty than any environmental con-
siderations. Frequently, this line of argument is accompanied by the suspi-
cion that environmental causes are raised by Western interests in order to 
stymie the economic development of the Global South so as to maintain 
exploitative centre–periphery relationships. If there exists any responsib-
ility for global environmental issues, it rested with the industrialized 
countries, as global environmental degradation is overwhelmingly the 
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by- product of the latter’s model of economic development during the last 
200 years. This argument is supported by the work of social movements 
and critical scholars, who have argued that the economic development 
model in the capitalist centres has been based on relations of unequal eco-
logical exchange (Bunker, 1985; Hornborg, 2011) and has resulted in eco-
logical debt vis- à-vis the peripheral countries of the Global South (Acción 
Ecológica, 1999; Goeminne and Paredis, 2010).
 This struggle between environmentalism and developmentalism is taking 
place within a shifting international context, which as a tendency is weak-
ening established mechanisms of global governance. The international gov-
ernance architecture built up under US hegemony since World War II is in 
a process of decline. The global governance euphoria of the 1990s has 
given way to a more sober recognition of the dawn of a multipolar world 
order, where political interests have become more heterogeneous and a 
new geopolitics of at least partial rivalry for spheres of influence, if not 
hegemony, is unfolding (Raza, 2010). The main new actors are large 
emerging national states, with the BRICS countries and China in particular 
taking a leading role. But second- tier powers like Turkey and Indonesia 
have also increased their international economic and political influence. 
Those emerging economies are essentially adopting models of state- led 
capitalism, with a marked emphasis on nationalistic discourses and, often, 
state repression. The legitimizing basis of the respective political classes in 
these countries rests on the promise of rapid increases in the material 
welfare of its populations and, particularly, its incipient urban middle- 
classes. As policies of redistribution of wealth and income are usually 
strongly contested and difficult to implement, the focus is on high eco-
nomic growth. Not dissimilar from some industrialized countries, espe-
cially the US, these emerging countries are very sceptical of binding 
themselves to international commitments, which impede their ability to 
pursue precisely these pro- growth policies. This represents a primary 
explanation as to why progress in international environmental, and, in 
particular, climate policies has become so protracted during the last 15 
years, the recent conclusion of a climate accord in Paris in December 2015 
notwithstanding. A similar situation characterizes other multilateral fora 
like the World Trade Organization (Raza, 2010). The latter are less and 
less able to impose conditions of Northern hegemonic powers upon the 
Global South, but are confronted with resistance and strong articulation of 
interests of new emerging powers. Concomitantly, other forms of inter-
national cooperation have emerged recently. These are marked by a higher 
degree of informality, like the G20, and are characterized by variable insti-
tutional geometries, for example, bilateral and regional trade agreements 
like the Trans- Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). A third variant of new international organ-
izations is set up under the leadership of emerging powers, particularly 
China, such as the BRICS Bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment.
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 Consequently, normative approaches like cosmopolitan liberalism (see 
Nili, in this volume; Pogge, 2001; Pogge and Barry, 2006), which advance 
global principles of justice with regard to natural resources, find it difficult 
to implement these principles for lack of appropriate global governance 
mechanisms. Instead, they are confronted with a situation where diverse 
actors – for example, Northern as well as Southern environmentalists, 
green growth optimists, pro- growth developmentalists – refer to normative 
claims as well as human rights principles in order to legitimize their per-
spective. While Northern as well as Southern environmentalists cite the 
rights of future generations and the rights of nature, respectively, in order 
to contest the legitimacy of a universalized model of capitalist develop-
ment, or contrariwise of ‘green’ capitalism, Southern (as well as Northern) 
developmentalists refer to individual as well as collective social and eco-
nomic rights of, essentially, present generation people(s) in order to defend 
their focus on high- growth strategies. Apparently, though perhaps to 
varying degrees, all sides acknowledge that economic development has 
environmental repercussions, at the national as well as international level. 
However, the question of who has to bear the responsibility for avoiding 
and/or mitigating this environmental burden remains severely contested.
 Thus, we are trapped in a situation, where all sides hold claims based 
on normative grounds, which are all legitimate and ethically defendable. I 
argue that if my outline of the general debate is accurate, then a political 
solution based on an exchange of normative arguments will not be 
reached, since all sides are convinced of the validity of their respective posi-
tions. However, I argue that the dualistic accounts of Northern versus 
Southern interests, and developmental versus environmental positions, 
respectively, turn a blind eye to more intricate, but crucial, aspects of the 
debate on resource fairness. These relate in particular to (1) the distribu-
tion of the social and environmental costs and benefits of resource extrac-
tion at the local level, traditionally side- lined by developmentalism, (2) the 
distribution of benefits and costs of resource exploitation and resource- 
based development at the national level, traditionally neglected by environ-
mentalism, as well as (3) the institutional architecture of resource politics, 
and in particular commodity trade, at the international level, often not 
properly accounted for by either environmentalists or developmentalists. 
Hence, we need a reframing of our analytical approach which allows us to 
focus on these neglected dimensions of resource fairness and which tran-
scends the usual Westphalian territorial framework.
An outline of an alternative framework for resource fairness
In the latest exposition of her theory of justice, Fraser (2010) rightly pro-
ceeds from the fundamental insight that any system of justice is by its very 
nature governed by institutions, both at the subnational, national, and 
international level. Thus, any approach to fairness cannot be restricted to 
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the national level as has been common under the Keynesian–Westphalian 
state system, which reserves the discussion of issues of justice to the 
members of the respective national polity. The framing of justice thus 
needs to consider fairness at various territorial scales. Hence, the debate 
about justice cannot stop at treating the usual substantive questions about 
the ‘what’ of justice, but needs to concern itself with “second- order, meta- 
level questions” (Fraser, 2010: 15) concerning the frame of justice, that is, 
questions that deal with the ‘who’ and the ‘how’ of justice.
 Furthermore, although fairness in the economic sphere is centred on 
questions of economic redistribution, that is, under which circumstances 
groups and individuals enjoy particular entitlements to the results of eco-
nomic production, Fraser (2010) points to two other dimensions of justice. 
The first is recognition, that is, the question whether economic, ethnic, reli-
gious, or gender status lead to discrimination with regard to the recogni-
tion of rights in society. In the context of resource politics, the rights of 
local communities (e.g. indigenous populations) are a case in point. The 
second dimension refers to representation, that is, whether the rights of 
particular individuals or groups are represented in the polity. This could 
refer to persons without full citizenship rights that are thus not allowed to 
participate in decision making even though they are affected by national 
regulations. The denial of political rights to migrants in the host country is 
an obvious example of such misframing. Related to resource extraction 
activities, fairness of representation refers to affected people being (un)able 
to participate in respective decision- making processes. Another case in 
point are the obligations that a parent company (and its executive manage-
ment) might hold under national law vis- à-vis the operations of its subsidi-
aries in third countries. Such issues of extraterritorial obligations have been 
neglected for a long time, and only more recently been debated (Amnesty 
International, 2014; Saage- Maß, 2014).
 Thus, by applying Fraser’s three- dimensional conceptualization of 
justice, we are able to develop a justice framework at various territorial 
scales. The two guiding principles for a democratic process of re- framing 
are the “all- affected” and the “parity of participation” principles (Fraser, 
2010). While the first principle states that all those individuals and groups 
that are affected by a measure or activity should be entitled to participate 
in the collective decision process, the second principle posits that there 
must not be any discrimination between the affected parties with regard to 
their rights of participation and co- decision. While the usual modes of 
justice in the Westphalian state system are centred upon both the national 
level and the question of redistribution, the resource challenge involves the 
local, the national, and the international level, and is also based upon 
the misrecognition as well as the misrepresentation of certain actors in 
institutional arrangements which are decisive in determining the distribu-
tion of benefits and costs of resource appropriation. Thus, it is of para-
mount importance that institutional arrangements are assessed against the 
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benchmark of whether they attribute parity of participation to all those 
individuals or groups that are affected by an activity or measure. Instead 
of taking the national setting with its established procedures for granted, a 
concept of justice in the current conjuncture needs to problematize pre-
cisely this conventional wisdom and asks who should be treated as a 
subject of justice in a given situation, and at which scale a process of 
justice should be located so as to safeguard a fair treatment of all the 
stakes involved (see also Pichler, in this volume, for a further elaboration 
of Fraser’s concept of justice).
 At the local level, fairness with regard to resource exploitation refers in 
particular to the distribution of social and environmental costs and benefits 
that resource extraction confers upon the local population, which often 
involves issues of misrecognition and misrepresentation. For example, the cul-
tural specificity of indigenous communities, that is, their particular cosmo-
vision and social relations to nature, might not be recognized by a government 
or company for fear of representing an obstacle to resource exploitation that 
cannot be made commensurable by way of ordinary means of economic 
redistribution. The lack of representation of local communities might effect-
ively foreclose any proper process of negotiation with government or the cor-
porate sector. In addition, interests might not be homogenous among local 
communities, with the capacities of some sub- groups or individuals to parti-
cipate in decision- making processes curtailed by lack of resources or of social 
status (see Schmitt, in this volume). Thus, adequate representation and recog-
nition depend on appropriate processes of economic, social, and political 
empowerment of disadvantaged sub- groups of a local community.
 At the national level, fairness refers to the distribution of the benefits 
and costs of resource exploitation among the national population at large 
– for example, in how far the social costs are compensated by the polluters, 
or the extent to which benefits are shared by the general public via taxa-
tion and redistribution mechanisms and/or by maximizing the value added 
and the employment of resource- based production through creating eco-
nomic linkages, respectively (see Buur and Monjane, in this volume). 
Again, issues of misrecognition and misrepresentation might render any 
settlement biased – for instance, in the case that local and regional com-
munities are underrepresented in the political system at the national level, 
or in the case that minorities are denied appropriate cultural autonomy, 
which constrains their legal rights to participate in political processes.
 At the international level, fairness refers to how value- addition and rent-
 sharing are organized along the international value chain. This is governed 
by both transnational corporations, which define the structure of the value-
 chain from extraction to processing and marketization, and institutional 
arrangements such as trade and investment policies, regulation of inter-
national commodity markets, and the intellectual property rights regime. 
These arrangements determine (1) the conditions of access to and utiliza-
tion of resource deposits, (2) the trading and pricing of commodities and 
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the allocation of risk with regard to price fluctuations, and (3) the terms 
under which technological knowledge for resource extraction and process-
ing is made available. Again, questions of misrepresentation play an 
important role at this level. For instance, do those affected by the opera-
tions of international commodity exchanges, such as small- scale miners or 
farmers, have a stake in the formulation of the terms and procedures upon 
which these exchanges operate (see Staritz et al., in this volume)?
Two extensions of a concept of resource fairness
The particular heuristic value of Fraser’s concept lies in three basic fea-
tures: (1) its emphasis on the multi- scalar nature of any concept of justice 
in the present conjuncture, (2) the insistence on the three dimensions of 
justice (redistribution, recognition, representation), and (3) the radical 
democratic proposition that all those affected by a measure/activity ought 
to have the right to participate in political processes on a par with social 
peers. In this section, I aim at extending the conceptual framework by two 
elements. First, I discuss if the economic value of resources is correctly 
evaluated by the market, by referring to a line of thought originating in the 
work of institutional economist Karl William Kapp and his notion of social 
costs. Second, I problematize the notion of resources, as it is convention-
ally used in most discussions, even in critical social science, by referring to 
the work of Erich Zimmermann and Clarence Ayres.
Social costs as an intrinsic feature of capitalist accumulation
Kapp (1950), being one of the early institutional economists who took an 
active interest in environmental concerns, is best known for his work on 
social costs, which differs fundamentally from the mainstream treatment of 
social costs in welfare economics. For Kapp (1950), it was obvious that the
political history of the last 150 years can be interpreted as a revolt of 
large masses of people (including small business) against social costs. It 
is doubtless true that the steady increase of protective social legisla-
tion, the enforcement of minimum standards of health and efficiency, 
the prohibition of destructive practices in many fields of production, 
the concern with air and water pollution, or even the efforts of 
farmers, businessmen and labor to peg the prices of products and ser-
vices, reflect, at least in part, an attempt to restrain destructive 
methods of production and exploitation of resources.
(Kapp, 1950: 15)
Thus, the notion of social costs includes what we would consider the 
environmental costs of production. However, far from being a rare by- 
product or ‘externality’ of economic processes, as economic orthodoxy 
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would like to make us believe, Kapp considered social costs an integral 
component of every economic process in capitalism:
In so far as social costs are the result of the minimization of the 
internal costs of the firm it is possible to regard the whole process as 
evidence of a redistribution of income. By shifting part of the costs of 
production to third persons or to the community at large producers 
are able to appropriate a larger share of the national product than they 
would otherwise be able to do.
(Kapp, 1950: 15)
Thus, every economic process changes the distribution of benefits and costs 
between the affected parties, and it is in the active interest of the private 
enterprise to shift as many negative effects as possible upon the general 
public. Consequently, “the fact that problems of social costs raise issues of 
income redistribution makes them matters of political economy and polit-
ical power” (Kapp, 1950: 15). An important implication of this line of rea-
soning is of course that market prices are never ‘correct’ in the sense of 
neoclassical theory, that is, a pure reflection of supply and demand con-
ditions. Prices are always the outcome of a process of social and political 
struggle, where the distribution of power and resources ultimately con-
ditions price- setting. Markets are thus institutional phenomena, a proper 
understanding of which necessitates an analysis of the typically asymmetri-
cal constellation of social forces and interests of parties involved in and 
meeting on markets (see also the more recent institutionalist literature, e.g. 
Hodgson, 1988, 1998).
 Kapp was quite sceptical as to whether one could fully internalize 
social costs into market prices, as welfare economics propose (the classic 
reference is Pigou, 1920). Such an internalization would imply a capacity 
to correctly monetize all the present and future social costs of a produc-
tive activity, which in the face of fundamental uncertainty and cultural 
dependency of all valuation is usually not possible (Heidenreich, 2006). 
Thus, there are no easy technical fixes to the problem of social costs. 
Instead, decisions about any economic activity, including, for example, 
the decision to exploit a particular natural resource, are by necessity prob-
lems of social choice. They depend not only on a proper analysis of the 
likely social benefits and costs of that activity, but need a process of polit-
ical deliberation. Here Fraser’s framework is of particular value, as it pro-
vides criteria against which to assess the fairness of this respective political 
process.
 The extent to which it will be possible to internalize social and environ-
mental costs into commodity prices thus largely depends on the relation of 
social forces at various scales. At the local level, affected communities 
might demand mitigation measures or social investments from companies 
in order to compensate for the loss of economic opportunities. Depending 
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on its negotiating position, at the national level the government might 
charge royalties or demand other benefits including technology transfer 
from extractive companies, the deployment of which might then contribute 
to mitigating social costs or increase long- term economic benefits. Social 
costs, however, might not necessarily be compensable by monetary pay-
ments, but grounded in basic social rights, which make them incommen-
surable with monetary compensation. Kapp recognized that such situations 
demand more radical solutions. In the case of resources, such a situation 
might emerge if, for instance, an extractive site happens to bear religious 
value for a local community. In such circumstances, other solutions (e.g. 
abstention from the exploitation of the resource in that particular place) 
might have to be found. Similarly, in such a situation, issues of Fraserian 
re- framing might emerge. It might be argued that national sovereignty over 
resources might not have precedence over the rights of indigenous people 
to a particular territory to which they attribute a sacred status. Such con-
flicts might not be readily solvable at all, but lead to an impasse, as has 
been the case with the resistance of the U’wa people in Colombia against 
the extraction of oil in their territory. This and many other resource con-
flicts are mapped in the Environmental Justice Atlas (Ejolt, n.d.).
 At the international level, another important mechanism to determine 
the extent to which social costs are accounted for in price- setting are com-
modity derivative markets. These constitute the central pricing mechanism 
for international commodity trade, in particular, the leading commodity 
exchanges in Europe and the US. Pricing significantly depends on the insti-
tutional configuration of these markets. Terms of access to these markets, 
the dissemination of information, as well as the trading procedures and 
strategies of diverse actors on these markets co- determine prices and their 
development over time. Unsurprisingly, the functioning of international 
commodity derivative markets has been controversially discussed ever since 
their beginnings in the late nineteenth century and their development to 
global benchmarks in the 1980s and 1990s. Earlier efforts by the newly 
independent states of the Global South in the 1960s and 70s to design 
alternative pricing mechanisms, in the end unsuccessful, were reflective of 
the quest to not only increase revenues from resource extraction but to sta-
bilize prices. Price volatility exacerbated by speculative interests and the 
emergence of new classes of financial investors on commodity derivative 
markets has become a primary area of concern (Staritz et al., in this 
volume; Ederer et al., 2013). Again, a political economy approach to 
justice would ask to what extent the interests of diverse actors, including 
producers and consumers, are taken into consideration in establishing and 
re- regulating the institutional architecture of commodity derivative 
markets, and in how far the procedures prevalent on those markets are 
conducive to the stated goals, that is, price determination that is reflexive 
not only of demand and supply conditions, but fair in its assessment of 
the social and environmental cost of production. The recent literature on 
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‘ecologically unequal exchange’ (Jorgenson and Rice, 2007; Jorgenson and 
Clark, 2009) and on ‘ecological debts’ (Srinivasan et al., 2008; Goeminne 
and Paredis, 2010) has provided broad and convincing evidence that social 
costs are notoriously absent from the pricing mechanisms in international 
commodity trade. Obviously, in addition to questions of how to correct 
for such negligence of social and environmental costs in economic policy, 
this raises questions with regard to the governance structure of inter-
national commodity markets. Though typically regulated by some – nota 
bene – national authority, many commodity exchanges are controlled by a 
club of powerful private financial actors, or have been, as in the case of 
over- the-counter transactions, not regulated at all. Issues of recognition 
and representation are thus of particular relevance at the international 
level too.
Resources as a process of creation
The second element in the extended conceptual framework for resource 
fairness calls into question the very notion of ‘resources’ as it is used in 
politics as well as in most of the social science literature. Typically, the 
term ‘natural resource’ is understood to refer to some material substance, 
which by implication is assumed to be provided by nature. Thus, typically 
it is supposed to be fixed and finite in quantity. Once humankind has 
started to consume the stock of that resource, the eventual depletion of the 
resource is basically a matter of time. Most of the discourse on resource 
politics, including on resource fairness, begins from this implicit assump-
tion. American institutionalist authors, in particular Erich Zimmermann 
and Clarence Ayres, have, however, questioned this understanding, and 
have proposed an alternative, dynamic conceptualization, summarized in 
the phrase: “resources are not, they become” (Zimmermann, 1972: 16; see 
also Schmitt, in this volume). Hence, what makes some material substance 
found in nature a resource is that human ingenuity has devised a particular 
way of using this resource for some determinate social end. This process of 
fashioning some material or non- material stuff in a form usable and serv-
iceable to humans is determined by the state of science and technology (De 
Gregori, 1987). Thus, it is the immaterial aspect of human knowledge that 
defines the resource character of a particular substance. In effect, the state 
of scientific and technological knowledge, as well as cultural bounds, deter-
mine the amount of resources humans have at their disposal. While the 
stock of a particular resource gradually depletes, technological innovation 
eventually leads to the creation of new resources, as indeed the fact that 
certain resources are currently used is already the result of some previous 
advance in knowledge. For instance, the utilization of lithium as a resource 
has become feasible because of advances in battery technology and the 
recent push propelled by environmental concerns to introduce electric cars 
on a grand scale (see Anlauf, in this volume). Similarly, rare earths only 
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became a critical resource for EU raw materials policy once their utiliza-
tion in electronic equipment such as mobile phones became technically 
feasible (as well as necessary) and the electronics industry came to be con-
sidered a major driver of growth in advanced economies.
 The resources a society uses at a given time are therefore linked to its 
level of technological development. As long as technological innovation 
continues, possibilities for the further creation of new resources exist and 
the total stock of available resources is neither fixed nor finite. Obviously, 
this conceptualization may seem out of tune with central dogmas of the 
environmental discourse, which have since the early 1970s time and again 
stressed the finite nature of resources on planet Earth. This is not the place 
to engage in an in- depth discussion on this controversy. Suffice to say 
that I do not subscribe to some naïve belief in technological progress that 
solves all environmental concerns (as ‘green economy’ concepts suggest). 
However, for the purpose of this discussion on resource fairness, the insti-
tutionalist account of ‘resourceship’ conceptualizes resources as a dynamic 
social relation. A resource- rich country today may be poor tomorrow, in 
the event that, for example, its main export commodity is not in demand 
anymore thanks to some technological substitution process. Think of the 
fate of countries exporting natural rubber, once it had become possible to 
produce rubber synthetically in the early twentieth century. The country 
may also be poor in the sense that although it possesses the material 
resource, it does not possess the technical knowledge of utilizing the 
resource. Thus, although it might be able to sell the resource on the global 
market, the long- term effect of resource exploitation on a particular 
commodity- exporting country is largely determined by social forces outside 
of its own influence. Resource politics therefore should not be restricted to 
a static vision of resources, with its focus on maximizing current monetary 
flows (e.g. sales prices, public income), but use the resource endowment as 
a basis for improving its productive capabilities over time. Thus, industrial 
policy conceived in a broad sense, including education, science, and 
innovation policy, becomes crucial. In addition, fields such as trade and 
investment policies merit closer attention, since it is via these policies that 
the conditions for investors to operate in a host country, the privileges they 
enjoy, and the duties they have to comply with, are conditioned. Thus, the 
policy autonomy of host governments to implement conditions upon inves-
tors that aim at maximizing the economic benefits of resource extraction 
to the national economy depends on how trade and investment policies are 
designed. Similarly, international agreements bind countries to implement 
stringent standards of intellectual property protection, which typically 
make the acquisition and usage of innovative technology more expensive.
 Unfortunately, and in spite of corroborating insights of structuralist eco-
nomic thinking since the mid- twentieth century (e.g. Prebisch, 1950, 1980), 
most resource- dependent countries of the Global South have (again) 
neglected these dimensions of a comprehensive resource politics during the 
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recent commodity price boom. Instead, most of them focused on maxi-
mizing short- term monetary gains from resource exploitation, which were 
used to a considerable extent for social investments, particularly by left- 
wing governments in Latin America (Brand and Dietz, 2013). I do not 
contest that this practice of neo- extractivism by Latin American govern-
ments like Bolivia or Ecuador constitutes an advance in comparison to 
previous extractivist regimes, also from a fairness perspective. However, 
despite notable efforts towards economic diversification and resource- led 
industrialization, (e.g. the African Mining Vision (AfDB et al., 2009) and 
the work of the ‘Making Most of Commodities’ project (Kaplinsky and 
Farooki, 2012; Morris et al., 2012)), it remains to be seen how resource 
dependent countries cope with the bust- phase of the current commodity 
super- cycle which started in mid- 2014.
Conclusion
I have outlined in this chapter a conceptualization of resource fairness that 
builds upon Fraser’s theory of justice and adds two components taken 
from institutional economics. With the concept of social costs, I have 
argued that resource extraction, like any other productive activity under 
capitalism, systematically changes not only the distribution of wealth and 
income, but often has broader implications for communities and their cul-
tures. Private enterprise has rarely ever an incentive to fully compensate an 
affected community for any social costs it suffers, if that were possible at 
all in the light of issues of incommensurability of value. Consequently, 
market prices usually do not reflect the full social cost of production. 
The struggle over the distribution of the benefits and costs of resource 
extraction is therefore necessarily political in nature and takes place simul-
taneously at various territorial scales. It is not only a struggle over ques-
tions of redistribution of benefits and costs, but is inextricably linked to 
questions of recognition of different cultural values and of equal repres-
entation of all social actors affected in the institutions that govern resource 
politics. Furthermore, I have highlighted the importance of broadening the 
scope of resource politics upon the basis of an alternative reading of the 
term ‘resource’. The conceptual core of this term refers to the scientific and 
technical knowledge that gives humans the capacity to use a particular 
material substance found in nature for a defined economic purpose – 
for example, the production of particular goods and services. ‘Resource’ 
is therefore a dynamic and open concept, the creation of resources 
proceeds with advances in science and technology. The necessary comple-
ment to a static notion of resource policy, which focuses on the maximiza-
tion of monetary benefits of resource extraction and the prevention of 
social costs, is therefore a focus on fostering the innovative capacities of an 
economy through industrial policy. The latter must, of course, be subjected 
to democratic control and reflect the social preferences of a society. 
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Only such a comprehensive approach toward resource policy can help to 
eventually overcome the structural constraints of resource dependency. 
Lastly, at the international level, trade and investment policies and com-
modity trading schemes need to be redesigned in order to account for the 
interests of all affected stakeholders of resource extraction, production, 
and consumption.
 Fair alternatives to current resource politics are, however, not easily 
found. Apart from earning windfall profits in the recent commodity price 
boom that were more (aka social investment and industrial diversification) 
or less (aka luxury consumption and real estate bubbles) wisely reinvested, 
most resource- exporting countries have not targeted the root causes of 
resource dependency. That owes to the prevailing institutional structure of 
the international economy in general and of commodity trade in particular, 
both of which have shielded core countries and the corporate sector from 
more fundamental reforms of international commodity trade. Besides, it 
also relates to power constellations in resource- exporting developing coun-
tries, where the economic and political elites profiting from resource 
extraction prevent a structural transformation of the economy (Rosser, 
2006; Collier, 2010; Barma et al., 2012).
 Nonetheless, the wholesale critique of neo- extractivist development 
models currently en vogue in the critical academic discussion, particularly 
in Latin America (e.g. Lang and Mokrani, 2013), and the related promo-
tion of ‘post- extractivism’ (Gudynas, 2013) or buen vivir as an alternative 
to capitalist development (Acosta, 2015), are both too critical of the neo- 
extractivist development models of the left- wing governments in Latin 
America and too utopian in their expectation that an alternative way of 
life beyond the large- scale exploitation of natural resources is possible and 
indeed desired by broad groups in developing countries, particularly urban 
populations. Against this, I would propose an approach to resource fair-
ness that takes the concepts of social costs and of resources in a dynamic 
sense, aiming at the continuous advancement of productive capabilities 
centre-stage. On this basis, a fair resource politics calls for a just distribu-
tion of benefits and costs and aims at the recognition and representation of 
all affected parties in resource politics at the local, national, and inter-
national level. Thus, in a sense, I call for a democratic politics of resource 
creation precisely in order to overcome the prevailing extractivist models 
in the Global South, and for a fundamental reform of international 
resource politics.
Note
1 I acknowledge very useful suggestions by and discussions with Karin Küblböck 
and Cornelia Staritz. I also appreciate the detailed comments from two reviewers 
of the chapter.
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For Nancy Fraser (2007), one of the most important critical theorists in 
social sciences, justice essentially “requires social arrangements that permit 
all to participate as peers in social life” (20). According to her concept of 
justice, people cannot participate on a par with others – with equal voices 
– as long as economic structures and institutionalized hierarchies of cul-
tural value deny equal opportunities for all members of the political com-
munity. Therefore, the redistribution of material resources, goods, and 
wealth as well as the recognition of all members as equal – while recogniz-
ing their ethnic, racial, sexual, and gender differences – are two basic 
aspects for social justice. Recently, Fraser conceptually enlarged her notion 
of justice by adding the political dimension of representation to the eco-
nomic and cultural dimension of social justice. Consequently, representa-
tion raises the question of who is involved and who is excluded, not only 
in terms of participation processes but also in the context of establishing 
institutional framework and decision- making rules (Fraser, 2001, 2007). 
While Fraser comprehensively elaborates on different dimensions of justice, 
these theoretical considerations do not indicate how such claims can be 
reached in terms of practical implementation, especially on a local level.
 In such practical terms, the (re)distribution of water plays an essential 
role in debates over resource justice. Water is not only an important sub-
stance for almost all human activities (agriculture, industrial production, 
energy production, recreational activities, etc.) but a fundamental essence 
to sustain life itself and is considered as the most strategic natural resource 
of the twenty- first century (Lehn and Parodi, 2009). In past decades, tradi-
tional forms of government have been continuingly expanded and replaced 
by more flexible and participatory forms of governance (Demirović and 
Walk, 2011; Newig, 2011: 485). The main player in such a governance- 
related paradigm shift in the water sector was the World Water Council 
(WWC) comprising members from the private sector (multinational 
water corporations), intergovernmental organizations (UN, World Bank), 
governments, academic institutions and professional water associations 
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(Linton, 2010: 212). The integration of all parties affected, the improve-
ment of administrative efficiency regarding complex environmental prob-
lems, and the increase of the legitimacy of decision- making processes 
comprise some of the aims of the environment governance doctrine. Thus, 
the implementation of participation processes became an essential part of 
this new governance architecture. By integrating all stakeholders and gen-
erating a compromise between all interests, participation – grounded in the 
promise of sustainability – was considered to be able to manage the 
(re)distribution of resources. Thus participation “is marketed as a way to 
establish more justice in the world and is presented as a universal value” 
(Barreteau et al., 2010).
 Is the demand for more participation, however, sufficient to reach what 
Fraser (2007) calls more resource justice? What are the explicit and 
implicit assumptions and presuppositions of the resource management 
approach? What are the dominant epistemologies and discursive settings in 
which this approach is framed? How are participation processes struc-
tured, do they extend existing power relations and how far do they con-
tribute to reproducing them?
 To answer these questions, I analyse the implementation of an Integ-
rated Water Resources Management (IWRM) system in the state of Ceará, 
Brazil, referring to Fraser’s approach of social justice informed by a polit-
ical ecology perspective. In the first section I will reflect on some general 
assumptions of the concept of water management on a more global and 
abstract level. To do so, I will show that the designation of water as a 
‘scarce resource’ is not a given fact but a socially produced discourse and 
structured entity. This dominant and westernized understanding of water 
excludes other non- western narratives and it is, furthermore, an essential 
ingredient for framing water as an economic good and the development of 
resource management as the dominant water policy approach. Subse-
quently, I will analyse some practical experiences of participation processes 
in water resource management on a local scale. These considerations are 
mainly taken from fieldwork in the state of Ceará (Brazil) between 2008 
and 2009, where I participated in meetings and trainings of the Water 
Basin Committee of the Lower Jaguaribe River and conducted interviews 
with members of the committee and water users who were not involved in 
the participation process. Based on the empirical findings, emphasis is put 
on Fraser’s notions of redistribution, representation, and recognition to 
show that the IWRM in the state of Ceará mainly serves as an instrument 
to (re)produce existing power relations and prevalent inequalities instead 
of initiating emancipation.
The constitution of resources and scarcity
The starting point of my reflections on resource justice is Erich Zimmer-
mann’s (1951) famous quote: “Resources are not; they become” (15). Seen 
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from this angle, a resource is not an objective substance outside the human 
sphere, it is a result of epistemologies, discourses, social values, and neces-
sities. The production of resources can be understood as a social trans-
formation of a specific entity of the material world with its own biophysical 
qualities into a natural resource. This occurs due to historically specific 
social needs, through symbolic meanings, discursive constructions, and 
available technologies in relation to the dominant mode of production. In 
this process, the non- human (and even the human) nature is conceptually 
divided into separate parts and receives its social meaning through being 
labelled as a resource (Schmitt, 2013: 82). David Harvey (2007), for 
instance, defines natural resources as “a cultural, technical and economic 
appraisal of elements and processes in nature that can be applied to fulfil 
social objectives and goals through specific material practices” (147). 
These social objectives and goals, however, are never fixed. They are 
always dynamic and changeable entities that depend on social power rela-
tions as well as on their inherent gender, class, and race relations. Thus, 
the production of resources is a genuinely social process that reproduces 
the dominant epistemologies and the socially accepted forms of knowledge 
(Linton, 2010).
 Not only resources, but also their availability and scarcity are socially 
produced. To define a natural resource as scarce always depends on modes 
of production and consumption as well as on existing knowledge and tech-
niques. Scarcity is mediated by social values, political institutions, and eco-
nomical regulations. Rare earth elements, for example, are actually not as 
rare as their name suggests. In fact, they became rare because of the expan-
sion of increasing demand for high- tech products (e.g. smartphones, solar 
panels, LED screens) resulting in an exponentially growing industrial 
demand. Their scarcity is also the result of the necessary efforts to extract 
them and of the geopolitical dimension of China being the dominant sup-
plier. Therefore, the limits of natural resources crucially depend on the 
societal relations to nature: “To say that scarcity resides in nature and that 
natural limits exist is to ignore how scarcity is socially produced and how 
‘limits’ are a social relation within nature (including human society) rather 
than some externally imposed necessity” (Harvey, 2007: 147).
 To raise questions about possibilities and dimensions of resource justice 
is not only to elaborate on the concepts of fairness, justice, or equality, but 
is also about accepting resources as a given fact and natural basis for 
human life and economic activity. Labelling (non- human and human) 
materiality as a resource has far- reaching implications in terms of how we 
perceive and conceptualize human–nature interactions and how we discuss 
questions of (fair) access, utilization, distribution, and disposal. Under-
standing a river as a unity with its surroundings – instead of a line in the 
landscape or as a water resource – is far more than just naming it differ-
ently. It is a different way of thinking about, understanding, and acting 
towards and with the environment. In his speech at the conference of the 
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people of the São Francisco Vale and the semi- arid region in Brazil, Marcos 
Sabaru, a leader of the indigenous community of Tingui- Botó, highlighted 
their understanding of a river as follows:
In our vision, the vision of the indigenous people, a river doesn’t exist, 
a human being doesn’t exist, an animal doesn’t exist, plants don’t 
exist. It is all just one thing. For us, [. . .] the river is a sacred residence; 
it is a source of life, a source of nutrition. Sometimes it bothers me 
when people are talking about the river and using words like water 
resource. I don’t think that we should only talk about a river as water. 
We should talk about a river as people; we should talk about a river as 
shore, as humans, as fish. [. . .] We should understand that all of this is 
just one thing. We shouldn’t talk about the water and forget about the 
people, the animals, the shores, forget about the faith.
(Recording 1)1
If water is considered as sacred and socially embedded, as an integral 
part of the environment and the human sphere, it is respected and treated 
in a very different way than if it is considered simply as a resource. Con-
ceiving water as a resource already starts the process of abstraction and 
exploitation, and likewise transforms it into a manageable and tradable 
commodity (Linton, 2010: 215). By speaking of nature as a resource, 
“nature has been clearly stripped of her creative power; she has turned into 
a container for raw materials waiting to be transformed into inputs for 
commodity production” (Shiva, 2007: 206). Framing questions about fair-
ness and justice within the discourse of recourse scarcity, therefore, already 
pre- defines the way in which the problems and possible solutions are 
conceptualized.
The international framing: water as a finite resource with 
economic value
The idea of water as being a scarce resource and an economic good was 
introduced with the ‘Dublin Principles’ published at the Dublin conference 
on Water and the Environment in 1992. On the eve of the Earth Summit 
in Rio de Janeiro, the conference was the most important international 
meeting on water where general principles for the water sector were deter-
mined and universalized.
 The four Dublin principles state that
1 Freshwater is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development, and the environment [. . .]
2 Water development and management should be based on a participa-
tory approach, involving users, planners, and policy- makers at all 
levels [. . .]
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3 Women play a central part in the provision, management and safe-
guarding of water [. . .]
4 Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be 
recognized as an economic good. (ICWE, 1992: 4)
The emphases on the finite and vulnerable character as well as the eco-
nomic value of the ‘resource water’ do not represent neutral representa-
tions of an existing reality. They have rather to be considered as a result of 
political negotiation processes with specific impacts on global water man-
agement. They have served as a precondition for the commodification and 
commercialization of water and provided the rationale for the marketed 
claim of a demand- oriented supply strategy comprising aspects of efficiency 
and profitability (Budds, 2004; Bakker and Bridge 2008; Swyngedouw, 
2008). As a result, an Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
was claimed to be “the only viable way [. . .] for sustainable water use and 
management” (Rogers and Hall, 2003: 30).
 As stated in the second principle, the introduction of a participatory 
approach became a key element for successful IWRM. By integrating all 
stakeholders, participatory decision- making processes are conceived to 
gather all interests in order to reach a compromise that is supposed to be 
beneficial for everyone. Participation, therefore, has become a pre- 
condition for resource fairness and justice in the water sector. However, a 
participatory process is neither neutral nor free of prerequisites and uneven 
power relations, nor does it guarantee an equal inclusion of all interests. 
Hence, participatory processes do not automatically contribute to social 
justice but must be analysed carefully regarding their contribution to 
change or stabilize existing power relations and inequalities.
Integrated water resources management in the state of 
Ceará, Brazil
The advent of IWRM as a global blueprint for the water sector constituted 
the international background for the introduction of a new water legisla-
tion in the state of Ceará. When the integrated water resources manage-
ment system (Sistema Integrado de Gestão dos Recursos Hídricos) was 
enacted in Ceará in 1992, the state became a model region regarding the 
implementation of the new paradigm of IWRM throughout Brazil.
 This development can only be understood in its particular climatic cir-
cumstances and political context. Ceará is a semi- arid region, where pre-
cipitations occur mainly in the rainy season (January to June) while in the 
dry season (July to December) water supply is secured through under-
ground aquifers, dams, and rivers. In addition, periodical droughts in the 
region have an enormous impact on the poor rural population as they are 
normally not connected to a public water supply system. Their water 
demand is covered by (irregular) rain fall, the access to local dams and 
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rivers, and water distribution through tank trucks organized by local state 
authorities (Frischkorn et al., 2003: 87–89). In this special context, the 
location of dams (normally built on private properties but financed by 
public funds), the access to the water from a dam or a river, and the 
purpose of its use (e.g. human needs, small agriculture, agribusiness) 
represent highly contested and politicized political issues. While the hinter-
land of the state (Sertão) was considered as the poorhouse of Brazil and 
farmers traditionally used the pastures for cattle breeding and cotton pro-
duction (especially during the American Civil War), its use and perception 
have changed in the 1990s. This shift was introduced by an enormous and 
material expansion of the water infrastructure (dams, river transposition, 
canals, wells, etc.) and the arrival of national and international corpora-
tions in the fruit production sector. Instead of being seen as a develop-
mental obstacle, the natural conditions of Ceará with high temperatures 
and the possibility of selective irrigation turned out to be a considerable 
advantage for the agribusiness (Oliveira, 1981: 47; Elias, 2006: 34). This 
led to the installation of big monocultures destined for export, multiplied 
the water demand in the region, and therefore increased competition for 
water.
 Looking back, one could say that the political circumstances in the state 
of Ceará in the late 1980s paved the way towards a new policy program. 
After more than 20 years of dictatorship and nepotism, a well trained and 
young elite of businessmen took over government in Ceará in 1986. Their 
understanding of good governance was based on the principles of an 
effective corporate management. Together with a team of consultants, sci-
entists, and engineers – and in close cooperation with the World Bank 
(who also financed the programme) –, they established technical, juridical, 
and institutional instruments to introduce a water resource management 
system guided by the principles of integration, decentralization, and parti-
cipation (Parente and Arruda, 2002).
 The main instruments introduced by IWRM consisted of water resource 
plans, user licences and bulk water tariffs, and participatory water man-
agement processes. The River Basin Committees (Comitê de Bacia Hidro-
gráfica) and the Users’ Commissions (Comissão de Usuários) are the main 
bodies of these participatory water management processes. The committees 
are responsible for the watershed level and support the execution of the 
water policy, approve the water resource plans, and transfer information 
concerning water policy. The users’ commissions are grouped around 
specific reservoirs and decide on the quantity of water being discharged 
from them (Formiga- Johnsson and Kemper, 2008; Taddei and Gamboggi, 
2011: 13–14).
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Participation and social justice in integrated water resources 
management
The decentralized and participatory river basin management was intro-
duced in Ceará to overcome the structures of clientelism and to re- shape 
the distribution of water in a more democratic way. The integration of 
various stakeholders in the decision- making process and management of 
the water resources was supposed to minimize potential conflicts by search-
ing for consensual solutions (COGERH, 2015). Besides this aspect, the 
participatory process aimed to increase the acceptance and the legitimacy 
of the water policy. Even the World Bank states that participatory pro-
cesses are without any doubt a key factor for the social acceptance of 
water policies (Pereira et al., 2005: 71). Less clear, however, is whether 
participatory processes can lead to more than just an increase in the accept-
ance of water policies and can structurally contribute to increased social 
justice. Based on a transfer of Fraser’s social justice concept to the local 
level of a river basin, the following sections therefore analyse whether the 
participatory processes led to an extended representation of the stake-
holders, a higher recognition of the different members and their framing of 
water politics, and a (better) redistribution of water and decision- making 
power.
Representation
Public participation can be defined as “the involvement of individuals and 
groups that are positively or negatively affected by or interested in a pro-
posed intervention, for example, a project, program, plan or policy, that is 
subject to a decision- making process” (Enserink et al., 2007). Bearing this 
in mind, the main questions concerning the representation of a participa-
tory process are: Who are the legitimate stakeholders to take part in the 
process? Are they all able to participate or, if not, what prevents them 
from participating? Do the stakeholder groups represent the affected popu-
lation or, if not, what are the biases and political logics inscribed in the 
process?
 The introduction of IWRM in Ceará was a top- down project initiated 
by the local state and the World Bank and did not (or only partially) result 
from a civil society struggle (Gutiérrez, 2006: 188). The composition of the 
river basin committees is defined by law determining that the committees 
are composed of representatives of the municipal government (20 per 
cent), state and federal government agencies (20 per cent ), organized civil 
society (30 per cent), and water users (30 per cent) (COGERH, 2015). The 
category ‘water users’ involves everyone who has a legal right to extract 
water. According to this framework, a water user can be a transnational 
fruit company with very high water consumption, representatives of irriga-
tion projects, or farmers. On the other hand, people without any direct 
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access to water resources like rivers or reservoirs are explicitly excluded as 
water users. They are just represented by organizations of the civil society 
(e.g. agricultural workers union, NGOs) or by representatives of the muni-
cipalities. Such a composition of the committees means that about 800,000 
to one million dryland producers – or 80 per cent of the rural population – 
in Ceará have no direct representation in the committees. They are 
excluded from decision- making processes despite their legitimate interest 
and – possibly – right to change current water politics in a region where 
access to water is essential for survival – especially in the dry season 
(Taddei, 2005: 126; Ballestero, 2006: 319).
 Besides the formal barriers that exclude potential participants, there are 
also practical obstacles that affect the various stakeholder groups differ-
ently. For a company, the possibility to participate in the meetings is much 
easier than for a small farmer who may not afford to spend one day off the 
field during harvesting season. Living in the outback implies a lot of effort 
and expenses to travel to a committee meeting. Access to participatory pro-
cesses is thus basically dependent on the availability of resources like 
mobility, time, and money which are unequally distributed among different 
stakeholders (Schmitt, 2013: 315).
 Whether the committees adequately represented the rural population 
was one of the main questions of the survey ‘Marca d’Àgua’, where 626 
members of 14 different river basin committees in Brazil were interviewed. 
The results give a solid overview of the composition of the committees. It 
shows that 67 per cent of the members earn ten times the minimum income 
or more, 80 per cent completed a higher education class (curso superior), 
75 per cent are older than 40 years, and 79 per cent are male. In particular, 
the presidential and vice- presidential positions of the committees – both 
positions having more representational power and authority regarding 
decision making – are usually occupied by male members (Empinotti, 
2010: 181; Frank, 2010; 48; Gutiérrez, 2010: 121). This means that a 
male, formally educated, economically better- off position dominates the 
committees, which obviously does not represent the rural population.
Politics of framing
Misrepresentation is not only a result of unequal participation opportun-
ities of different stakeholders. It also originates from the framing of 
decision- making processes. Who sets the agenda and connected procedures 
and who is entitled to establish decision- making rules which are important 
benchmarks for the evaluation of the process (Fraser, 2007: 24)?
 Initially, the river basin committees were designed as advisory and 
decision- making bodies. However, sharp criticism from the committees on 
the official water policy in Ceará led to an open conflict with the State 
Council for Water Resources (CONERH) in 2001. As a consequence, the 
state council revoked the formal decision- making power of the committees. 
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Even though the CONERH usually approves the decisions of the commit-
tees, there is no binding commitment in case of any conflicts, effectively 
reducing the committees to consultative bodies (Taddei, 2005: 316–317; 
Taddei and Gamboggi 2011: 24).
 In many interviews, various members of the water committees criticized 
a lack of autonomy. The committees neither have their own executive 
board nor their own funds. They can only operate with the approval 
of Ceará’s Water Resources Management Company (COGERH). The 
COGERH staff decides, for example, the place and time of committee 
meetings, schedules the agenda, facilitates the discussions, records the 
meetings, and provides the minutes. Only the COGERH is able to calcu-
late the allocation scenarios for the reservoirs – one of the most important 
tasks of the committees (Schmitt, 2013, 315–317). A former member of 
the board of the river basin committee of Baixo Jaguaribe stated:
There is a false participation, a domination by COGERH, a control by 
this institution. It masters the knowledge and the techniques [. . .]. 
When we won the board of the river basin committee, our intention 
was this: to be autonomous.
(Interview 2)
The election of the river basin committee of Baixo Jaguaribe in 2003 
resulted in a board that was critical towards the state’s official water policy. 
During their presidency (2003–2005), the limited possibilities of shaping 
Ceará’s water policy became evident. Through the withdrawal of funds for 
additional activities of the board – for example, the organization of 
information events in different municipalities, the production of a booklet 
about the conditions of the water resources, or the exchange with other 
committees – the COGERH undermined attempts to question the official 
water policy. These experiences show that participation processes should be 
equipped with their own budget and autonomous decision- making power 
in order to translate representation processes into political practices.
Recognition
Another important aspect of social justice refers to the notion of recogni-
tion. The composition of the committees, with mainly male and middle 
class members, already indicates a misrecognition of certain social groups 
that are not perceived as legitimate stakeholders in the participation 
process. Furthermore, mechanisms of (mis-)recognition can be found inside 
the committee structures as well. In particular, the disrespect of other 
forms of knowledge and languages conceptually prevent the recognition 
and participation of all stakeholders as peers.
 Since the discussions in the committees mainly centre on changes in the 
water legislation and decisions about water allocation, the language used 
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in the meetings is merely a technical one. Scientific and technical know-
ledge appear as a precondition for participation while other forms of 
knowledge (e. g. local and traditional knowledge) are devalued. 31 per cent 
of the members interviewed by the survey ‘Marca d’Água’ declared that 
technical knowledge is the most important skill for the participation 
process. As a matter of fact, 67 per cent considered the uneven distribution 
of technical knowledge to be the main obstacle for the process, and 18 per 
cent indicated that they did not always feel free to express their opinions in 
the meetings (Florit and Noara, 2010: 97).
 The access to and the use of expert knowledge became decisive not only 
for the possibilities of participating in the process, but also for the pre-
sentation of individual positions. When members of the committees raise 
their voice for the first time during a meeting, they are invited to mention 
their name and position. While farmers normally introduce themselves 
with their name and the municipality they come from, state or company 
representatives usually add their function and profession (e.g. engineer, 
agronomist). This seems to legitimize their own position while it devalu-
ates the position of others through introducing a social taxonomy from 
legitimate to illegitimate voices.
 Thus, an establishment of roles and a production of identity take place 
through the participation process. The division of the participants into 
certain categories can be considered as an external “interpellation” – a 
term taken from the French philosopher Louis Althusser – to certain posi-
tions (Bröckling 2012: 134). Such attributions are internalized and repro-
duced through self- designation during the meetings. At the same time, the 
externally and internally designated positions are inscribed in existing 
power relations. For example, the self- designation as ‘engineer’ comes 
along with a more powerful position than the occupational title ‘peasant’. 
These categorizations have impacts on self- perception and esteem, 
talking behaviour, the willingness to achieve a compromise, and the use 
of resistance strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms function not 
only within the committee, but also develop a power effect outside the 
consensus space. If the members of the committee agree on a compromise, 
they do so as representatives of a certain interest group. Thus, they 
need to advertise and ensure compliance with the compromise, which pro-
vokes a reinforcement of the identification with the committee and its 
operation.
 The organization of special training (curso de capacitação), where the 
historical, institutional, and legal foundations of water management are 
discussed, is an instrument to compensate for the knowledge bias between 
the members of the committee. This training is supposed to foster know-
ledge transfer and empowerment of all stakeholders. However, since 
these courses are normally given by representatives of public water 
agencies, they strive for the participation of the members in a pre- 
conceptualized way instead of critically discussing the management model 
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itself. Accordingly, the COGERH refused an attempt by the committees to 
open the training to ‘other experts’, as one member of the board criticizes:
We won the election and we began to think of the training. As we 
started to conceptualize the training, thinking of the contents, what 
would be the training for the new members, the state began to react. 
And I realized: wow, but we do not have autonomy? We cannot decide 
who the advisors that come to train the people are? Because: Who 
were the technicians that came to train the members of the committee? 
Members of the SRH [the public water resources office], the 
COGERH; which are the state. So we thought that these technicians 
came with the government discourse, they came to make the trainings, 
but they did not appear with the criticality we wanted, because in my 
view, the state has an economic and exploitative vision of the water 
resources, you know? So we realized that there was a discourse of the 
participatory management, of an integrated water resources manage-
ment, but in practice we saw something completely different. And 
when was it revealed? When the state wanted to patronize, which 
means to command, to coordinate the board of the committee, when 
we did not have freedom to think.
(Interview 3)
Therefore, this training does not serve as spaces to challenge existing struc-
tures, to construct alternative decision- making structures, or to produce 
new knowledge. They rather contribute to confirm the importance of tech-
nical knowledge and reproduce and strengthen dominant practices, posi-
tions, and power relations.
Redistribution
The idea of resource justice in the water sector is closely linked to a more 
equitable distribution of water resources. Participation is supposed to dis-
tribute the scarce resource water more equally to all stakeholders, by 
taking all interests into account. The decisions about the outflow of a 
reservoir could thereby serve as a good example to analyse the possibilities 
and limitations of such participation processes. But it also raises the ques-
tion of whether greater social justice can be reached by a redistribution of 
resources without a redistribution of power.
 The Santo Antônio de Russas reservoir is located in the basin of the 
lower course of the Jaguaribe river in the northeast of Ceará. It provides 
water for the non- perennial Palhano river. The main task of the users’ 
commission of that reservoir is the determination of the amount of water 
to be released from the reservoir. Thus, there is a permanent conflict 
between the interests of the water users of the upper and the lower course 
of the river. While the main interest of the cultivators of the upper course 
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is water security, that is, to maintain a sufficient amount of water in the 
reservoir to secure water flow during the whole year, the water users of the 
lower course demand a higher water discharge to guarantee that the water 
reaches their land.
 As indicated before, the COGERH prepares the meetings of the commis-
sion and pre- structures the decision- making process. COGERH calculates, 
based on strong legal regulations, different scenarios for the water outflow 
of the reservoir. This means that the members of the commission can only 
decide between these previously defined scenarios. However, even the scen-
ario with the highest water outflow (calculated in m3/s) does not provide the 
downstream farmers with enough water during dry season. Yet, at the same 
time, it would be possible to divert water from a big irrigation canal nearby. 
It is technically feasible to provide the Palhano river with a sufficient amount 
of water – this is just not the priority of the state’s water policy. The water is 
rather used to supply the 3.6 million people in the metropolitan region of 
Fortaleza and the industrial complex of the Port of Pecém.
 Representatives of the municipality of Palhano and downstream water 
users have been urging the users’ commission and the committee of the 
Baixo Jaguaribe for years to discuss procedures and mechanisms that would 
fundamentally change water distribution instead of only voting between 
pre- defined scenarios. So far, nothing has changed. Representatives of the 
COGERH argue that the task of the users’ committee is limited to the man-
agement of water in the reservoir whereas the public water company 
CAGECE is responsible for water supply for the rural population. When 
asked about the possibility of changing the situation, a COGERH staff 
member said: “We are just following the law [. . .]. Unfortunately, things are 
like that. We should not act irresponsibly when the dam does not have the 
capacity. We have to work with the present facts” (Interview 4).
The construction of hegemony
The examples mentioned above illustrate that the users’ commissions and 
the river basin committees have the right to decide on some aspects of the 
water policy in the river basin, but only in a strict framework and under 
predefined conditions. Structural changes such as the democratization of 
the access to water, the construction of small and decentralized water 
infrastructures, or the reform of the unequal property structure are not 
considered relevant parts of the agenda. Hence, the main function of the 
participatory process consists in the management of the dominant water 
politics which results in the stabilization of dominant power relations and 
existing inequalities. In this sense, the participation processes are part of 
new governance structures that re- produce and sustain existing hegemony. 
The Gramscian concept of hegemony refers to the fact that environmental 
governance is not only established by coercion, (e.g. laws, regulations, 
restrictions) but by convictions, the raising of consciousness, and the 
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establishment of consensus (Sauer, 2011: 119; Pichler, in this volume). 
Apart from being a top- down policy approach, the IWRM is a process of 
integration of – what is supposed to be – all stakeholders and of producing 
a consensus. The production of a collectively accepted knowledge and the 
adaptation of the management structures are mainly fostered by the train-
ing. The logic of the participation process pre- structures and predetermines 
the achievement of a compromise and its compliance. The example of the 
Palhano river shows that the representatives of the municipality can indeed 
submit their demands to the committee and try to reach a majority. If they 
fail, however, they have to accept the decision. Not to accept the decision 
of the committee would exclude them from the participatory process and, 
thus, from social consent (Schmitt, 2013: 326).
 The observations of the river basin committees reveal that the actual 
participation process falls short of the promise to represent all interests, as 
formal and informal barriers prevent equal participation. Yet, the assump-
tion of equal stakeholders with similar skills and knowledge impedes a 
more critical discussion of the existing knowledge and power relations. 
The incorporation of the various stakeholders is supposed to increase the 
acceptance and legitimacy of the official water politics, and potential 
opponents are integrated in the participatory process and subjugated under 
the paradigm of consent. Social distinction and struggles are being calmed, 
if not pacified, by their integration into the participation process, since dif-
ferent interests are, at least formally, taken into account (Brand, 2011: 
267f.; Jessop 2011: 55).
 The integration of resistant actors has to be analysed in the context of 
the history of north- eastern Brazil. From the 1950s to the military coup of 
1964, rural workers and peasants organized themselves in peasant leagues 
(ligas camponesas) to change their living conditions and to overcome 
unequal land ownership structures. Together with the communist party 
and parts of the Catholic church, they became a major force in the north 
east so that even the Brazilian government considered the region as a 
powder keg (Oliveira, 1981: 107; Costa, 2005: 58). While this movement 
was silenced during the military regime, some practices of resistance 
continued. They range from the occupation of land and barrages, the 
blockade of streets, the violent opening of floodgates, to the unauthorized 
extraction of water from reservoirs and rivers. The implementation of the 
consensus- orientated participation model, however, further delegitimized 
these practices.
 The fear of absorption and the various experiences of failure in chang-
ing water policies in the state of Ceará through the participation process 
led to a withdrawal of various social movements from the river basin com-
mittee of Baixo Jaguaribe. They considered the risk of legitimizing a water 
policy that strengthens social inequalities instead of opening possibilities 
for transformation. If the committees are not conceived as spaces of 
empowerment, they prefer not to be part of the participation process:
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Either we organize the application of participatory methodologies with 
a popular language so that people know what they are doing or in 
what they are participating or we leave the process. We will not legiti-
mize their process. [. . .] If a community does not have the power in the 
committee to destine projects for the distribution of water, we will 
leave and organize the people. We will develop projects; we will pres-
sure the city hall [. . .]. You have to create other ways to [. . .] empower 
the people, for that they create autonomy.
(Interview 5)
With the departure of a number of representatives of the social movements 
and the occupation of the vacant seats by professional ‘experts’, the social 
and political diversity of the committee, and eventually its democratic 
legitimacy, decreased. Since then, the meetings of the water committees 
have been considered less contested and more efficient (Taddei and Gam-
boggi, 2011: 25). Thus, it seems that the participation process has evolved 
into an efficient water management process where existing water policies 
are legitimized. It does not constitute – at least for now – a terrain for 
resistance or for the implementation of more social justice.
Conclusion
If social justice – according to Nancy Fraser – depends on the distribution 
of material goods, the recognition of social differences, and the broad 
representation of stakeholders, then the introduction of participation 
mechanisms in the water sector might be an instrument to implement a 
more just allocation of water. The analysis of participatory water manage-
ment processes in Ceará, however, has shown that without taking into 
account underlying power relations, different epistemologies, forms of 
knowledge and articulation, as well as differences in class and gender, 
these participation processes fail to contribute to social justice.
 Framed in the discourse of resource scarcity, the participation process of 
the IWRM in Ceará is limited to the act of deciding about water allocation 
and does not open up new societal nature relations:
Although it does perhaps integrate the interests of different stake-
holders, IWRM is still water resources management. Stakeholders and 
participants are thereby consulted but not so as to elicit how different 
players may relate to water in ways other than as a resource whose 
natural disposition is to be managed.
(Linton, 2010: 241)
This management approach in the water sector – and in fact the participa-
tory framework more generally – actually strengthen the idea of an eco-
nomically efficient water use and the dominant forms of water distribution. 
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Alternative forms of knowledges and concepts of relating to water, dif-
ferent modes of production and lifestyle, or attempts to reorganize the 
access to land and water are thereby excluded. In particular, the subtle 
power of the consensus paradigm makes participation mechanisms the 
perfect tool for the production of hegemony and aligned actors. The 
experiences of ‘stakeholders’ of the social movements in Ceará showed that 
the engagement in participatory processes can even lead to restricted 
opportunities for action and the weakening of social struggles instead of 
the expansion of their policy shaping power.
 In sum, the analysis of participation opportunities in the water sector of 
Ceará showed that without challenging and re- framing existing discourses 
and power relations, participatory processes in most cases lead to a stabili-
zation of dominant power networks and inequalities. Consequently, the 
redistribution of resources has to be linked to the redistribution of power 
relations that are always disputed and contested.
Note
1 All quotations from recordings and interviews were translated from Portuguese 
to English by the author.
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Introduction1
Scholarly analysis has, in the past, rarely focused on the role that diverging 
notions of justice play in the evolution of natural resource conflicts. The 
consequence of this is a lack of systematic knowledge about the justice 
claims that actors involved in natural resource conflicts put forward. This 
is surprising considering that, upon closer inspection, justice claims 
advanced by affected actors are easily identifiable within any particular 
resource conflict. Be it the population in the Niger Delta claiming a greater 
share of oil revenues or an end to the contamination of fragile local eco-
systems, or workers of the Marikana mine in South Africa protesting for 
higher wages and full rights for a particular union, almost all local claim- 
makers invoke ideas of justice as a basis for their demands.
 In International Relations, the disregard for considering justice in the 
context of natural resource conflicts is best illustrated in literature dealing 
with the causes of civil war. Notable overlaps exist between the concept of 
justice and the concept of grievance within the so- called greed versus griev-
ance debate (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Basedau and Lay, 2009; Collier 
et al., 2009). However, this literature generally conceptualizes natural 
resources as an essential element of the greed paradigm rather than as a 
grievance- related explanation for civil wars. In contrast, disciplines such as 
political theory and philosophy have long identified the exploitation and 
distribution of natural resources as a central point of contention in achiev-
ing (global) justice (Beitz, 1979; Pogge, 2002; Wenar, 2008; Nili, in this 
volume). These scholars have, however, mostly been interested in develop-
ing abstract principles of justice; as such, when they do mention empirical 
justice claims made by actors, it is primarily for illustrative purposes.
 Social anthropologists and scholars engaged in development and 
regional studies, on the other hand, have frequently conceded analytical 
priority to justice considerations. Their explanations for the root causes 
and/or dynamics of ongoing resource conflicts often highlight locally per-
ceived grievances publically expressed in terms of justice (Latouche, 1997: 
137–139; Ferguson, 2006: 35–38). Despite having this focus, work done 
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by scholars in these disciplines and research fields apparently does not 
differentiate between different types of justice claims in any systematic 
manner.
 This chapter analyses justice claims by local communities along with the 
governance initiatives that have emerged in response to these claims. We 
ask whether these governance initiatives adequately respond to local justice 
claims and identify the significance of misperceptions or misinterpretations 
of justice claims made by the actors involved in given conflicts. The chapter 
demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between various types 
of justice claims in order to achieve a better understanding of conflict 
dynamics and increase our knowledge of the governance mechanisms used 
to address them.
 In order to analyse local justice claims more systematically, we propose 
a threefold conceptualization of justice based on the work of Nancy 
Fraser (2009), which analytically covers distribution, recognition and 
representation- related claims (section 2, see also Schmitt, in this volume). 
We argue that the disentanglement of these different justice claims is 
important as the misperception of particular claims by addressees – such as 
corporations, state actors, or international organizations – might lead to 
governance initiatives that prove not only insufficient for satisfying local 
demands but could even further exacerbate the conflict dynamics.
 We apply this argument to a mining conflict in Peru, where numerous 
local conflicts exist in the context of large- scale mining projects (section 3). 
These conflicts have generally emerged between corporations and the 
affected communities, though they also invariably involve state institu-
tions. A common response has been to install Dialogue Tables (Mesas de 
Diálogo) to reach a compromise between parties to the conflict. The case 
study presented here focuses on the conflict between the population of Ilo, 
in Peru’s Moquegua region, and the Southern Copper Corporation mining 
company. The analysis is based on field research carried out between June 
and August 2013, including interviews conducted with various stake-
holders and participant observation in Mesa sessions.2 Our empirical ana-
lysis shows that the mesa de diálogo in Ilo has not been successful because 
of its inadequacy in addressing the local justice claims. While Southern 
Copper Corporation’s discourse focused on voluntary (financial) contribu-
tions to local communities, representatives from these communities 
emphasized the past damages caused by Southern, principally striving for 
(official) recognition of the company’s guilt. Hence, compromise- oriented 
policy instruments such as dialogue tables prove to be ill- suited for dealing 
with claims where recognition rather than compensation is at stake.
Local resource conflicts
According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
the year 2014 witnessed 96 inter- and intra- state political conflicts relating 
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to natural resources, raw materials, or the profit generated therefrom. 
Among these, 63 involved violence and nine passed the threshold of war 
(HIIK, 2015: 18).3 The Observatory of Mining Conflicts in Latin America, 
in comparison, counted 209 ongoing mining conflicts across the continent 
as of November 2015, directly affecting 313 local communities (OCMAL, 
2015a). Many of these conflicts have the potential to erupt into violence if 
not properly addressed. This also holds true for the probably much higher 
number of local natural resources conflicts worldwide (OCMAL, 2015b).
 Local resource conflicts are commonly characterized by the centrality of 
justice claims made by various actors. The claims that local communities 
from developing countries make tend to stand out in this regard as the 
socio- economic and metaphysical well- being of the majority of local com-
munity members frequently relies on (free access to) the local environment 
and associated resources such as water, land, and forests (Martínez-Alier, 
2009; Hahn, 2010). By being – or perceiving themselves as being – increas-
ingly cut off from their livelihood conditions due to resource exploitation 
projects, local communities often rise up and demand justice. Conflicts are 
subsequently triggered by the unequal distribution of costs and benefits 
that either create new conflicts between local communities and other actors 
(such as extractive corporations) or aggravate pre- existing conflicts among 
community members and between communities from the larger area. 
Numerous studies have shown that resource extraction projects tend to 
lead to a variety of negative socio- environmental impacts for local com-
munities, particularly those which depend on subsistence agriculture (e.g. 
Kok et al., 2009; Greve, 2011). For example, ecological conditions – such 
as the availability of water and fertile soil – are prone to be affected by 
resource exploitation; at the same time, substantial increases in migrant 
workers may challenge local markets and social settings. Furthermore, 
the unequal distribution of benefits and the subsequent justice claims 
are connected to financial profits generated from resource extraction. 
Whether already underway or predicted for the future, state actors, along 
with local communities, commonly associate resource extraction projects 
with the generation of significant profits. These profits, in turn, are fre-
quently distributed to specific stakeholders – primarily extractive com-
panies and their financial and political backers – in a way that other actors 
(particularly local communities) perceive as highly unjust (MiningWatch 
Canada, 2013).
 Typical conflict constellations involve the state, extractive companies, 
and local communities. The state, for its part, sets the regulatory frame-
work and has economic interests in large- scale projects. The state is often 
perceived as siding with companies and as intervening in favour of eco-
nomic interests (e.g. through regulatory action or the use of force against 
its own population). 
 In particular, large- scale extractive projects in weak zones of governance 
are often not only controversially discussed but have the potential to 
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escalate into violence. Extractive corporations – often with global opera-
tions – are powerful actors who possess superior technical knowledge and 
have financial and other resources at their disposal. Weak states are par-
ticularly dependent on these capacities, a condition that negatively influ-
ences their bargaining power. When conflicts erupt on the local level, 
communities often end up directly approaching corporations – or even a 
transnational public – since state institutions are either absent or perceived 
as weak and biased towards the companies. Moreover, companies are, 
rightfully, deemed as having the financial and other capacities to mitigate 
the community’s grievances. In order to receive more just benefits, locally 
rooted opposition movements often seek assistance from local, national, 
and global NGOs. These organisations, in turn, release public statements 
that convey empirically identifiable justice claims.
Conceptualizing local justice claims
Justice claims can be defined as claims for an entitlement (Welch, 1993; 
Müller, 2010).4 Justice claims are not an objective assessment but are based 
on the perceptions held by different actors. Hence, these claims express 
what actors believe they are entitled to (Welch, 1993: 19). While justice 
claims may entail the formulation of positive ideas about justice- related 
principles, we assume that complaints related to perceived injustices are 
central in the statements made by local communities involved in resource 
conflicts. As Amartya Sen (2009) has argued, while people often possess “a 
strong sense of injustice” (2), they may neither agree on the reason for this 
injustice nor on any ideas or principles for a perfectly just situation.
 Justice claims can be “self- referential (i.e. the actor perceiving the injus-
tice would be the aggrieved party) or other- referential (i.e. the actor per-
ceives an injustice suffered by someone else)” (Welch, 1993: 19). In the 
case of local resource conflicts, self- referential justice claims are generally 
made by communities and their representatives. Other- referential justice 
claims could, for instance, be made by civil society actors, such as NGOs, 
on behalf of the affected communities.
 One important objection to analysing justice claims is that actors might 
strategically make use of the justice theme to mask inherently instrumental 
objectives (Müller, 2010: 5). For example, local communities could use 
justice claims to mask their greed. Some scholars have, however, argued 
that justice arguments possess a different character (Welch, 1993: 20–21, 
40–41): An experience of injustice may, for instance, trigger “a unique 
emotional response”, and thus increase the likelihood of violent reactions 
(Welch, 1993: 20). Moreover, the justice motive only refers to benefits that 
people perceive as entitlements; as such, any argumentation for the pursuit 
of these benefits tends to be “categorical and deontological rather than 
utilitarian” (Welch, 1993: 21). Due to the methodological difficulties 
in differentiating between ‘real’ and ‘pretended’ rationales held by local 
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communities – or NGOs that claim to speak on their behalf – it proves 
useful to analyse more than just written or oral statements when inferring 
justice claims. In order to increase our understanding of these claims, con-
textual knowledge about conflicts along with data sources – such as obser-
vations made during field research – must likewise be taken into account. 
There are, however, no distinct criteria for distinguishing between ‘real’ and 
‘pretended’ rationales – we have been well aware of this issue in the context 
of our research. Justice claims made by local communities need to be under-
stood and carefully scrutinized within their context (Welch, 1993: 42).
 For systematizing the empirical analysis, we conceive of justice claims as 
being sent by local communities and/or representative organizations 
(senders) to other involved actors (addressees) (see Figure 6.1). Senders 
assume that these addressees have a say in the ongoing conflict and are, in 
turn, able to provide governance. Following the work of political theorist 
Nancy Fraser (2005, 2009), we distinguish between three types of justice 
claims: (1) claims for redistribution, (2) claims for recognition, and (3) 
claims for representation.
Redistribution
Claims for (re)distribution are a major issue both within nation states and 
beyond territorial borders (Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie, 
Addressees
Companies, governments,
civil society organizations, or others
Senders
Local communities
(or organizations representing them)
Justice claims
Demanding distribution, recognition, and/or representation
Governance initiatives
Located on local, national, and/or global levels
Figure 6.1  Local justice claims in resource conflicts (source: authors’ own 
illustration).
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2006; Fraser, 2009). As large- scale resource extraction almost always neg-
atively affects local communities, the latter most probably perceive an 
entitlement to some material benefits resulting from natural resource 
extraction on their land. The specific demands of local communities are an 
empirical question; they may demand some form of direct monetary com-
pensation, ask for education or health services, or insist on jobs with the 
extractive companies.
Recognition
Recognition is a basic human need; hence, misrecognition has the potential 
to become a major source of frustration and conflict (Wuppertal Institut 
für Klima, Umwelt, Energie, 2006; Fraser, 2009: 14). As such, local com-
munities might, first and foremost, demand respect and recognition from 
the state and/or corporations as comprising a group, including the 
acknowledgment of their existence and a serious consideration for their 
interests.5 Demands for recognition are often linked to claims for redis-
tribution and representation as the recognition of a group by the state and 
corporations is a virtual precondition for achieving representation and 
redistribution. Beyond the aim of gaining this sort of recognition, claims 
may also involve admissions of the harms inflicted on a community. More 
fundamentally, claims may refer to recognizing particularities such as the 
differing ways of life adhered to by specific groups.
Representation
Justice claims can also be made with regard to “the opportunity of repres-
entation and equality before the law” (Daase and Humrich, 2011: 6). 
These claims relate to a procedural dimension of justice and aim at includ-
ing certain groups in decision making on societal issues. Debates related to 
free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) serve as a prime example as they 
are one of the main outcomes of struggles by local communities claiming 
self- determination and participation in decision making in the context of 
major resource extraction projects (Oxfam, 2010). In general, these 
demands may focus on claims for consultation or on gaining more formal 
decision- making rights from the state. Extractive companies can also 
become the targets of representation claims. They may, for example, ensure 
that community representatives have a strong say in the design and imple-
mentation of core business activities and various social programmes that 
most major companies conduct nowadays.
 Although the disentanglement of distinct justice claims is essential, 
the relationship between the three dimensions is contested in theory and 
may also be blurred in the real world (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). 
Questions concerning the redistribution of material resources, for instance, 
almost inevitably have ramifications for questions of recognition as 
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resources can only be distributed to actors who are recognized as possess-
ing legitimate stakes in a given conflict. Likewise, if particular local com-
munities demand inclusion in political processes, this may indicate justice 
claims that are related to both representation and (some form of ) recogni-
tion. Nevertheless, we argue that the analytical distinction between the 
three dimensions is useful as a heuristic tool but the question of which 
dimension is most crucial in a given situation can only be answered by 
making use of empirical evidence.
Governance initiatives as a response to justice claims
Addressees of local justice claims can comprise a diverse set of actors. State 
actors intuitively come to mind since they bear prime responsibility for the 
population on their territory. State representatives are usually responsible 
for awarding contracts and licences to corporations and they provide the 
regulatory framework within which extractive projects are conducted. For 
developing countries in particular, extractive corporations are obvious 
targets of local justice claims as they are often much more visible to the 
affected communities than state actors. Justice claims made by local com-
munities can, however, also be addressed to other actors, such as inter-
national organizations, development agencies, local and international 
NGOs, or even the corporations’ home countries.
 Generally speaking, addressees of local justice claims may react in dif-
ferent ways: They can attempt to ignore local demands or they can choose 
to provide local communities with the demanded benefits. Alternatively, 
addressees can try to convince communities that they have misconceived 
the scope or content of the perceived entitlements (Welch, 1993).
 In recent years, a range of governance initiatives has emerged in 
response to resource conflicts including the Extractive Industries Transpar-
ency Initiative that promotes transparency in the oil, gas, and mining 
industry, the recent Open Contracting Partnership, aimed at publishing 
extraction contracts made between governments and companies, or the 
Kimberley Process, seeking to curb the trade of conflict diamonds (Darby, 
2010; Carbonnier et al., 2011). In addition to their participation in a 
broad range of multi- stakeholder initiatives, transnational corporations are 
also recognized as important local governance actors, as they implement 
social responsibility and community development programmes or provide 
basic social services to the communities in which they operate (see Sydow, 
in this volume). The common feature of governance initiatives that involve 
the private sector is that they are usually voluntary in nature, that is, 
neither states nor corporations are legally bound to follow particular pro-
cedures or provide certain benefits. In terms of substance addressed by the 
initiatives, most of them are focused on issues of transparency whereas reg-
ulations of corporate behaviour that go beyond reporting requirements 
are rare.
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 When responding to local communities’ justice claims, addressees are 
likely to engage according to their own conceptions of justice. Whenever 
senders and addressees of justice claims share similar notions of justice, it 
is likely that the latter will design and implement governance initiatives 
that attempt to address injustices as perceived by the local communities, 
thereby contributing to the mitigation of local conflict dynamics. In con-
trast, when local communities and governance actors adhere to differing 
notions of justice, resource conflicts are more likely to occur and escalate. 
The following analysis does not focus on conceptions of justice held 
by addressees but rather on governance initiatives used to respond to 
senders’ local justice claims. Given the prevalence of natural resource con-
flicts in developing countries, we expect empirical analyses to uncover 
serious justice gaps, meaning that governance initiatives do not respond to 
and satisfy local justice claims. This is based on the assumption that the 
latter – that is, corporations and state actors – probably adhere to substan-
tially diverging notions of justice, which implies that their governance initi-
atives will not satisfy local demands. Alternatively, addressees may very 
well misperceive local justice claims and thus fail to address these claims 
adequately. In some cases, corporations might also knowingly misinterpret 
or fail to recognize claims made by communities if they are deemed too 
far- reaching or costly. The consolidation and/or escalation of conflict 
dynamics – rather than their mitigation – is a probable consequence of 
either case.
Governing justice claims in mining conflicts in Peru
Natural resource conflicts in Peru
Mining is the most important sector of the Peruvian economy. While its 
contribution to GDP ranged from 5 to 7 per cent between 2005 and 2011, 
its share of export revenues amounted to 50 to 60 per cent, while its con-
tribution to tax revenues was 14 per cent in 2013 (CopperAcción, 2013). 
Copper and gold are by far the most important mining products in Peru. 
In 2014, 543 mining operations were carried out with an additional 440 in 
the exploration phase (Minem, 2014).
 While highly important to the economy, mining is also highly contro-
versial in public discourse in Peru and many of the hundreds of mining 
operations have caused conflicts on the local level, often manifesting in 
protest and blockades and not rarely erupting in violence. One of the 
reasons that mining conflicts in Peru have received a degree of notoriety is 
that they are unusually well documented. As of August 2015, Defensoria 
del Pueblo (2015) documented 142 social- environmental conflicts, out of 
which 94 were mining conflicts.6 These conflicts have been characterized 
by a set of typical characteristics that closely relate to Peru’s political 
history. The largest portion of mineral extraction is taking place in the 
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Andes, where the Andean inhabitants of indigenous origin (so- called 
campesinos) have experienced political and economic marginalization 
throughout Peru’s history. When mining projects arrive in these Andean 
communities, the conflicts that arise regularly centre on the competition 
for scarce land and water resources, on environmental impacts, and the 
distribution of material benefits generated through mining (Bebbington 
and Williams, 2008). These conflicts often manifest in the form of protests 
and street blockades or attempts to forcefully enter mining compounds in 
order to bring operations to a halt (Arellano- Yanguas, 2011).
 Formally speaking, the Peruvian state has devised a relatively broad set 
of policies and institutions for dealing with mining conflicts. The law 
requires comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessments 
(ESIA) – including public hearings of affected communities – to be con-
ducted before a mining project is licensed. A number of governmental 
agencies are tasked with overseeing mining projects to enforce environ-
mental and social regulations. A national revenue redistribution scheme, 
titled Canon Minero, is also in place. This scheme prescribes the imposi-
tion of a tax that mining companies pay to the central government. Once 
received, part of the tax revenue is redistributed to the regions and districts 
in which the tax- paying mine operates. As a result, mining communities 
rank among the richest areas in Peru (Arellano- Yanguas, 2011). As for 
indigenous communities, Peruvian law permits a so- called Consulta Previa, 
that is, the right for these communities to be heard before any mining 
operation licence is conferred in their territory (Schilling- Vacaflor and 
Flemmer 2015; Flemmer and Schilling- Vacaflor, 2016). While these pol-
icies and institutional frameworks have the potential, in theory, to address 
or even prevent the emergence of conflicts, the problem – as is so often the 
case in countries with strong extractive sectors – lies in the implementation 
of these laws that requires strong governmental institutions.
 While Peru is not necessarily a state with weak levels of governance, 
national institutions are not present throughout the entire territory, with 
institutional presence particularly limited in the Andes (Arellano- Yanguas, 
2011). Furthermore, Peru’s economy remains dependent on revenues from 
the mining sector, leading the government to strive for an investment- 
friendly climate wherever it can. Consequently, the competencies of 
environmental authorities have been reduced time and again (Echave, 
2015). When conflicts do erupt between local communities and mining 
companies, the government is often perceived as siding with the company 
rather than with the community. The police or military forces frequently 
forcefully repress anti- mining protests and make excessive use of violence 
(Misereor, 2013).
 Against this background, the government has recently embarked on a 
policy of dialogue as a priority instrument for addressing mining conflicts. 
Since 2010, the so- called Mesas de Diálogo (Dialogue Tables) have been 
installed across the country whenever mining conflicts emerge. The mesas 
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are designed as multi- stakeholder processes that involve the conflict parties 
– usually a mining company, a local community, and government authori-
ties – and strive to settle the conflict through negotiation and compromise 
(Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 2013). The following subchapters 
will scrutinize one of the many dialogue processes in order to assess their 
potential for addressing local justice claims.
Southern Peru Copper and the people of Ilo: misperceiving 
recognition as distribution
The dialogue table under scrutiny was installed to deal with a conflict 
between the Southern Copper Corporation and the population of Moque-
gua. Civil society organizations (CSOs) in the port city of Ilo comprise the 
most outspoken sector of this local population, and their claims mostly 
involve environmental pollution resulting from the company’s smelter and 
refinery operations (Grupo Iniciativa Anticorrupcion Ilo 2012; Scurrah 
2013; Mesa de Diálogo de Ilo (n.d.)). Unless otherwise indicated, all empir-
ical data used in the following subchapters was collected through parti-
cipant observations during mesa sessions between June and July 2013.
The conflict between Southern Copper and the town of Ilo
The Southern Copper Corporation is one of Peru’s oldest mining com-
panies. It operates two large open- pit copper mines in the southern part of 
the country: the Cuajone project in the Moquegua region and the 
Toquepala project in Tacna. Additionally, Southern owns a copper smelter 
and refinery in the port city of Ilo. Copper production in Toquepala and 
refining in Ilo began as early as 1960. The Cuajone mine, operational since 
1976, still ranks 19th on the list of the world’s largest copper mines and 
the Ilo smelter ranks 13th (International Copper Study Group, 2014: 12, 
18). Due to both its sheer size and its long history in Peru, Southern is 
often seen and portrayed as a corporation with very privileged access to 
political decision- makers. Southern benefitted from tax exemptions granted 
by Peru’s military government (1968–1980) while environmental regula-
tions otherwise applicable to more recent mining projects have not been 
enforced on Southern for many years (Scurrah, 2013: 6–7).
 Southern’s operations have been the subject of severe social conflicts for 
almost six decades. Though this subchapter exclusively focuses on the con-
flict between Southern and the population of Ilo – whose CSOs have 
always been among the most vocal protagonist in conflicts with the 
company – the mining conflict operates on various levels and involves dif-
ferent communities across Peru’s southern regions of Moquegua and 
Tacna.
 Two specific issues have been central throughout the decades of struggle 
in Ilo and the Moquegua region. First, Southern has always held exclusive 
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water- use rights for several of the most valuable fresh water sources in the 
Moquegua region, which happens to be located at the outskirts of the 
Atacama, the world’s driest desert. As a result, the company has been able 
to satisfy its enormous water demand at no cost while the city of Ilo has 
increasingly faced water shortages (Balvín Diaz, 2004; Scurrah, 2013). 
Second, Ilo was heavily affected by the smelting facility’s emissions. South-
ern’s continued operations using technical standards from the 1960s 
resulted in extreme levels of air pollution in the city, which was repeatedly 
confirmed by various governmental authorities. Although the capture of 99 
per cent of sulphur dioxide emissions in copper production has long been 
the standard elsewhere, Southern operated without any emission controls 
in Ilo for 35 years (Boon et al., 2001: 219). As early as 1968, a national 
law required Southern to begin reducing its emissions but was later 
repealed after a change in government. As recently as 1998 Southern com-
pleted an upgrade for capturing 33 per cent of emissions, still leaving them 
at levels that a WHO investigation deemed dangerous to human health 
(Boon et al., 2001: 219). The complete modernization of its operations 
that brought emissions controls up to current technological standards was 
only completed in February 2007 (Southern Copper, 2007).
 Complaints about these emissions and their impacts arose just months 
after the smelting facility in Ilo had begun operations in 1960 (Scurrah, 
2013: 6). In fact, Ilo’s vibrant CSOs emerged as a result of this very con-
flict. These organizations have led many street protests and have repeatedly 
tried to use Peruvian state institutions to forward their claims. For 
example, they sought administrative investigations by responsible authori-
ties, such as the national water authority (Autoridad Nacional del Agua, 
ANA) and the environmental monitoring agency (Organismo de Eval-
uación y Fiscalización Ambiental, OEFA). They have filed lawsuits in Peru 
and even took their claims to the United States when US investors still held 
a majority share in Southern (Interview 1). In the course of these struggles, 
the organizations built valuable human capital, since technical expertise 
was needed to provide evidence of the dangerous levels of emissions and 
their impacts on air quality, human health, or agricultural production 
(Interview 2; Scurrah, 2013: 40).
 In 2007, when Southern completed the modernization of its facilities, 
the CSOs based in Ilo achieved their primary objective of significantly 
reducing harmful emissions. Justice claims against Southern did not, 
however, subside as a result. On the contrary, Ilo’s population subse-
quently demanded material compensation for 46 years of uncontrolled 
emissions (LABOR, 2006; Mesa de Dialogo de Ilo, n.d.).
 From an analytical perspective, it is reasonable to classify this demand 
for compensation as a recognition- related justice claim. At first sight, the 
local claims undoubtedly aimed at (re-)distribution: Ilo’s population now 
demanded material benefits to compensate for past damages to their lives. 
At the same time, however, the people of Ilo also demanded the official 
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acknowledgement of their suffering and the subsequent recognition of the 
company’s wrongdoings. Hence, recognition was particularly important to 
the local actors. This became evident in many personal and written 
exchanges in which CSOs complained that company representatives, 
among other things, showed “a lack of respect for the people of Ilo when 
alleging that there had been no environmental impacts of the metallurgical 
operations” (Interview 3).
The governance response: a mesa de diálogo
Mesas de diálogo have become popular all across Peru over the past 
decade. They are one of the most important policy instruments for the 
central government in response to the many social conflicts revolving 
around mining projects throughout the country (Presidencia del Consejo 
de Ministros, 2013). On the initiative of the new regional government led 
by Manual Vizcarra in 2012, a new mesa was established to deal with the 
conflicting issues involving Southern in the Moquegua region. This initi-
ative complemented two other, closely related, mesa processes: In Moque-
gua itself, the regional government had successfully concluded a mesa with 
the incoming mining company, Anglo American, while local communities 
in the Tacna region successfully negotiated a new deal with Southern 
(Interviews 1, 2, and 4). The mesa with Anglo not only succeeded in secur-
ing an extraordinarily high social contribution from the company to the 
region, but also – and more importantly – resulted in significant changes in 
the mining company’s operational plans, particularly with regards to its 
water use management plans (Interviews 5 and 6; Scurrah 2013; see also 
Elliott 2013). As a result of the mesa, Anglo’s operations would greatly 
reduce the company’s reliance on freshwater resources that have com-
petitive uses in local agriculture. The mesa with Southern in Tacna, for its 
part, was primarily lauded for the social contribution that Southern agreed 
to pay in exchange for the expansion of its Toquepala mine. Following 
these recent and proximate examples, Martin Vizcarra, at that time the 
regional president of Moquegua, proposed an analogous process with 
Southern and succeeded in securing its implementation (Interview 2; 
Scurrah, 2013).
 The institutional design of the Southern mesa resembled the model that 
has been rolled out all across Peru. It was created by a ministerial resolu-
tion and is tripartite in nature, incorporating government representatives 
along with CSOs and the company (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, 
2013). The mesa has likewise adopted some regional particularities copied 
from the Moqeuguan mesa with Anglo. Among these regional specificities 
was the regional government’s very strong role in the proceedings. More 
precisely, the plenary was led by the regional president, who had also pre-
sided over the mesa with Anglo and was seen to have personally con-
tributed to its success (Flohr, 2014). The Southern mesa met regularly 
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between October 2012 and April 2014. Its mandate was broadly formu-
lated as “analysing the hydrological, environmental, and mining problems 
with Southern in the region of Moquegua” (Mesa de Diálogo, 2012: 1, 
authors’ own translation).
Misperceived justice claims
The mesa had a broad mandate to “analyse” a variety of issues related to 
the conflict with Southern.7 From its first plenary sessions, however, it 
became evident that the demand for compensation for environmental 
damages would be a central issue for many mesa participants, particularly 
civil society representatives (Grupo Iniciativa Anticorrupcion Ilo, 2012). 
The latter regularly raised this concern at plenary sessions, often resulting 
in heated confrontations with representatives from Southern. The compa-
ny’s representatives highlighted the fact that this topic was not part of the 
mesa’s mandate and that they were not ready to discuss the issue. Southern 
argued that a claim for compensation was totally ill- founded as its opera-
tions had always complied with the applicable laws. Hence, the alleged 
past environmental impacts were no longer a matter for discussion since 
large investments into upgrading the refinery and smelting facility to 
current technical standards had solved the problem (Interviews 7 and 8).
 For the people of Ilo, the technological upgrade was insufficient for cor-
recting the past harm they had suffered, and they therefore continued to 
demand compensation. While both social contributions and compensation 
entail a transfer of money, compensation also responds to claims for justice 
through recognition (of past harm inflicted) while social contributions do 
not. Consequently, the conflict between Southern and the community in Ilo 
was reinforced rather than mitigated. Any time this topic emerged, the dis-
cussions at the mesa would stall. For Southern, discussing the issue of com-
pensation was completely off the table; for the people of Ilo, compensation 
was their primary demand. The controversy was clearly understood as an 
issue of justice, specifically justice as a form of recognition. This is evident 
in light of the statements made during mesa sessions where citizens of Ilo 
reacted with indignation to propositions by Southern to make a (financial) 
‘social contribution’ to the region of Moquegua in exchange for a con-
tinued ‘social licence to operate’. Ilo representatives frequently intervened 
to clarify that, in their view, any such discussion about a social contribu-
tion was meaningless unless a debate about ‘compensation’ for the environ-
mental and health impacts the people had suffered from Southern’s 
operations in the past was started.
 The fact that the people of Ilo demanded compensation instead of a 
contribution indicates that this was a matter of justice as recognition (as 
victims of mistreatment at the hands of Southern) rather than justice as 
distribution – even though material benefits would ultimately be distrib-
uted one way or another. However, the nature of this local justice claim 
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was misperceived by most of the mesa participants and by Southern’s rep-
resentatives in particular. According to the latter, the mesa in the Moque-
gua region was a mistake in the first place as the company did not plan to 
make changes in their Moqugua operations and was therefore not obliged 
to secure any form of societal consent. In Southern’s view, the only reason 
that the people of Ilo demanded a mesa in Moquegua related to the fact 
that the company had agreed to pay a social contribution in Tacna and 
Moquegua sought to receive the same benefits. As the company argued, the 
contribution in Tacna was due to an expansion it planned for its 
Toquepala operations; since the company did not plan any expansion in 
Moquegua, there was no need to negotiate a benefit- sharing agreement 
with the locals.
 As is evident in the above analysis, attempts to resolve the long- standing 
conflict pertaining to Southern’s operations – and its past emissions in par-
ticular – through a mesa de diálogo were ill- conceived from the start. The 
Peruvian Mesas are, by their very nature, meant to facilitate collaborative 
processes that bring about compromise solutions through multi- stakeholder 
dialogue. Such an instrument could not address the central claim of the 
population of Ilo – compensation of past damages. Claims for compensa-
tion are invariably confrontational rather than dialogue- oriented. One side 
believes it has been unduly harmed by the other, while the other side is 
unlikely to voluntarily acknowledge and act upon this claim.
 Indeed, even if the party inflicting damage accepted its responsibilities 
and ‘voluntarily’ paid compensation, this outcome would still most likely 
not satisfy the party making the claim. This owes to the fact that claims for 
compensation inherently imply claims for rectification or punishment. 
Claim- makers want the accused parties to be faulted and publicly punished 
by a super- ordinate third party; this is the only outcome that would suffice 
to satisfy their recognition- related demands. In formal legal systems, 
courts, for example, provide this form of recognition (and often impose 
some type of compensation), particularly in criminal proceedings that 
result in identifying guilt. For cases in which a proceeding is sought by 
one party, out- of-court settlements are often not an option since the 
recognition- related claims remain unfulfilled without a formal identifica-
tion of guilt – despite the pecuniary result being very similar.
 In fact, the people of Ilo were seeking an official and ideally legal identi-
fication of Southern’s wrongdoing, which could not have come from 
Southern itself. In this sense, the mesa, with its collaborative proceeding, 
was an inappropriate venue for the compensation claim from the very 
beginning. Even if two thirds of its tripartite structure were ready to publi-
cally recognize Southern’s ‘guilt’, the company would have always refused. 
This deficiency of the mesa as a governance instrument for the mining con-
flict was apparently overlooked by all the parties involved. The regional 
government knew that the past damages done by Southern would be a 
central issue and even so installed the mesa. The Ilo- based CSOs expected 
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that their claim for compensation would finally be heard. Southern appar-
ently believed that it could use the mesa to secure its social licence to 
operate without dealing with compensation claims.8
Conclusion
Justice claims are ubiquitous in local conflicts involving natural resources. 
In this chapter, we sought to present an analytical framework for studying 
such conflicts. This framework departs from the justice claims made by 
local communities defined as perceived entitlements. The framework dif-
ferentiates among three dimensions of justice: justice as distribution, 
representation, and recognition. The assumption is that empirical analyses 
reveal serious gaps in justice between local communities – as senders of 
these claims – and their addressees – be they corporations, state actors, or 
others. Consequently, addressees may simply decline local claims or their 
governance activities will not satisfy the senders. Alternatively, addressees 
may misperceive the nature of local justice claims and therefore fail to 
properly address them. The consolidation and/or escalation of conflict 
dynamics is a likely consequence in either case.
 This argument was illustrated through a case study of a local mining 
conflict in Peru. In this conflict, the population of the port city of Ilo in 
Peru’s Moqeugua region had been protesting against the operations of the 
mining company Southern Copper and its metallurgical complex in Ilo for 
decades. The population demanded that Southern assume responsibility for 
the environmental and health impacts it had inflicted on Ilo. While the 
community demands compensation for these impacts, attempts at resolving 
the conflict have regularly failed since they do not take the justice dimen-
sion inherent in a claim for compensation into account: seeking compensa-
tion for past damages involves a recognition- based claim. All attempts at 
resolving the conflict, including the most recent multi- stakeholder dialogue 
process, have, however, resulted in Southern offering the community a 
social contribution, at best – which resembles a distribution- based claim.
 The proposed framework for studying empirical justice claims can be 
applied to local conflicts in different countries and in relation to various 
types of natural resources. A result of further research could be the identi-
fication of similarities and differences of justice claims. To what extent are 
justice claims – similar in regard to their content and addressees – put 
forward by local communities in different regions of one country or across 
several countries? To what extent do justice claims have regionally or 
culturally specific characteristics? What can account for the similarities and 
differences identified? Further empirical research might also highlight cases 
in which local justice claims have more comprehensively been addressed 
and indicate whether this has led to more effective mitigation of the under-
lying resource conflicts.
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Notes
1 The authors would like to thank Mara Funda for her highly professional research 
assistance.
2 The authors are immensely thankful to all stakeholders in Moquegua who sup-
ported this work by contributing their first- hand insights.
3 According to the revised definition of the HIIK (2015), a political conflict 
is a positional difference, regarding values relevant to a society – the conflict 
items – between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is 
being carried out using observable and interrelated conflict measures that lie 
outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core state functions, 
the international order or hold out the prospect to do so.
(8)
4 The approach chosen is in line with the Just Peace Governance research pro-
gramme at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, where the empirical investiga-
tion of justice claims and justice- related conflicts is one of the main objectives 
(see Müller, 2010; Daase and Humrich, 2011; Poppe and Wolff, 2013).
5 Note, in this context, that the very implementation of resource extraction pro-
jects may contribute to processes of identity and group formation in the first 
place.
6 Note that the marked difference between the Peru- specific figures presented in 
this section and the world- wide, as well as Latin America- specific, figures pre-
sented above seems to primarily result from an unfortunate interplay of discrep-
ancies in definitions, different ways of counting, and severe data gaps.
7 Indeed, the very mandate of the mesa regularly became the topic of fierce debate. 
During the sessions, Southern would often point out that the mesa was overstep-
ping its competencies when it went beyond an ‘analysis’ of the problems and 
sought accords on possible solutions.
8 At the time of writing (September 2015), the Southern mesa in Moquegua was 
ongoing because a technical commission, named ‘social contribution’, had been 
unable to work out a compromise. Though field research for this chapter was 
last conducted in 2013, the misperception of justice claims presented here is 
likely to remain the principal reason that the mesa participants remain unable to 
produce a mutually acceptable resolution for the local mining conflict up to the 
present day.
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7 Corporate social responsibility
A globally applicable tool to 
manage community–company 
relations in the extractive sector?1
Johanna Sydow
Introduction
When I arrived in New Abirem, Ghana in August 2009, the multinational 
mining company Newmont had not yet started its operations. It was estab-
lishing alternative livelihood programmes, community administered devel-
opment funds, and trainings for affected communities. Newmont was, it 
seemed, welcomed by the community, considered more responsible than 
other mining companies operating in Ghana. Newmont’s Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) programmes, administered through a newly estab-
lished NGO, were praised by different local institutions as being unique and 
extensive. Meanwhile, at the global level, the US- based mining company, 
one of the world’s leading gold producers, is part of the UN Global 
Compact and the Voluntary Principles of Human Rights and Security, 
which set certain standards that engaged corporations have to meet.
 In 2010 in Peru, where Newmont has been extracting gold since 1993, I 
encountered a very different picture of corporate- community dynamics. 
Community relations with Newmont were marked by deep mistrust and 
open contestation. Like in Ghana, Newmont had established an NGO, 
when it began operations in the early 1990s, to manage its CSR issues and 
community relations. Yet, as we will see, the NGO in Peru was seen in a 
rather different light – more as an instrument of corporate interests than a 
vehicle of community upliftment – to the one newly set up in Ghana.
 CSR, which this chapter examines more closely in the context of New-
mont’s operations in Ghana and Peru, has become common practice within 
the extractive sector over the past two decades and is the focus of an 
increasing body of academic literature. Scholarly perspectives concerning 
its impacts are often diametrically opposed. While some see CSR optimist-
ically as a way of humanizing business (Matten and Crane, 2003), many 
doubt that CSR prevents the negative social and environmental impact of 
multinational enterprise (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Going a step 
further, some argue that CSR grants the company more control and power 
over the government and local community (Rajak, 2011). This chapter will 
further investigate this argument, elaborating on the capacity of CSR as a 
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standardized strategy and set of corresponding technologies to exercise 
corporate power and discipline in very different local contexts.
 According to Ferguson (1994), the application of a standardized pro-
gramme is possible if the problem addressed is de- contextualized and 
discursively transformed into a technical problem. Through this de- 
contextualization, power structures are made invisible, and poverty causes 
and ‘development measures’ are de- politicized. Consequently, Ferguson 
argues, in the context of development operations, which he describes as 
“anti- politics” machines, highly political agendas can be implemented 
without seeming to be political. CSR in the extractive sector is promoted as 
this kind of standardized solution (Rajak, 2011: 18). In this sense, CSR can 
provide mining companies with a depoliticizing mechanism such as this, to 
veil or contain the underlying and emerging issues of inequality and margin-
alization – for example, in the case of displacement and resettlement of local 
populations. Questions of fairness of the implemented measures fade into 
the background and are quietened by the argument of development. Such 
questions could refer to the process of implementation and outcome. Fair-
ness in regard to process can mean that possible consequences of operations 
are outlined, all relevant stakeholders are included in decision- making pro-
cesses, weak stakeholders receive special support, and possible results of par-
ticipatory processes are accepted. Only if a process is perceived as being fair, 
there can be a ‘fair’ and acceptable outcome. In any case, the perception of 
resource fairness varies from social positions and different local contexts.
 My analysis shows how Newmont approaches local communities on 
different continents in a standardized way. Following its one global model 
developed in abstraction from the particular contexts of operations, it aims 
for standardized, manageable outcomes. Scott (1998) argues that a state, 
to a large extent, gains power over its citizens – as corporations do over 
surrounding populations (Ferguson, 2005) – by making society administra-
ble through the simplification of qualitative matters into measurable units. 
From this perspective, people are uniform, measurable units without any 
specific skills or experience (Scott, 1998: 346). Thus, a standardizing view 
on communities would provide the company with more control. Ferguson 
(1994) also argues that these standardized solutions often fail to achieve 
the targeted development result, but still have an (unintended) side effect. 
It is an influential “instrumental effect” (Ferguson, 1994: 256), which 
enables the exercise of power over the target population. This power is a 
“bureaucratic power” (Ferguson, 1994: 274) exercised through the admin-
istration of development projects over the surrounding population. Instead 
of working with the state, CSR works in the “spaces where the state fails 
to deliver” which “creates opportunities for new unintended consequences 
to flow from CSR interventions” (Sharp, 2006: 220).
 Yet, the ethnographic evidence presented here from Newmont’s opera-
tions in Ghana and Peru show that standardized methods do not neces-
sarily produce standardized effects of control. Newmont had been present 
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in Peru for much longer than in Ghana, but was not able to adjust its 
standardized concepts to the local context and to make use of instrumental 
effects. Its grand CSR concept could not prevent huge protests against its 
new mining project ‘Conga’. Indeed, violent clashes with the police led to a 
temporary suspension of the venture (Osterman and Wilson, 2012).
 While Scott (1998) and Ferguson (1994; 2005) give great insight into 
the workings of power, which will be particularly useful in the discussion 
of Newmont’s techniques, they neglect the relevance of counter- conduct. 
As I will show, they fundamentally underestimate the agency of local 
actors. Based on my ethnographic fieldwork at Newmont’s site of opera-
tions in Ghana (July–October 2009) and Peru (November 2010), I set out 
to examine the power and limitations of corporate techniques alongside 
the perspectives and agency of local actors, through a comparison of local 
responses to standardized corporate techniques. In Ghana, my core data 
include extensive field notes from participatory observation and 14 semi- 
structured interviews with different employees of the mining company, 
affected and non- affected local inhabitants, members of the district assem-
bly and other local institutions in the context of Newmont’s preparation 
for a new mining operation in New Abirem, as well as with activists, 
NGOs, and government bodies outside of the place of operation. More-
over, participatory observation from the three months of research, official 
documents, newspaper articles, and 40 additional interviews at four dif-
ferent mining sites broadened my understanding of the mining sector in 
Ghana. In Peru, I analysed the company–community relations on the basis 
of participatory observation, ten semi- structured interviews with local and 
international NGOs, the NGO responsible for Newmont’s CSR pro-
gramme, community leaders, and other community members affected by 
planned mining operations in Cajamarca and surroundings as well as inter-
national news, blogs of activists, and social media sites.
 The comparative angle of one company operating at two different places 
across two continents serves as a unique basis to better comprehend the 
dynamics of standardized tools in different contexts. Moreover, the dif-
ferent stages of the two operations – one being an expansion of a long- 
standing project, the other being a prospective operation far away from 
other operations of the same company – reveals how a temporal dimen-
sion, the stage of operation, influences corporate strategies as well as local 
response. The comparison between two different continents with suppos-
edly differing discourses on the benefits and risks of mining, a difference in 
experience with mining, differing legal frameworks, and different networks 
available will show that standardized techniques cannot always adequately 
deal with complexities at the local level nor fully absorb counter- conduct 
and the agency of local actors. Ultimately, I challenge the conception that 
standardized techniques of governance yield a standardized effect of domi-
nation and argue instead that local specificities, agency, and counter- 
conduct shape the effects of corporate techniques.
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The power and function of CSR: the academic debate
Much academic work has been published on the social and environmental 
impacts of mining across different disciplines reaching back to colonial 
times (Lentz, 2008). Even though the risks of resource extraction are well 
known (Sachs and Warner, 1997), mining is still promoted as a key driving 
force for development (Akabzaa, 2000). While some scholars see this issue 
as a matter of resource and revenue management, more critical voices have 
emerged that question resource- based economies and resource extraction 
in general, especially in Latin America (Gudynas, 2012).
CSR discourse
In response to this general critique, CSR programmes have emerged in the 
extractive sector (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012: 185). However, CSR 
itself has become the focus of an increasingly polarized literature. On the 
one hand, we find authors who welcome the emergence of CSR and 
endorse initiatives like the Global Compact as the foundation for volun-
tary engagement in environmental issues and human rights (Cetindamar 
and Husoy, 2007). Others go so far as to argue that companies should step 
into the empty space which governments fail to develop and correct this 
failure (Hopkins, 2012). Gifford and Kestler’s (2008) study on Newmont 
in Peru views CSR as a medium to earn the ‘social licence’ to mine, provid-
ing an adequate mechanism to control the behaviour of corporations. On 
the other hand, many see this development more critically, arguing that 
CSR is a façade that helps companies to formally satisfy different expecta-
tions, while maintaining practices which are strongly decoupled from the 
rhetoric of compliance (Hiß, 2006). In this sense, CSR distracts from the 
demands for stronger regulations (Cetindamar and Husoy, 2007). Some 
authors go further, arguing that CSR is a tool that shapes “social relations 
and projects according to a particular set of corporate interests and values” 
(Rajak, 2011: 12). Rajak points to a discursive power that lies with CSR, 
which is often dismissed. This provides companies with a “moral mech-
anism through which their authority is extended over the social order” 
(2011: 13). By creating cohesion and local bonds with actors of the com-
munity, companies can gain strength. Thus CSR, rather than being a phil-
anthropic and altruistic act, offers mining companies a way to increase 
their agency and control. This insight is the starting point of my analysis.
 Among the studies which examine CSR as a corporate tool to manage 
company–community relations, a few key studies highlight the way in 
which companies use social programmes to achieve control at the local 
level. Kapelus (2002) identifies different corporate strategies to stay in 
“good stead with potential financiers and local elites” (291). He shows 
how a company gains control by limiting participation to symbolic parti-
cipation. A so called ‘divide and rule’ strategy monitored by Sawyer (2004) 
Corporate social responsibility  113
is the creation of allies and inequality through the strategic implementation 
of social programmes. These studies give detailed insight into the power of 
CSR to channel local actors’ behaviour, while also revealing the common 
corporate logic and techniques in diverse contexts. Nevertheless, as 
Arellano- Yanguas (2011: 634) argues, companies are not always successful 
at eliminating conflicts over their operations through their CSR pro-
grammes, and other factors also play an important role. Indeed, as this 
chapter shows, CSR does not always achieve its intended ends and yield 
the expected benefits to companies.
Global yet local
According to Rajak (2011), “the power of CSR [. . .] lies, to a great extent, 
in its capacity to claim global applicability (underwritten by supposedly 
universal market values)” (218). Thus, CSR is promoted as a universally 
applicable and locally adjustable tool that is implemented by globally 
active companies like Newmont in different local contexts. Different insti-
tutions and standards, like the international protocol of Voluntary Prin-
ciples on Security and Human Rights provide a scheme into which local 
CSR programmes are meant to fit (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 2012). Thus 
global norms shape the content and processes of CSR, not least by ensur-
ing a respectable global image, which is important for multinational com-
panies when ensuring future investments. This construction of CSR implies 
that global schemes can be designed in abstraction of local specificities but 
capture, adjust to, and deal with local structures in a more or less predict-
able way. It implies that standardized CSR can shape, control and keep its 
‘community’ content by abstracting from cultural and historical differences 
and so on.
 There is little academic literature that systematically analyses and com-
pares the reaction of communities to similar corporate techniques by the 
same company in different national contexts in order to examine the 
assumption of their global applicability. Consequently, there is a lack of 
understanding of their limits and if and to what extent contextual factors, 
as opposed to standardized strategies, influence local inhabitants’ reaction 
towards mining operations. When set alongside Li’s (2009) study of a 
Newmont mine in Peru, my study of Newmont’s community engagement 
in Ghana and Peru makes clear that despite the major geographical, social, 
environmental, political, and economic differences, the company deploys 
the same toolkit and technologies in its attempt to manage the community. 
At the same time, the ethnographic evidence presented in this chapter 
reveals how Newmont’s claims to universal applicability are highly prob-
lematic and how contextual factors, in particular the agency of local 
actors, have a huge impact on its effects.
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Community relation management: the concept of Denver
Newmont’s multinational corporation’s management of corporate respons-
ibility is highly centralized and standardized. The “ultimate oversight 
responsibility for the management of community relationships lies with the 
Board of Directors [. . .] in Denver” (Smith and Feldman, 2009: 17). The 
company’s standards are developed according to the management goals 
and global standards like the Global Compact, Extractive Industry Trans-
parency Initiative (EITI), or ISO 14001 and then deferred to the regional 
offices to be implemented.
 This task is based on a good amount of global thinking and reduction 
of complexity by abstraction. Experiences from certain selected mine sites 
are gathered, generalized, and then transformed into strategies with 
intended universal applicability. This is seen clearly in Newmont’s Com-
munity Relation Review, which was demanded by a shareholder’s meeting 
in 2007 in response to protests that started to hamper Newmont’s opera-
tions (Smith and Feldman, 2009: 1). The review offers general “lessons 
learned”. In the following years, these have become criteria according to 
which the different mining sites are evaluated in an annual letter to the 
company’s shareholders.
 One such “lesson learned” is dealing with the implementation of a 
better monitoring system for community relations at the regional level. It 
results from the identification of a gap between implemented programmes 
and Newmont’s global standards on the paper. The external reviewers 
related this gap to the weakness of its reporting scheme for social relations. 
They argue that in order to “establish effective systems of accountability, 
Newmont will need to develop key performance indicators and metrics for 
community relations performance” (Smith and Feldman, 2009: 133). Inev-
itably, the processes of measurement and evaluation themselves have a 
significant impact on the object of evaluation (Scott, 1998: 348), as com-
munity relations are transformed into numbers in order to produce the 
necessary standardization and therefore better ‘manage performance’.
 An essential element of the global corporate standard is the establish-
ment of local Consultative Committees and Social Responsibility Forums, 
prescribed by the head office to all its operations in order to manage 
diverse and potentially unpredictable situations. The Social Responsibility 
Forum is celebrated as a best practice mechanism for participatory com-
munity investment and concern management to be implemented at the dif-
ferent sites. Here, the company seeks to enable a degree of local agency but 
within a controlled realm. By bureaucratizing and institutionalizing the 
interface between community and company, new structures are imple-
mented to exercise power.
 The following section moves on to explore the implementation of dif-
ferent elements (community concern management, participatory invest-
ment, engagement with the government at different levels, creation of local 
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jobs and business opportunities) of the global company- community 
relations standard generated in Denver at the company’s local operational 
sites in Ghana and Peru. In doing so, I show that, while Newmont 
approaches its community relations in a standardized way, the very same 
CSR tools and standardized strategies do not lead to standardized effects 
of domination.
Ghana: the application of a global concept in a local context
The Chief of Abirem in the Eastern Region, Nana Amo Kyeretwie I 
[. . .] has admonished the NGOs to allow the company to engage in 
fruitful negotiations with the communities in the Newmont Akyem 
Project area for mining to commence for the benefit of the people and 
the country as a whole.
(Daily Graphic, 2009)
In the context of the Structural Adjustment Programmes around 1983, a 
mining law with extremely low environmental and social standards and 
favourable foreign direct investment conditions was implemented in 
Ghana. The ensuing mining boom led to immense and violent resettle-
ments, water pollution, and conflicts between large- and small- scale miners 
resulting in violent clashes between local communities and both private 
and public security forces (Akabzaa, 2000). In this context, the NGO 
Wassa Association of Communities Affected by Mining (WACAM) was 
founded, supporting local communities in disputes with mining companies. 
In 2009, during my research in New Abirem (Eastern region) approxi-
mately 120 km from the location of these incidents, the mining company 
Newmont was preparing its second project in Ghana, the first being 
located around 200 km from New Abirem in Brong Ahafo region.
 While waiting for the approval of its Environmental Impact Assessment, 
the company’s local CSR personnel devoted their attention to building up 
key strategic relations with specific community actors. Due to future 
resettlement and compensation issues, the management of community rela-
tions is paramount for the company in the early stages of an operation. In 
this context, Newmont established two institutions with elected represent-
atives to enable broad community support following its global standard of 
participatory community investment and concern management: a Social 
Responsibility Forum (SRF ) and a Consultative Committee (in the form of 
a Compensation Negotiation Committee, CNC). Within the SRF, elected 
community representatives, the chief, members of the district assembly, 
and Newmont representatives came together to discuss ways to improve 
the communities, focusing primarily on infrastructural investment and 
development, such as the renovation or construction of schools. In this 
way, expectations that the mine would bring about development to the 
communities were raised.
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 The task of the CNC, following the same principles of election, was to 
negotiate the amount Newmont would pay in compensation for crop, land 
use, and property loss. In line with the standard, elected community repre-
sentatives, Newmont’s representatives, and the community chiefs estab-
lished procedural rules for the negotiation. External observers from the 
district assembly and other institutions were invited, but at the same time 
the objectives of the CNC forbid the reporting of decisions as well as 
recording or note- taking without permission. Through the implementation 
of this CNC, following globally applied principles of representative demo-
cracy, Newmont avoided multiple individual negotiations, instead aiming 
for a collective solution, namely a standardized price for everybody’s land, 
crops, and property.
 Yet, the standardized treatment of people, land, and property was per-
ceived as unfair by some of the farmers, who wanted to negotiate the price 
themselves and who saw the standardized method as failing to account for 
the complexity of local structures and different value of plants in the fields. 
They doubted that the chiefs were negotiating in the interest of the com-
munities and some indigenous farmers did not want to be represented by 
settler farmers. However, despite these conflicts of interest, by implement-
ing the CNC, Newmont effectively forestalled many individual conflicts 
and transferred the responsibility for price negotiations to the representa-
tives. This sharing of responsibility, also described by Li (2009) in Peru, 
suggests that local communities are participating in shaping the future. It is 
a side effect which empowers Newmont to achieve formal legitimacy for 
the established price and the compensation practice. At the same time, the 
individual agency of farmers is decreased in comparison to individual 
negotiations.
 Newmont stated at the time that it did not know where people would 
be resettled. Thus, the representatives did not know the extent to which 
they would actually be affected while negotiating in the committee. The 
emphasis was on monetary compensation, which, in comparison to what 
people normally earned, seemed substantial. Thereby, attention was drawn 
to what farmers would get, and away from what they would lose. 
This attempt to obscure the actual future impact for every individual 
effectively depoliticizes the highly contentious processes of compensation 
and resettlement. It conceals potentially unfair and disadvantageous out-
comes for certain local actors. It can be interpreted as a strategic form of 
(dis)information politics.
Local employment, business opportunities, and strategic 
information
A key element of Newmont’s CSR strategy is a set of measures designed to 
create local employment and business opportunities (Smith and Feldman, 
2009: 97). By founding an NGO, called Olives, that provided alternative 
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livelihood programmes, it refers to one of its core values, sustainability. At 
that early stage of operation not many jobs were yet available, but people 
envisioned a job in the near future. Those who worked with the mine were 
seen to earn a comparatively large amount of money. For many, the loss of 
farmland seemed to be redeemed by these fascinating probabilities, 
dismissing the risk of unfair outcome. Some people, such as the chiefs, 
had already been promised work by the company and in response 
Newmont received their support. By constantly referring to its high 
sustainability and commitments to participatory approaches, Newmont 
aimed to establish an image distinct from other companies. It successfully 
targeted the unlinking of its operations from negative environmental and 
social impacts that people had heard about from other places such as 
Obuasi and Prestea.
Politics of de- politicization
Newmont’s special involvement of members from the district assembly and 
chiefs in the CNC and SRF corresponds to a standard of involvement with 
the government of all levels from the headquarters in Denver. As the chief-
dom in Ghana is a traditional structure parallel to the governmental 
system, Newmont has to engage with the chiefs when adjusting its stand-
ards to the local context. Traditional chiefdom was strongly enhanced 
during colonial time as it served the British to execute indirect rule (Lentz, 
2008). Newmont builds on this structure or even enhances it. A calculated 
effect of this is that chiefs react with reciprocity towards the company and 
try to keep resistance low. This led to the fact that chiefs openly stated that 
they did not want NGOs like WACAM to come to the Akyem area. Rep-
resentatives of the NGO FIAN (Food- First Information and Action 
Network) were even detained by chiefs when they came to the communities 
without permission.
 Newmont also uses these chief–company relationships to project dis-
courses of accountability and transparency back onto critical NGOs. In 
this manner, Newmont tries to disqualify accusations against the company 
in order to hide the political dimension of its own operations. In 2009, the 
NGO FIAN (working together with WACAM) channelled a complaint 
against Newmont (Ghana) through the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Shortly after, newspapers 
quoted the chiefs stating that Newmont was very welcome and doing great 
work, they also stated that WACAM was lying and they did not want 
any more interference with this organization (Daily Graphic, 2009; 
Kofoya- Tetteh, 2009). According to WACAM, a chief openly admitted in 
an interview with a journalist that Newmont paid them money for carry-
ing out this media campaign. Newmont confirmed on its website that it 
promised chiefs an allowance of US$8,000 for all extra work upcoming in 
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the context of the mine (Newmont, 2009). Hence, it tried to silence the 
accusation of bribery by showing transparency.
 Whilst, in my interviews, doubts were raised with regard to New-
mont’s sustainability at the project site, nobody openly talked about the 
disagreement with the company. At the mine site, a virtual consensus 
emerged amongst informants, all hoping that the company would start 
operations quickly, so contributing to a general feeling that the majority 
supported the mine. More critical or dissenting actors were geograph-
ically distant from the mine site and dispersed, so that they mostly did 
not even know of each other, precluding the possibility of any organized 
dissent.
 With its CSR concept, Newmont managed to create a widely recognized 
image of being different from other companies, generating widespread 
popular support for the mining operations. In this context, the traditional 
structure of chiefdom was instrumentalized by the company in order to 
keep resistance low. The prospect of work, compensation payments, and 
local improvements stemming from the SRF were, for many, powerful 
inducements, despite potential losses of land and livelihoods as well as 
likely environmental damage.
Peru: the limits of standards
In 2012, hundreds of people marched through the streets of Lima protest-
ing against Yanacocha’s mainly Newmont- owned new venture, Conga, in 
the highlands of Peru, close to its other operations. Some weeks later, local 
protests led to a violent clash with the police, resulting in several deaths, 
the temporary suspension of the project, and a state of emergency (Oster-
man and Wilson, 2012). A key question running through this chapter is, 
then, how did the very same techniques of CSR that proved so powerful in 
enlisting local consent in Ghana fail to do the same and even contribute to 
dissent and resistance in Peru.
 Mainly Newmont- owned and present in Cajamarca since 1992, Yana-
cocha is one of the most influential mining companies in Peru (Bury, 2004: 
80). Much like Ghana, Peru has a history of mining dating back to colo-
nial times and possesses legal and favorable conditions for FDI and low 
environmental legislation (Arellano- Yanguas, 2008: 18–19). Thorp (2012) 
argues that the extraction processes “influenced the early shaping of insti-
tutions” (113), now seen to be weak at all levels of government. Interna-
tionally, Peru ranks very low in terms of security, political stability, and 
socio- economic agreements and ranks high on conflicts over land on indi-
genous issues (Arellano- Yanguas, 2008: 1). 
Conflicts harm the profits of operation and put the viability of 
large planned investments at risk. In response to this situation, mining 
companies, in collaboration with the national government and 
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international institutions, are trying to apply international prescrip-
tions to the Peruvian context.
(Arellano- Yanguas, 2008: 23)
CSR in the local context: an attempt at de- politicization
Similar to Olives in Ghana, the mine established an NGO named Associ-
ation los Andes Cajamarca (ALAC) in 2004. Its activity of funding pro-
grammes of other regional NGOs can be seen as a kind of participatory 
investment, as money is distributed to various local organizations. Both in 
reach and finance, it is far more extensive than in Ghana. However, several 
actors I interviewed described Newmont’s financing as a dangerous way of 
securing reciprocal behaviour and of defending the corporate idea. Several 
organizations and individuals criticized ALAC’s role in the development of 
conservation plans of hiring the experts necessary to secure the outcome of 
the study. To declare certain zones within the concession as conservation 
areas is an attempt by the regional government to regain control over the 
territory through land- use management. In trying to influence these studies, 
Newmont tries to prevent this regaining of control.
 ALAC is furthermore accused of influencing election results by financing 
special activities for favoured candidates, or by giving certain benefits to a 
community to create social pressure. The outcome of an election can be 
crucial for the mining company, as the mayor plays a decisive role in the 
process of land use management.
 According to the global standards from the headquarters in Denver, 
ALAC also focuses on local employment and business opportunities, in the 
form of local entrepreneurial capacity and income generation. It supports 
agricultural and agro- industrial production and introduces microcredit 
systems. According to an employee of ALAC, these programmes teach the 
value of money. This is a powerful tool as compensation mechanisms will 
only work if people willingly hand over certain rights to the company in 
exchange for cash. Only then can it be perceived as a fair deal. Moreover, 
local inhabitants observed that Newmont uses the promise of employment 
as a tool to silence participants in land- use management workshops. 
Hence, it tries to prevent the use of new bureaucratic structures to decrease 
corporate power.
 One of ALAC’s enterprises is institutional capacity- building conforming 
to the global standard of government engagement. According to an 
employee of ALAC, this involves the implementation of a new system of 
planning and budgeting, which can lead governments to plan huge invest-
ments, making it indispensable to support the mine to be able to pay back 
the debt. Many actors see this close relationship as compromising the 
impartiality of the government.
 Corresponding to the standard of community concern management and 
far more extensive than in Ghana, Newmont has implemented different 
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modes of public participation and community consultations in the context 
of its planned expansion, the Conga project, since 2007 (Newmont, 2012). 
However, these methods were perceived as symbolic participation. Parti-
cipants were able to ask questions and to comment, but their influence was 
not clear and in no case could they stop a project from being approved (Li, 
2009: 232).
 With its CSR programmes, Yanacocha portrays itself as efficient as well 
as socially and environmentally responsible (Arellano- Yanguas, 2008: 23). 
As in Ghana, the company points to its modern techniques in the context 
of water management and builds water reservoirs. By arguing that this will 
provide more water than before, Yanacocha tries to transform the accusa-
tion of being water- greedy to being the very provider of water itself (Beb-
bington et al., 2013: 329–330).
Politicization and growing distrust
Despite all these efforts to command local consent and support, several key 
events have derailed attempts to negotiate a working relationship between 
the company and the community. In 2000, a truck providing the company 
with mercury spilled several tons outside the village of Choropampa. The 
way Newmont dealt with this accident and the ongoing health impacts at 
the place of the accident led to a significant loss of credibility and support. 
Mistrust ran high and the mine was accused of repeatedly making bilateral 
promises that go unfulfilled (Smith and Feldman, 2009: 51). When Yana-
cocha wanted to expand its operations to the mountain Cerro Quillish, 
which provides the whole city of Cajamarca with water, even people 
employed by the company protested, according to a local actor. This 
finally led to the suspension of the expansion. Yanacocha’s new mining 
venture, Conga, which is much bigger than all its previous projects, would 
similarly affect the lakes that provide the surrounding communities with 
water and was eventually also suspended due to protests.
 Mining is seen by many, having experienced it in the surrounding area, to 
imply a move from a healthy environment towards a greater dependency on 
money. The presence of the mine in the surroundings of Cajamarca has led 
to a reduced access to natural and social resources. The increasing avail-
ability of capital and human resources for some actors led to immense social 
inequality. Many families have been left without capital after low compensa-
tion payment (Bury, 2004). These experiences have politicized the presence 
of the mine to a great extent and make power structures visible again. Ques-
tions concerning fairness of outcome and dependency become core issues 
shaping the relationship of local inhabitants regarding the mine.
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Protests
Defying the kind of ‘divide and rule’ effects of CSR that worked so well in 
Ghana, the widespread mistrust has led to intensified scrutiny of corporate 
discourses and techniques as well as to more organized forms of activism 
in Peru. Local activists inform potentially affected communities with 
detailed presentations about the scope and impact of the planned opera-
tions, showing the risk of the operation for the supply of water and thus 
dismantling the discourse of the corporation. Due to (communicated) 
experience from other operations and mistrust towards the government, 
the fear for loss of water access is so high that people are willing to risk 
their lives in protest (Bebbington et al., 2013: 326). With the changes in 
law in recent years, the criminalization of the protest facilitated and legal-
ized the use of force by police (Chérrez et al., 2011: 133). This made it 
more likely for protests to escalate into violent clashes.
 Twice the protests have led to the suspension of a mining project, when, 
as a result, the site was declared an area of conservation (Li, 2009). This 
can motivate other protests. Whereas the identification of potential conser-
vation zones is seen as a technical task, the decision to then pursue it is 
political, as observed by local NGOs. When government officials opt for 
mining instead of conservation, protest can be one way in which the 
affected population express their desire for a non- mining alternative. As 
the NGO WACAM laments in Ghana, the possibility to establish no- go 
zones does not exist.
 A crucial factor enabling a strong protest movement is, among others, a 
historical one. As one of the activists pointed out, old structures like the 
rondas campesinas (peasant rounds) that emerged as communal self- 
defence against cattle theft in the 1970s (Gitlitz, 1998: 24–26), are now 
used to mobilize the affected communities. Their participants are involved 
in multiple modes of resistance beyond street protests (RPP, 2013). In July 
2013, ronderos decided to punish everybody who sold their land to the 
company (La Republica, 2013a, 2013b). With possible support from 
rondas campesinas, actors around the mines in Cajamarca have more inde-
pendence from their elected leaders and a notably less hierarchical struc-
ture in relation to them than their Ghanaian counterparts have toward the 
chiefs. Thus, it is far more difficult for the corporation to effectively ally 
and to break resistance.
 While inequality was just as much an outcome of Newmont’s com-
munity investment programme in Ghana, in Cajamarca it provided a 
rallying point for protest directed toward the company. In this process, 
new solidarities across social and ethnic boundaries were created (Mi Mina 
Corrupta, 2013), which in turn reinvigorated the protest movement inter-
nally (Kirsch, 2013: 362). Meanwhile, environmental and regional dis-
courses of post- extractivism promoted by national and international NGOs 
provided legitimacy and moral support to the protest externally (Gudynas, 
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2012; Mi Mina Corrupta, 2013). While, in the past decade, a re- 
primarization of exports has taken place in many countries of Latin 
America, a discourse on alternatives to the extractivist model and a neces-
sary change towards less resource- based and export- driven economies has 
emerged in Latin America’s academia and NGOs (Gudynas, 2012). In 
Ghana, a similar discourse did not exist at the time.
 Despite its extensive CSR apparatus, the company was not able to depo-
liticize its already politicized operations in Peru as the company lost much 
credibility. Once created, mistrust is difficult to reverse. Although imple-
menting the same strategies in Peru as in Ghana, Newmont could not make 
use of bureaucratic power and depoliticizing effects. Ultimately, the stand-
ardized techniques did not lead to favorable instrumental effects for the 
mining company. Meanwhile, the persistent mistrust led to scrutiny of 
Newmont’s behaviour and a resistance to the ways in which the company’s 
development discourse and intervention devalued current modes of living.
Conclusion
“What gets measured gets managed” argued one of Newmont’s CEOs in 
the context of its community relations management. This statement reveals 
the mining company’s objective to control its community relations world-
wide through the implementation of standardized, global CSR concepts, 
the success of which can be measured through quantifiable metrics. Global 
norms like the UN Global Compact signed by Newmont, frame, endorse, 
and validate their engagement in these standardized techniques of CSR.
 This chapter examined the implementation and impact of these stand-
ardized CSR concepts in different local and regional contexts in the extrac-
tive sector. In contrast to much research conducted in this area, the chapter 
explored the limits of these corporate techniques in influencing company–
community relations. The comparative approach based on ethnographic 
data involved both a temporal and geographical dimension, challenging 
the conventional wisdom of globalized corporate practice and revealing the 
specificities of local responses to standardized techniques. I showed that 
local specificities, a temporal dimension, and particularly agency and 
counter- conduct, neglected by Ferguson (1994), have shaped the effects 
and explain the limitations of these techniques. Ultimately, I argue that 
standardized technologies of governance do not yield standardized effects 
of domination.
 Newmont’s expansion plans were widely accepted or even welcomed in 
Ghana, while they resulted in violent conflicts and their suspension in Peru, 
although Newmont applied the same strategy. At both places, Newmont 
used its CSR concept strategically to shape social relations in a way that 
benefits corporate interests. Government involvement at all levels was used 
by Newmont to influence political processes and to take advantage of bur-
eaucratic power. Furthermore, job policies were used to create reciprocal 
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relationships. Participatory investment was implemented in both countries 
but depoliticized Newmont’s operations significantly less in Peru compared 
to Ghana, even though it was used to a greater extent. In Ghana, com-
munity concern engagement resulted in criticism of its standardizing out-
comes but still secured a broad acceptance, whereas it was perceived as a 
corporate manoeuvre in Peru. Factors which have shaped the reaction of 
local actors to Newmont’s standardized techniques include: community 
organization (e.g. chiefs versus elected mayors), previous experience with 
the mining corporations, visible threats to livelihoods (e.g. water shortage), 
discourses on the role of mining, political structures, and experiences of 
the power of protest. These factors inhibit the fact that the use of CSR qui-
etens the discussions on fairness of resource extraction and its outcomes.
 In Peru, the project was in the vicinity of Newmont’s already ongoing 
operations, where Newmont itself admits that its own mistakes created 
huge mistrust in community members. Consequently, local actors exam-
ined corporate techniques very closely which, to a certain extent, prevented 
their instrumental effects. Hence, CSR could not redeem mistrust created 
by the corporation’s misbehaviour. Injustice was perceived, for example, 
regarding access to and control over water sources, self- determination con-
cerning the mode of living and choice of livelihood, inclusion in and 
control over decision making, and interference of the corporation in polit-
ical processes. Unity building on social structure and experience of success-
ful protest became the biggest weapon against the company.
 In Ghana, the local population did not have previous negative experi-
ences with Newmont as its other operation was located far away. Con-
sequently, the corporation could establish a discourse of being sustainable, 
participatory, and different compared to other mining corporations. It 
could raise hopes that mining would bring about desired development. 
Newmont could thereby depoliticize the operations to a large extent. Fair-
ness of process and outcome in regard to compensation, among others, 
was questioned by different individuals. However, these questions did not 
shape corporate–company relations at large. De- politicization was pro-
moted by the rather hierarchical community structure which made it more 
difficult for effective and organized protest to emerge.
 In sum, this chapter showed that global concepts have limited power to 
de- politicize mining operations and to control social relations in the 
interest of corporations. They are not universally applicable tools for cor-
porate control as they cannot be adapted identically to local complexities 
throughout the world. On a global scale, there are variances in social struc-
ture, political processes, and in local- historical context that these standards 
cannot fully account for. While global standards are mostly disconnected 
from local history, people’s reactions are not. Severe environmental and 
social impacts can make standardized monitoring systems reach their depo-
liticizing and ‘managerial’ limits.
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Note
1 A similar, yet more extensive version was published first in D. Rajak and C. 
Dolan (2016) The Anthropology of Corporate Social Responsibility, Berghahn 
Books, New York.
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8 Increasing fairness in global value 
chains?
Possibilities and limitations of fair 
trade standards for the agricultural 
and mineral sector
Jutta Kister and Fernando Ruiz Peyré
Introduction
Collapsing sewing factories in Bangladesh, the sickening use of agrochemi-
cals in agroindustry, or mercury contaminated mining in Africa – there are 
many examples where social and ecological aspects are being ignored in 
global value chains. Economic relations, including the relocation of pro-
duction processes, become increasingly complex and responsibility is exter-
nalized. Most companies still put maximizing profits first, despite the 
consequences for humans and the environment.
 Standards and certification mechanisms that go beyond the level of 
national legislation have been developed to secure environmental and 
labour protection in transnational trade relations. We raise the argument 
that standards, defining minimum criteria for products or companies, are 
drawn up in the region of consumption – usually in the Global North. 
Therefore, we look behind the power and governance structures of global 
value chains in order to analyse the underlying mechanisms of the creation 
of standards and the definition of minimum criteria. In particular, we high-
light the fact that these chains are embedded in the social environment of 
the consumer region. The process can also be influenced by group actors 
such as social movements or value- based consumer groups, among others. 
This opens up pathways for a redesigning of global value chains towards 
increased resource fairness and politics.
 While the ‘Fairtrade’1 system (FLO) is a well known and widely 
accepted ‘fair’ standard for mainly agricultural products, our aim is to 
determine whether this form of certification mechanism is also applicable 
to the mineral sector. Experiences with fair trade certifications in the 
mining sector are few and, due to the complexity of the value chain, even 
considered impossible in the early 1990s (Brown, 1993). Using the Global 
Value Chain (GVC) and Global Production Network (GPN) frameworks, 
we analyse similarities and differences along the structure of the value 
chains in agriculture and mining in order to show different starting points 
towards ‘fairer’ trading.
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 We begin with a brief description of recent developments in global trade 
and its consequences for global inequality, also highlighting the function-
ing of private standards in global trade. Second, we describe the experi-
ences of ‘fairer’ trading initiatives in the agricultural and mineral sector. 
We compare the GVC/GPN structure in order to analyse similarities and 
differences to understand which value chain structures are necessary pre-
conditions for the successful implementation of ‘fairer’ standards. Our 
focus is on governance structures and power relations in a qualitative 
actor- centred approach of value chain mapping. Finally, the conclusion 
summarizes the challenges of strengthening fair trade to increase fairness 
in resource supply.
Global trade, inequalities, and standards
Companies increasingly act and compete internationally. Raw materials, 
semi- manufactured, and final goods circulate globally (Bathelt and Glück-
ler, 2002; Giese et al., 2011), that is, value chains increasingly expand 
beyond national borders. Simultaneously, national governments and supra-
national organizations (like the EU) (re-)define their geopolitical strategies 
to secure access and control over natural resources worldwide. Under these 
conditions, global trade has reinforced global inequality (see Wade, 2004).
 The current characteristics of the global market help transnational com-
panies to avoid assuming responsibility for the social and ecological con-
sequences of production, processing, and trading. This aspect is made 
possible through the general lack of regulation in international trade and 
by the transmission of responsibility to subsidiary companies (Ungericht, 
2010: 59). Usually, developing countries have – also as a result of inter-
national deregulation processes – less strict legislation and public stand-
ards. The misconduct of single participants in the value chain as well as 
widely tolerated ‘bad practices’ (like agrochemical residues forbidden in 
the country of consumption, child labour, or fraudulent product declara-
tion) have the potential to discredit whole market areas, recurrently leading 
to scandals reported in media. They are often the cause of consumers 
demanding more transparency and control of production and manufac-
turing processes, eventually leading to an increasing number of public and 
private standards (Dannenberg, 2012). Public standards are constituted by 
governments, national or international regulation bodies, like the EU 
trading or national hygienic standards. Private standards are set up by non-
 governmental actors such as companies or producer associations. Big 
buying companies have the governance power to implement standards for 
their suppliers, establishing their own minimum requirements (Gereffi et 
al., 2005; Schamp, 2008). Today, in order to establish ecological, social, 
or fair trade initiatives, hybrid governance networks emerge by bringing 
together public and private or business and non- business actors (Schulz 
and Bailey, 2014; Schulz and Affolderbach, 2015).2
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 Standards aim to attain improvements in transparency and quality, as 
well as environmental and labour protection. In doing so, they are capable 
of raising consumers’ trust. In general, standards open up possibilities for 
producers in the Global South to participate in markets with high demand 
for products that are not permanently or only seasonally available in the 
Global North or that can be offered more cheaply (Bernzen and Dannen-
berg, 2012). Once established, standards have to be controlled. We distin-
guish between product and corporate certification. In general, every 
stakeholder involved in the value chain has to be certified and controlled 
periodically. Depending on the number of actors involved, this process 
becomes complex.
 Challenges and critiques are raised from the consumers’ side related to 
the difficulty of distinguishing between the numerous varieties of standards 
claiming sustainability. Additionally, some standards are criticized for lax 
control mechanisms. Some authors perceive private standards in global 
trade as trade barriers, especially for small- scale producers, who are 
excluded from the value chain due to high financial and technical require-
ments for certification (Brown, 2005; Nadvi, 2008; Dannenberg, 2012).
Value chain approaches as useful frameworks
Due to the global division of labour, the number of participants involved 
in production processes and the geographical distance between these parti-
cipants has increased (Gereffi et al., 2005). From an economic geograph-
ical perspective, the production, processing, and trading of different goods 
of global demand has been analysed within concepts of chains and net-
works. The GVC approach focuses on the relations between the actors in a 
value chain and their control over transactions (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 
1994; Gibbon et al., 2008). It is often used to analyse economic linkages 
between the North and the South (Schamp, 2008). The GPN approach 
includes the social embeddedness of the actors as well as the political and 
social framework in the analysis of power relations (Henderson et al., 
2002; Coe et al., 2008; Franz and Hassler, 2010).3
 The method of value chain mapping helps to visualize the production 
process by describing who is doing what and where (Figure 8.1). Politics, 
legislation, NGOs, and consumer groups in the market region influence 
public opinion (e.g. moralistic values or religious concepts) using aware-
ness raising, political campaigns, and lobbyism. The discourses around 
conditions of production and trading influence consumers in their lifestyle 
and consuming practice, as well as retailers and wholesalers in their deci-
sion making. In this process, NGOs and groups of civil society laid 
common ground for the definition of social and ecological requirements 
beyond the business- to-business standards (Raynolds, 2000).
 Hence, the standard is generated and permanently influenced by its 
embeddedness in the market region. As a result, standards are oriented 
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towards the social realities of the respective region they are developed in 
and for – the “consumer region” (Morgan et al., 2006). However, the 
standard becomes effective in a totally different region – the “producer 
region”. This is how the consumer region and their regional surrounding 
exert “cross- regional influences” throughout the standard (Dannenberg, 
2012).
 A multi- level perspective is necessary for the analysis of cross- regional 
influences. While private standards become effective on a global level, the 
consumer region and its social environments are influencing producers in 
their region. Bridge (2013) defines “Certification Territories” where 
“control by actors in the Global North [extends] over sites in the Global 
South, facilitated by a narrative of protecting vulnerable subjects in the 
context of a weak state” (123). In the producer region standards become 
effective quite locally.
The conceptualization of ‘fairness’ in global trade and value 
chains
What are the potentials of GVC and GPN approaches for analysing fair-
ness in global trade transactions and relations between actors involved? In 
the contemporary frameworks in economic geography, categories like 
‘solidarity’, ‘fairness’, or ‘justice’ are not conceptualized. They may be ana-
lysed when they become effective in the relationships between the actors 
Cross-regional influences in fair trade
Consumer regionProducer region
Private standards from politics, legislation
Standard




Flow of goods Influence Effect Kister, 2015 (inspired by Dannenberg, 2012)
Producer Exporter Importer Retailer Consumer
Figure 8.1  Cross-regional influences via standards in fair trade, schematic 
illustration.
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involved in the chain. On the one hand, we can take a closer look at gov-
ernance structures and power relations in the chains: on the other hand, 
the social and political embeddedness of the actors involved in the network 
may be used as a source of information. To identify fairness, consumer–
producer relations – in our case formalized through fair trade standards – 
are under scrutiny in this chapter.
 As governance power is a precondition to implement standards, it is 
recommended to shed light on the interests behind the creation of stand-
ards. In conventional trading, powerful lead firms are able to enforce 
standards on their suppliers. In fair trade, however, power relations are 
characterized by lead firms that are willing to share their power and create 
relationships in a cooperative partnership. In many cases, financial and 
technological assistance is offered to producers willing to get certified.
 Various scholars have tried to include a fairness perspective in the ana-
lysis of global trading. Earlier work of Renard (1999) sees fair trade as a 
niche in the world market. The niche has opened up because new sets of 
values have been developed in parts of society. In her concept, these norm-
ative implications are referred to as “qualities” of a commodity. In con-
temporary studies, in opposition to “conventional chains” that build up 
the mainstream market, “alternative chains” are constructed around topics 
such as organic food, fair trade, or regional trade (e.g. “alternative food 
systems”4). This binary view is criticized by post- structuralist researchers 
such as Gibson- Graham (2006), who rather speak of a “diverse economy”.
 The “convention theory” gives a stimulating contribution to the under-
standing of normative aspects of fairness (e.g. Morgan et al., 2006; Ponte, 
2009). The demands of specific social groups, defined by their value- based 
consumers’ behaviour, are considered as decisive for the constitution of 
alternative value chains. The characteristics of the value chain (power rela-
tions, modes of processing, handling of nature, etc.) are oriented on the 
requirements, raised by the social group. Furthermore, there are concepts 
of “moral geography” as in the works of Smith (2000) and Goodman et 
al. (2012) analysing food networks. Goodman (2004) detects a “moral 
economy” where discourses and moral values of a society gain special 
attention and Fridell (2007) speaks of “market- driven social justice”.
 We have to keep in mind that – following the concepts of economic geo-
graphy – normative ‘fairer’ GVC/GPN implicates guidelines defined by the 
demanding end of the chain. Conceptualizing fairness is normative, but 
fairness is not universally defined by all actors in the GVC/GPN. There-
fore, fairness is related to perspectives, dependent on subjective perception 
and social embeddedness of the actor or actor group (e.g. geographical 
origin, social discourses, shared values, personal background). The 
(utopian) claim of universal fairness would need an integrated discourse 
and negotiation with all actors involved to define ‘common’ standards.
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Global initiatives on ‘fair’ trading standards
In the scientific debate, little attention has been paid to making a link 
between fair trading initiatives in different resource sectors. This section 
presents and compares certification mechanisms in the agricultural and 
mineral sector that could be referred to as ‘fair’. While there do exist ade-
quate certification mechanisms in the agricultural sector, respective mecha-
nisms in the mineral sector are still scarce. In the following, we present the 
Fairtrade standard for agricultural products as an example for a certifica-
tion scheme associated with fairness. In comparison, we show several initi-
atives from the mineral sector directed towards fairness.
Fairtrade standard in the agricultural sector
The Fairtrade standard is known as a strict international business-to- 
consumer standard for food and several non- food-products. It is developed 
and reviewed by the Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International e. V. 
(FLO) and third party- controlled by FLOCERT. Fairtrade allows the con-
sumer to take an informed decision based on the label on the product and 
is often seen as an instrument for market- based development cooperation. 
FLO offers certification criteria for mostly food products produced by 
small- scale farmers in the Global South. South–South trading and mixed 
products (e.g. chocolate, biscuits) have played an ever- increasing role in 
the certification scheme as well. These products are given market access by 
fair trade in order to improve the livelihoods of disadvantaged peripheral 
producer groups.5
 Today, two dominant forms of trading practice exist: the chain of tradi-
tional alternative import organizations and the licensed processing and 
retailing where conventional companies use the Fairtrade label (Hutchens, 
2009). Against this background, power shifts from Global South to North 
have been observed in recent years (Kister, 2013). The fair trade market is 
showing fast growing sales rates especially in the mainstream supermarket 
segment, and powerful actors are engaging in the fair trade sector by 
selling certified products or producing own- brand products with certified 
raw ingredients. A growing number of mixed and highly processed prod-
ucts are designed to meet consumers’ preferences. As a consequence, more 
value- adding steps (like processing, branding, and marketing) are located 
in the consumer region, and the proportional share of producers’ power in 
the value chain declines (Kister, 2013). Conventional retailing and whole-
saling companies are able to reduce prices and additional services to the 
minimum standards defined. They refuse to make contracts covering 
several cropping seasons, which limits the possibilities for the producers to 
make social and ecological investments. By contrast, traditional fair trade 
importers rely on their founding values and even exceed minimum criteria 
compared to FLO standards, establishing long- term partnerships that go 
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beyond formal contracts. One of the positive effects of these partnerships 
is planning security for the producers, which encourages social and 
environmental community projects and promotes mutual exchange of 
information and quality improvement measures.
 On an international scale, fair trade is revealed to be a heterogeneous 
social movement mainly motivated by the idea of changing the world 
trading system through an alternative form of trading (Raynolds, 2012). 
Goods should be traded under equal terms, producers and buyers forming 
a long- term relationship, and providing security for the producers. The 
small- scale producers in the Global South should be given market access. 
By paying more than world market prices and a social premium, Fairtrade 
should contribute to the rural community’s development.
 The fair trade movement experienced an international harmonization 
after the Second World War. The movement was institutionalized by 
founding several national import organizations and further supra- national 
umbrella organizations (Gendron et al., 2009). This laid common ground 
for the implementation of the Fairtrade label in the early 1990s. Today, 
Fairtrade has attained equal participation of producers and importers in 
international bodies. An important milestone has been the global harmon-
ization of the definition of fair trade in 2001:
Fair Trade is a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency 
and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It con-
tributes to sustainable development by offering better trading con-
ditions to, and securing the rights of, marginalized producers and 
workers – especially in the South. Fair Trade Organizations, backed by 
consumers, are engaged actively in supporting producers, awareness 
raising and in campaigning for changes in the rules and practice of 
conventional international trade.
(WFTO and FLO, 2009)
It is part of Fairtrade’s self- definition to influence institutions, politics and 
social discourse through educational awareness- raising programmes, public 
campaigns, and advocacy work (Low and Davenport, 2005). Public opinion 
also puts pressure on conventional retailers to adapt their practices.
 The definition of fairness within the fair trade movement is constantly 
contested (Renard, 2003; Raynolds, 2009, 2012). Broome (1990) describes 
fairness as a negotiation process that navigates between the deserts formu-
lated by the actors involved; the “desert” differs from the objectively 
recognized “needs” of the actors. Between desert and need the agreement 
has to be discussed. In fact, the vision of what producers see as fair (or 
just) clearly differs from the vision of what import organizations, consum-
ers, or volunteers in ‘worldshops’ in the market region would define as 
fairness. Consumers might have a rather idealistic, simplified notion of the 
producer’s life and the labour behind the product (Wright, 2009). While 
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producers are expected to modify their organizational structures into a 
form required by the standard, they strongly prioritize measures that 
improve economic security and social welfare, enabling investments in 
work equipment and assistance in urgent social community projects (e.g. 
capacity building, health, or infrastructure).
 Today, Fairtrade faces several challenges. The strategy of redefining cri-
teria to align with market expansion is widely rejected by small- scale pro-
ducers, as they fear losing their unique selling proposition and expect to 
get played off by larger producers. This expansion measure has been criti-
cized as dilution of criteria by producer groups as well as by alternative 
traders. The split of Fair Trade USA is the most visible consequence (Jaffee 
and Howard, 2015). Other, more industry- friendly sustainability certifica-
tion schemes such as UTZ certified or Rainforest Alliance are putting 
pressure on Fairtrade. These schemes are competing in certifying the con-
ventional market in the Global North. At the same time, producer groups 
from the Global South are lobbying for higher prices and for keeping Fair-
trade preserved for small- scale farming. In particular, the Latin American 
producer network CLAC is challenging Fairtrade by establishing its own 
certification scheme, called Small Producer’s Symbol (Clark and Hussey, 
2016). Thus, the fair trade movement is keeping its heterogeneous charac-
ter between contested interests.
Initiatives to ‘fairness’ in the mineral sector
Public awareness is crucial for the successful implementation of standards. 
In the case of mineral products, the progress towards certification stand-
ards has been quite delayed (Childs, 2008: 207). The starting point for the 
increasing awareness of consumers and sellers about the origin of products 
and the social conditions surrounding production processes can be traced 
back to the late 1990s, when several campaigns connected mineral 
products to armed conflicts (e.g. “Conflict Diamonds”) or environmental 
disasters (e.g. “No dirty gold” campaign) (Bloomfield, 2014). As a con-
sequence, big mining companies and jewellery sellers started voluntary 
CSR initiatives to label their production ‘responsible’ (e.g. the Responsible 
Jewellery Council and the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance 
issued in 2006). These initiatives differ from fair trade certification schemes 
as they apply the standard to the entire company (not to the product) and 
are not externally controlled. Efforts are published in corporate reports but 
are not visible for consumers on the product. Compared to fair trade, CSR 
initiatives are more common in large- scale settings; similar initiatives also 
exist in the agricultural sector (for more details see Sydow, in this volume; 
Hafner and Coy, in this volume).
 Contrary to CSR, fair trade initiatives are oriented to artisanal and 
small- scale miners (ASM) in the Global South which “produce just 15% of 
the global gold supplies, but make up as much as 90% of the labour force 
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in the gold industry” (FLO, 2014). They are characterized by high levels of 
illegality, poverty, and exploitation (see Crawford and Botchwey, in this 
volume). The first programme targeting ecological and social certification 
of gold was Oro Verde in 2000, which can be seen as the inspiration for 
the later Fairtrade and Fairmined certification labels (Cardiff, 2010; 
Sarmiento et al., 2013). In 2003, the world’s first independently certified 
environmentally and socially responsible wedding rings were launched. In 
2006, in collaboration with miners’ organizations and stakeholders in 
Latin America the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM) developed Fair-
mined, the first standard for fair trade mining. In 2011, in cooperation 
with Fairtrade International, gold was introduced under ‘fair’ certification 
to the UK and Canadian market. A true milestone was the first selling of 
Fairtrade certified gold in Switzerland in 2014, representing one of the 
most important jewellery markets in the world.
 However, not many miners have reached fair trade certifications yet. 
Currently, only two mining organizations are certified by Fairtrade (both 
in Peru) and four by Fairmined (in Peru, Colombia, and Mongolia). Other 
ASM from Asia, Africa, and Latin America are working towards the certi-
fication. In doing so, they are, however, confronted with various chal-
lenges. To be part of the international fair trade market, the miners need 
to adapt to external standards that largely ignore the unfavourable socio- 
economic and political contexts in producer countries (Childs, 2014). For 
example, the standards expect transparent management and work safety 
measures. However, many extraction sites are located in areas with armed 
conflicts, safety issues, and high levels of corruption. Producers are highly 
affected by these circumstances but have little influence to change them.
Comparative analysis of ‘fairer’ trading initiatives
We argue that a key reason for the disparities of the successful implemen-
tation of fair trade standards in the small- scale agricultural and mining 
sector lies in the different structures of the value chains. The main differ-
ences are varying preconditions for successfully applying fair certification 
schemes. In this section, we evaluate the necessary structure of GVC/GPN 
in order to implement ‘fair’ certification mechanisms in a widely unregu-
lated global market. The analysis is divided into three dimensions: (1) pro-
ducers and products, (2) GVC/GPN characteristics, and (3) consumers and 
their influence.
 To facilitate the comparability, we focus on small- scale farming and 
small- scale mining. The analysis is based on empirical studies on food 
products certified by the Fairtrade standard carried out in Germany (end 
of 2013) and Nicaragua (2014) as well as on literature research and media 
analyses of existing experiences of ‘fair’ certification efforts in the mineral 
sector, such as Fairtrade Gold (FLO) and Fairmined (ARM).
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Fairtrade- certified products in the agricultural sector
Producers and products
The Fairtrade approach puts producers first. Certification principally leads 
to reduced health risks, better education, and optimized working proced-
ures among the producers involved. Great effort is also expended on the 
organizational structures in the producers’ surroundings. As a framework 
for the producers, local cooperatives of economically independent working 
family farms are preferred. These cooperatives have to have elected con-
trolling bodies and a general assembly, guaranteeing democratic organiza-
tion and financial integrity. Cooperatives work on gender issues and on 
improving farmers’ and communities’ wellbeing, and they offer farm ser-
vices and beneficial common purchasing and marketization. The producer 
cooperatives work together with certified exporters. In the case of Nicara-
gua, local cooperatives established top- level cooperatives operating on a 
regional scale. In many cases these structures cover further processing and 
exporting activities.
GVC/GPN characteristics
The complexity of the value chain can differ significantly depending on the 
product. Agricultural products (e.g. coffee, cocoa, tea, sugar) are low pro-
cessed goods comparable to raw materials that may undergo final process-
ing, blending, and packaging in the market area. Nevertheless, cooperatives 
have made efforts to add value in the producer region through labour- 
intensive processing steps.
 Market access is provided through certified fair trade buyers in most 
countries in the Global North. Usually, national import organizations, 
founded in the late 1970s and followed by other companies fully dedicated 
to fair trade, buy large amounts of the harvest. However, conventional 
companies that sell fair trade products under their brands or in their stores 
have expanded in the fair trade segment.
 In general, the value chain of fair trade products is kept simple, as the 
target is to avoid intermediaries. Interactions between the actors are char-
acterized by solidarity and partnership. While the importer in the Global 
North is governing the chain, the aim of the movement is to empower the 
small- scale producers in the Global South. Transactions include a pre- fixed 
fair minimum price and social premium. Constant knowledge exchange, 
pre- financing, or initiated social projects in local communities support 
trustful interactions. Power asymmetries can be detected where certifica-
tion leads to transactions connecting producer cooperatives to powerful 
conventional wholesalers, as these companies do not consider fair trade 
principles as their core company goal.
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Consumers and their influence
Goodman (2004) sees Fairtrade stakeholders integrated in a common 
network, built on shared ethical and moral principles. Consumers and pro-
ducers are no longer divided in ‘us’ and ‘them’ but combined in a ‘we’, 
“embedding the actions of both consumption and production in the cre-
ation and politics of fair trade” (907). Consuming fair trade products 
becomes a political statement and is an expression of values and defining a 
lifestyle (Ermann, 2006; Zick Varul, 2009). Moreover, Fairtrade has 
always been backed by an active and conscious alternative consumers 
group considering itself part of the social movement.
 Assigning consumers an important role for making Fairtrade successful, 
the products show growing consumer orientation. The product range has 
been diversified, the quality has improved, and Fairtrade offers more and 
more mixed products and processed goods (e.g. biscuits and chocolate 
bars). These products show high complexity in the value chain by, for 
example, adding ingredients produced in the market region. Consequently, 
shifts of value creation processes into the market region can be observed 
(Kister, 2013).
‘Fair’ initiatives in the mineral sector
Producers and products
ASM in the Global South are the most vulnerable group in mining activ-
ities, working under conditions of exploitation and dangerous circum-
stances for health and safety (see e.g. Hentschel et al., 2002; Spiegel, 2009; 
OECD, 2013). Most mining laws in the Global South – principally the reg-
ulations influenced by neoliberal politics implemented from the 1990s 
onwards – favour large- scale and industrial mining, thus excluding small- 
scale mining operations (Childs, 2014). This leads or even forces many 
artisanal miners into informal and illegal set- ups with risky conditions. 
Environmental and health risks are mostly linked to the use of mercury, 
which is frequently released into the environment, for the separation of 
gold from other particles. Mining also changes the physical environment, 
removing large amounts of material which is discharged into rivers and 
creeks (Heemskerk, 2001: 306). The increasing use of more powerful 
mining equipment in ASM goes along with a considerable growth of sedi-
ment spillages.
 The high market value of minerals like gold or diamonds makes them 
attractive for smuggling and can be used to finance war or terrorist activ-
ities. The minerals can be capitalized without big investments and are easy 
to transport. Minerals are usually extracted in remote regions with 
relatively low state monitoring or media scrutiny (O’Higgins, 2006: 241). 
Consequently, the predisposition for both miners and controllers to take 
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a gamble for a one- time high- value transaction is big and stimulates 
corruption.
 Small- scale miners are usually not organized in cooperatives or other 
forms of association. Most ASM activities are uncoordinated, “with miners 
working essentially independently or in small partnerships” (Hinton, 2005: 
103). Therefore, the first step towards certification usually provides sup-
port for an improved organizational structure at the community level.
GVC/GPN characteristics
The complexity of the GVC/GPN of mineral products has been seen as a 
profound challenge for fair trade certification (Brown, 1993). As the ASM 
production sites are generally located in remote areas, the supply chain of 
artisanal gold is characterized by numerous intermediaries (transport, local 
dealers, exporters), decreasing profits for miners. Furthermore, gold under-
goes complex processing steps – especially the final production of the jewel 
– until it reaches the final consumer. Similar to the agricultural sector, the 
target of fair trade gold is to simplify the value chain and to avoid interme-
diaries. The organizational structure of cooperatives as well as long- term 
exporter–buyer partnerships enable direct marketing to the exporter and 
facilitates the tracing back of the mineral.
Consumers and their influence
The lifestyle of the precious metals and gems consumer group differs 
considerably from the typical fair trade consumer of agricultural products. 
This makes it difficult for fair trade standards in the mineral sector to gain 
ground as consumers eventually influence the determination of fair trade 
standards, that is, they directly depend on the ethical and moral principles 
that guide their consumption. Slogans like ‘gold to be proud of ’ or ‘the 
best gold story in the world’ try to encourage the consumption behaviour 
of the end- user about the jewel they are wearing.
 The challenges of the fair trade certification of ASM today are various. 
The context in which ASM takes place is not undergoing fundamental 
changes, in relation to environmental impact, informality, and transpar-
ency. The retailers and consumers are generally not informed about these 
conditions and there is a lack of emotional proximity, leading to low levels 
of awareness compared to traditional agriculture fair trade standards.
Similarities and differences
Is the Fairtrade system as a well- known standard in the agricultural sector 
applicable to the mining sector and under which conditions? Based on 
the comparison above, we recognize similarities in the GVC structure in 
agriculture and mining, which would make a transfer possible, but also see 
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differences that may explain the challenges faced by the existing fair trade 
initiatives in the mineral sector.
 First, focussing on the similarities, the production primarily takes place 
in the Global South, while consumers are mainly located in the Global 
North. Lead firms in control of the global value chains are predominantly 
also located in the Global North.
 Second, the increasing globalization of markets for raw materials, the 
falling transport costs, and technological innovations facilitate the access 
and trade of those resources. The globalization of the Western mode of 
living, which is based on the unlimited and permanent availability of cheap 
resources (Kulke, 2009) and the rapid economic growth of emerging 
countries, contribute to increasing demand. The spatial distance between 
the origin of the producer and the end- consumer has almost become 
insignificant.
 Third, the growing global demand for resources leads to an increasing 
competition for the access to natural resources. This aspect is stronger for 
strategic mineral resources (e.g. lithium, see Anlauf, in this volume), but is 
also increasingly observable in the agricultural sector. Competition between 
local food and cash- crop production over access to factors of agricultural 
production (land, soil, or water) is increasing (see Schmitt, in this volume). 
The economic asymmetry of power is used to guarantee this access.
 Fourth, in both sectors we must distinguish between small- scale produc-
tion (ASM and peasant agriculture) and large- scale production (mining 
TNCs and agribusiness), with considerable differences concerning fair 
trading possibilities. We see parallels in the kind of certifications in large- 
scale productions, oriented towards CSR, and the fair trade orientation of 
small- scale production, with the emphasis on the social aspects of trade 
relations.
 In our comparison we also see notable differences. First, concerning the 
production forms: In the agricultural sector, a certain degree of organiza-
tion and infrastructure is needed to be able to manage the cultivation and 
harvesting process and to persevere unproductive seasons. Agricultural 
production is a renewable activity and can be increased through intensifi-
cation or the expansion of the acreage. In the mining sector, production 
directly depends on the amount and quality of the mineral deposit. Mining 
quantities can only be increased through technological advance or higher 
investment, usually not accessible for small- scale miners.
 Second, forms of organization in cooperatives and inclusion into the 
local community have great significance in the agricultural sector. In con-
trast, an important percentage of ASM miners work individually or in 
small groups, often in temporary camps and far away from home. The 
informal character of the activity and the lack of transparency and control 
make it difficult to achieve the degree of organization and the social 
stability needed for fair trade certification. A suitable size and production 
volume is required for participating in international fair trade markets.
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 Third, in the case of precious metals and gems, the considerably higher 
market value compared to agricultural products enhances the predisposi-
tion to illegal economic activities such as corruption, smuggling, and even 
the financing of armed conflicts. As a result, in these conditions of illegality 
the access to certification mechanisms is much more difficult if not imposs-
ible. Furthermore, the difference in market value between both product 
groups affects the chances of success in the fair trade market. While most 
agricultural products are mass consumption products, the possibility for 
jewellery to enter the mass market is strongly limited.
 Fourth, if we look into the value adding steps we also find important 
differences. In many agricultural products, the processing steps are few and 
the small- scale producers are able to invest in value chain upgrading by 
carrying out some processing activities. In the ASM, the miners are not 
very powerful in relation to intermediaries and international buyers, and 
they are not capable of assuming the further processing of the minerals.
 Finally fifth, there is a time delay in which the sectors (both participants 
and industry structures) have started to introduce fair trade aspects into 
the supply chain. According to Davies (2007), fair trade in the agricultural 
sector has already reached an “institutionalisation era”, with stabilized 
markets and being well- known by end- consumers in the Global North 
(455). The mineral sector can still be seen in an initial phase where the 
niche market must be established, making the first steps and beginning 
with ASM precious metals and gems.
Conclusion
The chapter discussed opportunities and limitations of private fair trade 
standards to support a ‘fairer’ trading process of agricultural products and 
mineral resources. In analysing and comparing the GVC/GPN structures of 
agricultural and mineral products, we presented similarities but also differ-
ences which make the use of fair trade initiatives in the small- scale mining 
sector challenging. However, ASM is an important economic sector for 
many regions and countries. Despite many constraints on fair certification 
in the small- scale mining sector, efforts have to be made to achieve better 
resource fairness. As observed, the challenges to reach the level of certified 
fair production are enormous in this context. In particular, long- term plan-
ning and increased organizational structures are necessary to develop a 
more viable ASM sector which is necessary for fair trade to be effective.
 The main requirements for the implementation of certification schemes, 
where small- scale producers attempt trading into global markets, are legal-
ized access to land, property, and mining rights. Producers further have to 
adapt to specific organizational structures which are transparent and 
consist in terms of delivering of a relevant size. Reduced complexity of the 
GVC/GPN enables effective trading conditions that are traceable, and 
avoid losses to intermediaries. Formalized, certified, and controlled formal 
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structures are capable to exclude violence, illegal production, open up 
formalized global markets to small- scale producers, and improve social 
outcomes for producers.
 In fair trade, standards are able to set minimum criteria for the benefit 
of small- scale producer groups. Still, standards are oriented towards the 
desires of the consumer region. Fair trade standards are thus not protected 
from their dilution by powerful actors from the conventional market. 
While value- based niche markets can open up adequate market opportun-
ities for small- scale producers, simultaneously, the specifications of certifi-
cation schemes can build up trade barriers and hamper participants from 
the Global South.
 Although respective regulations and norms exist on a global level, they 
often do not come into effect in the regional setting of the producer. Espe-
cially in developing countries, deregulation is problematic, and in many 
cases compliance with legislation is not sufficiently monitored. Standards 
and certification schemes may compensate for the lack of regulation and 
enforcement to a certain degree, but they do not replace national regula-
tion as they are quite selectively effective on the producing sites integrated 
in certified value chains.
 This chapter showed that fairness is a matter of perspective. Corre-
sponding to our investigation, standards are framed among the particip-
ants embedded in the powerful Northern consumer region, while producers 
in the Global South must adapt their understanding of ‘fairer’ trade. Cross 
regional influences show the impact of these standards on the producers’ 
region. It remains important to keep the question of definitive power in 
mind, particularly when it comes to the implementation and control mech-
anisms of standards in global value chains.
 In fairer trade initiatives, actor groups that are outside the value chain 
have a crucial influencing role and are capable of raising additional 
demand and opening up a market niche. Awareness raising, educational 
campaigns, and information among civil society are important factors to 
increase consumers’ interest and to exert pressure on importers, whole-
salers, and retailers. Indisputably, consumers’ conscience is easier to influ-
ence with products that are eaten or worn. With the growing use of 
mineral components in technical devices – even in sustainable forms of 
driving and energy production – it becomes, however, increasingly neces-
sary and possible to achieve ‘fairer’ conditions in the mineral sector.
 The predominant GVC/GPN structure in the mineral sector is unlikely 
to be changed in the near future. However, there still exist many starting 
points to increase fairness through the implementation of standards, 
improving the situation for small- scale producers. Therefore, it remains 
important to increase consumers’ consciousness, backed up with an 
engaged network of societal actors (e.g. NGOs and media). Much like in 
the agricultural sector, it is important to enable and extend the fairness 
discourse around production and trade of mineral resources.
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Notes
1 We use ‘Fairtrade’ when we refer to the certification of Fairtrade Labelling 
Organizations International (FLO) (www.fairtrade.net), controlled by FLOCERT 
(www.flocert.net). We use ‘fair trade’ to refer to the market segment in general, 
which is not homogenous and involves a larger group of products, companies, 
and actor groups. In many cases, they identify themselves as part of the ‘fair 
trade movement’.
2 For more information about standards in global trade, see Nadvi and Wältring, 
2002; Bernzen, 2014.
3 For a comparison of GVC and GPN, see Hess, 2008; Fischer et al., 2010; 
Coe, 2012.
4 For more information about alternative food systems, see Goodman and Watts, 
1997; Raynolds, 2000; Barrientos and Dolan, 2006; Fold and Pritchard, 2005; 
Goodman et al., 2012.
5 Many studies about private standards concentrate on the impacts on farmer 
households (see Becchetti and Costantino, 2008; Valkila and Nygren, 2010; 
Raynolds and Bennett, 2015; Chiputwa et al., 2015).
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9 The soy- production fair(y) tale?
Latin American perspectives on 
globalized dynamics, territoriality, 
and environmental justice1
Robert Hafner and Martin Coy
Introduction
Over the last three decades, the production of soy has become an increas-
ingly lucrative business in Brazil and Argentina. Now fully incorporated in 
globalized production networks, local consequences of global activities are 
observed; socio- territorial fragmentation, increasing vulnerability, rising 
polarization between socio- spatial inclusion and exclusion, and the mani-
festation of socio- ecological conflict constellations become core problems 
of investigation. In this context, discussions on fairness have become 
increasingly relevant in the production of and discourse on soy (e.g. RTRS, 
2015).
 In this chapter, we compare two soy frontiers: the Mato Grosso Region 
in Brazil and the Argentine Chaco. At first glance, the two regions seem to 
undergo similar patterns of development, experience the same challenges 
and conflicts, and deal with issues of (un)fairness and (in)justice in similar 
ways, that is, mostly in the form of non- response and non- articulation of 
environmental justice claims. However, on a closer look, there are 
important differences in the two countries related to different national 
agendas, foci, and socio- environmental frameworks, for example, fiscal 
export policies or migration and spatial reconfiguration patterns. These 
differences are also reflected in the multiplicity of approaches and mean-
ings of ‘fairness’.
 The objective of the chapter is twofold. First, the two soy frontiers are 
compared in order to unearth particular regional characteristics. Second, 
it is shown that fairness should be treated more as a ‘conception’ (an 
individual or group’s perception of a concept) than as a ‘concept’, since 
the understanding of what is considered ‘fair’ is context- related and 
perspective- based. In this vein, activist- driven environmental justice con-
cepts help to develop arguments of what fairness could look like in dif-
ferent contexts and from different perspectives. However, they are limited 
in analytical scope since situations of non- articulation of socio- ecological 
claims are not considered. Such elements, however, are of high importance 
in our case studies.
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 We start by putting fairness and environmental justice into perspective by 
developing our understanding of the two concepts/conceptions. The concept 
of territoriality is introduced in order to bridge the gap between intangible 
theory and the tangible materiality of the case studies. Two axes of investi-
gation are proposed: (1) territoriality, contextualizing the two regions in 
relation to non- articulation of conflicts, and (2) discourse, highlighting the 
different conceptions of what is considered fair by three main groups of 
actors in the two regions. After the conceptual section, we analyse the two 
case studies and compare them along the axes of investigation. The last 
section concludes with a focus on what can be learnt for resource fairness.
Fairness, environmental justice, and territoriality
In the context of soy production in Brazil and Argentina, it is vital to con-
ceptualize the term ‘fairness’ as well as environmental justice (EJ). ‘Fair-
ness’ is an intuitive and highly normative term; it is often used as an 
example of a concept that is clear unless defined. However, in order to be 
able to empirically work with the concept, an attempt to define and clas-
sify has to be undertaken. Hooker (2005) offers an interesting approach by 
distinguishing between formal and substantive fairness. Formal fairness’ 
central feature is its non- normativity and impartial applicability, without 
claiming that those rules of fairness should be good or bad, moral, or 
context- or subject- sensitive (Hooker, 2005: 329).
 Substantive fairness expands formal fairness to the extent that context 
and side- conditions are taken into account: “People get what they deserve” 
(Hooker, 2005: 330), although it becomes blurry how it is decided what 
people should deserve. Important in this way of thinking is Rawls’ con-
sideration that unfairness per se is of no importance; his understanding of 
fairness is highly theoretical- utopian and consequentialist, that is, the con-
sequences of a process should be fair, fairness of the process itself is sec-
ondary (Rawls, 1999: 114). One can argue, however, that the actual 
realization of substantively unfair situations is already a form of con-
sequence and has, therefore, to be dealt with. Fairness itself has to be con-
sidered an ideal situation (much in the cosmopolitan liberal sense of Rawls’ 
intentions; see also Nili, in this volume).
 Hooker and Rawls should be considered as examples of how fairness is 
defined. The direct application of their fairness concepts – the main con-
siderations of which are theoretical and abstract – in our empirical analysis 
is questioned, since – as will be shown – the local, regional, and (supra-)
national actors each work with their particular interpretations of the 
concept of fairness. Unearthing and comparing these conceptions of fair-
ness both within as well as among the case studies offers new insights into 
the regional frontier dynamics.
 Going beyond a mere theoretical or social discussion and introducing 
the biophysical environment as a medium, EJ offers the potential to 
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analyse power relationships and interdependencies among different actors 
(Wapner and Matthew, 2009). Hence, both human and natural variables 
are considered in order to deal with three intertwined questions: (1) how 
do humans’ actions impact particular attributes of nature (interest and 
action); (2) how are people affected/conditioned by (changing) biophysical 
variables (effect and consequence); and (3) what should be altered in 
the human–nature interplay in order to deal with possible injustices (reac-
tion located on the normative level, see Drummond, 2008: 181). Thus, 
unlike fairness, EJ has always had a strong link to the local level (with 
possible supra- local origins of environmental injustice), while being – in 
the tradition of political ecology – conscious of the fact that “ ‘nature’ or 
‘environment’ – in both their ‘materiality’ and social construction – 
cannot easily be used in immaterial abstraction” (Debbané and Keil, 
2004: 210).
 Over the recent years, EJ research has developed its focus from analys-
ing the distribution of environmental risks (through quantitative methods) 
to include dimensions of responsibility, recognition, and participation 
(qualitative methods) (Stanton et al., 2007; Holifield et al., 2009: 599). 
The openness and diversity of the concept is also reflected in the fact that 
researchers increasingly combine EJ with other approaches, such as cap-
abilities (Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010; Nussbaum, 2013; Groves, 
2015) and sustainability (Agyeman and Evans, 2004), or refer to different 
scales beyond the local (e.g. global environmental justice; Agyeman, 2014; 
Martin et al., 2014; Mehta et al., 2014), including aspects of climate 
change (Okereke, 2010; Wilson et al., 2010).
 Particularly in a Latin American context, research goes beyond tradi-
tional EJ studies (e.g. on the effects of toxic landfills or air pollution) and 
deals with conflicts with international oil, mining, and agribusiness com-
panies in the context of development challenges (Martínez-Alier, 2003; 
Roberts and Thanos, 2003; Schlosberg and Carruthers, 2010). Even 
though research on supra- national capitalist influence on frontiers of glo-
balization can be found (particularly in Brazil; Gerber et al., 2009; Acsel-
rad, 2010; Porto, 2012; Coy, 2013), up- to-date empirical in- depth analyses 
from Latin America are scare (for an exception see Reboratti, 2012; for 
implicit examples of EJ research see Hufty, 2008; García-López and 
Arizpe, 2010). One particular characteristic in Latin America lies within 
the alternative framing (Taylor, 2000) of EJ, such as context- based initi-
atives in the form of networks (e.g. Rede Brasileira de Justiça Ambiental), 
the inclusion of socio- ecological approaches (Gudynas, 2013), or the dis-
cussions of risk (Coy, 2010). This chapter focuses in particular on the 
work of Flitner (2007) who established an analytical matrix of scales of 
meaning and regulation (see Towers, 2000; Urkidi and Walter, 2011: 685), 
as well as of justice of distribution and recognition. In so doing, material 
(distribution of environmental goods and bads), symbolic (thought styles 
in the Flecksian interpretation on said distribution2), procedural (form 
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of actors’ inclusion in the process of decision making and action), and 
cultural (socio- cultural background of actors being part in conflicting situ-
ations) justice put focus on socio- ecological conflicts at hand (Flitner, 
2007: 50).
 So far, it has been shown that theoretical discussions of fairness con-
cepts are hard to transfer to contextual empirical studies; we consider the 
actors’ interpretations and definitions (i.e. conceptions) of fairness more 
fruitful. The analytical basis is laid with EJ, since it is a more tangible form 
of dealing with justice and the environment. Then, introducing territorial-
ity as an underlying concept enables the inclusion of multi- scalar perspec-
tives in terms of global production networks and the materialization of 
socio- economic change in socio- ecological conflicts. The physical compon-
ents of the soybean frontier are reinforced in the analysis and put in 
an analytical framework of complex interactions and dynamics of the 
relationship between space and human agency (Agnew and Muscarà, 
2012: 60).
 Particularly in the discipline of geography, territoriality has often been 
used to analyse the national state and its execution of power within and 
beyond its borders (Kythreotis, 2012: 462). However, recent studies have 
shown that a more relational definition is preferred: territoriality as a fluid 
and historically grown, complex process (e.g. Elden, 2010; Agnew and 
Muscarà, 2012), where certain interdependences and their normative inter-
pretations overlap (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Brenner, 1998). We 
understand territoriality, in short, as “a strategy of social power, by 
gaining control over a certain area” (Jerneck, 2000: 29).
 As an addition to EJ, the concept of territoriality goes beyond claims- 
making as an indicator of socio- ecological unfairness. Therefore, it is 
highly suitable in our case studies, since the sole focus on justice claims 
would leave out the multifaceted realities of Latin American soy frontiers. 
Power relations do play a role in the concept of territoriality: they are not 
limited to the political sphere, but also include socio- economic as well as 
socio- ecological and spatial perspectives. Henceforth, focus has recently 
been laid on topological scalar terms, rather than areal ones (see Herod 
and Wright, 2002; Antonsich, 2009: 796), allowing for a contextual 
understanding of global- local interplays and dependencies.
 Summing up, we use ‘fairness’ as a conception relating to varying actors’ 
interpretations of the consequences of the same socio- ecological and eco-
nomic processes. EJ offers an analytical frame to unearth and investigate 
conflict situations. With the inclusion of territoriality in the EJ debate, we 
avoid the EJ trap of needing the analytical trigger of claims- making, but 
still have a tool to analyse power relations materialized in the bio- physical 
regions. Hence, in order to visualize different aspects of fairness and EJ in 
the context of Latin American soy production, two axes of investigation 
are proposed: (1) territoriality and (2) discourse. The goal of the first 
axis is to contextualize the two case studies and to identify underlying 
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mechanisms of (non-)conflict handling. The second axis highlights discur-
sive elements of different conceptions of fairness according to varying set-
tings and thought styles.
Soy frontiers: Brazilian Mato Grosso and Argentine Chaco
In this section, we analyse two soy frontiers, the Brazilian Mato Grosso 
Region and the Argentine Chaco along the axes of territoriality and dis-
course. The first case has been the major part of a research agenda over 
decades, with long- term stays in the region, allowing for first- hand obser-
vations and mappings of soy expansion, enriched by focussed and expert 
interviews. The second case has been studied via 14 months of fieldwork in 
2013 and 2014, predominantly working with Jazz Methodology, a 
context- based approach combining sensory ethnography, participatory 
methods (e.g. Jane’s Walks, workshops, netmaps), expert and focussed 
interviews.
Territoriality: or, where are the conflicts?
Soy production is a vital economic activity in Brazil and Argentina, with 
the second and third largest production worldwide, respectively (FAO, 
2014). High levels of change (especially surface expansion) have been 
experienced in both countries over the last 20 to 30 years. Two of the most 
dynamic soy frontier regions are the Brazilian Mato Grosso and the Argen-
tine Chaco.
Brazilian Mato Grosso
For a long time, the state of Mato Grosso was one of the most peripheral 
and ‘underpopulated’ regions of Brazil. At the beginning of the 1970s, 
much like the Brazilian Midwest and Southern Amazonia, the region 
became a priority region for agricultural colonization. The military regime 
promoted land distribution at the frontiers of settlement as a double 
strategy: for the expansion of agricultural production, and for the creation 
of alternatives to the solution of land conflicts in the core regions of Brazil. 
Thus, the new Mato Grosso frontier formed part of a re- territorialized 
response to socio- ecological conflict situations (dealing with distribution of 
environmental goods, interest, and actions). Instead of agrarian reforms, 
national avoidance strategies led to the implementation of settlement 
schemes for small farmers, organized by the state or private firms from 
Southern and South- Eastern Brazil. The expansion of modernized agricul-
ture in the South had caused deep structural changes through land concen-
tration and expulsion of small farmers in the South. In the form of an 
economically- driven exit strategy, business was made on the expelled peo-
ple’s hopes for a better life at the pioneer front in Mato Grosso.
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 Three development phases are observed: First, an occupational phase of 
Northern Mato Grosso (especially the region of influence of the BR- 163 
highway from Cuiabá to Santarém) was dominated by small farmer immi-
gration during the 1970s and the first years of the 1980s. Second, a phase 
of extractivism was dominated by timber and gold extraction during the 
late 1980s and the 1990s (shifting the focus from people to commodities). 
Third, a very dynamic expansion of large soybean farms implemented on 
large estates in Cerrado areas has substituted failed small farmers in the 
settlement schemes. This markedly altered the socio- economic and socio- 
cultural structure of the region (Coy and Klingler, 2011), causing increas-
ing regional vulnerabilities due to world market oscillations and the 
concomitant agribusiness reactions (Coy, 2005).
 Hence, due to its high absorption of land and its high demand for 
investment (machinery, seeds, agrochemicals), the soybean boom con-
tributed over the last 30 years to a marked process of land concentration 
and agro- social exclusivity by privileging highly capitalized farmers and 
gradually excluding small- scale farmers. Viewed from outside of the 
region, social- environmental questions of territoriality, exclusion, and 
environmental (in)justice (particularly in terms of effects and consequences) 
have to be raised.
 At the same time, the soybean boom left its marks in regional settlement 
structures, inscribing its social exclusiveness and its local- global logics in 
the new and highly dynamic pioneer towns (e.g. the ‘boom towns’ along 
the BR- 163 road, developed by private settlement companies). Some of 
these towns are now the ‘wealthiest’ municipalities in Brazil. They are eco-
nomically dominated by the agribusiness sector (e.g. silos, traders, banks, 
implement merchants) and socio- culturally driven by farmers who increas-
ingly prefer to live in an urban context.
 Summing up, the development of Mato Grosso unearths plenty of con-
tradictions: an impressive economic ‘success story’ on the one hand and a 
story of social (and economic) exclusion as well as of ecologic risks (e.g. 
destruction of the Cerrado vegetation, reduction of biodiversity, erosion, 
contamination by agrochemicals) on the other (Nepstad et al., 2014). 
Questions of distribution and concentration (now favouring the ‘Big Four’ 
producers ADM, Bunge, Louis Dreyfuss and Cargill as well as some big 
national companies, such as Amaggi) have to be raised, particularly in the 
context of EJ spheres of regulation. However, this call is very little – if at 
all – answered within the region.
Argentine Chaco
In the Argentine Chaco, the beginning of soy production can be dated to 
the 1970s, while a major increase has been experienced the mid- 1990s, due 
to the adaptation of production modes towards direct seeding and the use 
of genetically modified crops. Nowadays, the Gran Chaco Region faces the 
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highest deforestation rate worldwide (Hansen et al., 2013), while the 
Argentine Chaco being most affected by soybean expansion (Gasparri et 
al., 2013). In previously deforested areas, the new production scheme acts 
in strong competition with traditional forms of agri- and horticulture; new 
actors enter local markets, scales of production increase; land tenure and 
increasing land concentration and privatization occurs.
 Considering the region from an outside perspective, certain potentials 
for socio- ecological conflicts can be identified: the application of pesticides/
herbicides close to settled areas, the privatization of land, the displacement 
of puesteros (small- scale farmers living in the Monte, i.e. land covered with 
trees and bushes), and deforestation (i.e. restriction of access to forestland), 
among others. Three main results are observed: First, the thought style of 
‘progress’ is omnipresent. Even though locals may not directly benefit from 
increased soy production, the overall perception in villages surrounded by 
soy fields is surprisingly positive. This feature is highly represented in 
casual language of locals when talking about deforestation: “Han limpiado 
el campo” – “They have cleaned the field”. Even though approximately 26 
per cent of the people living in the Argentine Chaco use firewood from the 
Monte as a primary source of combustion for cooking (Krapovickas et al., 
2016: 228), it is astonishing how far the positive outlook on frontier 
expansion is present in the local community.
 Second, this one- term event changes local–regional territorialities, intro-
ducing new and predominantly extra- regional actors through moving the 
centres of their lives to the Chaco region. However, these actors came 
without their families. Coupled with the fact that workforce in the new soy 
agribusiness is not needed (in general, one skilled employee per 1,000 hec-
tares of cultivated land is required), the advancement of the soy frontier 
has occurred without migration towards the region. Since locals living in 
the Monte were forced to leave for villages and local urban centres, an 
increasing disconnection between urban areas and rural surroundings 
occurs. Thus, it goes without saying that the most prominent sources of 
friction (if not to say conflict) arise from predominantly urban problems.
 Third, the major results of several workshops carried out with young 
adults in three different locations show that socio- ecological problems cir-
culate around the following themes: waste management, soy silos within 
urban areas, and increased motorization of the area (mostly trucks). Even 
though clear signs of – often unlawful – fumigation are observed in the 
vicinities of the villages (the minimum distance between urban areas and 
fumigated land has been observed to be less than two metres), fumigation, 
however, does not play a major discursive role.
Comparison
As Table 9.1 shows, the Mato Grosso Region shows more characteristics 
of a state- encouraged expansion, accompanied by new settlements, thus 
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focussing on an expansion with people rather than a mere commodifica-
tion of land as experienced in the Argentine Chaco. Remaining in the eco-
nomic realm, it is observed that the concentration of land towards the ‘Big 
Four’ in Mato Grosso is not that well pronounced in the Argentine coun-
terpart, due to already- institutionalized conflicts between the Argentine 
government and the agrarian sector.
 Both case studies show that the primary thought style revolves around 
the notion of ‘progress’, the accompanying thought collective within the 
region is represented by what Fleck (2011) describes through esoteric 
Table 9.1  Territoriality – comparison between Brazilian Mato Grosso and Argen-
tine Chaco
Mato Grosso Argentine Chaco
Development of 
frontier
From land colonization to 
large-scale farming
From local peasantry to large-
scale farming
Migration patterns Migration from South Brazil 
to Mato Grosso
No significant migration to the 
Chaco region, but increased 
sub-regional migration to 
urban areas
Form of frontier 
expansion
State encouraged State tolerated
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Very high towards the Big 
Four (ADM, Bunge, Cargill, 
Louis Dreyfus) market 
leaders in agribusiness
Medium concentration, still 




Very high visibility of soy-
related activity; leads to more 
restrictions locally
Still more peripheral frontier 
with little visibility on a global 





Non-/low-level materialization of unfairness or injustice; 
EJ claims are hardly voiced within the frontier region
Source: authors’ own analysis.
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(inner; made of key stakeholders in the soy- agribusiness) and exoteric 
(outer; other actors related to the issue of soy expansion, be it first or 
second hand) circles. The esoteric circle defines the circumstances of ‘pro-
gress’ in the region. The exoteric circle – through territorial power rela-
tions – is willingly or unwillingly drawn to the pre- set notions and modes 
of action to the extent that articulated forms of fairness claims – and thus 
the creation of conflicts – are hardly observed.
 This interesting characteristic can be visualized through two often- heard 
quotes by locals: (1) “We will not bite the hand that feeds us”; and (2) 
“Nothing can be done”. While (1) represents a clearly perceived depend-
ence of locals on soy- related stakeholders – be it legitimized or not, (2) 
reflects some sort of resignation towards the dominant thought style and 
form of superimposed actions. This feature in particular goes along with 
the theoretical discussion of socio- cultural aspects of justice (see Flitner, 
2007), where context, tradition, and modes of living are crucial. These 
remarks refer to frontier- internal perspectives.
 From outside perspectives on the case studies, however, socio- ecological 
conflicts rather than previously discussed notions of ‘progress’ are central. 
Two potential sources of socio- ecological conflicts can be characterized as 
either one- off events (such as deforestation), or repetitive events (like fumi-
gation). Both of them can be put in Flitner’s (2007) EJ matrix under dis-
tributive justice. However, the main obstacle here is the non-/or low- level 
materialization of formal unfairness (Hooker, 2005). This interesting 
aspect can be coupled with changing territorialities and asymmetrical 
forms of procedural (in)justice (see Flitner, 2007). Simply put, participa-
tion in decision making on environmental issues related to soy expansion 
and its effects is close to non- existent, even though small- scale attempts of 
public participation on local levels exist. For example, some environmental 
secretaries try to supervise agriculture- related activities according to legal 
regulations.
Discourse: or, the justification of fairness?
Since it has been shown that conflict articulation does not play a pivotal 
role in terms of the relation between local, regional, and extra- regional 
actors, the second axis focuses on examples of how fairness and soy pro-
duction is dealt with by different organizations. Three actor groups and 
their perspectives will be presented: the national government, non- 
production-related NGOs, and producer- driven actors.
Brazilian Mato Grosso
The Brazilian soybean economy has been legitimated by its obvious eco-
nomic dynamism, putting the country on the top of the world producers 
and exporters of agricultural raw products. This is a constitutive part of a 
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long- lasting Brazilian discourse of ‘agricultural vocation’, integrating Bra-
zil’s frontiers into global commodity chains and production networks.
 In Brazil, national politics and agribusiness are intrinsically linked. The 
perception of agribusiness as a national ‘growth engine’ is discursively and 
politically supported by the powerful and growing representation of agri-
business interests in the Brazilian parliament (so- called bancada ruralista); 
national and regional governments reinforce agribusiness and the soybean 
sector by a decisive growth- and modernization- oriented policy, including 
large- scale infrastructural investments. The soybean sector has developed a 
very professional ‘machinery’ of self- representation, of political lobbying, 
and of image and discourse building. Aprosoja (Association of Soy and 
Corn Producers) has become a professional and powerful instrument of the 
sector in all kinds of political debates. Its main field of action is to claim 
logistical improvements (e.g. reduced transport costs, road infrastructure) 
and to politically safeguard an entrepreneurial friendly (neo- liberal) frame-
work for investment. Simply put, the discourse is linked to a linear form of 
argumentation: soy expansion is considered part of progress and growth, 
which secures sustainability. Sustainability is seen positive and fair, making 
the circular assumption that soy expansion is fair. As a result, farmers’ 
immediate economic interests are put first, setting back issues such as 
socio- ecological governance, an intrinsic aspect related to EJ. Nevertheless, 
Aprosoja’s own visions of ‘social and ecological responsibility’ have mean-
while become a visible part of its discourses (e.g. Aprosoja’s CSR- activities 
‘AçãoVerde’ or ‘AgroSolidário’).
 In this vein, in 2006 the soy processing agroindustries, together with dif-
ferent NGOs and other actors, agreed for a so called soy moratorium 
which should have guaranteed that soybeans produced on recently cleared 
forest land in the southern part of the Amazon should not be commercial-
ized. This moratorium proved to be relatively efficient, aggravating and 
breaking, for instance, the expansion of soybean cultivation along north-
ern parts of the BR- 163 corridor (Nepstad et al., 2014). Despite all such 
initiatives for certification or for the implementation of rules aiming at a 
‘greening’ of soy production, the greatest obstacles for such initiatives are, 
nowadays, shifts in global demand structures. China, specifically, as not 
only an emerging, but increasingly dominating, market is not very inter-
ested in socially or ecologically certified products. Therefore, producers do 
not feel any pressure, at the moment, to comply with changing production 
standards, notwithstanding all discursive- contrary declarations.
 Nevertheless, the soy production sector is faced with resistance by 
national and international civil society activism. The BR- 163 region in 
Mato Grosso became a ‘hot spot’ of disputes in this sense. The plans for 
the conclusion of road pavement towards Santarém required by the repre-
sentatives of Mato Grosso’s agribusiness (e.g. Aprosoja) in order to guar-
antee competitive transport costs and market conditions, prompted 
resistance from ecologists and social movements. Against this conflicting 
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situation, the Lula government (2003–2011) intended to frame the plans 
for road building at the BR- 163, for the first time, with a programme 
(Plano BR- 163 Sustentável) containing measures of participatory planning, 
ecological governance, protection of natural and indigenous areas, and a 
whole package of measures towards sustainable regional development. In a 
certain sense those plans were promising concerning a fairer and just 
regional development. In more recent years, however, those plans were 
substituted by the merely modernization- and growth- oriented national 
investment programmes PAC1 and PAC2, highlighting the aforementioned 
national discourse.
 Thus, the recent regional incorporation of Mato Grosso into the glo-
balized market was based discursively on social development and economic 
opportunities of the soy frontiers for all people (colonization as an ‘altern-
ative’ to agrarian reform), but in reality, the capitalist interests of private 
firms dominated from the beginning. Therefore, ‘fairness’ and (socio- 
economic as well as environmental) ‘justice’ were never valuable concepts 
within the (societal, economic, and socio- ecological) context of Mato 
Grosso development. Thus, the dominant thought style driven by market 
forces shows an implicit understanding of libertarian fairness where those 
who invest get the returns.
Argentine Chaco
Unlike in Brazil, in Argentina the relationship between the government and 
the agrarian sector has been fraught with tensions for the last 60 years, 
culminating in the agrarian crisis in 2008 (Reca, 2010: 435). This tense 
relationship is manifested in one particular form of taxation on exports, 
particularly of soy- related products. While from 1993 to 2001 export taxes 
(retenciones) amounted to only 4 per cent of the commodity’s value, the 
retenciones were increased to 35 per cent by 2007 (Reca, 2010: 440). Since 
the internal market for soy is not considered relevant, the vast majority of 
producers have been affected negatively. Since then, Argentina’s govern-
ment under Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 
(2003–2015) has radicalized its discourse against agrarian monopolies, 
defaming soy as being yuyo (i.e. weed; La Nación, 2008).
 Nevertheless, a fundamental piece of information here is the actual dis-
crepancy between promoting negative publicity against soy production and 
the application of the high- value retenciones.3 Taking into account the 
various forms of social plans existing in Argentina, it would be impossible 
to finance those plans without the existence of the globalized soy market. 
A clear form of action- oriented pragmatism is observed. Following neo- 
extractivist thought styles, the redistribution of funds coming from extrac-
tive industries (here particularly including the agribusiness) establishes an 
approximation towards formal fairness of secondary income distribution 
due to soy expansion. Thus, the government’s form of applying fairness 
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(also in relation to Flitner’s (2007) symbolic justice) goes towards the max-
imization of people’s benefits (through a mixture of egalitarian and utili-
tarian fairness) in monetary terms, thereby neglecting the locally based 
negative effects of soy expansion. This feature becomes particularly 
important in the Argentine Chaco since – as the previous section described 
– local forms of resistance/articulation and materialization of fairness 
claims are not accentuated. Thus, as a first critical remark, it becomes clear 
that theoretical concepts of fairness have to include scalar dimensions, 
since what may be fair on the national level, can be considered unfair on 
the local scale.
 The second critical perspective on fairness should be highlighted with 
the example of Greenpeace’s activities in the Argentine Chaco. From an 
outside perspective, it would be expected that NGOs engaged a lot in local 
struggles, be they ecological or socio- ecological. However, from a regional 
inside- perspective, clear critique from locals in the Argentine Chaco is 
voiced. The presence of NGOs, particularly Greenpeace, is seen as practi-
cally non- existent by locals. The locals’ anger at the perceived NGO’s non- 
commitment in the region is constantly being expressed. Confronted with 
this accusation, a representative of Greenpeace in Buenos Aires elaborated 
the organization’s focus on deforestation. This anecdote highlights the 
problem of the Chaco region of being an area out of focus for (inter-)
national activist groups.
 The third actor group, representing a group of farmers in Las Lajitas 
(Grupo Las Lajitas), is a mix of locally and regionally rooted, but also glo-
balized, producers streamlining their technical expertise in the area. This is 
of particular importance, since – unlike in many production areas in 
the US – technical state support for farmers focuses primordially on small- 
scale (often self- subsistent) agri- and horticulturalists. Thus, the auto- 
organization of groups of middle- to-large- scale farmers occurs out of 
necessity to create parallel support structures for day- to-day business; the 
organization’s principles are clearly defined by libertarian thought styles. 
When dealing with fairness on a discursive level, action- oriented prag-
matism is very prominent. Once again, it is seen that from a national level, 
Argentina is more critically minded towards agribusiness activities, also 
articulating fairness claims on a national and supra- regional level, even 
though state incomes critically depend on agriculture.
Comparison
As shown in Table 9.2, in both our cases we have seen different modes of 
interpretation of fairness, owed to national structures as well as socio- 
economic patterns and traditions. The most obvious difference between the 
two regional examples lies in the states’ discursive approaches towards 
agricultural activity: Brazil shows a continuation of the positive outlook 
on agriculture, while Argentina radicalized its discourse, particularly 
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against soy production, but still heavily relies on its revenues. This feature 
is prominently reflected in the establishment and level of formalization of 
agricultural lobbying groups in both regions.
 One great commonality of both regions is the aspect of certification of 
soy production. Certification is intrinsically important. As confirmed by 
brokers in Buenos Aires, the current standards for exporting to the Nether-
lands (and thus the EU) say that certified soy and soy related products are 
an added benefit but are not a primary necessity. However, it is believed 
that the current status is only one step towards making certification obliga-
tory, intensifying the pressure on producers to follow stricter norms in 
relation to legal compliance and good business practices, labour con-
ditions, responsible community relations, environmental responsibility, 
and good agricultural practices (see RTRS, 2015); thus highlighting the 
‘fairness of soy’.
 Another interesting aspect in this context deals with business size. In 
both regional cases, small or medium scale farmers do not see the necessity 
for certification since their visibility (on all scales) is fairly limited, thus 
reducing the need for better corporate social responsibility. Large- scale 
Table 9.2  Discourse – comparison between Brazilian Mato Grosso and Argentine 
Chaco
Mato Grosso Argentine Chaco
Overall 
agribusiness 
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Source: authors’ own analysis.
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companies, however, are frequently faced with criticism in relation to their 
production modes and are thus more willing to participate in certification 
programmes (as confirmed through informal talks with RTRS representa-
tives). Another vital argument in this context deals with the growth of new 
soy markets (predominantly China), where the core purchasing reason is 
defined by pricing rather than socio- ecological standards.
 Summing up, in both regions, certification only plays a role for large 
companies with high visibility on a global scale, who are influenced by the 
opinion- formation of potential customers. As a result, the dichotomy of 
perception of the ‘big and bad multinationals’ vs. the ‘small and good 
farmers’ has to be broken up and re- evaluated; visibility can thus be seen 
as an indicator for global pressure towards fairness. Furthermore, certifica-
tion – from the point of view of soy farmers – is predominantly an act of 
marketing rather than an actual statement towards fairer production.
Conclusion
Soy production and fairness discussions are clearly context dependent. 
While Brazil and Argentina show two different forms of discourse 
regarding agriculture, it has become apparent that both countries rely on 
the production of soy; Argentina, in particular, may be even more 
dependent on this commodity. The chapter has shown that the concepts of 
fairness are difficult to operationalize in empirical research. Therefore, we 
have looked for alternatives and have applied an EJ approach that was 
extended with the concept of territoriality. This allowed us to unearth 
underlying conceptions and situations of fairness.
 Taking up two axes of investigation – territoriality and discourse – 
major differences in perspective, from within the case studies and from the 
outside, are observed. Fairness per se is not discussed in the research areas 
unless open conflicts arise. In this case, particular understandings of fair-
ness are instrumentalized to legitimize actors’ strategies. Referring to our 
first axis of investigation, (1) territoriality, both regions have it in common 
that open conflicts between members of the agribusiness and locals/local 
(environmental) groups are hardly found. Two reasons are the thought 
style of ‘progress’, dominated by leading actors of the agribusiness that 
constantly overwrite the articulation of fairness claims and the perceived 
dependence on the new dynamisms of the agribusiness (particularly in 
terms of job creation). The second axis, (2) discourse, is less physio- 
regionally attached but deals more with how different thought styles 
towards soy production are presented. Taking three different actor groups 
and their specific discourses into account, certification proved to be a 
major issue in the debates on soy- related fairness. Here, examples have 
shown that the motivation for certification (of all actors involved) depends, 
once again, on pragmatic reasoning of output maximization. This shows 
yet again that fairness is not a value per se but becomes relevant when 
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extra benefits are obtained (in terms of publicity, marketing, and the use of 
protest resources).
 Finally, it has been shown that the combination of EJ and territoriality 
can be fruitful for empirical cases dealing with resource fairness, since they 
facilitate profound insights into the underlying structures of socio- 
ecological conflict situations and their territorial as well as discursive fram-
ings. Hence, we conclude that for global topics such as resource fairness, 
regional contexts are of great importance. Therefore, regional comparisons 
help to deconstruct common fair(y) tales and substitute them with multi- 
faceted and multileveled perspectives towards reality.
Notes
1 We thank the Austrian Agency for International Cooperation in Education and 
Research (OeAD- GmbH) for awarding Robert Hafner a Marietta Blau grant, 
financed by the budget of the Federal Ministry of Science, Research and Economy 
(bmwfi). Furthermore, thanks go to the Austrian Academy of Science for Robert 
Hafner’s DOC Fellowship at the Institute of Geography, Innsbruck University.
2 Ludwik Fleck (e.g. 1980) has elaborated the concept of ‘thought styles’ in order 
to study the way in which cognition and thinking is formed in a community. The 
advantage of using thought styles rather than paradigms lies in the fact that they 
are procedure- oriented and constantly changing, based on the members within 
the community but also highly influenced by its surroundings.
3 In November 2015, with the election of Mauricio Macri, the Kirchner era came 
to an end. Thus, changes in the retenciones regime in favour of Argentine pro-
ducers are already announced and partly implemented.
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10 Greening the imperial mode of 
living?
Socio- ecological (in)justice, 




How can we reach a wide- ranging de- carbonization within the twenty- 
first century? Obviously, the transport sector is of particular 
importance.
(German Chancellor Angela Merkel (Bundesregierung, 2015, 
author’s translation))
This quote from a speech by Angela Merkel held at the National Confer-
ence on Electromobility in Berlin in June 2015 demonstrates the import-
ance major policy makers attribute to electric vehicles as a ‘green’ 
alternative to fossil fuels in the context of climate change and peak oil. 
Within the discourse of a Green Economy (UNEP, 2011), these vehicles 
might invoke the image of environmentally friendly technologies and sus-
tainable transport solutions. This chapter challenges these assumptions 
from a political ecology perspective (see Pichler, in this volume), focusing 
on asymmetries of power and transnational justice implications with 
regard to a specific commodity: lithium. Although the metal has been 
exploited for several decades for a variety of applications (e.g. lubricants 
and ceramics), current battery systems for electric vehicles make lithium an 
indispensable resource, leading to a “lithium rush” (Koerner, 2008). The 
primary targets of this rush are the salt brines of the ‘lithium- triangle’ in 
the Andean highland plateau between Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, where 
the majority of the world’s lithium deposits are located (and where the 
extraction is most profitable). Argentina is of particular importance as it is 
home to a number of emerging lithium extraction projects that receive 
major investments from car and battery producers and/or their suppliers. 
To better understand the local implications of the global lithium rush, the 
chapter analyses the Olaroz lithium project in the province of Jujuy, and 
reflects on its socio- ecological impacts and transnational connections. 
Drawing on the concept of the imperial mode of living (Brand and Wissen, 
2013), I argue that green economy strategies are built on global and local 
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asymmetries of power, and spatially and temporarily externalize ecological 
and social costs. Therefore, they fail to promote socio- ecological justice, 
but are rather ‘greening’ the imperial mode of living.
 The research is based on a qualitative case study of the Olaroz project 
in which transnational corporations (TNCs) interact with the provincial 
state of Jujuy and local indigenous communities. During a two- month field 
research from March to May 2014, 22 semi- structured interviews were 
conducted with local government representatives, company managers and 
engineers, researchers, as well as local community representatives.
 The chapter proceeds as follows: After clarifying the theoretical con-
cepts and the political economic context of lithium extraction, I illustrate 
the actors involved in the project and demonstrate their interests and strat-
egies in order to analyse socio- ecological conflicts against the backdrop of 
asymmetric power relations among these actors.
Green economy, the imperial mode of living, and 
socio- ecological justice
Amidst signals of multiple crisis dimensions (e.g. financial, economic, 
climate, energy), political parties and international organizations proposed 
various ‘green’ strategies. Among these strategies are the Green New Deal 
(Green European Foundation, n.d.), Green Growth (OECD, 2011), and a 
Green Economy (UNEP, 2011).2 The common element of these suggestions 
is to harmonize economic growth, poverty reduction, and ecological con-
cerns, understanding the recent economic crisis as an opportunity for 
investment in ‘green’ sectors. While these sectors also include market- based 
conservation mechanisms or biotechnologies, the strongest emphasis is on 
reducing fossil fuel dependence with investments in alternative energy and 
technologies. I refer to this latter strategy by the terms ‘green’ and ‘green-
ing’. Viewing the “gross misallocation of capital” as the “common feature” 
causing different crisis dimensions (UNEP, 2011: 14), a green economy is 
to be achieved by changing taxes, subsidies, and investment incentives.
 Electromobility is an important element of the envisioned green economy 
(UNEP, 2011: 404; OECD, 2011: 68–69; Green European Foundation, 
n.d.). Significant amounts of the thousands of billions of dollars that were 
spent to counter the 2007/2008 economic crisis were dedicated to support 
green technologies in the automotive industry in OECD countries (for an 
overview see OECD, 2009: 22–29). Whereas full electric cars still lack con-
sumer acceptance due to low kilometre range and long charging times, 
hybrid cars in particular have already significantly contributed to regaining 
growth in the automotive industry. For example, in 2012 1.2 million out of 
8.7 million cars sold by leading automotive manufacturer Toyota were 
hybrid vehicles (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2015).
 While there is a growing agreement that “present patterns of transporta-
tion [. . .] are highly unsustainable” (UNEP, 2011: 380), the proponents of 
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a green economy rarely consider the sustainability and justice implications 
of ‘green’ technologies. The concept of the “imperial mode of living”, in 
turn, highlights these connections and the underlying modes of production 
and living:
Exclusive access to resources, guaranteed by contract or through open 
violence, and the externalization of the socio- ecological costs that 
using these resources entails, are the conditio sine qua non of the 
global North’s mode of living, which we therefore call ‘imperial’.
(Brand and Wissen, 2013: 699)
From a Gramscian perspective, Brand and Wissen (2013) introduced the 
concept referring not only to dominant fossilist patterns of consumption 
and production but also to the overarching orientation towards economic 
growth and competitiveness of state institutions, which shape the percep-
tions and actions of politicians. Adapting individual automotive mobility 
to renewable energies3 makes it possible to keep up a fossilist consumption 
pattern of symbolic significance for the imperial mode of living, including 
the built environments of streets, highways, and housing or working areas. 
Furthermore, electric vehicles provide new means of accumulation for a 
sluggish car industry. For their production, the industry not only requires 
new technologies but also a different supply of resources, among which 
lithium is crucial. The focus on the extraction of these resources allows us 
to cast a different light on the sustainability implications promoted by the 
proponents of a green economy.
 Building on Pichler’s political ecology perspective on socio- ecological 
justice (this volume), I highlight unequal power relations and the structural 
conditions of resource extraction for electromobility. While green economy 
strategies might promote sustainability with regard to fossil fuel depend-
ence and CO2 emissions, they are far from promoting socio- ecological 
justice as “self- determination and equality in the access to and control over 
nature and natural resources” (Pichler, in this volume, 48). Crisis strategies 
such as a green economy are notably silent on the issues of power and 
democracy. A very well- referenced report by the ETC- Group (2011) argues 
that a green economy, as it is currently unfolding, will lead to the concen-
tration of market shares and power of those companies already dominat-
ing the global economy. In the transport sector, Toyota Motors, one of the 
major players of the ‘brown’ automotive industry, is also positioning itself 
to become a leader of electromobility. At the same time, new ‘green’ capital 
fractions such as Tesla Motors emerge.
 A focus on actors involved in resource extraction and processing is a 
fruitful point of entry for understanding the injustices on which the impe-
rial mode of living is based and which are reproduced through its greening. 
Bryant and Bailey (1997) developed an actor- oriented political ecology 
approach to study the unequal power relations in socio- ecological conflicts. 
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They define power as the “ability of an actor to control their interaction 
with the environment and the interaction of other actors with the environ-
ment” (Bryant and Bailey: 1997: 39). From this perspective, socio- 
ecological conflicts, particularly those publicly expressed, are “important 
moments when underlying structures of power and real interests are most 
revealed” (Turner, 2004: 864).4
The political economic context of lithium extraction
Lithium technologies have become dominant in batteries for electric cars 
and other applications due to their advantages regarding costs, capacity, 
and efficiency (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2012). While lithium- 
ion batteries are well- established, competing technologies – such as fuel 
cells – that might become more attractive in the mid- to long term, have 
only recently entered consumer markets. The raw material lithium 
carbonate represents about 2 per cent of the value of a battery cell and the 
overall market volume was relatively small at US$2,200 million in 2012 
(COCHILCO, 2013: 1). However, lithium is becoming a resource of stra-
tegic importance for battery technologies due to its high electrochemical 
potential (Roland Berger Strategy Consultants, 2012: 35–37). Against this 
background, various (inter)governmental and independent reports high-
light the strategic importance of the metal (e.g. European Commission, 
2014: 24; Gunn, 2014). Currently, portable electronics (e.g. smartphones 
or notebooks) are driving the lithium demand. However, the required 
lithium input per unit for a hybrid or electric car is 100 to 1,000 times 
higher than for a smartphone or a notebook which helps to anticipate pos-
sible long- term trends and interests in lithium deposits (SignumBOX, cited 
in Fox- Davies Capital 2013: 7–8).
 South America is of particular importance for the lithium market since 
it hosts the majority of lithium deposits and has the lowest production 
costs at about US$2,000 per ton (Orocobre, 2013: 13). With world market 
prices at over US$6,000 per ton that are projected to remain stable (Vil-
laroel, 2014), investing in these projects provides an opportunity to gain 
high returns on investments for surplus capital that is seeking realization in 
the context of a crisis of over- accumulation. Hence, a multitude of new 
projects has started in South America, with different political and legal 
conditions. While Bolivia pursues a strategy of state- led industrialization, 
Chile has a restrictive legal framework that makes it difficult for companies 
to receive concessions for lithium resources (COCHILCO, 2013). Argen-
tina, in turn, has a relatively business- friendly mining legislation and large 
amounts of high quality resources. This combination has attracted many 
companies that started lithium extraction projects in the different salt 
lakes or salares of the Andean Northwest. This chapter focuses on the 
Olaroz project which entered commercial production in December 2014 as 
the first of these new projects (Orocobre, 2014). Due to these projects, 
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Argentina is expected to become the leading producer of lithium com-
pounds by 2020 (COCHILCO, 2013: 20; Villaroel, 2014) or in 
investment- market words “the global powerhouse of lithium mining” 
(Filice, 2013). The lithium boom in Argentina is located within a general 
expansion of the mining frontier. A number of neoliberal reforms in 
mining regulation that came into effect in the mid- 1990s during the presid-
encies of Carlos Menem have facilitated this expansion. Back then, Menem 
introduced regulations to attract transnational capital for investment that 
have not changed since the ascent of the Kirchner administration. In fact, 
in 2004, then- president Néstor Kirchner evaluated the prevailing legisla-
tion as “very positive” and aimed to “consolidate the process of mining 
investment and development in Argentina” with his National Mining Plan 
(cited in Svampa et al., 2009: 36). The administrations of Néstor Kirchner 
and his widow Cristina Fernández de Kirchner are seen as part of a wider 
Latin American phenomenon of “post- neoliberal” governments (Grugel 
and Riggirozzi, 2010). While these governments claim an increased share 
of export revenues for social redistribution and even promote selective re- 
industrialization, they rarely question the extractivist model of exporting 
raw materials in the context of a robust resource boom (Gudynas 2009).
 Mirroring national policies, the provincial governors of Jujuy, Eduardo 
Fellner and Walter Barrionuevo from Kirchner’s Justicialist Party, have, 
since 2003, developed new alliances and social policies since 2003 which 
are mostly directed towards marginalized urban classes (Battezzati, 2012). 
Similar to other provinces of the Andean northwest, Jujuy’s economic 
dynamic stems from the appropriation of natural resources and their inser-
tion into global value chains (Paolasso et al., 2013). Seventy- eight per cent 
of the province’s exports are primary products, and the mining sector 
makes up more than half of exports (Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas 
Publicas, 2011: 2–3). Securing the valorization of natural resources for 
capital accumulation is therefore of particular importance for the political 
project of social redistribution in the absence of other significant economic 
activities.
Actors, interests, and strategies in the Olaroz project
The Olaroz project is operated by the company Sales de Jujuy, a joint 
venture of the Australian mining company Orocobre, the Japanese Toyota 
Tsusho Corporation, and Jujuy’s state- owned mining and energy enterprise 
Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado (JEMSE). The salar de Olaroz 
is located in the Andean highland plateau, called puna, near the Chilean 
and Bolivian borders at approximately 3,900 m above sea level. Although 
the installations for extracting and processing the minerals are relatively 
small, the project affects a number of indigenous communities in the sur-
rounding area, mainly due to hydrological dynamics.
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The Australian mining company Orocobre
As the name indicates, the Australian mining company Orocobre originally 
planned to exploit gold (Spanish: oro) and copper (Spanish: cobre) in 
Argentina because of a “highly prospective” geology, and Argentina’s 
“standardised federal mining framework and attractive investment regime” 
(Orocobre, 2009a: 3). In May 2009, however, after the chaotic breakdown 
of the 2007/08 crisis, Orocobre started to exclusively focus on lithium, 
when US- based Lithium Investors invested US$5.4 million into the “rapid 
development of the Olaroz Lithium- Potash Project” (Orocobre, 2009b). In 
the wake of the economic crisis and an emerging green mobility sector, fin-
ancial capital identified lithium as a sector with high profit margins. As 
secured funding is a major issue for junior mining companies (Filice, 2013), 
Orocobre was obliged to please its investors and secure their participation 
by completing the rapid development of the Olaroz project.
The Japanese Toyota Tsusho Corporation (TTC) and associates
TTC is part of the Japanese Toyota group and provides material supplies 
to its parent conglomerate as well as to other East Asian companies such 
as Panasonic and Sanyo (Toyota Tsusho Corporation, 2014). Toyota 
Motors and Panasonic formed a joint venture to develop and produce 
battery packs for hybrid cars which had recently shifted to lithium technol-
ogies. In the wake of growing demand, Toyota Motors and Panasonic plan 
to increase the production of lithium- ion batteries by six times at their 
Omori plant in Japan (Filice, 2014). When entering into an agreement with 
TTC, Orocobre (2010) stated: “Toyota Tsusho’s interest in the project 
stems from the desire to increase its exposure to reliable and diversified 
lithium supplies as global demand for lithium batteries in the automotive 
sector continues to grow” (2). According to Kentaro Tanimoto, mining 
manager at TTC, the company will obtain all but 5 per cent of the lithium 
carbonate produced at Olaroz (Interview 1). The mother company Toyota 
Motors is to become the “first and potentially the primary customer” 
(Dowling, 2010).
 The strategic importance of lithium is emphasized by the fact that the 
Japanese government’s Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation 
(JOGMEC) assisted TTC with initial surveys and debt guarantees for the 
Olaroz project. According to TTC, “for Japan, with its sparse energy 
resources, securing stable resource supplies is a core part of national strat-
egies” (Toyota Tsusho Corporation, 2014). The Olaroz project shows both 
the importance of the material resource base for green technologies as well 
as the willingness of state institutions to secure strategic resources for 
domestic industrial production beyond its own territory in the wake of 
increasing competition for the earth’s resources (Brand and Wissen, 2013).
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The provincial state of Jujuy – JEMSE
In March 2011, the provincial government declared lithium a strategic 
resource to “generate socio- economic development in the whole province 
of Jujuy” (Gobierno de Jujuy, 2011). While it remains unclear what pre-
cisely this means or how it will be realized, the state defined new rules of 
legality, making an association with the simultaneously- created state enter-
prise JEMSE a necessary condition for the approval of lithium projects in 
the province. JEMSE would obtain an 8.5 per cent share of the lithium 
companies operating in Jujuy as well as 5 per cent of the produced lithium 
carbonate. Orocobre (2012) views the JEMSE agreement as an “important 
milestone for the Company, closely aligning the interests of the Province of 
Jujuy with those of Orocobre and its project partners” (10). By national 
law, the provinces can charge a maximum royalty rate of 3 per cent. 
Against this background, Javier Elortegui, mining director of the provincial 
government, describes the creation of JEMSE as a means of increasing the 
income gained from the mining operations without violating national 
norms (Interview 2). The expansion of lithium mining is of particular 
importance for the province of Jujuy. First, lithium carbonate could 
become its single most important export good, increasing the total export 
value by 50 per cent. Second, the provincial government aims at creating 
local added value in the lithium battery value chain with the 5 per cent of 
the product it obtains from the lithium projects. Currently, the government 
is preparing to build a pilot plant in an old steel factory near the provincial 
capital of San Salvador de Jujuy (Interview 2). At the moment, however, 
there is no local company with the technological know- how or capital to 
join the project and the provincial state faces the technological challenge of 
installing a highly complex plant that has to be competitive with cathodes, 
cells, or batteries of leading international firms who are constantly invest-
ing in product improvement. For example, with an investment of US$4 
billion Tesla’s Gigafactory exceeds the annual budget of the entire provin-
cial state by a factor of 4 (Ministerio de Hacienda, 2013). Despite a strong 
discourse on industrializing lithium resources (La Gaceta, 2014) and 
several research and development initiatives in cooperation with national 
entities, these asymmetries are currently deepening Jujuy’s dependence on 
lithium extraction and the export of natural resources (Anlauf, 2014, 
Chapter 8).
Local communities
The adjacent salt lakes of Olaroz and Cauchari are located in the centre of 
the department of Susques which is inhabited by almost 4,000 people, who 
live spatially dispersed in a total of ten communities of up to several 
hundred people each. According to official data, in Susques 67 per cent of 
the households lack basic necessities (Garcia Moritán and Cruz, 2011: 15). 
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Basic infrastructure is often absent and Göbel (2013) even speaks of a “his-
toric vacuum of the state” (145) in this peripheral region. The whole 
department of Susques is located in the Puna de Atacama, which is among 
the most arid regions in the Andean highlands, having only scattered grass 
and shrub vegetation while water sources are scarce (Göbel, 2008: 
223–224). These conditions require extensive areas for the main economic 
activity: pastoral farming of llama, goat, and sheep. Livestock are mainly 
used for wool, leather, and meat production, either for subsistence or for 
trade. Although many families deploy flexible income strategies, including 
(temporary) wage labour, this does not imply any intention to give up pas-
toral farming, since it is of great cultural significance. According to Göbel 
(2013: 143), the close interaction with nature and the resulting knowledge 
are fundamental parts of an identity of difference. This Atacama identity 
(re-)surged in a politicization process in the 1990s, alongside political self- 
organization with broad social participation. As a result, the communities 
received legal recognition as aboriginal communities with juridical person-
ality in the early 2000s. Based on the ILO Convention 169 that Argentina 
ratified in 2000, these communities also received communal land rights, 
and created an autonomous community administration. While this re- 
organization took place without any official funding, the old structures of 
the state, namely the municipal commission which is tied to political 
parties and funded by the state, continued to exist (Göbel, 2013: 143–144). 
The companies took advantage of the ill- designed autonomous administra-
tion as well as the historical vacuum of the state. While local residents, 
particularly those engaging in pastoralism, have a strong interest in a 
sound environment, many also feel an urgent need for (immediate) 
improvements of their material well- being.
Territorial transformation and socio- ecological conflicts
In order to better understand the socio- ecological conflicts around lithium 
extraction, this section starts with a brief hydrological excursus. Beneath 
the salt surface crust of the salar de Olaroz is a deep basin containing the 
salt brine which has developed over thousands of years. For the production 
of 17,500 tons of lithium carbonate per year, 240 l/sec of salt brine are 
extracted by a number of wells. The brine is then concentrated in evapora-
tion basins before it is introduced to a chemical plant where lithium 
carbonate is produced. With the help of fresh water, the lithium carbonate 
is washed to the required purity of >99.5 per cent (Interview 3). The 
environmental impact report of the Olaroz project considers the impact of 
the fresh water extraction of up to 20 l/sec, which may lower the level of 
the aquifer (Ambiental, 2011: section 5.3). According to the report, this 
would be the only lasting impact of the project, which will be reversed in 
the medium term after the operations have ceased. The report, however, 
fails to mention the extraction of salt brine, which exceeds the former 
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extraction of salt brine by the factor of 12. Although the impacts of brine 
extraction are not mentioned, one has to consider that at the margins of 
the salar, the brine is also in contact with a layer of fresh water located 
above the brine because of its lower density. While the fresh water dis-
charges towards the surface because of pressure, extracting huge amounts 
of brine has the risk of lowering the groundwater level and reducing the 
pressure. This could lead to the disappearance of wetlands and lagoons, 
which are mainly nurtured by subterranean waters instead of rain. These 
wetlands and lagoons are central for flora and fauna habitats and thus for 
human life, particularly for pastoralism (Messerli et al., 1997: 235; Gal-
lardo, 2011). A significant amount of these subterranean waters are con-
sidered fossil water, which is “renewed extremely slowly, or [is] even 
non- renewable” (229). Considering this matter, mining geologist Diana 
Mutti comments that “no one knows how much fossil water the com-
panies are extracting and no one knows how this will affect the hydrologi-
cal system of fossil water in the Puna” (Interview 4).5 Against the backdrop 
of the water consumption and its effects on the ecosystem, the geologist 
Fernando Díaz concludes:
This exploitation affects the ecosystem, the fauna, the migration of 
birds, the camelids, and also the human population. Even if they are 
not many in number, they have particular ethnic characteristics and 
any exploitation that doesn’t preserve the communities is to be con-
sidered ethnocide.
(Cited in Gallardo, 2011: 29, author’s translation)
While the term ethnocide may seem dramatic, the lithium extraction indeed 
threatens the very existence of the local communities, particularly their 
ancestral form of production which is central for their identity. While the 
direct land use changes are relatively small and only affect a number of 
families from specific communities, a bigger impact on a much larger area 
occurs in the process of valorization, once the identified and secured 
resource (lithium) is extracted. The extraction of lithium reconfigures the 
use of water (salt brine or fresh waters), hitherto an essential part for the 
equilibrium of an extremely arid ecosystem, for the production for external 
markets. Hence, lithium mining intervenes in the communally managed 
territory and claims disproportionate, exclusive usage of the scarce 
resource water. Since pastoralism is highly dependent on the equilibrium 
of the ecosystem and the availability of water sources, lithium extraction is 
likely to influence a far greater territory than that affected by direct land 
use changes.
 Up to now, however, neither the mining companies nor the provincial 
government have integrated the concerns of local people into the project 
development. For Orocobre, the rapid development of the Olaroz project 
became imperative in mid- 2009. Hence, respecting the valid norms 
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regarding indigenous rights, including appropriate consultations with 
potentially slow community procedures – not to mention a potential rejec-
tion of the project – are not conducive to the company’s interests. The fol-
lowing statement by Alejandro Calpanchay, a resident of the community 
Susques, who used to work on the construction of the Olaroz plant reflects 
this process:
Two or three years ago we didn’t want to [approve the project] 
because we didn’t know about the topic, we didn’t know what was 
going to happen over time. We had our doubts. And afterwards, 
people from Jujuy were coming [to say] that we should hurry [. . .]. The 
company Sales de Jujuy came on strong, it wanted to start working 
right away(!), right away and well we didn’t want to, we didn’t want 
to, we didn’t want to, and finally we agreed. I don’t know where this 
is taking us, I don’t know!
(Interview 5)
This statement reveals that while there was formal community approval, 
local decision- makers were pressured to make a decision without being 
provided with sufficient information that would have been necessary for a 
democratic negotiation. Although the valorization of the lithium resources 
was formally open for contestation, the minutes of those meetings held to 
approve the project show that in various communities, these meetings were 
attended by less than 20 people, even in the community of Susques, where 
almost 1,000 people live. Critics such as Carlos Guzmán denounce the 
irregularity of this approval since the statute of the community says that at 
least 50 per cent of the community has to approve projects affecting all the 
inhabitants (Interview 6). The approval therefore has an undemocratic 
character, as the public sphere was explicitly closed to those whose parti-
cipation would have been legally required. Furthermore, the question of 
how the valorization of lithium would occur, that is, under which circum-
stances and with which consequences (see above), was never open for con-
testation as the uncertainty and lack of information in the above- cited 
statement shows. This uncertainty is very common among local residents – 
even people in the community leadership such as Josefa Barrios from 
Puesto Sey answered questions about their opinion on the project with “I 
don’t know, I don’t know. I know they are working there, but, [. . .] I don’t 
understand a lot of this” (Interview 7).
 Instead of informing the population and respecting community proced-
ures on decision making, the company mostly negotiated with the municipal 
commission, a state institution dependent on political parties. Sales de Jujuy 
found stable partners among local leaders who were willing to cooperate 
and helped to get them into key positions in the municipal commission. 
These relatively young leaders, often re- migrants from the cities, accepted 
jobs in the companies and hence developed a self- interest in successful 
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project development. Furthermore, the lithium company gained a relatively 
high degree of legitimacy by (at least temporarily) filling the historic vacuum 
of the state. It provided free services, including transport, health care (e.g. 
ophthalmology and dentistry), as well as education (e.g. metallurgy training 
and a school library). However, many of these services stopped once the 
project was approved (Göbel, 2013; Anlauf 2014, Chapters 7–8).
 Although these procedures are in clear violation of the legal norms 
regarding indigenous peoples’ rights to prior consultation and participa-
tion in the management of their resources, the provincial state authorities 
regarded these procedures as legal. It is precisely the capacity of the state 
to define legality that constitutes its main power dimension. The mining 
companies, in turn, did not only have the financial and organizational 
capacity to co- opt local leaders. They also possessed the necessary techno-
logy and capital to enable new rounds of accumulation via the valorization 
of natural resources which generates export revenues needed for the polit-
ical project of the provincial and national state. The provincial state is 
therefore actively encouraging the extraction of lithium within its territory 
and does not intervene in the conflict between lithium companies and local 
communities. Historically marginalized, not accustomed to Western know-
ledge systems, and without means to access important information (e.g. 
through the internet), most residents of the indigenous communities in the 
department of Susques had to rely on partial information provided by 
companies and the government. This lack of information and access largely 
excluded them from the decision- making process, which has resulted in 
highly unequal access to and control over natural resources, especially 
water. Despite their legal personality and communal land holdings, the 
company’s strategy was largely successful in defusing protest by filling the 
vacuum of the state, while local leaders also saw the company’s presence 
as an opportunity to improve the material well- being of the communities.
 The issue of water consumption and the conflict over the unequal distri-
bution of water resources, however, led a group of pastoralist families to 
start organizing protest in the “Colectivo Apacheta”.6 Their spokesperson 
Carlos Guzmán explains:
We formed the collective because of the fear of being left without 
water; because of not having consented [to the project]; because of not 
having had all the necessary conversations with us as small producers 
before they would take all of the water and all the minerals. [. . .] We 
want legal participation. We have been taking care of this land since 
our grandfathers and our great- grandfathers. We are the owners, but 
until now, [we haven’t received] anything.
(Interview 6)
This quote demonstrates a great degree of awareness of the unequal alloca-
tion of costs and benefits, but also the aforementioned exclusion that is 
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perceived as injustice, because local residents are losing access to and 
control over the critical resource of water. While bearing this cost, they are 
largely excluded from the benefits that are not only obtained by the mining 
companies. As discussed above, the production of electric and hybrid vehi-
cles helped to regain growth in the global North in times of economic 
crisis. The massive valorization of lithium resources in South America for 
electromobility also helps to keep up the imperial mode of living with 
regard to mobility in times of peak oil and climate change. While car pro-
ducers and consumers in the global North pride themselves on the imple-
mentation of cleaner technologies, these are produced at the expense of 
livelihoods of marginalized people in the global South. If socio- ecological 
justice was established and these people could exercise democratic control 
over their environment, it would be more difficult to find socially and 
environmentally just solutions in the mobility sector. Such solutions would 
require the reorganization of consumption patterns, built environments, 
production patterns, etc.: in short, the abandonment of the imperial mode 
of living, because it is built on the exclusive access to these resources. It is 
precisely the marginalized people’s demand of the “right to equality” that 
“renders visible and exposes the ‘wrongs’ of the existing [socio- political] 
order” (Swyngedouw, 2009: 606). To claim their participation in the re- 
ordering of arrangements of ownership, control, and distribution, the 
Colectivo Apacheta has initiated a number of legal initiatives. For example, 
together with a lawyer from San Salvador de Jujuy, they denounced the 
validity of the approval process. They support this legal initiative with 
direct action, such as road blockades. Hitherto the alliance of TNCs and 
state apparatuses, however, has successfully resisted a democratization of 
society- nature relations towards a more equal access to and control over 
natural resources.
 In the course of the conflict, “the naming of different possible socio- 
environmental futures” (Swyngedouw, 2010: 228) becomes an important 
moment of democratization and socio- ecological justice as the self- 
determination over natural resources. First and foremost, the Colectivo 
Apacheta wants to strengthen pastoralism. Susques- based pastor Irma 
Soriano highlights the importance of this form of production against 
Western visions of ‘development’:
A thousand times, I prefer my field over cars or money. [. . .] If you are 
going to the city everything is money. If you have cattle, you already 
have everything. You have something to eat, you have something to 
weave, you have something to sell, everything!
(Interview 8)
As parts of an alternative future, Carlos Guzmán also envisions the 
(re-)introduction of agricultural crops such as quinoa or potato and 
community- controlled tourism. The Colectivo’s initiative to receive funding 
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for nightposts and other improvements for pastoralism, however, was 
denied by the national ministry of social development as “not viable” 
(Interview 6). In contrast to the mining activities in the area which are act-
ively encouraged by state- apparatuses, small- scale pastoral production 
does not receive support. This makes it even more difficult for the local 
residents to exercise democratic control over natural resources, but it is 
precisely the vision of self- determination that becomes a foundational 
part of socio- ecological justice for the Colectivo Apacheta: “It’s enough of 
them making money with what belongs to us. We will defend and fight 
until we have our land as it is, because we already know how to live” 
(Interview 6).
Conclusion
Taking up the case of lithium, this chapter has demonstrated that a shift 
from fossil fuelled to electric cars still relies on the exclusive access to (stra-
tegic) resources. Based on a green economy strategy and corresponding 
regulation, societal nature relations are moving away from the dependence 
on fossil fuels and becoming ‘greener’. However, there is no significant 
alteration in the patterns of production and consumption which structure 
societal nature relations. The analysis of the impacts of lithium extraction 
in Argentina shows that – facilitated by asymmetric power relations – these 
green technologies spatially and temporarily externalize socio- ecological 
costs and constitute a continuation of the Global North’s imperial mode of 
living. While a Green Economy might promote more sustainability in the 
sense of lowering fossil fuel consumption and CO2 emissions, it is by no 
means promoting socio- ecological justice. The case study of lithium extrac-
tion in the province of Jujuy shows that most parts of the affected local 
population were excluded from the decision- making process, that is, the 
valorization of lithium resources for capital accumulation was never really 
open for political contestation. Hence, in association with the provincial 
state of Jujuy and those states hosting their production facilities, TNCs 
have the power to control the environment of local communities, appro-
priating them of local resources for transnational cycles of accumulation. 
These resources are feeding an emerging green economy that is promoting 
sustainability without questioning the dynamics fostering environmental 
degradation and social inequalities at the local level. The exclusive access 
to fresh water and salt brine for lithium extraction marginalizes other 
forms of societal nature relations such as pastoralism which relies on the 
integrity and reproduction of the ecosystem. With a high awareness of this 
process, a small group of pastoralists started to organize protest, claiming 
their ‘right to equality’ through participation and control of local land and 
water resources. Although they have not been able to influence the opera-
tions at the salar de Olaroz yet, their claims to equality and self- 
determination allow us to grasp the flaws of a green economy from the 
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perspective of socio- ecological justice. This shows that we need to think a 
socio- ecological transformation beyond a ‘greening’ of current modes of 
production and living to include the claims of the most marginalized.
Notes
1 Field research for this chapter was generously supported by the Rosa Luxemburg 
Foundation in Germany.
2 For the remainder of this chapter, I use the term green economy to refer to this 
bundle of strategies.
3 The energy source fuelling electric vehicles obviously depends on the respective 
electricity supply, which is still dominated by fossil fuels, such as coal. However, 
electromobility can potentially be powered by renewables.
4 For an overview of the field, see Pichler, in this volume.
5 All direct interview quotes were translated by the author from Spanish to 
English.
6 Apacheta is a mound of rocks, constructed by the indigenous peoples of the 
Andean highlands as an offer to Pachamama (mother earth) or other goddesses.
References
Ambiental (2011) Primera Actualización del Informe de Impacto Ambiental Etapa 
de Explotación del Salar de Olaroz, Departamento Susques, Provincia de Jujuy, 
Ambiental, Buenos Aires.
Anlauf, A. (2014) ‘Towards mining development with environmental provision and 
social inclusion? The political ecology of lithium extraction in Jujuy, Argentina 
from a global perspective’, MA thesis, Roskilde University, Denmark.
Battezzati, S. (2012) ‘La Tupac Amaru: intermediación de intereses de los sectores 
populares informales en la provincia de Jujuy’, Desarrollo Economico, Revista 
de ciencias sociales, vol. 52, no. 205, 147–171.
Brand, U. and Wissen, M. (2013) ‘Crisis and continuity of capitalist society–nature 
relationships: the imperial mode of living and the limits to environmental gov-
ernance’, Review of International Political Economy, vol. 20, no. 4, 687–711.
Bryant, R. and Bailey, S. (1997) Third World Political Ecology, Routledge, 
London.
Bundesregierung (2015) ‘Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zur Nationalen Kon-
ferenz “Elektromobilität – Stark in den Markt” am 15. Juni 2015 in Berlin’, 
www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Rede/2015/06/2015-06-15-elektromobili-
taet.html [accessed 31 August 2015].
COCHILCO (2013) ‘Compilación de informes sobre: mercado internacional del 
litio y el potencial de salares en el norte de Chile’, www.minmineria.gob.cl/wp- 
content/themes/minmineria/documentos/InformeLi.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Dowling, N. (2010) ‘Toyota powers up on Aussie lithium project for future electric 
and hybrid cars’, Perth Now, 20 January, www.perthnow.com.au/business/
toyota- powers-up- on-aussie- lithium-project- for-future- electric-and- hybrid-cars/
story- e6frg2qc-1225821608841 [accessed 17 October 2014].
ETC Group (2011) ‘Who will control the green economy’, www.etcgroup.org/sites/
www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/pdf_file/ETC_wwctge_4web_Dec2011.pdf 
[accessed 30 August 2015].
178  A. Anlauf
European Commission (2014) ‘Report on critical raw materials for the EU’, http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/raw- materials/files/docs/crm- report-on- critical-
raw- materials_en.pdf [accessed 17 October 2014].
Filice, L. (2013) ‘Argentina: home to emerging lithium producers’, Seeking Alpha, 
8 December, http://seekingalpha.com/article/1883921-argentina- home-to- 
emerging-lithium- producers [accessed 26 June 2014].
Filice, L. (2014) ‘Toyota’s lithium- based future’, Seeking Alpha, 3 March, http://
seekingalpha.com/article/2062623-toyotas- lithium-based- future?source=google_
news [accessed 26 June 2014].
Fox- Davies Capital (2013): ‘The lithium market’, www.globalstrategicmetalsnl.
com/_content/documents/405.pdf [accessed: 26 June 2014].
Gallardo, S. (2011) ‘Extracción de litio en el Norte argentine: la fiebre comienza’, 
EXACTAmente – La revista de divulgación científica, vol. 18, no. 48, 26–29, 
http://revistaexactamente.wordpress.com/2011/10/25/extraccion- de-litio- en-el- 
norte-argentino/ [accessed 17 October 2014].
García Moritán, M. and Cruz, M. B. (2011) ‘Comunidades originarias y grupos 
étnicos de la provincia de Jujuy’, http://proyungas.org.ar/wp- content/uploads/ 
2014/12/Cartilla_Etnias_Jujuy.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Göbel, B. (2008) ‘Dangers, experience, and luck: handling uncertainty in the Andes’, 
in M. Casimir (ed.) Culture and the Changing Environment. Uncertainty, Cogni-
tion, and Risk Management in Cross- Cultural Perspective, Berghahn, Oxford, 
221–250.
Göbel, B. (2013) ‘La minería del litio en la Puna de Atacama: Interdependencias 
transregionales y disputas locales’, Iberoamericana. América Latina – España – 
Portugal, vol. 49, 135–150.
Gobierno de Jujuy (2011) ‘Decreto- Acuerdo No. 7592/2011’, http://cdn.ipernity.
com/118/03/99/10150399.525cb637.pdf [accessed 17 October 2015].
Green European Foundation (n.d.) ‘Green new deal’, http://greennewdeal.eu/ 
[accessed 17 October 2015].
Grugel, J. and Riggirozzi, P. (2010) ‘Post- neoliberalism in Latin America: rebuild-
ing and reclaiming the state after crisis’, Development and Change, vol. 43, 
no. 1, 1–21.
Gudynas, E. (2009) ‘Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo: contextos y 
demandas bajo el progresismo Sudamericano actual’, in J. Schuldt, A. Acosta, A. 
Barandiarán, A. Bebbington, M. Folchi, CEDLA – Bolivia, A. Alayza, et al. (eds) 
Extractivismo, Política y Sociedad, CAAP and CLAES, Quito, 187–225.
Gunn, G. (2014) Critical Metals Handbook, Oxford, Wiley.
Koerner, B. I. (2008) ‘The Saudi Arabia of lithium’, Forbes, 6 October 2008, www.
forbes.com/forbes/2008/1124/034.html [accessed 24 June 2014].
La Gaceta (2014) ‘Giorgi: “La producción de litio es clave para el desarrollo indus-
trial de la región del NOA” ’, www.lagaceta.com.ar/nota/589520/economia/
giorgi- produccion-litio- clave-para- desarrollo-industrial- region-noa.html [accessed 
17 October 2015].
Messerli, B., Grosjean, M., and Vuille, M. (1997) ‘Water availability, protected 
areas, and natural resources in the Andean desert altiplano’, Mountain Research 
and Development, vol. 17, no. 3, pp. 229–238.
Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas Publicas (2011) ‘Fichas provinciales: Jujuy’, 
www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/dnper/fichas_provinciales/Jujuy.pdf [accessed 24 
June 2014].
Greening the imperial mode of living?  179
Ministerio de Hacienda (2013) ‘Presupuesto sintético 2013’, www.hacienda.jujuy.
gov.ar/wpcontent/uploads/presupuesto/sintetico/sintetico2013.pdf [accessed 26 
June 2014].
OECD (2009) ‘Responding to the economic crisis: fostering industrial restructuring 
and renewal’, www.oecd.org/industry/ind/43387209.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
OECD (2011) ‘Towards green growth’, www.oecd.org/greengrowth/48224539.pdf 
[accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2009a) ‘A lithium and potash producer in the making’, Company pre-
sentation, 17 February, http://orocobre.com.au/PDF/ASX_17Feb09_Company%20 
Presentation.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2009b) ‘Placement to strategic cornerstone investor’, ASX announce-
ment, 11 May, http://orocobre.com.au/PDF/ASX_11May09_Placement%20
to%20Strategic%20Cornerstone%20Investor.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2010) ‘Orocobre and Toyota Tsusho announce JV to develop Argentine 
lithium project’, ASX Announcement and Media Release, 20 January, http:// 
orocobre.com.au/PDF/ASX_20Jan10_Orocobre%20and%20Toyota%20
Tsusho%20Announce%20JV.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2012) ‘Annual report 2012’, http://orocobre.com.au/PDF/29Oct12_ 
2012AnnualReport.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2013) ‘Investor update May 2013’, www.orocobre.com.au/PDF/ 
9May13_InvestorPresentation.pdf [accessed 26 June 2014].
Orocobre (2014) ‘Opening ceremony of Olaroz lithium project’, http://orocobre.
com.au/PDF/ASX5Dec14_Olaroz_Opening.pdf [accessed 28 August 2015].
Paolasso, P., Rainer, G., Ruiz Peyré, F., and Coy, M. (2013) ‘Entwicklungstenden-
zen im ländlichen Raum Nordwestargentiniens’, Geographische Rundschau, 
vol. 65, no. 12, 14–21.
Roland Berger Strategy Consultants (2012) ‘The lithium- ion battery value chain’, 
www.icatconf.com/Sunumlar/SESSION4/3_LiB- Market-Overview- SHORT_ 
2012-08-03_TR%20version.pdf [accessed 27 June 2014].
Svampa, M., Botaro, L., and Sola Álvarez, M. (2009) ‘La problemática de la 
minería metalífera a cielo abierto: modelo de desarrollo, territorio y discursos 
dominantes’, in M. Svampa and M. Antonelli (eds) Minería Transnacional, Nar-
rativas del Desarrollo y Resistencias Sociales, Buenos Aires, Editorial Biblos, 
29–50.
Swyngedouw, E. (2009) ‘The antinomies of the postpolitical city: in search of a 
democratic politics of environmental production’, International Journal of Urban 
and Regional Research, vol. 33, no. 3, 601–620.
Swyngedouw, E. (2010) ‘Apocalypse forever? Post- political populism and the 
spectre of climate change’, Theory, Culture & Society, vol. 27, no. 2–3, 
213–232.
Toyota Motor Corporation (2015) ‘Vehicle production, sales and exports by 
region’, www.toyota- global.com/company/profile/figures/vehicle_production_
sales_and_exports_by_region.html [accessed 30 August 2015].
Toyota Tsusho Corporation (2014) ‘Stable provision of a crucial resource for 
next- generation automobiles’, www.toyota- tsusho.com/english/about/project/04/ 
[accessed 23 October 2014].
Turner, M. D. (2004) ‘Political ecology and the moral dimensions of “resource 
conflicts”: the case of farmer- herder conflicts in the Sahel’, Political Geography, 
vol. 23, no. 7, 863–889.
180  A. Anlauf
UNEP (2011) ‘Towards a green economy: pathways to sustainable development 
and poverty eradication’, www.unep.org/greeneconomy/Portals/88/documents/
ger/ger_final_dec_2011/Green%20EconomyReport_Final_Dec2011.pdf [accessed 
26 June 2014].
Villaroel, F. (2014) ‘Escenarios en Sudamérica de la minería del litio: mercados’, 
presentation at the international seminar Lithium in South America, Catamarca, 
Argentina, 9 April.
List of interviews
Interview 1: Kentaro Tanimoto, mining manager at TTC, San Salvador de Jujuy, 6 
May 2014.
Interview 2: Javier Elortegui, director of mining and energetic resources in the pro-
vincial government, San Salvador de Jujuy, 5 May 2014.
Interview 3: Osvaldo Zambrano, chemical engineer at Sales de Jujuy, Olaroz plant, 
29 April 2014.
Interview 4: Diana Mutti, professor for mining geology at Universidad de Buenos 
Aires, Buenos Aires, 30 September 2014.
Interview 5: Alejandro Calpanchay (pseudonym), former worker at the Olaroz 
plant, Susques, 23 April 2014.
Interview 6: Carlos Guzmán, spokesperson of the Colectivo Apacheta, San Salador 
de Jujuy, 27 March 2014.
Interview 7: Josefa Barrios, assesor of the comunero of Puesto Sey, Puesto Sey, 28 
April 2014.
Interview 8: Irma Soriano, Susques- based small producer, Susques, 5 April 2014.
11 Foreign involvement in 
small- scale gold mining in Ghana 
and its impact on resource 
fairness
Gordon Crawford and Gabriel Botchwey1
Introduction
Ghana is well known for its gold production, the second largest in Africa, 
with both large- scale and small- scale gold mining. While large- scale gold 
mining is dominated by transnational mining corporations, artisanal and 
small- scale mining (ASM) has been a traditional and indigenous activity 
for centuries, commonly using rudimentary means of extraction, and an 
activity that by law is reserved for Ghanaians (Parliament of the Republic 
of Ghana, 2006: sec 83). As in other African countries, ASM takes licensed 
and unlicensed forms, with the latter predominating – such illicit miners 
are known in Ghana as galamsey, an adulterated version of the English 
phrase “gather them and sell” (Aubynn et al., 2010: 3). In contemporary 
times, ASM in Ghana has become an increasingly important means of live-
lihood for many rural dwellers, often turning to mining to supplement or 
replace farming incomes (Jonsson and Fold, 2011: 480; Hilson and Gar-
forth, 2012).
 The last decade has seen two other major and interrelated changes in 
the ASM sector in Ghana. One is that gold production from small- scale 
mining has increased spectacularly, both by volume and as a proportion of 
total gold production. Official figures show that the volume of gold from 
small- scale mining has increased seven- fold from 225,411 ounces in 2005 
to 1,576,478 ounces in 2013, and that the percentage of total gold produc-
tion from small- scale mining (in comparison with large- scale mining) has 
increased from 11 per cent in 2005, to 15.2 per cent in 2008, and to a 
remarkable 36 per cent in 2013.2 Such phenomenal growth can be 
accounted for partly by the rise in rural households that are involved in 
ASM activities, and partly by the next change.
 The second development has been more controversial due to the ques-
tions of legality and resource sovereignty that it raises. The last decade has 
seen a large increase in foreign involvement in the ASM sector, especially 
miners from China. From 2006 onwards, small numbers of Chinese and 
other foreign miners started coming to Ghana to engage in artisanal gold 
mining. The hike in gold prices from 2008 then led to a veritable gold rush 
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and the arrival of substantial numbers of foreign miners, all working on an 
illicit basis given that small- scale mining can legally be undertaken only by 
Ghanaian citizens. Foreign miners came from nearby countries in West 
Africa as well as more distant parts of the world such as Armenia and 
Russia, but by far the largest concentration was from China (Interview 1). 
Indeed, in 2013 at the height of foreign involvement, a Chinese newspaper 
reported that an estimated 50,000 miners had left China for Ghana (Kane, 
2013). The Chinese miners introduced new technology and machinery 
which increased the scale of mining, leading to larger areas of land being 
turned over to mining and to a consequent increase in environmental 
degradation.
 By 2013, the participation of Chinese nationals in informal mining in 
Ghana had grown to such proportions, with adverse media coverage of 
‘illegal Chinese miners’ and of conflicts between local and Chinese miners, 
that the Government of Ghana was forced to act. On 15 May 2013, Pres-
ident Mahama finally acknowledged that “We do clearly have a problem” 
and established a high- level Inter- Ministerial Task Force to combat illegal 
small- scale mining. While the President was careful to include all illegal 
mining activities in its remit, the sub-text was clear that this was a measure 
primarily aimed at foreign miners, especially Chinese nationals. The Task 
Force was essentially a military operation undertaken by the army and 
police, referred to as the ‘flushing out’ of illegal miners, and led to the 
deportation of 4,592 Chinese nationals, of whom 571 had been arrested 
and the rest had ‘turned themselves in’, as well as smaller numbers of other 
foreign nationals from Russia, Togo, and Niger (Modern Ghana, 2013).
 Although the scale of foreign involvement in ASM has declined post- 
Task Force, we argue here that this short but intense episode of foreign 
involvement, especially the role of Chinese miners, has brought about 
significant and irreversible changes in this traditional economic sector. 
What are the implications of such changes for the questions of resource 
fairness being examined in this volume? Traditionally, ASM has provided 
economic opportunities for low- income Ghanaians in rural areas (Akabzaa, 
2009: 59; Jonsson and Fold, 2011: 480). This is in contrast to large- scale 
mining where benefits have been “disproportionately appropriated” by 
transnational mining corporations (Akabzaa, 2009: 29), with limited 
revenue to national government, and often negative livelihood impacts for 
communities affected by mining (Akabzaa, 2009: 58; Anyidoho and Craw-
ford, 2014). In fact, official Ghanaian government policy has specifically 
promoted licensed ASM as a means of poverty reduction (Aryee, 2003), 
especially through rural employment creation and reduced rural–urban 
migration (Minerals Commission, 2009). Similarly, the restriction by law 
of small- scale mining to Ghanaian citizens would appear to be an attempt 
to enhance resource fairness, as reflected in a statement by the deputy 
minister for lands and natural resources that the law is intended to enable 
relatively low- income Ghanaian citizens “to benefit from the country’s 
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mineral resources” (Asamoah, 2014). However, the apparent flouting of 
this law by large numbers of foreign miners in the last decade could under-
mine this intent. Therefore, we explore two main questions in this chapter. 
What has been the impact of foreign involvement in small- scale mining in 
Ghana? And what are the consequences for issues of resource fairness?
 Before turning to address these questions, it is necessary to define what 
we mean by resource fairness in this context. We examine the concept in 
four interrelated ways: resource sovereignty; state revenue collection; the 
distribution of benefits; and the issue of externalities and environmental 
degradation. Resource sovereignty refers to national control over a coun-
try’s mineral resources, and the extent to which benefits from natural 
resource extraction are retained internally or subject to external capture 
and flight. Such questions are closely related to the issue of revenue collec-
tion and the degree to which the state is able to gain tax revenue from 
resource extraction for use in service provision and infrastructural develop-
ment. The distribution of benefits concerns the question of who benefits 
directly and indirectly from resource extraction in terms of income- 
generating activities, and the extent to which benefits are enjoyed by low- 
income Ghanaians or subject to elite capture. The issue of fairness in the 
distribution of benefits also involves a gender dimension, and the extent to 
which benefits are shared by both women and men. Finally, the issue of 
(negative) externalities concerns the question of who benefits from mining 
and who bears the costs of the associated environmental degradation.
 Fieldwork was undertaken by the authors in July and August 2014 in 
the Upper Denkyira East Municipality in the Central region, bordering 
with the Ashanti and Western regions, one year after the Task Force’s 
operations. Although the presence of foreign miners was much less by 
then, we were able to gather data on the preceding period and the con-
cerns, issues, and changes that had emerged during this time. This muni-
cipality was chosen as it is in the heartland of the main alluvial gold mining 
area in southern Ghana, and a centre of Chinese involvement in small- scale 
mining. Data collection methods involved: semi- structured interviews with 
government officials at regional and municipal levels, chiefs and local poli-
ticians, local journalists, and local Ghanaian miners; and focus group dis-
cussions in two mining communities. In addition, visits were undertaken to 
ASM sites, both legal and illegal, to observe mining processes at first hand, 
including the degree of environmental degradation. National level inter-
views were conducted both prior to and after fieldwork to validate the 
initial findings, involving Ghanians and Chinese citizens resident in Ghana.
 The chapter proceeds in six main sections. After this introduction, the 
second section provides background information on small- scale gold 
mining in Ghana. The third examines the rise of foreign involvement, espe-
cially by Chinese miners. The fourth section looks at the impact on the 
ASM sector of foreign involvement, while the fifth considers the implica-
tions for issues of resource fairness. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the 
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findings and reflects on why this situation was allowed to happen, given 
the illegalities involved, and what this tells us about the nature of the state 
in Ghana.
Artisanal and small- scale mining in Ghana
ASM in Ghana has a very long history which can be dated back at least to 
the fifteenth century, when mercury was first used in gold extraction 
(Dummett, 1998; Tsuma, 2010: 10). With regard to the legal framework, 
there are three key provisions. The first applies to both large- scale and 
small- scale mining, while the other two pertain to ASM only. First, consti-
tutionally, all minerals in Ghana are the property of the state, vested in the 
president: “Every mineral in its natural state [. . .] is the property of the 
Republic and is vested in the President in trust for the people of Ghana” 
(Republic of Ghana, 1992). This empowers the state to acquire mineral- 
rich lands and to give them out as concessions for mining purposes both to 
large- scale mining companies and to registered small- scale artisanal miners, 
with limited compensation rights to farmers and traditional land users. 
One consequence has been the dispossession of land from many rural 
households, especially by the large concessions provided to mining corpo-
rations, which has, somewhat paradoxically, led to their increased depend-
ence on ASM activities as a livelihood strategy (Tschakert and Singha, 
2007: 1305; Hilson and Garforth, 2012).
 Second, ASM was formally illegal in Ghana until 1989, although widely 
practised. The Small- Scale Gold Mining Law 1989 (PNDCL 218) legalized 
and attempted to regulate small- scale mining by introducing a registration 
and licensing process. This was then incorporated into the current Miner-
als and Mining Act 703 (Parliament of the Republic of Ghana, 2006). This 
formalization process enabled artisanal miners to apply to the Minerals 
Commission for a concession of 25 acres maximum in designated mining 
areas and then to acquire a licence to mine. However, this process is criti-
cized as lengthy, bureaucratic and very expensive, including a range of offi-
cial and unofficial fees. As such, it precludes most low- income miners from 
registering (Tschakert and Singha, 2007: 1306; Tsuma, 2010: 21; Hilson 
et al., 2014: 297–298), and therefore galamsey activities have continued to 
proliferate. One report states that, out of an estimated 250,000 ASM oper-
ators, “less than 30 percent [. . .] are duly registered and licensed” (Aubynn 
et al., 2010: 3). An earlier report estimated that 85 per cent operated 
without a licence (Carson et al., 2005). Therefore, the large majority of 
ASM operators remain informal and illicit.
 The main advantage for licensed miners is that they have security of 
tenure and a legal entitlement to mine on their 25 acre concession (Carson 
et al., 2005), can apply for loans from banks and other financial institu-
tions (Hilson et al., 2014: 299), and are not subject to the occasional 
crackdowns by the state on illegal mining (Hilson and Yakovelva, 2007). 
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They also pay little to no taxes or royalties, with exemption for the first 
three years of operation, with the law on both royalties and income tax 
described as “ambiguous” by the National Association of Small- Scale 
Miners, indicating that tax is rarely paid (Interview 2). The key source of 
government revenue from small- scale gold mining is through sales of gold 
to the Precious Minerals Marketing Company (PMMC), a state agency 
responsible for gold exports. The Government of Ghana takes 0.5 per cent 
of the value of gold exported by PMMC as revenue (Interview 3). Small- 
scale miners, including galamsey operators, sell gold to licensed gold 
buyers, who in turn, and by law, sell the gold to PMMC. Interestingly, in 
buying gold, PMMC does not differentiate in sales from legal or illegal 
miners, a policy driven by the reality of illicit mining, but also indicating a 
degree of state tolerance of galamsey activities.
 However, despite the attempt to formalize and regularize small- scale 
mining from 1989 onwards, there is a strong argument that the state has 
actually neglected the ASM sector for decades and simultaneously priori-
tized the large- scale sector dominated by transnational corporations. 
Clearly, this has an adverse effect on prospects for greater resource fairness 
through engagement in ASM. Hilson et al. (2014: 298–299) make the case 
forcefully that the long delays in applications for licences, at times taking 
years, coupled with a lack of state financial and technical support to 
licensed ASM operators, amounts to neglect and maintains the sector’s 
“perpetual informality” (Hilson et al., 2014: 292; see Jonsson and Fold, 
2011: 485 for similar problems regarding ASM licensing in sub- Saharan 
Africa generally). Tschakert and Singha (2007) also highlight processes of 
marginalization of the ASM sector in Ghana, including the leasing of large 
areas of land to large- scale mining corporations and the criminalization of 
galamsey. Such processes in their view are “in stark contrast to the official 
rhetoric of poverty reduction” (Tschakert and Singha, 2007: 1306). 
Further, Hilson et al. (2014: 301) argue that it is precisely this state failure 
to provide appropriate support that led ASM operators, both licensed and 
unlicensed, to be open to opportunities for collaboration with migrant 
Chinese miners when they arose.
 Third, as indicated in the introduction, according to the law, licensed 
small- scale mining can only be undertaken by citizens of Ghana. There has 
certainly been some disjuncture between the law and the reality on the 
ground, with non- Ghanaian miners involved in galamsey activities. Yet, 
until recently such ‘foreigners’ were almost entirely from neighbouring 
countries in West Africa – for instance, Burkina Faso and Togo – having 
migrated across porous borders in search of economic opportunities. This 
situation changed dramatically in the last decade with the influx of large 
numbers of foreign miners into the small- scale sector, most notably from 
China.
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Rise of foreign involvement in ASM
Until about ten years ago, two points could be made with certainty about 
artisanal gold mining in Ghana. First, it was a traditional activity, often 
using the same rudimentary means of extraction (pick, shovel, and bowl) 
for centuries. Second, it was almost entirely an indigenous activity, apart 
from those few miners from neighbouring countries. However, the last 
decade has seen rapid and interrelated changes to both these aspects. As 
indicated above, foreign miners from China and other faraway places 
started coming to Ghana to engage in small- scale gold mining from 2006 
onwards, which turned into a gold rush with the hike in gold prices from 
2008. It is stated that many Chinese miners came into Ghana via Togo, 
which had a ‘no visa required’ arrangement with China, and then crossed 
the border unofficially, while others came in on tourist visas (Interview 1). 
The exact numbers of such irregular migrants is not known, due to the 
evasion of immigration laws, but it can be safely stated that the number of 
Chinese miners was in the tens of thousands, with the large majority 
coming from Shanglin County in Guangxi province and known as the 
‘Shanglin gang’ (Huifeng, 2013). All such irregular migrants were working 
on an illicit and illegal basis given that the sector is reserved for Ghanaian 
citizens by law.
 The Chinese miners had a major impact, however. They transformed 
the artisanal nature of mining through the introduction of a much higher 
level of mechanization, notably the use of excavators, bulldozers, and wash 
plants. Much of this equipment was also sold or hired out by Chinese 
traders. One particular innovation introduced by Chinese miners was 
direct mining within rivers by means of a barge or platform fitted 
with suction equipment, despite the illegality of mining in rivers or 
indeed within 100 metres of a river bank (Interviews 4, 5, and 6). River 
mining, or dredging mining as it is known, was subsequently adopted by 
Ghanaian miners and has resulted in rivers becoming severely polluted, 
with disastrous consequences for the aquatic eco- system and for the provi-
sion of potable water for local communities (CSIR Water Research Insti-
tute, 2013), consequences that are difficult and very costly to reverse 
(Interview 7).
 How did such large numbers of foreign miners, particularly from China, 
come to be involved in ASM in Ghana? This research identified both con-
tingency and structural factors, as well as external and internal aspects. 
The main contingency factor was the meeting in 2006 between a Chinese 
national, resident in Ghana and involved in the small- scale mining sector, 
and a Chinese miner from Guangxi province. This led to the introduction 
of the ‘trommel’ machine, or wash plant, for use in alluvial gold mining 
(Interview 8). It vastly increased the grams of gold that could be extracted 
on a daily basis. Each machine required a team of eight workers to operate 
in a cooperative manner, and therefore groups of eight Chinese migrants 
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started to come into the country. Large sums of money were being made, 
especially as the world market price of gold rose rapidly from 2010 
onwards, and news spread quickly by word- of-mouth back in China, par-
ticularly in Shanglin County where that technique had been used for more 
than 30 years. Another driver was the economic boom in China which 
made it possible for lower- class Chinese citizens to borrow sums of 
US$25,000 from the bank, providing groups of eight Chinese nationals 
with approximately 200,000 dollars for investment in ASM activities 
(Interview 8).
 However, this account only tells part of the story. How could tens of 
thousands of Chinese and other foreign nationals be working in an indus-
try that, by law, is restricted to Ghanaian citizens? Further, how could 
Chinese miners in particular operate in a country that is so different from 
their own in many respects? It appears that collusion in illegality occurred 
from the local level to high levels of government. On entry into the 
country, bogus visas and work permits were issued unlawfully to some 
Chinese miners by corrupt immigration officials for a fee (Interview 9). We 
were informed that Chinese migrants from Shanglin County were relatively 
poor people, not highly educated, and rarely able to speak English (Inter-
view 8). They were unfamiliar with Ghanaian culture and traditions, 
especially regarding land ownership, and guidance and assistance in 
entering local communities was essential. Accounts of chiefs disbursing 
land to Chinese miners for significant sums of money as well as allegations 
of official corruption were recurring themes (Focus groups 1 and 2). Not 
least, the Chinese miners undertook mining in close collaboration with 
Ghanaian miners, either with licensed concession holders or in galamsey 
activities.
 It is evident that the influx of Chinese miners into small- scale gold 
mining in Ghana, and the new methods that they introduced, did not 
simply lead to conflict over resources, as was reported in newspaper head-
lines, but to significant levels of collaboration with Ghanaians. Such col-
laboration was particularly attractive when large sums of money could be 
made very quickly, given the combination of more efficient extraction 
methods and the very high price of gold. Many Ghanaians were keen to 
take advantage of their positions either to facilitate Chinese mining, for 
instance, through provision of access to land, or to allow illegal mining to 
occur through ‘turning a blind eye’ in return for financial inducements. 
Issues of state corruption are discussed further below.
Impact of foreign involvement in ASM
Over a short period from 2008 to 2013, the impact of Chinese involve-
ment in ASM has been very significant, with considerable implications for 
issues of resource fairness. This section looks at the different areas of 
impact while the next discusses the consequences for resource fairness.
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Mechanization and intensification of small- scale mining
Chinese involvement has transformed the small- scale mining sector 
through the introduction of new technology and machinery. From tradi-
tional and artisanal production using rudimentary methods, the sector, or 
at least a significant part of it, has become highly mechanized, and indeed 
can no longer be described as artisanal. Chinese miners also brought 
considerable amounts of capital, and the combination of new technology 
and capital has led to a huge intensification of production both on small- 
scale concessions and on other lands where mining is carried out illicitly. 
Areas of land that previously would have taken years to mine using the 
traditional methods are now mined in weeks, and the amount of land that 
is acquired from land owners for mining purposes has increased enor-
mously (Interview 10). The mechanization and intensification of produc-
tion involves irreversible changes to the nature of small- scale mining.
Small- scale mining becomes big business (for some)
A consequence of mechanization and intensification of mining is that the 
economic rewards are now much greater for concession holders, foreign 
miners, and galamsey operators alike. Although it is illegal to sub- let, one 
common model involves licensed miners turning over their concessions to 
foreign miners, invariably Chinese in our experience, and splitting the 
value of the gold produced, commonly 15 per cent to the concession 
holder(s) and 85 per cent to the Chinese miners who effectively do all the 
mining (Interview 11). We were informed by concession holders that a 15 
per cent stake can amount to an income of 15,000 to 25,000 Ghana cedis 
per week, or approximately 3,000 to 5,000 British pounds per week. These 
are huge incomes in a sector mainly associated with the survival strategies 
of poor rural households (Bush, 2009; Hilson and Banchirigah, 2009). 
Although the Chinese miners bear the cost of production, it is also evident 
that they have made large amounts of money on these deals. One Chinese 
respondent, who had Chinese miners as business clients, stated that “in 
four to five years, a lot of Chinese millionaires, even billionaires” were 
created, adding that they “had worked very hard” often in tough con-
ditions “in the bush” (Interview 6).
 Chinese media reports also confirmed the huge amounts of money that 
Chinese miners were making from small- scale gold mining in Ghana. In a 
story that followed President Mahama’s announcement of the Inter- 
Ministerial Task Force, the 21st Century Business Herald, a Chinese busi-
ness daily newspaper, reported on the riches made by the estimated 50,000 
Chinese miners in Ghana, the so- called ‘Shanglin gang’ (GhanaWeb, 2013). 
The headline figure was that US$500 million had been made, citing stories 
of gold bars brought home as gifts and Ferraris being ordered from the 
proceeds. The report cited one local bank source as stating that in May 
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and June 2011, more than 1 billion Chinese yuan (approximately US$150 
million) was wired into Shanglin from abroad. They reported that 100,000 
Chinese yuan could be made in gross profit daily (approximately 
US$15,000 per day), presumably per small- scale mining operation of about 
eight miners.
 However, small- scale gold mining is only a lucrative business for a small 
proportion of those involved. Indeed, the stratification and inequalities 
amongst Ghanaians involved in small- scale mining has significantly 
increased, inclusive of a gender dimension, which addresses one element of 
our ‘resource fairness’ criteria. While male concession holders at the apex 
of the small- scale mining industry can now earn significantly more than the 
President’s official salary, in contrast women, children and many youths 
are now left to extract remnants of gold by re- washing the gravels that are 
left in heaps of ‘tailings’ at sites abandoned after intensive mining has been 
completed. This is known locally as ‘doing pooley’ and described by low- 
income women as backbreaking work (Focus group 3).
Environmental degradation (for all)
A further consequence of mechanization and the intensification of produc-
tion has been much larger- scale environmental degradation in areas of 
alluvial mining, inclusive of both land and water bodies. Regarding land, 
many abandoned pits are left uncovered and become flooded, posing a 
danger to local residents, especially children, and to livestock (Focus 
groups 1 and 2). Additionally, extensive damage to farm lands and forests 
has occurred with the rush to acquire land, mostly illegally, for small- scale 
mining. Loss of farm lands has adversely affected both cocoa production 
and food crop production.
 The destruction of river systems has been a new and catastrophic form 
of environmental degradation that has occurred precisely due to the intro-
duction of dredging mining within rivers by Chinese miners, subsequently 
adopted by Ghanaian miners. Main rivers are now severely polluted, 
notably the river Pra and its tributaries such as the Offin, with high levels 
of water turbidity, loss of aquatic life, and contaminated drinking water. 
The river Offin was described by a local journalist as “now looking like 
coffee with milk” (Interview 12). The degree of water pollution has very 
severe consequences for local communities, including those served with 
piped water, increasing the cost of chemical treatment to make such water 
potable (CSIR Water Research Institute, 2013).
Local conflict and increased insecurity
The increased competition for resources has also led to issues of law 
and order. This has related not only to direct conflicts between miners 
and to incidences of robbery of Chinese miners, but to increased security 
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problems for all citizens. In the Central region, it was stated by the police 
that armed robberies had increased, and that such robberies often occurred 
with guns originally brought in by the Chinese to protect themselves while 
mining in the bush (Interview 6). These weapons had been abandoned 
during the operations of the national Task Force and had fallen into crimi-
nal hands (Interview 13). Local conflicts between Chinese and Ghanaian 
miners over access to gold resources were reported in the national press 
from mid- 2012 onwards, with deaths and injuries on both sides (BBC 
News, 2012). Disputes have also arisen between Ghanaians, and in par-
ticular between young people in communities and the traditional authori-
ties (chiefs), often accused of ‘selling land’ to Chinese miners (Boadi, 2013; 
Frimpong, 2013).
Lost revenue
Significant opportunities for revenue collection by the Government of 
Ghana have been lost, a particular concern from a resource fairness per-
spective. While the government gets some revenue from small- scale gold 
mining through sales of gold to PMMC, the state’s gold- buying agency, 
there are strong suggestions that gold is being smuggled out of the country, 
with a significant loss of foreign exchange to the state (Interviews 1 and 2). 
Although this research has no direct evidence of how gold produced by 
foreign miners was sold, it would seem likely that a significant proportion 
of such illicit production has not gone through official channels, but has 
been taken illegally out of the country. Indeed, a knowledgeable source at 
national level stated that this is “a widely- held view” (Interview 2), while 
an informed source in Dunkwa- on-Offin, a licensed concession holder who 
had worked with Chinese miners, expressed the view that “gold was sent 
directly to China” or smuggled out to China, with “so many ways” of 
doing so (Interview 11). We have no means to verify the accuracy of this, 
but equally no reason to doubt the veracity of this first- hand information 
from different sources.
 Aside from gold sales, very little revenue would seem to be collected 
from ASM activities, despite the extremely large sums of money being 
made by those involved at the apex of the business. Clearly, irregular 
Chinese migrants are paying no taxes to the government. Similarly, unlaw-
ful galamsey operators pay no tax, yet their operations have increased in 
scale with foreign involvement or adoption of Chinese technology and 
practices. Legal concession holders pay little or no taxes or royalties, 
despite the potential for concession holders to now gain very high incomes 
(Interview 9). Concession owners are obliged to pay a small annual fee to 
the local government for a business operations permit, yet, according 
to a local government official, “some do and some don’t, as they are so 
powerful”(Interview 14).
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Legal impunity
Despite the various elements of illegality in foreign involvement in small- 
scale mining, these have frequently been ignored and the law not enforced 
– for example, the purchasing of small- scale concessions from Ghanaians; 
mining in rivers; and the allegations that gold produced is not going 
through the PMMC. Clearly, local Ghanaians were also collaborating in 
such unlawful practices, inclusive of both licensed miners and local galam-
sey operators. But the scale of legal impunity increased greatly during this 
period of substantial foreign involvement in small- scale mining, and the 
consequences are much more significant in terms of environmental 
degradation. It is also extraordinary that foreign involvement in ASM was 
allowed to escalate over a period of years to such a level that tens of thou-
sands of foreign miners were operating illegally within the country, yet 
with no government action.
 The situation prior to the establishment of the Task Force in May 2013 
was described as a “culture of impunity” (Interview 15), where small- scale 
mining was being undertaken collaboratively by Chinese and Ghanaians in 
a “free- range” manner that was “out of control” (Interview 9) with little or 
no respect for the law by those mining or, disturbingly, by the relevant 
authorities. Although foreign involvement has decreased post- Task Force, 
the fact that it was allowed to develop and reach such proportions raises 
fundamental questions about the nature of the Ghanaian state. It is also the 
case that the Task Force was a one- off crackdown targeted at foreign 
miners, and Ghanaian miners continue to undertake illegal operations, such 
as mining in rivers, with relative impunity, as observed during fieldwork.
Institutional failure and corruption
Why was this culture of impunity allowed to develop? And why did it take 
so long for the government to act? The endemic nature of corruption is 
central to any answer.
 During fieldwork, we were constantly hearing allegations of various 
individuals taking bribes and/or being bought off. This extended from 
immigration officials to local chiefs, and from local government officers to 
high- ranking central government personnel. We were informed by lone 
voices in the public sector that foreign miners, especially from China, were 
protected by “big shots in government” in return for payments (Interview 
14). As well as private benefits, it was also suggested that various politi-
cians were protecting the Chinese, especially in the run- up to the December 
2012 general elections, in return for financial support to sponsor their 
campaigns. Such accusations were corroborated by a Chinese respondent 
with first- hand experience of incoming Chinese miners as business clients 
(Interview 6). He noted that “money talks” and Chinese miners had made 
payments to both high- level government officials and those at ground level, 
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with the latter also expected to channel money to senior officials. He 
alleged that “many [government] people were involved”, including officials 
from key government agencies, and that they had effectively provided pro-
tection to Chinese miners. Yet post- Task Force, he noted that a funda-
mental shift had occurred and Chinese miners were “no longer protected 
by the [Ghanaian] government”, and therefore most had moved on to 
other countries in the region or returned to China (Interview 6).
 This view was corroborated by a Ghanaian mining source, himself 
involved with Chinese miners. He stated that those very officials who had 
previously colluded with and accepted payments from Chinese miners, 
such as immigration officials, subsequently denied all knowledge of them 
at the time of the Task Force, to the surprise of the Chinese miners, and 
condemned as ‘fake’ those same work permits that they had previously 
issued unlawfully (Interview 9). Although the Inter- Ministerial Task Force 
eventually brought an end to this free- for-all ravaging of Ghana’s gold 
resources, the allegations of corruption also extended to the Task Force 
itself. Significant payments by Chinese miners to Task Force members in 
order to avoid arrest were reported, as well as the theft of gold and prop-
erty from Chinese miners, in the course of the military- style crackdown. 
Indeed, we were told that those Chinese who were arrested and deported 
were precisely those who “could not pay” (Interview 11).
Consequences for resource fairness
We have defined resource fairness in four interrelated ways: resource sover-
eignty; the distribution of benefits amongst the populace; state revenue col-
lection; and the issue of externalities and environmental degradation. We 
now examine the longer- term implications of this episode of foreign 
involvement in ASM in Ghana for these four dimensions. The con-
sequences would appear to be largely negative.
 First, if the rationale for legally restricting small- scale mining to Ghana-
ian citizens is understood as an assertion of resource sovereignty, enabling 
relatively poor citizens “to benefit from the country’s mineral resources”, 
as stated by the deputy minister, then clearly this has failed. Over a period 
of a few years, many foreign miners, especially Chinese nationals, have 
made large amounts of money very quickly from the extraction of Ghana-
ian gold (Interviews 9 and 6). Depressingly, this illegal capture of Ghana’s 
resource wealth has been facilitated by relatively powerful Ghanaians in 
government and in chieftaincy institutions, eager to grab a personal share 
of the ‘quick money’ being made. It is impossible to estimate the value of 
the gold that has been extracted, but it is clearly a multi- million, if not 
multi- billion, dollar sum that has been appropriated into private pockets 
and removed from the country in a process of informal capital flight.
 Second, in terms of the distribution of benefits, the introduction of 
increased mechanization and intensification of production by Chinese 
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miners has brought irreversible changes to the ASM sector, and intensified 
the inequalities amongst Ghanaians, inclusive of a gender dimension. On 
the one hand, for those concession holders and galamsey gang leaders who 
are now mining using Chinese technology and techniques, small- scale 
mining has become a highly lucrative business. Invariably men, they have 
become wealthy individuals in their communities, using their capital to 
develop other businesses, such as hotel ownership and mining equipment 
hire. Such individuals remain a minority in the sector, however. Others are 
left in a worse position – for instance, the women directly involved in 
ASM, now forced to eke out livelihoods by re- washing gravels to extract 
any remaining traces of gold at already mined and abandoned sites. Thus, 
the degree of stratification amongst small- scale miners has intensified, 
inclusive of a marked gender dimension, due to the differential access to 
the benefits of intensified small- scale gold mining.
 Third, if an essential aspect of resource fairness entails revenue collec-
tion which the state can use to provide services and infrastructure for the 
collective benefit of all, then the loss of potential revenue through smug-
gling of gold and the lack of an effective tax regime is another adverse con-
sequence. The allegations of smuggling of gold out of the country are a 
particular concern. If correct, this deprives the Ghanaian government not 
only of tax revenue, but much- needed foreign exchange. In effect, it is theft 
of Ghana’s sovereign resources in what was undeniably an unregulated 
free- for-all scramble. The smuggling of gold is an area in itself that requires 
further research. Another area of potential revenue generation that is not 
realized concerns the lack of royalties and income tax paid by licensed 
small- scale miners, despite current earnings that, at times, dwarf the Presi-
dent’s official salary. This is clearly unsatisfactory and requires legal reform 
to clarify this so- called “ambiguous” situation and ensure the state collects 
appropriate tax payments (Interview 2).
 Fourth, the environmental degradation associated with intensified allu-
vial mining also impacts adversely on resource fairness in terms of negative 
effects on local people’s access to land and water. Large tracts of land have 
become lost to farming with the top soil removed by excavators to a depth 
of over six metres. This results in land becoming completely degraded, 
inclusive of abandoned pits of stagnant water. With land reclamation 
rarely undertaken, the loss of farm land is thus long- term. There are conse-
quent adverse effects on incomes and on local food production, with 
increased reliance by rural folk on purchasing food products from urban 
markets, requiring in turn greater cash income (Focus group 3). This forces 
many farmers, especially women, into undertaking small- scale mining 
themselves as a means of income generation, in difficult and hazardous cir-
cumstances, often in abandoned pits, as described above. Rivers and 
streams have also become so heavily polluted from intensified mining that 
they can no longer be used as sources of drinking water in situations where 
other sources such as boreholes and wells are not available. There are 
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negative externalities, as those benefiting from gold mining are not paying 
for the associated environmental costs. On the contrary, despite collecting 
limited revenue from small- scale mining, the government is faced with an 
enormous, and indeed incalculable, bill to remedy the environmental 
damage caused by intensified ASM operations, while many of those 
responsible have left the country.
 In sum, despite the legal framework around small- scale mining that 
asserts resource sovereignty and a notion of resource fairness in which the 
state and its citizens benefit from Ghana’s mineral endowments, foreign 
involvement in the ASM sector has led to a privatization of benefits to indi-
vidual miners, inclusive of foreign nationals and an elite fraction of Ghana-
ian ASM operators. The capture of such mineral wealth is illegal in many 
instances, including all operations where foreign nationals are directly 
involved in mining. In terms of benefits and costs to the state, it is evident 
that the state has failed to regulate the sector sufficiently, which has led to 
a failure to collect the revenue that is core to a resource fairness agenda, 
while incurring the huge costs required to repair the environmental 
damage. Most depressing, however, is the evidence that indicates that this 
free- for-all scramble for Ghana’s gold occurred with the active collusion of 
state officials, politicians, and traditional authorities, all eager to gain a 
private share of the wealth produced, whatever the public costs. This is 
clearly the antithesis of any resource fairness agenda.
Conclusion
This chapter has examined the recent and controversial phenomenon of 
foreign involvement, especially of Chinese miners, in the ASM sector in 
Ghana. It posed two questions: What has been the impact of foreign 
involvement in small- scale mining? And what are the implications for 
issues of resource fairness? The findings suggest that the impact of this 
short period of intense foreign involvement, at most from 2008 to 2013, 
has been very significant. Indeed, it is argued that, with mechanization and 
the application of new technology, ASM in Ghana has changed irrevoc-
ably, and in such cases can no longer be described as artisanal. Although 
since 2013, the presence of foreign miners is no longer so evident, the 
equipment and methods introduced by Chinese miners are now being used 
by Ghanaian miners. In terms of resource fairness, findings show an inten-
sification of resource unfairness or resource injustice. Resource sovereignty 
is undermined by foreign miners making ‘quick money’ from Ghana’s gold 
and there is greater inequality in the distribution of benefits amongst Gha-
naians. Even more troubling is that the state has gained very little revenue 
while it is left with incalculable environmental costs. While ASM has the 
potential to contribute significantly to Ghana’s development trajectory 
both directly through income generation for relatively poor Ghanaians and 
indirectly through government revenue collection, this has palpably not 
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occurred. We conclude by attempting to analyse why this situation has 
occurred, and indeed been allowed to happen, given the illegalities 
involved.
 The role of the state is key to understanding this situation. What is most 
striking about this case- study is that a situation developed to the stage 
where it was described by a senior official in environmental protection as 
“out of control” and characterized by a “culture of impunity” (Interview 
1). This peaked in 2012 and 2013 with tens of thousands of foreign 
miners, mainly Chinese nationals, engaged in an illegal free- for-all for Gha-
naian mineral resources. Where was the state in this context? The state was 
very slow to respond, despite increasing media coverage of local conflicts 
and environment destruction, until finally President Mahama established 
an Inter- Ministerial Task Force. Yet, the state was not absent in the pre-
ceding years. We argue that this phenomenon of foreign involvement in the 
ASM sector in Ghana was allowed to occur, despite the legal prohibitions, 
due to a combination of rent- seeking by those in positions of authority and 
the “persistent informality” (Van Bockstael, 2014) of the sector.
 The Ghanaian state is not a weak state, as became evident when the 
Task Force was eventually put in place. Yet, this example has also shown 
that it is a state, like others in sub- Saharan Africa, which is increasingly 
characterized by “everyday corruption” and the rent- seeking behaviour of 
public officials (Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006). Similarly, traditional 
authorities in Ghana, the hierarchy of chiefs and sub- chiefs, have used their 
positions of authority in mining localities to personally benefit from galam-
sey activities (see Hilson et al., 2014: 301). It would appear that foreign 
miners, especially from China, were able to operate with impunity for so 
long because they were actually protected by those in authority – public 
officials, politicians, and chiefs – in return for private payments. Various 
state institutions have clearly failed in their responsibilities to maintain the 
law. Yet, this is not due to weakness or issues of capacity. Rather, public 
officials have ‘turned a blind eye’ to illicit mining in return for a share in 
the large sums of money being made from gold extraction. Similarly, chiefs 
have seen an opportunity for personal gain, especially by selling land for 
mining. Those in public positions, including traditional authorities, have 
become increasingly oriented to pursuing private accumulation rather than 
public service. Significantly, corrupt behaviour and opportunism was even 
evident in the Task Force’s activities, with army and police personnel 
taking advantage of their power to pursue private gain at the expense of 
the Chinese miners.
 Clearly, corrupt and rent- seeking behaviour by those in authority has 
had an adverse effect on prospects for a fairer use of Ghana’s gold 
resources in the small- scale sector. Furthermore, the concept of informality 
is key here, both the informality of the state’s functioning and the inform-
ality of the ASM sector. We argue that the combination of the two has 
enabled illicit foreign involvement in small- scale mining to occur in a 
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manner that has intensified resource unfairness. Blundo and Olivier de 
Sardan (2006) emphasize the significance of the concept of informality in 
relation to everyday corruption. They note that “the ‘real’ function of the 
state is very removed from its ‘official functioning’ ” (Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan, 2006: 5) in terms of laws and regulations, and describe this 
‘real’ function as the “generalized informal functioning” of the state 
(Blundo and Olivier de Sardan, 2006: 5), facilitating corrupt practices and 
private accumulation by public officials. This is heightened by the inform-
ality of the ASM sector itself, described by Hilson et al. (2014) as its “per-
petual informality” (292). This is precisely due to the state’s failure to 
legalize and formalize the sector through access to licences and to provide 
the necessary support to licensed operators, despite its official policy rhet-
oric. Given the increasing reliance of many rural dwellers on ASM as a 
means of livelihood, often due to land loss to large- scale mining opera-
tions, this has inevitably meant an increase in unlicensed and informal 
mining. Foreign miners have been able to take advantage of this inform-
ality in an unregulated sector, and indeed have provided some of the finan-
cial and technical support that many ASM operators have lacked. 
However, the negative consequences of foreign involvement in such 
informal and mainly illicit mining, including the environmental impact, 
have become much greater than in traditional ASM due to the intensifica-
tion of production through mechanization. The sector’s informality com-
bined with the ‘informal functioning’ of the state, where state officials and 
traditional authorities can easily be bought off, has enabled the plunder 
and appropriation of Ghana’s gold resources by foreign miners in a neo- 
colonialist manner and in stark contrast to any notion of resource fairness. 
Conclusions therefore are that the recent phenomenon of foreign involve-
ment in ASM has further intensified issues of resource unfairness in small- 
scale gold mining in Ghana.
 How can such issues be addressed and a greater degree of resource fair-
ness achieved? Whereas the state has been identified as the problem, it is 
also crucial to any potential solution. Formalization of the sector is needed 
if income generation opportunities for low- income Ghanaians and revenue 
collection for the government are to be enhanced. This requires viable and 
effective state institutions, ones that are able to develop and enforce a reg-
ulatory system for natural resource management in the ASM sector. How 
such institutions can be achieved is a much bigger question, beyond the 
scope of this short chapter, but one which challenges the dominant neolib-
eral paradigm and its construction of a limited, pro- market state (Harri-
son, 2004). It is clear that creating institutions and laws that work will 
require the state to adopt a much more pro- active and interventionist role 
to ensure that resource extraction is organized and regulated in ways that 
enable low- income Ghanaians to share in the benefits in a manner more 
congruent with the concept of resource fairness.
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Note
1 The authors would like to thank the International Growth Centre, Ghana, for 
financial support for this project.
2 These numbers were taken from a document obtained from the Minerals Com-
mission in Accra in 2014, thought to be the small- scale mining section extracted 
from the annual report.
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12 Elite capture and the development 
of natural resource linkages in 
Mozambique
Lars Buur and Celso Marcos Monjane
Introduction
Since the end of the 16-year, devastating civil war in 1992, Mozambique 
has enjoyed a remarkable turnaround, with strong and sustained economic 
growth averaging approximately 7 per cent per year. But as “the low 
hanging fruits from post- war reconstruction were reaped” (IIM, 2012: 11), 
growth has largely been driven by overseas development assistance (Jones 
and Tarp, 2012) and mega- project investments in the form of large, 
capital- intensive, and foreign- owned operations, without any clear signs of 
a structural transformation taking place (Whitfield et al., 2015).1
 Since the first democratic elections in 1994, mega- projects have func-
tioned as ‘showcases’ for successive Mozambican governments, exposing 
Mozambique to potential investors. Mega- projects have been considered 
important for investors and donors for at least two reasons. First, foreign 
investment- driven mega- projects have counteracted the negative, investor- 
hostile image of the country’s post- independence socialist period (Buur and 
Baloi, 2009). Second, the successful attraction and protection of large- scale 
foreign investments have been seen as a litmus test showing potential inves-
tors the Mozambican government’s readiness to act in an open liberal 
economy and as a catalyst for investment in much- needed infrastructure 
development (Clément and Peiris, 2008).
 However, while mega- projects account for most of the overall growth in 
industrial manufacturing and exports, this has been growth with little sus-
tained formal employment creation or broad- based poverty reduction, as 
investments have led to little or no development of national entrepreneuri-
alism or capabilities of substance in the productive sectors of the economy. 
This is somehow surprising, as in many ways there has indeed been a push 
to make sure that investments have a positive impact on the Mozambican 
economy, as well as a strong drive towards poverty alleviation. It has 
generally been acknowledged in key government documents that Mozam-
bique faces three key challenges: “(a) to diversify its economy, (b) to begin 
the process of structural transformation, and (c) to achieve broad- based 
gains in living standards” (IIM, 2012: 11).
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 The paradox is that, even though relatively elaborate official organiza-
tional and institutional arrangements based on policies, strategies, and 
units have emerged over time in order to reap the benefits, particularly in 
terms of linkages of large- scale investments in the extractive sectors to 
local firms and the economy more broadly, such linkages rarely take place. 
Linkages are important because they can form part of triggering the eco-
nomic transformation processes of resource- rich developing countries if 
foreign investments succeed in linking up to local firms so that domestic 
firms are upgrading, transfer of technology, knowledge, and skills are facil-
itated, business and management practices are improved, and access to 
finance and markets are eased. Strong linkage creation can as such promote 
“production efficiency, productivity growth, technological and managerial 
capabilities, and market diversification in local firms” (UNCTAD, 2013: 
1). For poor but resource rich countries like Mozambique the importance 
of creating linkage development related to resource investments is perti-
nent, as it seems, besides taxation, to be the most important avenue for 
reaping the fruits of its rich natural resource endowment. It is only by 
linking the national economy to extractive investments that the economy 
can move from extreme dependence to a more fair engagement with the 
global economy.
 However, the shift to natural resources that Mozambique has experi-
enced over the last decade has not played a pivotal role in the transforma-
tion of the economy. Instead, economic growth has increased the already 
enormous disparity in wealth that sustains the political- cum-economic elite 
coalition linked to the Frelimo Party that has increased its grip over power 
in the two decades since the peace accord of 1992. In important ways this 
seems to reproduce Mozambique’s predicament, mentioned by Castel- 
Branco (2010), that the country has become an extractive service economy, 
bucking the formal imperative of industrial and economic transformation 
that has been the policy of the Frelimo party since independence. Con-
sequently, the present development pattern seems to be making the 
Mozambican economy even more of an “enclave economy” (Morrisey, 
2012), thus mirroring key features of the critique of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI)-driven development and the ‘resource curse’ literature’s quite 
negative assessment (Killick, 2004) of the potential for abundant natural 
resources economies to break the logjam of economic transformation and 
inclusive growth.
 This chapter explores these broader processes from the perspective of 
linkage creation in Mozambique related to mega- projects in natural 
resource extraction and development from a political economy perspective. 
From a resource fairness perspective, linkage creation is essential as it 
allows for a more fair distribution of opportunities for local firms to gain 
from large- scale natural resource investments and for learning and spill-
over effects to other parts of the economy. In a longer term perspective, it 
is a potential key source of economic transformation towards higher value 
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added activities and more and better local employment, therefore reducing 
dependence on resources.
 The chapter proceeds as follows: the first section briefly considers the 
scope of mega- investments and their relation to Mozambique’s economic 
structure. The second section describes how linkage development has been 
pursued in relation to mega- investments and explores the organizational 
and institutional realm that has developed over the last 15 years. The third 
section reviews the limitations to linkage development and analyses why 
the present wave of mega- investments in the extractive natural resource 
economy is struggling to engage in linkage formation. A brief conclusion 
ends the chapter.
Extractive FDI investments in Mozambique
Mozambique’s history of natural resource extraction is relatively recent. 
Mozambique opened up the economy after the General Peace Accord in 
1992. From 1997 to 2009, mega- projects generated FDI inflows amount-
ing to approximately US$8.4 billion (Mwanza, 2012: vii). Since the end of 
the 1990s, it has seen investments in aluminium processing, gas extraction, 
heavy sand flow, and most recently coal- mining (see Buur et al., 2013). 
The first large extractive investment was the MOZAL aluminium smelter 
outside Maputo which went online in 2001.2 At present, the government 
has already granted more than a hundred coal exploration licences, even 
though production has only started for nine main extraction projects. The 
biggest coal investor is the Brazilian company Vale, which is “expecting to 
invest into the total project up to US$8.2 billions” (MCMP, 2013: 74). 
Nevertheless, this is far below future investments in gas and liquid natural 
gas (LNG) facilities, which are expected to exceed US$50 billion over the 
next ten years (Besseling, 2013; Ledesma, 2013). Mozambique is expected 
to become one of the world’s largest producers of LNG and is aiming at 
the Asian growth markets. In contrast, the biggest agricultural investments 
in the sugar sector amounted to the much lower figure of approximately 
US$400 million after the programme was initiated in 1996, with another 
US$300–400 million after the millennium (see Buur et al., 2012a). More-
over, Mozambique’s GNP lingers around approximately US$13 billion, so 
foreign investment in the extractive natural resource industries is con-
sidered a ‘game changer’.
 Castel- Branco (2010, 2012) argues that mega- investments in Mozam-
bique are a continuation of a far longer history of an extractive develop-
ment economy characterized by considerable path dependencies. The 
Mozambican extractive development economy is characterized by an 
extreme concentration on a limited set of export products, services and 
firms in the energy and extractive sector that account for most of the eco-
nomic growth. The economy is also a typical consumption economy rather 
than an economy based on investments for production. Urban centres rely 
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on imported consumer goods of everything from hardware to foodstuffs. 
This has been exacerbated by the service economy, which has dominated 
more than 50 per cent of GDP from 1994 onwards. The service aspects of 
the economy have undergone dramatic structural change, as it is no longer 
the regionally oriented transport subsector that dominates, but rather the 
growth of banking, insurance, and telecommunications, as well as air 
travel, domestic transport, and tourism.
 While agriculture’s contribution to GDP has fallen significantly over the 
past 30 years, from 35 per cent in the 1980s to approximately 20 per cent 
at the beginning of the new millennium, this is due to a fall in agriculture’s 
relative weight since the MOZAL and following extractive investments. 
The changing status of agriculture is therefore not attributable to a process 
of economic maturation of the economy based on an increase in agricul-
tural productivity and linkages to the processing industries (Whitfield et 
al., 2015). Agriculture has remained important for the economy because 
this is where most people find employment and make their livelihood. 
Industry’s contribution to GDP was only 21.1 per cent (KPMG, 2013). 
From 2000 onwards, mega- projects such as the MOZAL aluminium, coal 
and mineral sands exploitation accounted for the majority of growth in the 
‘industry’ component of GDP, with MOZAL alone accounting for two- 
thirds. Besides mega- projects, the other major industries include beverages, 
tobacco, sugar, and more recently the re- emergence of cashew processing 
(Hanlon and Smart, 2008). In terms of exports, the MOZAL aluminium 
smelter alone accounted for 31.38 per cent of all exports in 2012, followed 
by coal (12.52 per cent), electricity (6.73 per cent), tobacco (6.57 per cent), 
gas, and sugar.3
 In other words, the extractive development economy that has evolved in 
Mozambique is an economy that produces what is not consumed domesti-
cally, and consumes what it does not produce (Weimer et al., 2012). One 
important implication of the extractive nature of the economy is that 
domestic capitalist class accumulation and income are based not on pro-
duction in productive sectors, but on the rents of the services linked to 
extractive economies, while the economy is heavily dependent on external 
capital inflows, with a tendency to generate cyclically negative capital out-
flows. The economy’s extractive nature creates a mode of accumulation 
that relies on natural resources and existing infrastructure, as well as creat-
ing structural inequalities in capitalist development across the different 
regions of the country (Castel- Branco and Ossemane, 2010: 143).
 The dependence on the extractive sectors and related FDI investment 
can be seen in the incentive packages provided for the first and second gen-
eration of mega- investments. Even though there are vast differences 
between what has been granted as tax breaks and holidays in order to 
attract FDI, a clear pattern has developed. According to the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM, 2009: 163–164), as a first mover, MOZAL 
was granted Africa’s most generous tax exemption benefits. Added to this 
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is the “preferential treatment” by government agencies establishing “task 
forces” catering for permits, licences, and non- standard procedures in 
order to compensate for cumbersome standard procedures (Krause and 
Kaufmann, 2011: 49). Moreover, both the SASOL gas investment and the 
Kenmare heavy sand investments have received generous tax holidays. 
Calls for contracts to be re- negotiated have therefore been made. But since 
the content of most contracts is not made available, the issues of incentives 
granted for investing in Mozambique and possible links to the ruling polit-
ical elite are wide- ranging.
 However, in contrast to what one would expect, and based on its low 
position on all governance indexes, Mozambique has formally developed 
an organizational and institutional setup linking the extractive economy to 
the national economy and small and medium sized enterprises (SME) 
development in response to the first wave of mega- investments from the 
mid- 1990s and the second, intensified, wave since 2005.
FDI- driven linkages: the institutional and 
organizational realm
Since 1998, the key driver of linkage and local content awareness and pro-
motion in Mozambique has been intimately related to the experience of the 
US$2.4 billion MOZAL aluminium smelter outside Maputo, until recently 
the single biggest FDI investment in Mozambique and its first mega- 
investment.4 MOZAL has been used as an ‘ideal model’ showing investors 
that investments in risky destinations such as post- conflict Mozambique 
are possible, as well as being a ‘best practice’ example of the promotion of 
linkages between FDI mega- investments and SME and local content devel-
opment. Whereas the first assumption is difficult to assess, the veracity of 
the second assumption has been thoroughly evaluated in multiple studies, 
assessments and manuals (see Castel- Branco and Goldin, 2003; Jaspers 
and Mehta, 2007; Robbins et al., 2009; Sonne- Schmidt et al., 2009; Ernst 
and Young, 2010; Krause and Kaufmann, 2011; Da Costa, 2012). While 
some studies herald MOZAL as a prime example of investor commitment 
and the power of following best practice blueprints, other studies have 
marked out the limitations of this type of investment.
 The MOZAL investment had two phases of construction: MOZAL I 
was initiated in 1998 and took two and a half years, while the MOZAL II 
expansion was initiated in 2001 and took only one and a half years to be 
completed. Four steps can be identified in which linkages and local content 
provisions have been promoted in relation to MOZAL’s construction and 
operational phases.
 Identification: From 1997, the Mozambican state, through the Centre 
for the Promotion of Investments (CPI) and with support from the Inter-
national Financial Corporation (IFC) and the World Bank, carried out a 
study as part of preparations for the participation of domestic SMEs in the 
Elite capture and resources in Mozambique  205
construction of MOZAL and its subsequent production. A study screening 
370 enterprises in 1997 found that “99% had serious problems with 
product quality” and generally lacked experience, did not have the neces-
sary portfolio of projects, operated with out- dated and depleted equipment 
and technology, and had serious management shortages (Castel- Branco 
and Goldin, 2003: 24). With very low levels of intra- and inter- firm link-
ages and technological capabilities, and a very thin and dispersed formal 
enterprise base, there was very little MOZAL could do to tap into and link 
up with local SMEs. So while opportunities would emerge, there were very 
few domestic enterprises that could engage with MOZAL. What became 
particularly clear to CPI and MOZAL was that the “standard contract 
format” MOZAL brought with it from South Africa was too large and 
technologically advanced for Mozambican companies to engage with 
(Robbins et al., 2009: 28). One consequence of this was that Mozambican 
participation in the construction of MOZAL I was limited.
 SME Empowerment Linkages programme (SMEELP): Since 2001, there 
has been a joint MOZAL, CPI, and IFC programme that attempted to 
develop Mozambican firms so they could become eligible for participation 
in the enlargement of the MOZAL plant (MOZAL II) through matching 
grants. This was based on the creation of a Mozambican firm database and 
the vetting of the potential of enterprises to engage with MOZAL. This 
was followed up by the redesign and unbundling of MOZAL standard 
contracts, in addition to the reformulation of procurement standards so 
that they would better fit Mozambican business realities. Finally, the 
project engaged in the facilitation, information exchange, and training of 
the Mozambican SMEs that were considered the most capable candidates 
for MOZAL bidding, including when they were contracted for follow up 
through mentoring. In total, 16 SMEs were trained and, over time, 28 con-
tracts worth just over US$5 million were awarded.
 Mozlink I: From 2003, SMEELP continued from the construction to the 
operational phase of the smelter, with a particular focus on banks and fin-
ancial institutions providing loans to SMEs and the provision of technical 
capacity training. The linkage programme culminated in 2005 with the 
opening of the Beluluane Industrial Park next to MOZAL, which enjoys 
‘Industrial Free Zone’ status and aims at creating clustering effects 
(Robbins et al., 2009: 22), with CPI and IFC being the key drivers. The 
programme trained 45 SMEs, and Mozlink enterprises gained contracts 
worth US$13 million out of a total expenditure on local content of 180 
million dollars, in which electricity and water combined accounted for 96 
million dollars (Krause and Kaufmann, 2011: 51).
 Mozlink II: This expanded Mozlink I in 2006 from being tied to 
MOZAL to including other FDI- driven investments, primarily in the gas 
(SASOL in 2002) and beverage sectors (Coca- Cola and South African 
Breweries). These were three- year supply- chain programmes aimed at 
strengthening the business and technical capabilities of SMEs so that they 
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could compete for industry contracts (Ernst and Young, 2010). The key 
driver was the IFC’s Private Enterprise for Africa (IFC PEP Africa). The 
IFC boasts that Mozlink II (IFC, n.d.; Jaspers and Mehta, 2007; Ernst and 
Young, 2010) has trained 75 SMEs and secured US$20 million in revenues 
for them, with a 40 per cent growth in contract development by Mozlink 
corporate partners and providing employment for 3,000 employees.
 Following in the slipstream of new mega- investments and the attempt to 
create linkages between the first generation of extractive industry mega- 
investments, new legislation emerged. Most importantly, at least in name, 
were the “Industrial Policy and Strategy” (GoM, 2007a) and the related 
“Strategy for the Development of Small and Medium Size Enterprises in 
Mozambique” from 2007 (GoM, 2007b). Among other issues, the Indus-
trial Policy formulated mainly by the Mozambican state and government 
(GoM, 2007a: 4) highlighted the development of linkages between the ben-
eficiaries of industrial development, encouraging them to organize them-
selves into productive clusters in order to increase the productivity and 
efficiency of the entire value chain. The policy also suggested that indus-
tries should focus on areas with a major economic and social impact,5 per-
mitting the promotion of vertical and horizontal integration as well as of 
industries able to exploit productive resources and capacities adequately 
and sustainably.6 If the hallmarks of good industrial policies are the target-
ing, prioritization, and enforcement of the conditions for productivity, then 
the Industrial Policy was rather vague, because it did not provide guidance 
on how to link up with mega- investments (Krause and Kaufmann, 2011: 
28), nor clearly provide strategic guidance on how, for example, an invest-
ment like MOZAL could be used to boost economic development in the 
future (APRM, 2009: 165).
 In contrast to the overall Industrial Policy, the specific strategy for SME 
development does set out key priorities and objectives while also proposing 
a certain sequencing of actions, including the establishment of an Institute 
for the Promotion of Small and Medium- sized Enterprises (IPEMA). While 
IPEMA was established in 2008 to drive implementation of the SME 
strategy, it largely relies on external funding for implementation, as is 
common for most organizational developments in Mozambique. The 
general idea was for IPEMA to take over from earlier institutions such as 
the Foundation for the Promotion of Small Industries and the Institute for 
the Development of Local Industries, which had some state funding, their 
own staff, and were implementation- oriented. As few initiatives supported 
by donor funding have been established by IPEMA, they do not seem to 
have provided any particular foundation for developing SMEs.
 The three key pillars of the strategy – improving the business environ-
ment for SMEs, strengthening their technological and management 
capacity, and the provision of strategic support – depend on changing 
the overall business environment by “creating a level playing field and 
reducing transaction costs for SMEs” (Krause and Kaufmann, 2011: 29). 
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In this sense, IPEMA’s role primarily becomes one of facilitation, as 
its results depend on general policy reform and on support and 
resources, principally from donor organizations. However, while donor 
organizations are supportive of IPEMA, they have largely focused on 
running, establishing, or renewing their own organizations and institu-
tional linkage programmes. Programmes such as the World Bank’s Project 
for Entrepreneurial Development (PODE), which operates its own match-
ing grant scheme for co- financing training sessions, consultancies, export 
promotion, and so forth, is a good example and is indeed keen on linking 
Mozambican enterprises to current mega- investments. In 2009, the Bank 
added the New Mozambique Competitiveness and Private Sector Develop-
ment Project, whose US$25 million budget is far larger than the budget of 
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MIC), not to mention IPEMA. In 
addition, most national donor agencies, such as Danida, NORAD, and 
SIDA, run their own support mechanisms for private- sector, SME, and 
linkage development.
 A particularly important point is that, at least to date, no specific legis-
lation on local content for Mozambique exists, although some provisions 
can be found in different laws.7 Local content policies, understood as the 
extent to which investors have to purchase inputs and services locally, are 
contentious in regard to which criteria are used to define a Mozambican 
company as a firm. The Investment Law (No. 3/1993) suggests that a 
company or firm is Mozambican when it is formed and registered under 
Mozambique law, with headquarters in the Republic of Mozambique, and 
in which the respective capital share belongs at least 50 per cent to 
Mozambican citizens, companies, or institutions, whether private or 
public. But what constitutes ‘capital’ can be interpreted in different ways 
with the implication that local content provisions can de facto be provided 
by foreign companies with sleeping Mozambican partners that operate as 
‘fronts’ for foreign companies. Another contentious issue has been that 
local firms will only be preferred under certain conditions, based on the 
quality of products and services offered locally, as they must be compar-
able to those offered internationally (Petroleum Law, No. 21/2014, Art. 
41). This may as such be ‘fair’ if the aim is to promote competition, but it 
has the potential to reduce the participation of local firms, which can 
rarely comply, given their low capabilities and the relatively low quality of 
local products and services.
 Finally, the legislation described so far overwhelmingly effects backward 
linkages, those links related to the supply of inputs to the commodity 
sector. Importantly, the regulatory frameworks also envisage the develop-
ment of forward linkages, where outputs from the commodity sector are 
used as inputs to other industries. For example, the Mining Law (No. 
20/2014) states that “mineral resources should be used where appropriate 
for power generation in order to achieve national energy security or as 
raw material for the manufacturing or other applications in the country” 
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(Art. 21). This means that the state can buy mining products at market 
prices to use in the local industry whenever the commercial interests of the 
country require: “whenever possible, treatment and processing of ores 
exploited in Mozambique must be carried out within the country” (Art. 57).
 If this is the institutional and organizational set- up for support to 
domestic SMEs that came out of the first and second generations of mega- 
investments, beginning with MOZAL in 1998 and the subsequent specific 
legislation related to extractive industries, the broader question is, what 
has been the actual experience of linking domestic firms to mega- 
investments?
Limitations to linkage creation: the political economy of 
linkages
Compared to the quantity of investments in which MOZAL has been 
involved, the results of the efforts to build linkages were rather meagre. 
Although no one has disputed the importance of the linkage programmes 
that emerged in the slipstream of the MOZAL investment, there were 
important limitations that are worth examining, as this experience is inti-
mately related to how natural resource linkages are being pursued today in 
Mozambique.
 First, as Krause and Kaufmann (2011) argue,
the effects have been quite limited in number and scope, as well as 
structure. The results are limited to the creation of a small market 
niche for local firms that depend almost completely on MOZAL and 
have not contributed to the development of an industrial cluster of 
innovative SMEs.
(50)
Second, in most cases the companies that received grants during the first 
generation of linkage programmes were the same as those in the following 
stages, with each company providing an increased number of services and 
supply functions (Jaspers and Mehta, 2007). This left a distinct impression 
that the linkage programmes that emerged from the MOZAL slipstream 
were helping a small, favoured number of enterprises instead of enlarging 
the general SME pool (Krause and Kaufmann, 2011: 51). This has clear 
historical origins, but there are also clear political and economic reasons 
for this concentration and favouritism. Over time, MOZAL created more 
than 200 suppliers of inputs to its operations in metallurgical services, 
transportation, auto- mechanical and electrical products and services, con-
struction, security, cleaning, catering, and laundry. However, the majority 
of the enterprises were linked in one way or another to South African com-
panies related to the South African aluminium establishment in Richards 
Bay and elsewhere (Castel- Branco and Goldin, 2003: 6) that reallocated 
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with MOZAL. They also established subsidiaries over time and in many 
cases entered partnerships with well- placed Mozambicans. This seems 
to be a logical outcome, as MOZAL, through its main investor Billiton, 
came to Mozambique with an established business structure and model 
developed in South Africa. This had clear advantages, as an entire package 
of companies that could be subcontracted and that could establish links 
with Mozambican partners over time, though it also created rather limited 
and narrow linkage effects in Mozambique itself.
 Third, this linkage model had few spillover effects to the Mozambican 
economy regarding technological capabilities and learning. Although it 
catered for some infrastructure development in energy, transport, and site 
and service development of an industrial area, in addition to the creation 
of around 1,100 jobs, the development impact as such was rather limited. 
Even though MOZAL worked with suppliers in a broad spectrum of 
services, most of the more genuine Mozambican owned and steered 
enterprises were in the low hanging fruits service sectors related to 
security, cleaning, and transport with limited knowledge and technological 
transfers.
 Fourth, the concentration and monopolization of opportunities had the 
potential to trigger the establishment of new enterprises that were better 
geared and attuned to exhausting the opportunities emerging from the 
extractive natural resource industry, which does, however, not seems to 
have happened thus far. Research suggests that the Mozambican enter-
prises that came out of the MOZAL linkages programmes in fact became 
specialized and upgraded, being able to satisfy ISO and similar inter-
national standard requirements for safety, but also that they struggled to 
find new companies they could link up with until the recent wave of coal, 
gas, and energy mega- investments. Initially due to upgrading, they lost 
access to “traditional markets, or [lost] some space and ability to work 
with the traditional market” (Castel- Branco and Goldin, 2003: 29) as they 
became too expensive and advanced for the Mozambican economy. In this 
context, the enterprises that emerged in the shadow of MOZAL began a 
process of de- specialization in order to obtain enough domestic contracts 
to survive. One of the consequences has been that relaxed company prac-
tices needed for survival have spread to the specialized domain of the 
company, hence undermining gains in productivity and technological capa-
bility. This then caused problems when the recent wave of mega- 
investments into coal, gas, and energy came on stream after 2007 as 
the cluster of smaller enterprises that had evolved out of the MOZAL 
experience struggled to get contracts with the new investors due to de- 
specialization.
 Finally, while the intention behind the SME programme was to create 
forward linkages when possible, experience from the first generation of 
mega- investments spearheaded by MOZAL suggests that this has not hap-
pened because of the limited technical capacity of Mozambican companies 
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and the lack of specific policies ‘forcing’ forward linkages. The expectation 
that the mere existence of MOZAL would create a manufacturing cluster 
based on aluminium ingots, or that SASOL would create forward linkages 
in which gas would be used as the raw material for a local industry, has 
until recently proved elusive (Warren- Rodriguez, 2008). For example, gas 
from the Pande and Tamano fields in Mozambique was transmitted to 
South Africa, from where it returned as value- added gas for household 
consumption in Mozambique until a new, smaller plant was set up in 
Mozambique in 2012 (Nhancale and Vilanculos, 2010).
 Hence, where all the first- generation mega- investments were first- mover 
investments (aluminium, gas, and heavy sand) and therefore had special 
government attention – often with special institutional arrangements such 
as generous tax, customs, and import agreements (Castel- Branco and 
Goldin, 2003: 23) – there were also disadvantages and first- mover costs 
such as the lack of infrastructure investments and institutional and techni-
cal capacity. The hope was that the first generation of mega- investments 
would transform the general business landscape, making it easier for the 
second generation to link up to the Mozambican economy. However, 
second- generation investments have neither been as smooth as anticipated 
nor had the expected outcomes so far. Investments have generally found it 
very difficult to find small and medium sized Mozambican companies 
outside a small pool of companies to link up to. One reason remains the 
underlying problems of lack of capacity to meet the standards the new 
extractive mining and energy companies require. A second reason is that 
the national economic policy environment generally failed to give SME’s 
sufficient attention during implementation despite the official focus on 
local linkages and SME development.
 To understand these issues and the earlier and current challenges of 
linkages creation more generally it is crucial to take into account the – 
often overlooked – political economy context and consequently the polit-
ical forces that shape linkage development in Mozambique. This is 
important as industrial policy inevitably will be about distributing eco-
nomic benefits and favouring certain economic factions or actors in con-
trast to other factions or actors. In this regard, the dynamics of linkages 
related to the new extractive economy must be placed within a broad polit-
ical economy context in order to understand the nature of the domestic 
capitalists who have emerged over the last three decades and the scant 
attention seemingly given to emerging SMEs.
 Interestingly, Mozambique was one of sub- Saharan Africa’s eight most 
industrialized countries, at least until its independence in 1975 (Torp, 
1979), but “after independence in 1975, the majority of fearful settlers fled 
back to Portugal and the industry was largely left alone” (Hanlon and 
Mosse, 2010: 2). With many businesses abandoned, “inexperienced and 
often poorly educated Mozambicans had to fill the gaps to avoid economic 
collapse, and five years after independence, Frelimo remained immensely 
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popular, both for ending colonial oppression and for the expansion of 
health and education” (Hanlon and Mosse, 2010: 2).
 At that time, it was believed that an honest and hard- working elite 
could develop the country, but the escalating civil war undermined the 
project of building a new developed state. The mid- 1980s saw a shift to a 
mixed economy under the tutelage of the World Bank, even while the war 
continued. Liberal economic reforms took place, and state assets, except 
for strategic enterprises, were largely privatized. On top of access to prop-
erty, officials and newly emergent business people were also given special 
access to dollar loans and credits by the state. As Pitcher (2003) argues, the 
fifth Frelimo Congress in 1989 had eliminated the restrictions imposed on 
party members, giving them an allowance to participate in the private 
sector. By doing so, the Congress gave the Frelimo state the power to 
reward its supporters by giving them state enterprises, while politicians 
viewed privatization as an opportunity for wealth accumulation.
 This history of accumulation suggests that the most recent national cap-
italists are members of the ruling Frelimo coalition, which includes former 
government officials, administrators of state enterprises, and members of 
the security complex. Indeed, “these new capitalists started their careers in 
the government and in politics and owe their existence or economic expan-
sion to patron client networks” (Pitcher, 2003: 807). The result was that
more than 40% of the new firms went bankrupt within five years of 
privatization, more than half of the remainder were traded for cash or 
shares or transformed into warehouses, and the state could not raise 
the expected additional revenue from massive selling of its property.
(Castel- Branco, 2014: 29)
Related to this, the Mozambican structure is highly skewed, consisting of a 
few big enterprises owned in part by foreign capital and in part by the state 
or members of the ruling elite; a few formally registered SMEs owned by 
both foreign and domestic capital, but with little clustering effect; and a 
large stratum of informal micro- enterprises owned by domestic entrepren-
eurs that comprise 98.6 per cent of all enterprises (Krause and Kaufmann, 
2011: 13–14).
 Key Frelimo elites have been known to win contracts as a way of 
making sure that economic opportunities are restricted and do not benefit 
or assist the opposition (Weimer et al., 2012). This created various ‘bottle-
necks’ as ‘point resources’, and key service domains related to knowledge 
and consultancies, transport and port handling, access to finance and cur-
rency, imports of foodstuffs and consumer goods, machinery and technical 
appliances, and the export of natural resources were monopolized by 
Frelimo elites or Frelimo- supporting trade houses acting as cartels and 
monopolies. This includes the capture of the local content market in ser-
vices and linkages by certain Frelimo factions.
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 The SMEs that were created during the first generation of linkage pro-
grammes in Mozambique in connection with MOZAL, as well as the 
various companies linked to members of the ruling elite coalition that 
emerged after the liberalization of the economy during the early 1990s, 
often in joint ventures with foreign companies, therefore became part of 
the cartel and monopsony economy. Over time a relationship evolved 
between the Frelimo ruling elite and the international donor community 
that supported the coalition with aid that has been characterized as a 
“pathological equilibrium” (Renzio and Hanlon, 2007: 6), allowing 
Frelimo to use the state to secure its dominant position and win elections 
as long as political stability was maintained. A tacit assumption is that 
mega- projects and foreign companies are in a secret alliance with the top 
political leadership of Frelimo. The paradox is that this alliance between 
Frelimo and mega- projects (or FDI more generally) are strongly supported 
by the international financial institutions and donors that aim at promot-
ing good governance and democratization, while at the same time such 
investments buttress the Frelimo regime and its capacity to monopolize the 
democratic space in Mozambique.
 As Buur et al. (2012b) observed, party coalition members who are 
engaged in economic activities are rarely found in the productive sectors 
but rather where easy rents can be deducted, as in trade and imports, com-
munications, transport, and banking, often protected by state barriers of 
entry in one way or another. This is compounded by a limited manufac-
turing base in which few economic entrepreneurs having the required cap-
abilities. Hence, when opportunities arise, they will nearly always be easy 
to monopolize, with the only people with capabilities, if any, coming from 
the ruling elite. Further, smaller entrepreneurs will try to stay ‘under the 
radar’ and spread out their activities in order not to attract the attention of 
politically connected business groups that could feel under threat, as one 
business man and representative from CTA phrased it in 2012. Thus, even 
though new opportunities have been made available by the present wave 
of mega- investments little happens. As a World Bank official noted 
in 2013:
There are opportunities. There is also a lot of talk and conferences at 
Indy Village [referring to the much used venue for donor and state 
promotion of governance, where at one conference in 2012 discussing 
SME opportunities related to mega- investments eight ministers parti-
cipated]. They say that we need to ‘take the opportunities’ mega- 
investments provide, that there is enough for all, but then there is 
silence and nothing happens.
(Interview with Lars Buur, Maputo, March 2013)
One consequence of such monopolization and elite capture is that foreign 
companies begin to develop their own programmes for local content 
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development. For example, former Rio Tinto Coal Mining (RTCM) argued 
that, while they obviously liked working with foreign companies of a 
certain standing that they had established links with from other contexts, 
they were becoming increasingly interested in attracting competition for 
service contracts and hence also work with a larger pool of local firms. The 
reason was simple: the price level was artificially high, as a small group of 
companies had ring- fenced port- handling, transport, imports of machinery, 
and the various types of services they depended on. The mapping of poten-
tial new enterprises that RTCM had commissioned from a consultancy 
company, and the setting up of a training facility in Maputo that aimed to 
empower companies so they could win procurement contracts over time, 
was all done in order to create competition and challenge the established 
monopolies. Thus, instead of using the structures created by the first 
generation of investments, including the state’s organizational and institu-
tional framework related to IPEMA, they were in the process of establish-
ing their own linkage programmes in an attempt to challenge the tacit 
monopoly and monopsony status of a group of companies that restricted 
competition.
 Another example of elite capture is the Norwegian Oil for Development 
Programme (OfP), which is generally acknowledged to have been success-
ful in supporting demand- driven capacity- building, with its focus on tech-
nical capabilities being greatly appreciated by counter- party institutions 
(NORAD, 2012: 1). After 2006, when support was provided through the 
OfD programme umbrella, the majority of the funding was used to provide 
institutional support for the National Institute for Petroleum (INP), with 
smaller components of institutional development and capacity- building for 
the state- owned oil company (ENH) and the Ministry of Environment. The 
fact that more or less all people with knowledge of the oil and gas sector 
have been involved with the OfD programme means that a situation has 
evolved where there are overlapping relationships between members of the 
sector, the Frelimo government, and business (CIP, 2010; 2012). It seems 
like all the top senior government officials and bureaucrats in the INP, 
ENH, and related ministries have launched companies to service the oil 
and gas sector because they enjoy “privileged access to information on the 
country’s natural resources” (CIP, 2010: 1). Where such close networks 
and relations between political and technocratic elites and international 
business are inevitable in a country with a very limited private sector and a 
recent history of state- led development, they may be the foundation for a 
greater ability in the future to manage resources. But so far much suggests 
that Mozambique seems to be heading in the direction of inefficient rent 
usage with little ability to manage its rich resource endowment securing a 
more fair distribution and use of resources.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that large- scale FDI in Mozambique’s natural 
resource endowments from the mid- to late- 2000s has created fewer 
linkage opportunities than expected and that access to these opportunities 
has been monopolized. The tendency for linkage formation to be driven 
towards monopolies or what we have called “linkage patronage” (Hansen 
et al., 2015) has major consequences for realizing the potential of linkages 
in extractives for development. The groups that become the main benefici-
aries when foreign investors involved in extractive industries link up with 
or move import functions to domestic entrepreneurs will be those who 
already control the economy. In Mozambique, this means elite groups 
closely related to Frelimo. Once such easy rents from ‘low- hanging’ linkage 
promotion have been captured by key ruling elite coalitions, it is very diffi-
cult to change the distribution of economic opportunities and benefits from 
linkage policies. The dangers of capture are very real and not conducive to 
linkage promotion and by implication productive transformation, as the 
ruling elite focus on trade and service.
 One implication of the findings from this chapter is that broader ques-
tions related to fairness and a more equal distribution of potential benefits 
from natural resource exploitation are not solely related to external 
factors, such as FDI dominance, that create an uneven playing field for 
least developed economies, but are also intimately related to internal polit-
ical economy factors, which implies that the political incentives – be they 
direct, as part of industrial policies, or less steered – that motivate elites to 
pursue linkage development need to be taken seriously. Here, contexts 
such as institutions and politics matter, as they impact on the political 
incentives that influence political, bureaucratic, or economic elites in for-
mulating and implementing policies. Only by taking such considerations 
into account can one begin to understand how, and whether, linkage devel-
opment is exercised, and who ultimately gains, and, hence, if these policies 
and processes provide support or limits to resource fairness.
Notes
1 In Mozambique, investments that exceed 500 million US dollars are referred to 
as mega- investments.
2 It is owned by the Australian based BHP Billiton Ltd, the Industrial Development 
Corporation of South Africa Ltd, the Japanese Mitsubishi Corp, and the Mozam-
bican government (with less than 4 per cent).
3 Before the mega- investments began to change the composition of exports, 
Mozambique had a chronic balance of payments problem. However, the 
economy is dependent on a small number of export commodities, and it imports 
a significant amount of goods and services for extraction purposes that are con-
sumed or used domestically, making the economy extremely vulnerable to exter-
nal price shocks for oil and food.
4 The construction of MOZAL was followed by the US$1.4 billion SASOL pipe-
line from the Pande and Tamana gas fields in the Inhambane province in the 
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south of the country from 2002 and the construction of the Kenmare/Moma 
heavy sand plant in Nampula in the north of country from 2003, coming into 
operation in 2006/7.
5 The examples were very specific, such as “the food- processing industry, with its 
capacity to maximize agricultural and fishery potential, and in turn providing 
multi- sectorial linkages, employment and import substitution, as well as 
increased and diversified exports” (GoM, 2007a: 4).
6 Again, the examples were specific, “such as industries for the processing of 
timber and its derivatives, and industries producing construction materials, 
among others” (GoM, 2007a: 4).
7 Five pieces of legislation have various provisions of relevance to this chapter: the 
Investment Law (Law No. 3/93 of 24 June, Mozambique), the Law on Public–
Private Partnerships of Large Scale Projects Business Concessions (Law No. 
15/2011 of 10 August, Mozambique), the Mining Law (Law No. 20/2014 of 18 
August, Mozambique), the Petroleum Law (Law No. 21/2014 of 18 August, 
Mozambique), and the Policy and Strategy of Mineral Resources (Resolution 
No. 89/2013 of 31 December, Mozambique).
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13 The agrofuels project in Ukraine




Agrofuel politics have been highly contentious over the past decade.2 While 
agrofuels are widely held to contribute to energy security, local develop-
ment, and the mitigation of climate change (European Union, 2009), 
environmental, development and human rights NGOs, as well as a growing 
body of academic opinion, question the benefits and point to the negative 
social and environmental impacts of these crops. Agrofuels erode biodiver-
sity (Campbell and Doswald, 2009) and increase greenhouse gas emissions, 
rather than reducing them, by influencing land use (Searchinger et al., 
2008), thus driving climate change (Fargione et al., 2008). They also pose a 
threat to local food security and cause changes in agricultural regimes 
(McMichael, 2010). The production of agrofuels has promoted the com-
modification of crops, the valorization of land and increased export depend-
ency. By influencing land use it gives rise to land access conflicts (Borras et 
al., 2011; Dietz et al., 2015) and raises major resource justice issues.
 The introduction and implementation of agrofuel policies by the EU has 
met with growing opposition. The Biofuels Directive adopted in 2003 set a 
blending target of 5.75 per cent of agrofuels to be added to conventional 
fuel by 2010 (European Union, 2003). The Renewable Energy Directive 
(RED) (European Union, 2009) adopted in 2009 raised this goal to 10 per 
cent, to be attained by all member states by 2020. Although attempts were 
made to spin a strong ‘win- win’ narrative around the agrofuel drive, high-
lighting the supposed economic and environmental benefits, the backlash 
led to the introduction of sustainability criteria. However, these are strictly 
environmental and have no social dimension. Criticism has continued to 
mount, with the spotlight increasingly on indirect land use change, due to 
the additional greenhouse gas emissions occasioned by the cultivation of 
‘virgin’ land needed for food production. In response, in 2015 the Euro-
pean Parliament (2015) reduced the blending target in the RED to 7 per 
cent for the so- called ‘first generation’ agrofuels produced from food crops. 
Nevertheless, what is by now a firmly entrenched agrofuel industry still 
enjoys strong policy and government support.
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 This chapter examines the political and economic implications of agro-
fuel production, and its related transformation of the agricultural system. 
McMichael (2009) refers to the rise of the agrofuel industry as that of the 
“agrofuels project”, which he describes as a state- capital nexus. “The rush 
to agrofuels, under the guise of policies geared to alternative energy and 
reducing carbon emissions, opens up new profit frontiers for agribusiness, 
energy and biotechnology corporations” (McMichael, 2009: 826). Agro-
fuel crops – notably rapeseed, soya beans, and palm oil, but also wheat, 
maize, and sugar cane – should therefore be seen as part of an expanding 
“flex crops” industry (Borras et al., 2016). This term points to the fact that 
oilseeds and starches are subject to multiple use – as feedstock for agrofu-
els, but also as food, animal feed, or inputs for other industrial products 
such as cosmetics. This flexibility enhances the security of demand for 
these crops, making their cultivation more economically appealing.
 This chapter analyses the transnational impact of the EU’s agrofuel pol-
itics on Ukraine and their consequences for agrarian justice. The EU relies 
on imported feedstock to meet its blending target. Ukraine possesses over 
32 million hectares (ha) of fertile farmland and is a major feedstock 
exporter to the EU, in line with its traditional role as the “breadbasket of 
Europe”. Ukraine’s expanding rapeseed output primarily reflects the rising 
demand for agrofuel feedstock in the EU (Schaffartzik et al., 2014), while 
corn, soya beans, sunflower, and wheat are also exported to the EU as 
‘sustainable’ agrofuel feedstock (ISCC, n.d.). From an agrarian justice per-
spective, the crucial questions are “the collective struggles of rural working 
people to democratise access, ownership, and control of land, water and 
other natural resources” (TNI, 2015), as well as the opportunities to shape 
and take part in the decision- making process (see Pichler, in this volume). 
An agrarian movement capable of articulating such demands has yet to 
emerge in Ukraine. The prevalent oligarchical structures are an obstacle to 
grassroots organization. The agrofuels project, and the active support of 
the EU, reinforces the oligarchic system and agribusiness. A full picture of 
agrarian justice, in terms of access, distribution, and representation, would 
need to take account not just of small farmers and their representation but 
also of influence of the Ukrainian oligarchs and the ruling class as a whole.
 Drawing on McMichael (2009), I argue that the agrofuels project in 
Ukraine should be viewed as an oligarchic project supported by the EU. 
The state sets the stage for societal nature relations. In Ukraine, the olig-
archs – understood as internal bourgeoisie – dominate the state. Agrofuels 
are an opportunity for them to make profits by engaging in agribusiness. I 
examine the capital–state nexus by focusing on internalization – the inter-
play of internal (here, the Ukrainian oligarchs) and external actors (multi-
national agribusiness corporations, funds and traders, as well as the EU 
and member states) – in a situation where there are aspects of both conflict 
and cooperation with respect to the control of land, trade, and sustain-
ability certification among the ruling class. The German government has 
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been particularly keen to promote the production of supposedly ‘sustain-
able’ biomass in Ukraine in order to obtain agrofuel feedstock. Exporting 
this feedstock does not contribute to agrarian resource justice in Ukraine 
but strengthens the country’s agribusiness and oligarchs.
 The analysis is based on qualitative expert interviews, conducted in 
Ukraine in winter 2011 and 2012, and on documents, including different 
draft bills, adopted laws, agreements, position papers, online portals, and 
newspaper articles. The experts interviewed were representatives of minis-
tries, renewable energy and agricultural pressure groups, international 
organizations and financial organizations, NGOs, agribusiness, farmers, 
agrofuel producers, the EU and its member states in Ukraine, and agricul-
tural experts.
 The second section draws on political ecology and introduces internali-
zation as a theoretical framework in the context of the Ukrainian state and 
oligarchs. The next section gives an overview of agrofuel consumption in 
the EU and related feedstock production in Ukraine. The fourth reviews 
the interconnection of the Ukrainian state, oligarchs, and agribusiness. The 
fifth explores the realms of land, trade and sustainability certification, and 
conflict and cooperation among the ruling class. The final section looks at 
the implications of the agrofuel project for agrarian justice in Ukraine.
Understanding the Ukrainian state: oligarchic projects and 
internalization
The following analysis treats the agrofuels project as an oligarchic project. 
It draws on the debate about the role of the state in “societal nature rela-
tions” (German: gesellschaftliche Naturverhältnisse) (see Brand and 
Wissen, 2012; Brand and Görg, 2013) and gives prominence to the concept 
of ‘internalization’, that is, the interplay of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ social 
forces. Since the economic and the political spheres cohere in the persons 
of the oligarchs, in Ukraine internalization is inseparable from personal 
relationships. The interplay between these social forces shapes the agricul-
tural sector and, in turn, agrarian justice.
 The agrofuels project in Ukraine and related agrarian justice issues can 
only be understood in the light of societal nature relations. A political 
ecology perspective not only reveals the power relations that are inscribed 
in societal nature relations, it also demonstrates how nature is appropri-
ated and transformed, and how this is feeds back into society. Identifying 
the winners and losers in the transformation process sheds light on agrar-
ian justice (see Pichler, in this volume). Social inequality is one of the keys 
to an understanding of the Ukrainian agrofuels project (see Wissen, 2015).
 The state has a decisive influence on societal nature relations in Ukraine, 
and this has been true of the agrofuels project and related questions of 
agrarian justice (see Pichler, in this volume). Defining the state as a social 
relation (Poulantzas, 1978) underlines its contested character – the 
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conflicts, social forces, and various capital factions that mould it. Similarly, 
according to this reading, the ruling class is not a unified bloc but is consti-
tuted of a number of factions. Poulantzas (1976) not only differentiates 
between a national and a comprador bourgeoisie (i.e. one that is dependent 
on external capital) but also introduces the term “internal bourgeoisie”. 
The internal bourgeoisie is interwoven with international capital but still 
has a strong material base in the country.
 Depending on the prevalent politico- economic conditions, the state will 
be more accommodating to some interests than to others. This is high-
lighted by Jessop’s “Strategic- Relational Approach”. “A given type of 
state, a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to 
some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state 
power” (Jessop, 1990: 1873). Rather than treating the Ukrainian state as 
“weak” (Kuzio, 2012) or “captured” (Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001), as 
many authors do, I believe that it is more productive to focus on the 
politico- economic interaction of the Ukrainian oligarchs, viewed as an 
internal bourgeoisie. In Ukraine, the oligarchs have a massive influence on 
the post- Soviet space, constitute the Ukrainian state, and are at the same 
time interwoven with the world market. Due to their political and eco-
nomic power, exercised through Finance Industry Groups, they are the 
doorkeepers to all socio- ecological and economic influence in Ukraine 
(Plank, 2015a). The apparatus of the state is dominated by the economic 
power of the ruling class; what Poulantzas calls “relative autonomy” (Pou-
lantzas, 1978) is virtually non- existent in Ukraine (Becker, 2015: 409).
 This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for foreign actors to directly 
engage with or intervene in the Ukrainian state and economy without 
cooperating with the oligarchs. I show how foreign players frame their 
interests and strategies to obtain sustainable certified feedstock. The Pou-
lantzian concept of internalization draws attention to the connection 
between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ political and economic dynamics and 
social forces, and thus makes it possible to examine agents of international-
ization such as the Ukrainian oligarchs (Poulantzas, 1976: 22). Since indi-
viduals (or clans) hold the economic and political reins, personal 
relationships are especially vital to internalization in Ukraine. By drawing 
on Jessop’s “Strategic- Relational Approach” (Jessop, 1990), I show how 
foreign actors – in the development aid community, science, agribusiness, 
and government – can only pursue their interests by joining forces with the 
Ukrainian oligarchs. Cooperation within the ruling class reinforces social 
inequality and agrarian injustice.
EU agrofuel industry targeting Ukraine’s agricultural 
potential
The EU’s demand for agrofuel feedstock is driven by existing refining capa-
city and the mandatory blending target. Despite the reduction of the target 
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to 7 per cent for ‘first generation’ agrofuels in the RED, the demand for 
feedstock remains high. The EU agrofuel industry depends both on domes-
tically sourced feedstock and on imported flex crops. For instance, 20 per 
cent of the feedstock for agroethanol and 40 per cent of that for agrodiesel 
had to be imported in 2010 (Gerasimchuk, 2013: 5). Most cars in the EU 
are diesel fuelled, and agrodiesel consumption is some four times higher 
than agroethanol use by volume, as shown by Table 13.1. The share of 
renewables in fuel consumption has increased since 2009 but has remained 
below the blending target, standing at 5.4 per cent in 2013. More domesti-
cally grown and imported feedstock will be needed in future to attain even 
the reduced target.
 The largest consumers of transport agrofuels in the EU in 2014, in order 
of volume, were France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain, 
while Germany is the leading producer (EurObserv’ER, 2015: 14). In 
Germany, agrofuel moved from small- scale to large- scale production when 
the government changed its support policy from tax- free payments to a 
blending target in 2006. Small- scale producers were pushed off the market 
by the oil companies because they were unable to supply the large volumes 
required (Vogelpohl, 2014: 22–26). Today, the largest agrodiesel produc-
ers in Germany are transnational corporations such as ADM Germany, 
Verbio AG, and Petrotec (EurObserv’ER, 2015: 12). In the case of agro-
diesel in particular, there is still unused capacity because the producers rely 
on sustainable certified feedstock. Although certification as such is volun-
tary for agrofuel producers, and is carried out by private schemes, it is 
mandatory for anyone wishing to make output count towards the RED 
blending target and thus qualify for the financial incentives. In line with its 
history as a renewable energy pioneer, Germany was one of the first coun-
tries to insist on compliance with sustainability criteria (Biofuel Sustain-
ability Order, 2009). The order requires companies to supply certified 
agrofuels in order to obtain state subsidies. The International Sustainability 
Table 13.1 Agrofuel consumption in the EU 28*
Year Agrodiesel (’000 tonnes 
of oil equivalent [toe])
Agroethanol 
(’000 toe)
Renewable energy as a share of 
transport fuel consumption** (%)
2009 8,013.0 1,719.3 4.3
2010 8,934.6 1,991.0 4.8
2011 8,493.5 1,763.7 3.4
2012 9,209.5 2,056.0 5.1
2013 9,868.5 2,580.8 5.4
Sources: Eurostat, 2015a, 2015b.
Notes
*  The shares of biogas and other liquid agrofuels are insignificant (at 1% or less of agrofuel 
consumption).
** Including electricity.
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and Carbon Certification (ISCC) system is one of the main certification 
schemes backed by the German Federal Ministry of Food, Agriculture and 
Consumer Protection via the Agency for Renewable Resources (FNR) 
(European Commission, 2011). Germany is a key agrofuel producer, con-
sumer, and certifier and has, as I will show in more detail below, a strong 
interest in Ukraine as a source of feedstock.
 Against the backdrop of an expanding EU agrofuel industry, various 
studies and government documents have highlighted Ukraine’s agrofuel 
potential. This has been examined by research on land availability and 
greenhouse gas emissions (Van der Hilst et al., 2014). Some studies have 
also focused on the economic viability of agrofuel production in Ukraine 
(Lakemeyer, 2007; Strubenhoff, 2009). For example, a “Market Scan 
Bioenergy Ukraine” was carried out for the Dutch government in 2009; 
this recommended exchanging feedstock for knowledge and technology 
(Elbersen et al., 2009). There has been repeated discussion as to whether 
land around Chernobyl could be used for agrofuel production. This would 
permit the utilization of contaminated land that is off limits for food pro-
duction (edie.net, 2009). All these studies point to the country’s great agri-
cultural potential, particularly as an exporter. In the words of two authors, 
“Ukraine has all preconditions to become one of the largest sustainable 
biomass suppliers” (Ogarenko and Nivievskyi, 2012: 2).
 Indeed, Ukraine is already an important feedstock supplier to the EU 
agrofuel industry. While it exports a variety of flex crops, rapeseed produc-
tion is largely driven by agrodiesel demand. Ukraine is among the world’s 
leading rapeseed exporters (Gerasimchuk, 2013: 7–8). Conversely, the EU 
is the main export market for Ukrainian rapeseed, with over 90 per cent of 
the output going to EU member states (Schaffartzik et al., 2014). Besides 
rapeseed, Ukraine exports soya beans, sunflower seeds, wheat, maize, and 
sugar beet for agrofuel production in the EU. However, these products’ 
share of the agrofuel market lags far behind that of rapeseed (Gerasim-
chuk, 2013: 7–8; ISCC, n.d.).
The Ukrainian state, the oligarchs, and agribusiness
Oligarchs play an important role in the economic and political life of 
Ukraine, and are closely interwoven with the state. Oligarchic clans 
emerged as a national bourgeoisie in the metals, energy, and banking 
sectors after the waves of privatization under President Leonid Kuchma 
(1994–2005). They do not constitute a single capital faction, but their 
groups should be seen as Finance Industry Groups that are strongly rooted 
in the domestic economy. These Finance Industry Groups have grown from 
regional bases – Kyiv, Donetsk, and Dnipropetrovsk – and there are strong 
rivalries between them. A common feature of the oligarchs is their desire 
to remain powerful in the country and extend their power there, and this is 
the motive that guides their decisions to support the West and/or the East. 
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As members of parliament or ministers, as well as via their political parties, 
they are more or less able to directly influence the state apparatus. In 
addition, they influence Ukrainian society via the media (Plank, 2015a: 
595–597).
 Since the financial and economic crisis, the renascent farming industry 
has played an important role for Ukraine and its oligarchs because agricul-
ture is a stable export sector and is now very profitable. Agriculture’s huge 
untapped potential has been noticed by the oligarchs, and it has been 
carved up among them. During Janukovych’s presidency (2010–2013) 
members of his Party of the Regions, many of whom are involved in agri-
business, played a prominent part in parliamentary decisions of importance 
to the sector. For instance, Oleg Bakhmatyuk, the owner of UkrLandFarm-
ing, the largest agricultural holding company in Ukraine, controlling 
654,000 ha, is a member of the Janukovych ‘family’. The richest and most 
influential oligarchs, Rinat Achmetov (Donetsk clan) and Ihor Kolo-
moyskyi (Dnipropetrovsk clan) have also diversified by setting up their 
own agricultural holding companies, HarvEast (170,000 ha) and Privat- 
AgroHolding (116,000 ha), respectively (Plank and Plank, 2014: 56–58; 
Latifundist, n.d.a). In the current parliament, agriculture is the most 
coveted committee among the party’s members (Leshchenko, 2015). Mean-
while, in the person of Petro Poroshenko, the new President elected in 
2014 after the events on the Maidan, for the first time an oligarch is ruling 
the country, and Poroshenko, too, has major holdings in the food and agri-
culture industry (Samaeva, 2015).
 Not only local oligarchs, but also Western capital, are seeking to gain 
from the revival of Ukrainian farming. The change of government from 
President Yushchenko (2005–2010) to Janukovych (2010–2013) had a 
considerable influence on the investment climate for Western companies. 
After Ukraine opened up to Western capital in the aftermath of the Orange 
Revolution in 2004 it was easier for European companies to gain a foot in 
the door, and this also applied to the agricultural sector. However, under 
Janukovych this changed, and Western interests found it increasingly diffi-
cult to win a hearing from his government. With the protests on the 
Maidan, Janukovych’s fall, and the signing of the Association Agreement 
and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the EU, the 
politico- economic balance has again tilted towards the West. The new pro- 
Western government envisages a sell- off of state agricultural enterprises 
and energy companies, and is encouraging Western companies to take part 
in the privatization process. The changes of government from Yushchenko 
to Janukovych, and now to Poroshenko, have thus profoundly altered 
social, political, and economic relations between Ukraine and the West 
(Plank, 2015a).
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Internalization through land, trade, and sustainability 
certification
I shall now set out to show how the oligarchic agrofuels project fosters 
agribusiness, thereby reinforcing resource injustice, and how the EU is pro-
moting this trend. Land concentration, the creation of a farmland market, 
export quotas and RED sustainability certification are all arenas of conflict 
and cooperation among the ruling class, and shape the agricultural sector 
and hence agrarian justice.
Land concentration and the creation of a farmland market
The land reform ushered in by Ukrainian independence transformed the 
agricultural sector. The collective and state farms were dissolved, and the 
land distributed to the workers on them. Most of the beneficiaries do not 
work their land but lease it out, because neither the means of production 
nor financial support were provided when the change in ownership took 
place (Allina- Pisano, 2008). As long ago as the 1990s, the EU, the World 
Bank, and USAID began pushing for the creation of a land market in 
Ukraine. For example, they offered aid for the establishment of a land reg-
istration system and cadastre (Roth and Valetta, 2006; World Bank, 2016). 
Germany’s longstanding cooperation with Ukraine has had a strong focus 
on the agricultural sector. It has actively advised on the transformation 
process in Ukraine, providing information on ‘best practice’ in the West. 
This advice has come from both the public and the private sector (Deut-
scher Bundestag, 2015). Today, the EU twinning programme, under which 
expertise is provided by Germany, the Netherlands, and Lithuania, is 
attempting to transfer ‘best practice’ regarding the liberalization of the 
land market to Ukraine. However, the privatization of the farmland 
market remains controversial because most of the rural population and the 
domestic agribusiness sector oppose it (Plank, 2015b). As a result, the 
moratorium on the sale and purchase of farmland has again been extended 
– this time until 1 January 2017 (Drannik, 2015).
 A dualistic farm structure inherited from the Soviet Union – subsistence 
farming and former kolkhozes (collective farms) – is still characteristic of 
the post- Soviet sector.3 The old collective farms are now increasingly 
grouped under big umbrella companies known as ‘agroholdings’. The 
latter are horizontally and vertically integrated agricultural companies that 
control not only much of Ukraine’s farmland but also the whole supply 
chains of various agricultural and food products. Some, like Kernel 
(390,000 ha) and Nibulon (82,500 ha), are major grain traders. Ukrainian 
oligarchs increasingly own ‘agroholdings’, meaning that the agribusiness 
sector is dominated by domestic capital (Plank and Plank, 2014; Lati-
fundist, n.d.a). The chief executive of a large foreign agroholding that is 
invested in Ukrainian agribusiness told me: “There are actually very few 
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agro- companies managed by foreigners. Very few. You know, the oligarchs 
buy them. But it’s actually not that important, to be frank. If the land is 
well managed it doesn’t matter” (Interview 1). The political structures 
favour large agroholdings against smallholdings, and the former dominate 
the agricultural sector. Ukrainian oligarchs prefer large units because they 
are easier to control.
 Despite the dominance of the oligarchs, the increasing demand for feed-
stock and the low cost of leasing land in Ukraine have prompted some 
European investors and managers to begin investing in Ukrainian agricul-
ture, due to their belief that the European agrofuel market offers bright 
prospects for profits (Plank and Plank, 2014). However, only a few – 
mostly people with experience of operating in the country – have remained 
on the market. In 2007 Britain’s Landkom International PLC and France’s 
AgroGeneration, two European agroholdings, began growing rapeseed, 
wheat, barley, maize, soya beans, and sunflowers in Ukraine for the EU 
food and agrofuel markets (AgroGeneration, 2015; Bloomberg, n.d.). Both 
were the objects of friendly takeovers. Sweden’s Alpcot Agro, subsequently 
renamed as Agrokultura, bought Landkom in 2012 and swapped its farm-
land in Ukraine (in the Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano- Frankivsk regions) with 
the Ukrainian agroholding and large- scale poultry producer Myronivsky 
Hliboproduct (MHP) for land in the Voronezh region in Russia (Concorde, 
2015). The challenges of Ukrainian agriculture tend to prompt foreign 
investors to withdraw again.
 Despite the fact that agroholdings from EU member states have diffi-
culty in gaining entry to the agricultural sector and Western governments 
have met with obstacles to the creation of a Ukrainian land market, the EU 
supports agribusiness via loans extended by the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD has a strong preference for 
funding agribusinesses rather than smallholders. For example, it only pro-
vides limited credit in local Ukrainian currency (EUUKRAINECOOP, 
2015). At the same time, Ukrainian agroholdings are listed on EU stock 
exchanges, and are often registered in offshore tax heavens like Cyprus or 
Luxembourg. Foreign funds (e.g. the Dutch Pension Fund for Care and 
Well- Being and Sweden’s AP3 pension fund) sometimes own shareholdings 
in Ukrainian farming groups. Investments by foreign financiers, including 
pension funds and listings on foreign stock exchanges, mean that owner-
ship is increasingly intertwined and there is a trend towards the financiali-
zation of the sector (Plank and Plank, 2014).
Trade barriers
Along with the concentration of land, trade disputes are another major 
area of conflict among the ruling class. Along with the control and cultiva-
tion of land, trade is a major field of activity for agribusinesses. The agro-
holdings aim to control the whole supply chain from seed production 
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through to land, storage, and trade facilities. At the same time trading 
companies also engage in the cultivation of land. International traders such 
as Cargill, Dreyfus, Serna (the Ukrainian subsidiary of Glencore), Toepfer 
(now owned by ADM) and Suntrade (Bunge’s Ukrainian subsidiary) have 
all been active in Ukraine since the 1990s, and export flex crops to the 
EU for agrofuel production (ISCC, n.d.). As mentioned above, Ukraine’s 
Kernel and Nibulon control large areas of farmland. Multinationals also 
engage in agriculture in Ukraine; for instance, Glencore holds 70,000 ha of 
land there, while Cargill acquired a 5 per cent interest in UkrLandFarming 
in 2014 (2015). International traders have been trying to extend their influ-
ence over the Ukrainian agricultural sector.
 The introduction of export quotas for some crops caused regular con-
flicts between the Ukrainian government and international agribusinesses – 
especially multinational traders – during the Janukovych era. Ukraine has 
frequently introduced export restrictions since 2006 (EBRD, 2014). World 
Trade Organization (WTO) regulations only permit this at times of eco-
nomic difficulties. However avoiding domestic grain shortages is crucial to 
keeping the price of bread down. The Ukrainian government regulates the 
price of wheat, which is regarded as a strategic crop, using administrative 
measures including export barriers (Interview 2).4
 The introduction of export quotas led to a major dispute under Januko-
vych during the 2010/2011 grain export season. Export quotas for wheat 
were introduced when world prices rose. This step met with strong resist-
ance from international traders. Export licences were awarded to the newly 
founded state company, Khlib Investbud, which belonged to Janukovych’s 
‘family’, and the international traders came away empty handed. Con-
sequently, the multinational traders protested – supported by the inter-
national community in the shape of the EBRD, the European Business 
Association, the US–Ukraine Business Council, and the American Chamber 
of Commerce in Ukraine – and called for the abolition of the quotas 
(Olearchyk, 2011; Interview 3).
 Unlike wheat, which is one of Ukraine’s most important export crops 
by volume, rapeseed is not a cause of friction among or with the traders 
because there are no export controls. The agroholdings value this absence 
of trade barriers.
There are no customs, no duties on rapeseed and no regulation. That’s 
another reason why it’s an attractive product. It’s because the state 
doesn’t regulate the volume. The state doesn’t see it as a strategic crop 
like wheat. With wheat it’s much more complicated. That’s why we 
are decreasing the number of hectares given over to wheat.
(Interview 4)
This difference explains why the share of rapeseed production relative to 
total agricultural output has surged since 2004. The Ukrainian government 
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regards rapeseed as a ‘technical crop’ without a strategic bearing on food 
production. It can therefore be exported to the EU as agrofuel feedstock. 
While only Janukovych’s ‘family’ gained from the export quotas, low 
bread prices benefited the population at large.
Sustainability certification
Germany takes a particularly close interest in the Ukrainian agricultural 
sector. The German government has played a major role as an adviser on 
Ukraine’s economic transformation process. Germany operates at an insti-
tutional level to promote agricultural cooperation in general and agrofuel 
production in particular.5 The “sustainable biomass” project launched by 
Germany’s GIZ development agency and run by the German–Ukrainian 
Agricultural Policy Dialogue (APD) – a lynchpin of German–Ukrainian 
bilateral cooperation based at the Institute for Economic Research (IER) in 
Kyiv – acts as a focal point for institutional support for the agrofuels 
project in Ukraine. A look at the project’s aims and the parties involved 
reveals how strong the links between the German government and agrofuel 
industry, and Ukrainian agribusiness are.
 In line with the ‘win- win’ claims on behalf of the RED, the GIZ devel-
opment project sells agrofuels as a response to climate change and ‘peak 
oil’, and a means of fostering local development. As part of the project 
workshops have been held in various parts of Ukraine with a view to 
enforcing sustainability criteria for agrofuel feedstock, and a handbook on 
the certification process has been produced. Agricultural experts from the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Toepfer have commented on 
the handbook, and training programmes have been held in cooperation 
with Agrivent, which belongs to the Ukrainian Agribusiness Club (UCAB) 
(Interview 5).
 UCAB is a crucial partner for the GIZ project. Together with the Ukrain-
ian Agricultural Federation and the Ukrainian Grain Association, it is one 
of the three big lobbying organizations that have a say in agricultural pol-
itics. UCAB is the only lobbying group that knows how to work with 
Western companies. The organization has strong ties with Germany 
through its director Alex Lissitsa, who is a former senior researcher at the 
Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies 
(IAMO). Lissitsa also worked for Yuriy Melnyk when he was Minister of 
Agriculture under President Yushchenko (Latifundist, n.d.b). Today Melnyk 
is on the board of UCAB and is the Chief Operational Officer of the MHP 
agroholding (UCAB, 2015). These examples illustrate the role of personal 
relationships in Ukraine, and the close ties between business and politics.
 Despite these workshops problems with sustainability certification have 
emerged because in some cases it only exists on paper. Under the RED, 
the sustainability criteria include an obligation to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. They also exclude the use of land converted from areas with 
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previously high carbon stock, such as wetlands and forests, or land of high 
biodiversity such as primary forests or highly biodiverse grassland, for 
agrofuel production (European Union, 2009). The RED does not impose 
any social criteria. The ISCC scheme works on a self- declaration basis, 
which can result in compliance problems. Little is done to monitor con-
formity, and sustainability is sometimes being claimed in the absence of 
compliance. As an interviewee put it: “I think that there [in the EU] every-
thing is OK. But Ukraine has problems with peat land. In Poltava oblast 
they plant crops on peat land. That’s against the criteria but they are still 
certified” (Interview 6). He added that sustainable cropping was being cir-
cumvented in other ways:
There can also be the case that one company really operates according 
to the criteria. But this company is supplied by smaller companies 
which are not certified, and only the big one gets checked. [. . .] But 
you know that’s business. If business can avoid something then it will 
do so.
(Interview 6)
There is only an incentive for sustainability certification if it brings higher 
prices. If producers and traders will receive the same price regardless there 
will be no reason to seek certification (Interview 7). Certification schemes 
favour large- scale companies over smallholders because of the administra-
tive red tape (Interview 5). Certification for sustainable biomass is contro-
versial in Ukraine, both because it sometimes amounts to no more than 
window- dressing and because it puts small farmers at a disadvantage.
 To sum up, the EU and the USA have so far been unsuccessful in their 
efforts to promote liberalization of the Ukrainian farmland market. A fully 
privatized land market would give them easier access to land. To date, 
most of the agroholdings active in the country are owned by Ukrainian 
capital, and Ukrainian oligarchs are increasingly controlling land via agro-
holdings. The latter are supported by credit from international financial 
institutions, and foreign funds hold shares in them. Ukrainian farming 
companies and traders have strong ownership links, making them still 
more powerful players in the agricultural sector. The imposition of export 
quotas for wheat spawned conflicts between the internal and external fac-
tions of the ruling class. By contrast, certification according to the RED 
sustainability criteria does, indeed, represent a win- win situation for agro-
holdings, traders, and the EU agrofuel industry.
Implications of the agrofuels project for agrarian justice in 
Ukraine
This last section looks at the social and environmental consequences of the 
agrofuels project in Ukraine, and shows how, in terms of access, distribution, 
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and representation, the agrofuels project fosters agrarian injustice in the 
post- Soviet space. Generally, the export of feedstock for agrofuels supports 
agribusiness in the form of the agroholdings; it tends to marginalize rural 
communities and strengthen the oligarchs.
 The post- Soviet dualism of agricultural holding companies and small 
farmers has persisted down to the present. However, if the tendency for 
these large- scale farming groups to control and consolidate ever more 
acreage continues a growing number of small farmers will probably be 
driven off the land. The agroholdings are increasingly making it impossible 
for small farmers to keep their land, let alone expand production. However, 
according to official statistics, small farmers still account for the production 
of most of the food consumed in Ukraine. In 2014 they harvested 98 per 
cent of all potatoes, 86 per cent of all vegetables, and 85 per cent of all fruit 
and berries in the country. They contributed 52.7 per cent of gross agricul-
tural output (UkrStat, 2014). Visser et al. (2015) call the importance of 
small- scale producers in the post- Soviet space “quiet food sovereignty”. 
They carry out labour intensive work and produce the majority of potatoes, 
other vegetables and fruit whereas the agribusiness sector focuses on export-
ing flex crops. However, the small farmers are not organized as a political 
movement. The agrofuels project endangers their “quiet food sovereignty” 
by furthering the interests of the agribusiness sector.
 Another feature of the post- Soviet system is the fact that so far the state 
has played no part in rural development. There is no distributive mech-
anism in place that would enable the state to provide support for rural 
communities. Neither is there a strategy to maintain the livelihood, quality 
of life, and standard of living of the rural population. Under the Soviet 
system, kolkhozes were the heart of the villages, and were responsible for 
providing infrastructure and social services. Today the agroholdings have 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies. For instance, Landkom and 
AgroGeneration have built roads, schools, hospitals, and orphanages in 
order to win the support of local people (Miller, 2008; AgroGeneration, 
2015). However, these CSR measures are no substitute for the absent state. 
Moreover, the contribution of the agroholdings to employment is disputed. 
They require few employees, and the workforce is often brought in from 
outside (Interview 8).
 There is no pressure group capable of effectively representing small and 
medium sized farmers, and of fighting for agrarian justice in Ukraine. Olig-
archs dominate not only the economic but also the political sphere. They 
are represented in person or via their parties in parliament and/or govern-
ment, and the three large agrarian pressure groups also defend their inter-
ests. The oligarchs are not interested in agricultural and rural development, 
but regard agriculture as just another source of profits. Likewise, the EU 
supports large- scale agriculture by providing EBRD loans for agribusi-
nesses. Member states, and especially Germany, are preoccupied with 
obtaining ‘sustainable’ flex crops from Ukraine, and this is the one priority 
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for Germany’s bilateral development assistance effort. In consequence, EU 
development aid does little for agrarian justice.
 Neither have environmental NGOs raised the issue of agrarian justice, 
and they have only recently begun looking at the social and environmental 
impact of large- scale agriculture at all. The CEE Bankwatch Network has, 
however, pointed to the severe consequences of the agribusiness activities 
of MHP, the acquirer of Agrokultura’s land in Ukraine. A report from 
Bankwatch shows that people in the countryside around Vinnytsia have 
been forced to lease their land to MHP. Other impacts are poultry waste 
production, odour nuisance, and increased truck traffic. MHP has been 
unwilling to engage with local residents about these issues. The source of 
such problems lies in the unquestioning overall support for agribusiness 
(Kolomiets and Bacheva McGrath, 2015), due to the close links between 
economic and political interests.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the consequences for Ukraine of the agro-
fuels blending goal set by the Renewable Energy Directive. The EU’s agro-
fuel industry targets Ukraine as a feedstock producer. The characteristics 
of, and conditions for the agrofuels project in Ukraine are determined by 
the state, which is dominated by the Ukrainian oligarchs. This constella-
tion of social forces strengthens Ukrainian agribusiness, and with it the 
export of flex crops. Foreign players, such as farming companies, funds 
and traders, are attempting to cash in on the agrofuel boom by engaging in 
feedstock production and trade in Ukraine. However, they are compelled 
to compete with local oligarchs for control of farmland and trade. 
Germany is attempting to encourage ‘sustainable’ production of biomass 
from the Black Earth region by providing development assistance designed 
to feed the German and European agrofuel industries. This results in inter-
nalization processes that are reinforcing existing agrarian injustice. The 
reality of the EU’s agrofuels drive on the ground is an oligarchic project 
that is hindering small farmers’ access to land. The Ukrainian state offers 
no help for rural communities and smallholders, and rural communities 
lack an effective pressure group or political movement. The focus on the 
production of agrofuel feedstock does not contribute to a more just agrar-
ian sector but instead reinforces existing inequalities.
Notes
1 I thank Ulrich Brand and the two reviewers for their comments. I should also 
like to thank the Austrian Academy of Sciences, the University of Vienna, and 
the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation for their financial support.
2 I use the term ‘agrofuels’ instead of ‘biofuels’ to highlight their agrarian origin 
and its controversial character. The international peasants’ movement La Via 
Campesina has coined this term and critical scholars have adopted it.
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3 In Ukraine, the farm structure is as follows: there are corporate farms with an 
average of 1,700 hectares, less than 400 state farms, about 50,000 family farms 
with an average of 80 hectares, and household plots with an average of 2.5 hec-
tares (Lerman, 2007).
4 This regulation was introduced because of memories of the great famine of the 
early 1930s, known as the ‘Holodomor’, where millions of Ukrainians starved to 
death. Regulating the price of wheat and thus of bread remains an important 
task of every Ukrainian government (Interview 2).
5 While the Netherlands are also involved in biomass production and sustainability 
certification in Ukraine – the Dutch government, for instance, issued a Biomass 
Action Plan for Ukraine in conjunction with the Ukrainian government (SEC 
Biomass, 2009) – they focus mainly on solid biomass.
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Introduction
The sharp commodity price rise and heightened volatility between 2003 and 
2013 have reignited academic and political discussions on the drivers of com-
modity prices and their consequences, particularly for commodity dependent 
developing countries. From a resource fairness perspective, the questions of 
how commodity prices are set and transmitted to actors involved in commod-
ity production and how price risks are distributed among these actors are of 
crucial importance. Rather than focusing on price levels per se, this chapter 
focuses on the distribution of price risks across commodity chains. Despite 
the close interrelation between price levels and risks, the latter has not been a 
focus of resource fairness debates although it is a major concern for commod-
ity producers and captures most clearly the growing interconnection of finan-
cial markets with physical commodity trade.
 Commodity trade takes place in global commodity chains, that is, inter- 
firm networks in which the production and trade of commodities is organ-
ized. In particular, the governance structure of such chains, and herein the 
strategies and practices of lead firms – that is, international extractive com-
panies, commodity traders, manufacturers or retailers that extract, trade, 
process or sell the majority of internationally traded commodities – have 
an important impact on price setting, transmission and risks. Yet, global 
commodity chains are based in and react to institutional contexts at the 
global and local level: these contexts co- determine chain dynamics and 
governance and mediate outcomes for actors involved in commodity 
chains. In commodity sectors the institutional and policy context has 
changed significantly since the 1980s and 1990s – from stabilization of 
commodity prices and export earnings in producer countries to liberaliza-
tion and marked- based instruments for price setting and price risk manage-
ment (PRM) (World Bank, 2011; Nissanke, 2011).
 At the global level, international commodity agreements (ICAs) were 
established in the 1950s and 1960s with the aim of stabilizing commodity 
prices that have been historically very volatile, including minimum price 
238  C. Staritz et al.
systems, buffer stocks, and export quotas (Küblböck, 2015). In addition, 
compensatory financing schemes such as the Compensatory Financing 
Facility of the International Monetary Fund and two facilities for the stabi-
lization of export earnings, STABEX (for agricultural products) and 
SYSMIN (for mining products) agreed between the European Commission 
and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries under the 
Lomé and Cotonou agreements were put in place to ameliorate the adverse 
effects of fluctuating export earnings (Newman, 2009). Given a number of 
problems of the ICAs (e.g. related to the determination of a long- term price 
level, the high cost of maintaining buffer stocks, problems of cheating, 
rent- seeking, and free- riding) but also a general shift to market liberaliza-
tion in order to ‘get prices right’, they were dismantled by the end of the 
1980s. Simultaneously, access to the compensatory financing schemes had 
become more and more complicated. With increasingly tight conditionali-
ties they lost their attractiveness (UNCTAD, 2008).
 Subsequently, financial markets, that is, commodity derivative markets, 
have become the central pricing and risk management mechanism for inter-
national commodity trade (Nissanke, 2011). This shift was accompanied 
by a surge of liberalization and deregulation of financial markets, such as 
the liberalization of exchange rates and international capital flows, deregu-
lation of the banking sector, and the removal of barriers for investors in 
commodity derivative markets. These developments have resulted in an 
increased importance of financial motives in commodity derivative trading 
through the dominance of financial investors and the expanded financial 
activities of large physical traders (Newman, 2009). These developments 
can be subsumed under the term ‘financialization’, that is, “the increasing 
role and dominance of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors 
and financial institutions in the operations of the domestic and inter-
national economies” (Epstein, 2005: 3). This has led to the increased inter-
action between financial and physical markets for commodities.
 The collapse of ICAs and the deregulation of financial markets occurred 
concomitantly with widespread domestic liberalization in commodity 
sectors in the context of structural adjustment programmes supported by 
the World Bank and other donors. This involved the dismantling of 
national commodity marketing boards – remnants of colonial commodity 
marketing structures in Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA) that were carried over to 
the post- colonial era – that guaranteed minimum prices to farmers and 
controlled exports and stocks in accordance with ICA limits in many com-
modity producer countries. In the context of market reform, minimum 
prices and other price stabilization instruments were largely abandoned, 
thus shifting to more market- based price setting that has bound together 
producer prices with global futures prices. There remains, however, variety 
in local market structures and state involvement in producing countries 
with important implications on how price volatility is transmitted and how 
different actors experience and negotiate prices (Staritz et al., 2015).
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 The main question of this chapter is: how does the current global com-
modity price setting mechanism based on derivative markets impact on the 
distribution of price risks in commodity chains? The analysis is based on 
four case studies of the coffee sector in Ethiopia and the cotton sector in 
Burkina Faso, Mozambique, and Tanzania. Coffee and cotton are the most 
important cash crops in SSA upon which millions of smallholder farmers 
and rural households depend for their livelihood. We assess how global 
and local institutional changes, particularly global liberalization and finan-
cialization and domestic market reform in producer countries, have 
affected price setting, transmission, and risks of different chain actors. In 
doing so, we connect global processes of liberalization and financialization 
to local outcomes in commodity producing countries and make inferences 
concerning the impact of these processes on the distribution of risks along 
commodity chains. The paper adds to resource fairness debates by focusing 
on commodity price risks and the role of financial markets in influencing 
distributional outcomes. In fairness debates there is often a focus on the 
real side of the economy, not taking into account the role of financial 
markets and actors which has become particularly important in the context 
of financialization.
 We show that international traders generally use global prices, arising 
from commodity derivative markets in particular, as their reference point 
in commodity trading. So export prices in producer countries are linked to 
futures prices that are set on increasingly financialized derivative markets 
with implications on volatility and short- termism. However, national price 
setting arrangements still vary with important implications for producer 
prices and distribution of risks between international traders, national 
intermediaries or processors, and producers. They range from atomistic 
competition where individual producers negotiate prices with intermediar-
ies or international traders, market- based contract farming arrangements 
with some sort of pre- determined prices, and national commodity 
exchanges to fixed seasonal producer prices negotiated among associations. 
In these systems access to PRM tools also varies. However, national actors 
in producer countries generally do not use hedging as they cannot deal 
with the involved risks and costs – even more so in the context of finan-
cialization – which contrasts with large international and financially adept 
actors that can benefit from hedging and other financial trading strategies 
(Newman, 2009).
 We further argue that discussing commodity price setting and the distri-
bution of price risk from a resource fairness perspective has to go beyond a 
focus on ensuring that prices are based on economic fundamentals (i.e. via 
reducing excess speculation) to questioning if markets and, in particular, 
derivative markets are a useful instrument to ensure the inclusion of eco-
nomic and social criteria, including social costs, in price setting and risk 
distribution (see also the discussion on social costs in the chapter by Raza, 
in this volume). In this context, other factors such as distributional and 
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poverty impacts, which are not usually reflected in markets – even less so 
in the very short term functioning of derivative markets – have to be taken 
into account. Exposure to risk is a particularly important dimension of 
poverty. Poor households in developing countries are typically more 
exposed and vulnerable to risk. Further, agriculture – on which the 
majority of poor people depend – involves particularly high risks, such as 
bad weather conditions, pests, or effects of climate change. Hence, com-
modity price risks add to these vulnerabilities, particularly those of the 
weakest group in the chain, namely, smallholder farmers in developing 
countries. These distributional outcomes are highly related to questions of 
representation, that is, the extent to which the interests of different actors 
are taken into account in establishing and regulating the institutional archi-
tecture of price setting and hence which actors can influence rule setting 
(see also Raza, in this volume, and Pichler, in this volume).
 This chapter is based on trade, industry, and financial data and inter-
views with international commodity traders and financial investors con-
ducted at commodity futures markets in New York and London and with 
local actors in the coffee and cotton commodity chain in Ethiopia, Burkina 
Faso, Mozambique and Tanzania. During fieldwork in the four SSA 
countries, semi- structured interviews were conducted with farmers’ organi-
zations, processors, processors’ associations, relevant government institu-
tions, and sector experts.1 The chapter starts with an analysis of global 
commodity markets with an emphasis on financialization dynamics fol-
lowed by a discussion of price risks in global coffee and cotton commodity 
chains. The last section concludes at a conceptual and a policy level, focus-
ing on implications for resource fairness and governance.
Financialization and global commodity markets
At the centre of financialization dynamics in commodity sectors are com-
modity derivative markets – their increasing importance in price setting 
and risk management on the one side and the increasing prominence of fin-
ancial motives in trading on these markets through the dominance of fin-
ancial investors and the expanded financial activities and practices of large 
physical traders on the other side.
 A vast literature, based largely on econometric analysis, emerged in the 
context of the exceptional development of global commodity prices in the 
2000s, often perceiving derivatives on commodities in the literal sense 
only, with futures conceptualized as investment vehicles disconnected from 
physical commodities (for an overview see Ederer et al., 2016). Yet, deriv-
atives and their markets have become locked to physical markets in new 
and complex ways (Russi, 2013), being today the central mechanism for 
price discovery and risk management in physical commodity trading. 
Futures prices are generally used as a benchmark in contracts between 
physical traders as spot markets are often geographically dispersed and 
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centralized futures markets are accepted as the best indicator for overall 
supply and demand conditions.2 Commodity derivative markets have also 
been promoted as insurance as physical traders can hedge against the risk 
of price fluctuations.3 Hence, commodity derivative markets have served as 
the linchpin between the financial and the physical sphere (Clapp, 2014).
 The structure of commodity derivative markets and trading activities on 
these markets has changed, particularly in the 2000s. This involves, first, 
the increasing importance of financial markets for firms’ decision making 
around the allocation of resources. The business models of international 
commodity trading houses shifted towards financial motives and activities, 
reflected in the restructuring of commodity trading companies to place 
‘risk management’ at the centre of their core competencies, namely in- 
house research departments and futures brokerages that cater to traders of 
physical commodities as well as financial investors. Commodity trading 
houses thus play the dual role of physical commodity trader and financial 
investor on commodity exchanges (Newman, 2009). While there is 
considerable variation among international traders, the increased role of 
large multi- commodity trading companies has led to financial trading strat-
egies becoming more dominant alongside traditional physical commodity 
related hedging activities. Several large international traders have their own 
financial services units or hedge funds, investing on their own account, 
managing third party money, and selling investment products. While the 
proportion of company revenues coming from such financial activities has 
remained relatively small and variable, they have grown relative to rev-
enues derived directly from the trading of physical commodities (Gibbon, 
2014).
 Second, and connected to the first, is the increase in activity on com-
modity derivative markets driven purely by financial interests. Initially, 
these markets were developed primarily to allow the management of risks 
for physical commodity traders, but they have increasingly become domi-
nated by traders outside physical commodity markets, particularly finan-
cial investors. Speculators have always played a role in these markets by 
taking opposite positions to physical hedgers but they were largely special-
ized in the trading of few commodities. Financial investors, in contrast, 
trade in a large range of commodities as an asset class in order to derive 
profits from price changes – similar to stocks, bonds and real estate assets 
(Nissanke, 2011; UNCTAD, 2011). The 1990s saw an increase in hedge 
funds active on commodity exchanges in the context of deregulation and 
declining barriers with the transition from open outcry to electronic 
trading platforms. More recently, large institutional investors, pension 
funds in particular, have flooded commodity derivatives markets. Further, 
investment banks have increasingly offered diverse products for commod-
ity derivative market investments to allow their clients to profit from com-
modity price developments, in addition to trading on their own account. 
This has increased, in particular after the dot- com crises (2000/2001) and 
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in the context of the global economic crisis (2007/2008) as investors 
searched for new investment opportunities. Funds from financial investors 
in commodity futures markets have increased from US$13 billion in 2003 
to US$411 billion in the first quarter of 2013 (Barclays Capital, 2013).
 These developments have crucial implications on price discovery and 
volatility in international commodity trade and on the possibilities for 
accessing derivative markets for PRM. There is a controversial debate on 
the effects of financialization on commodity prices. Despite large differ-
ences, an increasing amount of research shows that trading strategies of 
financial investors have impacted on short term price developments in 
addition to fundamental factors (see also UNCTAD, 2011). In our own 
research, we test the impact of positions held by financial investors on 
monthly commodity prices in addition to fundamental demand and supply 
factors. We find that 50 per cent of variations in coffee prices and 15 per 
cent in cotton prices can be traced back to net long positions of financial 
investors, particularly money managers, in futures markets between 2006 
and 2012 (Ederer et al., 2016).4 This means that, at least in the short term, 
financial investors’ trading strategies disturb coffee and cotton prices which 
questions the extent to which commodity derivative markets fulfil their 
economic role of price discovery based on economic fundamentals.
 In addition to price impacts, the functioning of these markets has also 
changed. Pronounced short termism and complexity have increased costs 
and risks of derivative trading, raising entry barriers for actors without 
access to financial resources and markets (Heumesser and Staritz, 2013). 
Trading strategies of financial investors and new investment products, 
together with electronic trading and extended trading hours have increased 
the speed, complexity and short- termism of derivatives trading – with 
intra- day volatility being a rather new phenomenon in markets for coffee 
and cotton. These changes make trading more flexible and allow for imme-
diate reactions but also demand continuous awareness of the market and 
permanent access to finance in order to finance margin calls.5 For producer-
 country actors these markets were always difficult to access, involving high 
costs and risk and requiring permanent access to market information, 
finance, and brokers. For smaller physical traders that do not have the 
resources to interact actively with financial markets these developments 
have also made access to hedging more difficult, furthering the concentra-
tion process at the trader side. In contrast, large physical traders tend to 
profit from these developments, as they are increasingly involved in finan-
cial activities and own separate financial units in addition to physical com-
modity trading.
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Price setting and risks in coffee and cotton commodity 
chains
Price setting
The global coffee and cotton chains include actors in producing countries 
such as smallholder farmers or commercial farmers, processors, and 
exporters. The transactions among these actors might be mediated by 
local traders. The export of ‘green’ (or raw) coffee beans or of cotton lint 
runs through the hands of international traders, before downstream 
processing and final sale via various distribution channels. Generally, 
coffee involves minor processing in producer countries with green beans 
being exported to roasters that roast coffee or make instant coffee that is 
sold to retailers, super markets or coffee chains. Cotton involves more 
processing in producer countries as seed cotton needs to be ginned – 
where the cotton lint is separated from the cotton seed – before exporting. 
Cotton lint is largely exported to textile mills that produce yarn and fabric 
for apparel production. International traders play a key role in global 
coffee and cotton trade with a few globally acting companies handling the 
large majority of internationally traded coffee and cotton. They act as 
intermediaries between producers/exporters and processors/manufac-
turers, providing purchasing and buying services, arranging transport and 
guaranteeing performance (Larsen, 2008). Some international traders 
have also invested upstream in local buying and processing to secure 
supply (ITC, 2013).
 Physical coffee and cotton prices are generally determined by applying a 
differential to prices in futures markets. For cotton, futures and options 
contracts traded at the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) in New York serve 
as a global benchmark – despite substantial basis risk as ICE futures con-
tracts are limited to the delivery of U.S. cotton to U.S. locations. The 
Cotlook A Index, compiled daily by Cotton Outlook, a private company 
in Liverpool, by collecting quotations from traders, is also important. The 
Index is highly intertwined and correlated with ICE futures prices as 
traders take into account ICE closing prices for their quotations. For 
Arabica coffee, Coffee C futures traded on ICE serve as a global bench-
mark; for Robusta it is futures traded on the NYSE London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). Prices in physical coffee 
and cotton contracts vary because of differences in quality, location, 
delivery schedule, local supply and demand conditions, and bargaining 
power. But global prices are used as a global benchmark or reference in 
physical trade, being the most important factor in price determination.
 The importance of futures markets in price setting is related to the dis-
mantling of national price stabilization systems in producer countries as 
well as to the trading practices of international traders. International 
traders increasingly prefer using futures prices as a reference in physical 
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contracts as they use derivative markets for hedging. For hedging to be 
effective (by taking the opposite position to the physical position on deriv-
ative markets) physical prices have to reflect futures prices. This is done by 
either using forward contracts, where the price is fixed when signing the 
contract, or price to be fixed (PTBF ) contracts where the volume and 
delivery date are fixed but the price is fixed on a later time contingent on 
the prevailing futures price. PTBF contracts only require hedging after 
prices have been fixed and allow for more sophisticated and flexible risk 
management. However, this advantage can only be used by actors with 
access to derivative markets, foremost international actors. For actors 
without access to derivative markets PTBF contracts transmit volatility 
even more directly to local prices (Newman 2009; Bargawi and Newman, 
2013). In our cases, PTBF contracts are not widespread due to their less 
frequent use in the cotton sector and regulations in Ethiopia that only 
allow for export contracts with fixed prices.
 The four case study countries have different market structures with 
Ethiopia and Tanzania being more liberalized and Mozambique and, par-
ticularly, Burkina Faso more regulated in terms of producer prices. Ethio-
pia introduced strict regulations in the coffee sector, including the 
exclusion of foreign companies and traders from coffee trading within the 
country. Ethiopia also established a central commodity exchange in 2008 – 
one of the first countries in the SSA to do so – on which the majority of 
coffee production is traded. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) 
price system’s focus is on price transparency, that is, the efficient trans-
mission of ECX auction prices that are linked to global prices to the farm 
gate, without price stabilization measures or instruments to deal with price 
instability (Tröster and Staritz, 2015). The Tanzanian cotton sector is the 
most liberalized in SSA (arguably together with Uganda’s). The sector is 
open to competition with no restrictions on farmers’ and ginners’ choice of 
trading partners and a large number of private companies active. An indic-
ative producer price is set before the marketing season, based on a stake-
holder consultation, but it can be revised during marketing if global prices 
should change. Thus it provides no stability to producers (Staritz et al., 
2015).
 In Burkina Faso and Mozambique, the cotton sector is organized 
through regional concession systems where ginners have to buy cotton 
from farmers in a particular region and have to provide inputs to them. 
Farmers, in turn, have to sell their cotton to the ginner. In Burkina Faso 
the system is concentrated with only three ginners and strong state involve-
ment in the largest one. A fixed price is set before planting, negotiated 
amongst sector stakeholders. Two unique features of the system in Burkina 
Faso are the two tier price system with a potential premium paid to 
farmers at the end of the season and the existence of a smoothing fund that 
subsidizes local prices when world prices are low and is replenished in 
years when prices are high (Kaminski et al., 2011). In Mozambique, the 
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regional concession system involves around 11 private ginners. The sector 
operates a national minimum price system for seed cotton negotiated 
between sector stakeholders. The minimum price is set in April/May, 
between six weeks and two months in advance of cotton marketing. In 
2007 the system was amended by an indicative price set in October/
November, seven to eight months prior to purchasing and before planting. 
But this price is subject to change in the marketing season which reduces 
price stability for farmers. In both countries the price formula that is used 
as a basis for negotiations includes the Cotlook A index to capture global 
prices but there are discussions to adopt the ICE futures price.
 Despite these differences, in all four systems coffee and cotton prices 
along the chain are increasingly co- integrated with global price bench-
marks. Figure 14.1 shows the evolution of the annual average export and 
farm gate prices together with the relevant futures prices. It is seen that 
yearly export prices follow the volatility of global prices. Correlation coef-
ficients show this close relation between global and export prices account-
ing for 0.83 in Tanzania, 0.90 in Burkina Faso and Mozambique, and 0.92 
in Ethiopia for the period 2005 to 2013/2014. Yearly realized farm gate 
prices also follow global price dynamics. Correlation coefficients between 
farm gate prices and futures prices are around 0.70 in Mozambique and 
Tanzania and around 0.90 in Ethiopia. In Burkina Faso we find a correla-
tion index of 0.58; however, once the second payment is taken into 
account the coefficient increases to 0.87.
Price risks
The extent to which volatile international futures prices are transmitted to 
and lead to price risks for farmers depends on the national market and 
price setting structure. Price risks for coffee and cotton commodity chain 
actors can be differentiated in price fluctuations between seasons (inter- 
seasonal price risk) and within seasons (intra- seasonal price risk). Inter- 
seasonal price instability is a reality in all case study market structures as 
national prices are based on and increasingly aligned to global prices. This 
risk is largely born by farmers in all four countries as producer prices 
closely follow world prices through adoption of market- based producer 
price setting mechanisms in competitive systems (Ethiopia and Tanzania) 
as well as in regulated systems where price formulas have increasingly 
been based on world prices (Mozambique and Burkina Faso). Hence, in 
all market structures, producers bear the brunt of inter- seasonal price 
instability.
 There are, however, differences concerning intra- seasonal price volatil-
ity in the four case study market structures. In contrast to most other com-
modities and countries, in the cotton sectors in Burkina Faso and 
Mozambique, there exist national producer price stabilization measures 
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Figure 14.1  Futures prices, export prices, and farm gate prices for cotton (upper) 
and coffee (lower) (source: Futures prices from ICE; export prices from 
UN Comtrade, International Coffee Organisation, and Ethiopian Min-
istry of Trade; producer prices for cotton from MAFAP and FAO 
(compared with national sources – UNPCB in Burkina Faso, TCB in 
Tanzania, and IAM in Mozambique) and for coffee from International 
Coffee Organisation; exchange rate from WDI).
Note
In US dollar per tonne for cotton and in US dollar per lb for coffee; The export price value 
for 2003 is unrealistically low for Mozambique – hence, we excluded it from the analysis; A 
conversion factor from seed cotton to cotton lint of 0.42 was assumed for all countries; mar-
keting year based on season in Burkina Faso.
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seasons, but for a season fixed producer prices are negotiated in tripartite 
structures between farmers, ginners, and the government based on a 
formula linked to global prices. In Burkina Faso, prices are fixed in 
advance of planting which helps to stabilize farmers’ incomes by reducing 
uncertainty in planting decisions. In Mozambique, there are two price 
fixing meetings – one before the planting season and one before marketing 
starts where prices may be changed. Farmers are thus exposed to changes 
in the world price that occur between the meetings.6 In Burkina Faso, 
moreover, the smoothing fund partly compensates ginners should prices 
decline during the season. In return, a part of the price has to be con-
tributed to the fund in high price years. The government also holds risks as 
it has a mandate to re- capitalize the fund if prices decline for an extended 
period, as occurred in 2007 (IMF, 2014).
 The price systems in Burkina Faso and Mozambique are also different 
concerning the share of farmers’ prices in export prices. The two tier price 
system in Burkina Faso ensures a relatively high farmers’ price share. This 
is in contrast to Mozambique where the price share going to farmers is 
comparably low. This is related to Mozambique’s incomplete price stabili-
zation system that fixes a minimum price but does not ensure a second 
payment if prices should increase during the season. In a regional conces-
sion system higher prices can also not be secured through competition 
among ginners (as in Tanzania) as farmers have to sell to one ginner.
 In Tanzania, farmers are exposed to world price volatility over the 
whole season although this is to a limited extent tempered by the – adjust-
able – indicative price setting at the start of the marketing season. World 
price movements are thus transmitted to Tanzanian producers within a 
season. This is exemplified in the following quote: “If NY goes up, you’ll 
see the price goes up as well in the field. And if next day NY price goes 
down, you’ll see the price going down later that day in the field” (local 
ginner, Interview 1). Since ginners can pass on world price movements to 
producers, the price risk they face on this side of the transaction is limited. 
Also, in Ethiopia global price volatility is transmitted to local processors 
and farmers through the EXC, leading to price fluctuations between and 
within seasons. Farmers bear the majority of the price risk as local proces-
sors and exporters can transfer export price volatility to farmers. The 
strong link to ICE futures notations in the ECX system is confirmed in the 
following interview quotes: “The benchmark is the NY futures price” 
(international NGO, Interview 2). “We are price takers, not decision 
makers. [. . .] The price is determined in New York” (local exporter, Inter-
view 3). “The ECX price and the ICE price are highly correlated, but there 
are some circumstances where ECX price is lower than ICE price or – to a 
lesser extent – when ECX price is higher than ICE” (ECX representative, 
Interview 4).7
 The PRM strategies employed by different actors along coffee and 
cotton chains depend, on the one hand, upon their exposure to world price 
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movements and, on the other hand, their access to PRM strategies (see 
Figure 14.2 for a schematic representation on these two indicators). PRM 
strategies may be classified as physical or financial. Physical PRM strat-
egies involve influencing the time of selling through storage, back- to-back 
trading, and fixed price forward contracts.8 Financial strategies involve 
hedging through futures and options on commodity derivative markets 
(Dana and Sadler, 2012). Although futures prices are used as a benchmark 
for local prices in all market structures, local actors do not use derivate 
markets for risk management. This is related to the high costs, risks and 
complexities involved – even more so given the increased speed and com-
plexity of trading in the context of financialization. It also requires access 
to information, financial resources, and brokerage services. Further, 
trading on derivative markets is not adapted to the contexts of local actors 
in producing countries – for instance, the volumes of local exporters are 
often very small compared to lot sizes in futures markets. A particular 
problem is the increasing short- termism of trading and the related intra- 
day volatility of commodity prices which leads to more frequent and 
unpredictable margin calls requiring permanent access to finance. For 
actors that do not have financial units and the resources and capacities to 
interact actively with derivative markets and weather any losses associated 
with sudden adverse price changes, hedging has become an even more dif-
ficult risk management instrument. Even Burkina Faso’s Sofitex, the largest 
ginner in SSA, does not use futures or options.9
 Farmers have also very limited access to physical PRM strategies. Storage 
and insurance are limited and costs are high. Only the wealthiest farmers 
are able to choose the time when they sell (Bargawi, 2008). Farmers have 
no possibility to use forward contracts since the marketing season is fixed 
by the government and transactions are conducted in cash. Hence, farmers 
have largely no alternative PRM option available other than adapting their 
production volumes and/or the use of inputs from season to season. The 
capacity of processors and exporters in producer countries to manage price 
risks varies depending on their size and expertise but most importantly on 
whether they are affiliated to international traders. Independent local 
exporters are restricted to physical PRM, most importantly selling at dif-
ferent points in time through fixed- price-forward contracts. As forward 
sales lead to production risks, because sales are often signed when actual 
production levels cannot be predicted, international traders only buy for-
wards from exporters if they are confident that volumes can be guaranteed 
(ITC, 2013). This is the case for all three ginners in Burkina Faso and the 
majority of exporters in Mozambique and Ethiopia where forward sales are 
used extensively. In Tanzania, larger ginners can also sell forward to inter-
national traders. But smaller independent ginners are generally not in a 
position to guarantee volumes or store lint for extended periods. They prim-
arily deal with price risks by trying to secure large margins and adjusting 
their buying price over the course of the season.
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 In contrast, international traders (and locally- based processors or 
exporters affiliated to international traders) hedge most of their trades 
through their headquarters which have specialized financial units. Hence, 
access to hedging gives multinational actors, that is, international traders, 
and their local affiliates an important advantage in dealing with price risks 
relative to local actors in producing countries and smaller traders (Dana 
and Gilbert, 2008). Hedging is increasingly required not only to reduce 
traders’ internal price risk exposure but to be creditworthy for banks and 
other funders that require risk management as a prerequisite, even more so 
since the global economic crisis. However, the impact goes beyond price 
security as commodity derivative markets are not only used for hedging 
but also for speculative purposes. In particular, large multi- commodity 
traders, far from being concerned by the increasing presence of financial 
investors on these markets, have made speculative derivatives trading an 
important part of their business strategy, opening expanded profit oppor-
tunities. By contrast, smaller, traditional commodity traders have largely 
remained focused on physical trading activities with limited expansion into 
financial services.
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Figure 14.2  Intra-seasonal price risks and PRM for producers, local exporters, and 
international traders (source: authors’ own analysis).
Note
ETH = Ethiopia; TAN = Tanzania; MOZ = Mozambique; BF = Burkina Faso.
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Conclusion
Price instability and related price risks are major concerns, particularly for 
smallholder farmers. Given the liberalization of price stabilization schemes 
in producer countries and international traders’ practices, particularly the 
use of hedging, commodity derivative markets have become the central 
pricing mechanism for international coffee and cotton trade. Futures prices 
are increasingly transferred along the commodity chain to exporters and 
producers. This is particularly problematic in the context of the increased 
short- termism in derivatives trading and the limited PRM options for 
actors in producer countries. The extent to which unstable world prices are 
transmitted to producers depends, however, upon the national market 
structure and price setting arrangements. Inter- seasonal price instability is 
a reality in all countries studied since national prices are based on, and 
increasingly aligned to, global prices. This is the case under competitive 
price setting as well as in administered price setting systems. Within- 
seasonal price volatility is a greater concern for farmers in Ethiopia and 
Tanzania than in Burkina Faso and Mozambique given the existence of 
different types of national producer price stabilization schemes.
 Uneven exposure to price instability and access to PRM strategies have 
important distributional and fairness implications. International traders 
have the capacity to deal with price risks through hedging in addition to 
expanding their activities and profit possibilities through pursuing financial 
trading strategies and providing financial services on commodity derivative 
markets. In contrast, local actors in producer countries face the challenge 
of price instability and increased short- termism with very limited access to 
PRM. Financialization has given rise to opportunities and challenges for 
actors in cotton and coffee commodity chains and, given the heterogeneity 
of actors, has tended to exacerbate existing inequalities. Large inter-
national and financially adept actors stand to benefit from opportunities 
for speculation alongside hedging activities on derivative markets while 
local actors in producer countries face greater challenges in an environ-
ment of price instability and short- termism (Newman, 2009; Staritz et al., 
2015; Tröster and Staritz, 2015).
 National market structures mediate uneven exposure to price risk and 
risk management but only to a certain extent. National structures can 
address and mediate local relationships and power asymmetries in pro-
ducer countries by negotiating how price risks are shared amongst actors 
operating in the national marketing system. The national institutional 
context, particularly tripartite negotiation structures and processes and 
strong independent farmers’ associations are crucial for outcomes that 
reflect farmers’ interests. National structures alone, however, cannot fully 
address the major driver of inequality in incomes and risks, namely, 
unequal power structures in global commodity chains – the dominance of 
international traders, in particular, and their increasing links to commodity 
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derivative markets (Newman, 2009; Staritz et al., 2015). Through acting 
on these markets they are in a position to determine prices along coffee 
and cotton chains, cope with price risks, and expand their financial activ-
ities and profit avenues.
 In light of these conclusions, policy reforms are necessary at least at four 
levels – regulation of commodity derivative markets to reduce the domi-
nance of financial motives (Staritz and Küblböck, 2013); establishment of 
national price stabilization schemes to ensure fair and stable prices in pro-
ducer countries; development of alternative physical price determination 
beyond commodity derivative markets, such as an adapted version of col-
lective price agreements that were created by ICAs; and reduction of 
dependence on international traders through developing marketing and 
trading capacities in producer countries and through furthering local and 
regional processing and other production linkages.
 Re- regulation of commodity derivative markets would be an important 
step towards price stabilization. Despite some important steps (e.g. 
regarding transparency and position limits), attempts to re- regulate com-
modity derivative markets in the EU in the context of the economic crisis 
have, however, once more been strongly influenced and watered down by 
the financial industry (Küblböck and Staritz, 2014). Actors that bear the 
negative consequences from higher volatility and price risks lack the pos-
sibility of influencing regulation, which is highly problematic from a fair-
ness point of view. Current efforts by some international organizations to 
deal with price risks of farmers and exporters through extending their 
access to hedging instruments is certainly not the policy answer. Commod-
ity derivative markets are not an effective way to cope with commodity 
price risks for an important group of physical traders and particularly local 
actors in developing countries. Such efforts would intensify the impact 
of financialization on commodity chains and the uneven distributional 
implications discussed in this chapter.
 Reforms beyond commodity derivative markets will be necessary to 
stabilize commodity prices and reduce vulnerability for local actors. Price 
stabilization schemes at the national or regional level are a useful instru-
ment to cushion price risks for producers. Given asymmetric power struc-
tures between the involved parties, an important prerequisite for price 
negotiations is tripartite institutional structures as well as strong and inde-
pendent farmers’ associations. A main challenge for national and regional 
price stabilization funds is securing financing, particularly in the context 
of long- lasting low- price periods. Hence, stabilization funds could be 
coupled with an international counter- cyclical financing facility to miti-
gate income shocks from commodity price movements and ensure finan-
cial and policy space (Nissanke and Kuleshov, 2012). Ideally, such 
measures are complemented with new price stabilization mechanisms at 
the international level. In this regard, the re- establishment of ICAs, includ-
ing supply and inventory management measures, could be an important 
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step. However, lessons learnt from the past, such as flexibility and medi-
ation procedures, definition of an appropriate price range compatible with 
market conditions, and creation of a compensation fund with sufficient 
resources would need to be incorporated in the design of ICAs (UNCTAD, 
2010).
 Ultimately, developing countries need to reduce their dependence on 
commodities and diversify their economies not only to deal with price 
instability and external vulnerability but to secure structural transforma-
tion to higher value added activities, better jobs and sustained growth (see 
also the dynamic conceptualization of resources presented in the chapter 
by Raza, in this volume). An important opportunity is productive linkages 
from commodity sectors to other sectors (Morris et al., 2012). This 
involves forward linkages to processing – roasting or instant coffee pro-
duction in the case of coffee and spinning, weaving and apparel produc-
tion in the case of cotton – with important potential for value addition 
and employment generation. But also backward linkages provide diversifi-
cation possibilities in terms of input provision including pesticides, fertil-
isers, equipment, and various services from IT to transport. For 
diversification and commodity based development, price stabilization is 
an important prerequisite, but in addition it requires a broad set of indus-
trial policies and capacities at the public and private sector as well as suf-
ficient policy space.
 On a conceptual level, our analysis reveals the necessity of considering 
the interdependencies between value chain governance and global macro 
and local contexts to assess distributional outcomes for local producers of 
export crops. In particular, the role of financial markets and financializa-
tion in determining prices and value, related risks and PRM options, and 
the structure of physical chains and the actions and motives of different 
actors are crucial. Not taking into account this additional dimension of 
power and its interrelations with traditional lead firm power in commodity 
chain analysis makes a distributional analysis incomplete. It circumvents 
the central question of how value is created or ‘set’ and income and risks 
distributed, which is strongly influenced – if not dominated – by financial 
markets and their interaction with the physical sphere of production and 
trade in the context of financialization.
Notes
1 In Ethiopia, we conducted interviews with six exporters, two cooperatives, one 
roaster and the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX). In Burkina Faso and 
Mozambique, we conducted interviews with seven ginners, two spinners, two 
input providers, farmers’ unions and ginners’ associations. We also interviewed 
representatives of the government institution responsible for the sectors, Minis-
tries of Trade and Agriculture, international institutions, NGOs and sector 
experts. In Tanzania selected telephone and field interviews were conducted with 
two ginners, the Tanzania Cotton Board (TCB) and the Textile Development 
Union (TDU).
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2 Commodity derivatives can either be traded on regulated exchanges, called 
futures markets, that provide price information (i.e. futures prices) or bilaterally 
and unregulated over the counter (OTC) (Staritz, 2012).
3 For instance, a producer of wheat can sell futures contracts according to the 
amount of the expected harvest today, which secures today’s price for wheat, 
while a consumer of wheat can buy futures contracts to secure input costs.
4 Financial investors can be differentiated into money managers that pursue active 
and short term, often trend following, trading strategies and index investors/
swap dealers that pursue longer term and passive long only trading strategies 
(Ederer et al., 2016).
5 Holding futures requires margins that are adjusted on a daily basis to reflect 
market movements. Margin calls take place when the current price falls outside 
the margin that is set below the original purchase price by the futures contract.
6 In practice, there has been no downward revision of prices following the second 
meeting to date.
7 Farmers being part of cooperatives get a higher share of export prices in Ethiopia 
due to a potential secondary payment if export prices increase during the mar-
keting season as in Burkina Faso. However, only around 5 to 10 per cent of 
farmers are part of cooperatives.
8 There are also longer term strategies such as switching to niche and special-
ity product markets that are less affected by world- price instability and diver-
sification through selling a larger variety of products or increasing local 
processing.
9 In Tanzania, the World Bank and CRDB promoted hedging through its “Kinga 
Ya Bei” project with very limited uptake (Newman, 2009). In Ethiopia, the 
access to financial derivative markets for hedging is also restricted for Ethiopian 
actors given foreign exchange controls.
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15 Responsibility for financing 
biodiversity conservation




Biological diversity (biodiversity) provides numerous so- called ecosystem 
services for human material livelihoods.2 Among other things it supplies 
food, drinking water (through soil cycling functions), income (through the 
sale of nature- based products), and protection against floods and storms 
(provided by mangroves and coral reefs in coastal regions). Many eco-
system services transcend national or continental borders, including, inter 
alia, the climate- regulating effects of tropical forests and the medicinal 
properties of some tropical plants which benefit customers around the 
world (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Yet human economic 
activities significantly overexploit the earth’s biological resource base and 
thereby threaten the very basis of human life (Rockström et al., 2009). In 
reaction to this, at the highest political level, the UN Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity (CBD) commits its signatory parties to the objectives of 
conservation and to the sustainable use of biodiversity, with the latter 
generally understood as part of the former (United Nations, 1992).3 Biodi-
versity conservation does not come for free, of course, and principles are 
thus needed to determine who should be responsible for bearing the costs 
of conservation. While these principles are in practice politically negoti-
ated, ideally, they should be just. Ideals will hardly ever be reached in ‘real 
world’ politics, but they can operate as an important guidance for reform 
(Buchanan and Keohane, 2006: 406–410). Therefore, I consider it worth-
while to discuss how far the international conservation regime of the CBD 
provides for the just international allocation of responsibility for 
conservation- related costs. In order to keep the global ecological balance 
intact it is particularly urgent to conserve biodiversity in developing coun-
tries, where most biodiversity today is concentrated (Rosendal, 2000: 20). 
Hence, I focus on responsibility for conservation in developing countries.
 Specifically, I ask who should be responsible for bearing the costs of 
biodiversity conservation in developing countries. The question about the 
just allocation of costs for international environmental policies has sparked 
a huge debate among global climate justice scholars (e.g. Shue, 1993; 
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Neumayer, 2000; Caney, 2006, 2010; Page, 2016; Schuppert, 2016), but a 
similar discussion is still missing for other environmental policy fields. By 
singling out biodiversity conservation as a starting point, I hope to con-
tribute to closing this gap. Moreover, by its very nature, the theoretical 
debate is focused on the principled normative question of who ought to 
bear what burden of global climate policies but rarely moves on to ask 
how actual policies fare in this light (for a recent partial exception see 
Armstrong, 2016). However, if political theory is to work as a practical 
discipline that helps in deciding what should be done, then it surely does 
need to engage with actual policies (Swift and White, 2008). A second 
objective and contribution of this chapter, therefore, is to empirically 
evaluate how far the policies adopted in the framework of the CBD live up 
to normatively justifiable principles of responsibility.
 In order to address these twin objectives, the chapter proceeds as 
follows. In the first, theoretical, section, I argue for a combination of the 
contributor pays principle and the ability to pay principle. On this basis, I 
conclude that the least developed states should be exempted from conser-
vation funding and all other states should bear a progressively increasing 
funding responsibility. In a second, empirical, section, I work out whom 
the CBD and finance- related decisions of its Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) hold accountable for funding conservation in developing countries. 
I then evaluate these policies in the light of the normative principles dis-
cussed and conclude that the CBD itself is largely in line with my norm-
ative suggestions for the allocation of responsibility, but recent COP 
decisions diverge from this by attributing too much responsibility to devel-
oping countries. Finally, I highlight the increasing role of the private sector 
as an actor in biodiversity conservation that needs more attention in norm-
ative theorizing.
Normative principles for the allocation of responsibility
Before I embark on a discussion of principles for the just international 
allocation of responsibility for biodiversity conservation, it is necessary to 
briefly specify which kinds of agents ought to be responsible for what 
kinds of activities. Regarding agents, my argument is that responsibility for 
international environmental conservation policies ought to be borne by 
states because unsustainable resource- use patterns can ultimately be 
ascribed to them. By setting the legal and political framework for resource 
exploitation, states are the main agents that can steer resource- use patterns 
in one direction or another (Page, 2012: 302). Regarding activities, I think 
we need to separate the responsibility to undertake conservation measures 
from the responsibility to fund them (Page, 2016: 84). The two do not 
necessarily go together, and there are reasons why they should not. 
Conservation of its own biodiversity is a justice requirement for each state 
for two main reasons. First, species and ecosystem composition is very 
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place- specific, so conservation activities have to be undertaken in the local-
ities where biodiversity is threatened. Second, and relatedly, states should 
serve the function of realizing their citizens’ basic interests and ought to 
avoid imposing harms on future generations and people in other countries. 
These duties apply to all states and are generally assumed to include the 
respect for ecological limits (Schuppert, 2016: 110-111). International 
sharing of responsibility can, then, only take the form of sharing the costs 
of conservation. The costs for conservation policies can be of various 
kinds. For instance, funds are needed for directly conservation- related 
measures, such as monitoring, threat control, and ecosystem rehabilitation. 
Funding also relates to stakeholder compensation for use restrictions, thus 
covering their opportunity costs (Hein et al., 2013: 89–90). In the specific 
context of the CBD, countries require funds for the institutional and 
administrative framework of conservation, for example, the development 
of national plans for biodiversity conservation and the build- up of national 
reporting systems (see e.g. COP Decisions IX/11 and XI/4).
The contributor pays principle
With these clarifications, I now turn to discussing two principles for the 
international sharing of the costs of biodiversity conservation in develop-
ing countries.4 The first principle is widely established in international 
environmental policy and law and has a strong appeal to most people’s 
justice intuitions. According to this so called ‘contributor pays principle’ 
(CPP), agents are morally responsible for bearing the costs of mitigating 
environmental harm in relation to their contribution to causing the harm 
(Shue, 1999: 534–535; Neumayer, 2000: 187–188; Singer, 2002: 34).5 
Biodiversity loss occurs through myriads of local, regional, and global 
processes, not all of which are yet fully understood or documented 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: 36). Nevertheless, it is possible 
to identify a number of main drivers of biodiversity loss in developing 
countries, enabling us to spell out general principles for how to allocate 
conservation funding responsibility between countries.
 To start with, developing countries themselves have historically over-
used significant parts of their biodiversity and are continuing to do so. In 
Southern Asia and parts of Latin America, for instance, large forest areas 
had been cleared for agricultural purposes long before the arrival of Euro-
pean settlers (FAO, 2012: 9, 13). In many tropical regions, moreover, 
deforestation rates have increased in recent decades, largely as a result of 
the growing population and its dependence on land- based economic activ-
ities as well as due to the pressure from commercial agriculture for export 
purposes (FAO, 2011: 5; 2012: 9–15). In some parts of Asia biodiversity 
loss rates due to agricultural intensification and nutrient exposure have 
also accelerated recently (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2010: 59–60). Likewise, fish consumption levels and overfishing 
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have increased in many developing countries, particularly in the emerging 
economies (FAO, 2014: 3). Moreover, in many developing countries 
rampant corruption provides a fruitful ground for illegal logging and wild-
life trade of endangered species (Smith and Walpole, 2005: 252–253). 
Overall, these major trends illustrate that developing countries significantly 
fuel biodiversity loss. According to the CPP, they should therefore be held 
responsible not only for undertaking domestic conservation activities but 
also for bearing the financial burden of these activities. In line with the 
stronger contribution of emerging economies to at least some environ-
mentally harmful activities such as overfishing, they should be allocated a 
somewhat greater responsibility than developing countries in general.
 However, only considering the site of the problem, that is, the country 
in which environmental harm takes place, is not sufficient. Rather, one also 
has to ask who has (politically and/or economically) instigated the harmful 
action. For example, historically, a lot of colonial timber exploitation took 
place in Asia (FAO, 2012: 13) which certainly should be considered the 
moral fault of the colonial powers. Currently, consumers in developed 
countries instigate much biodiversity overexploitation in developing coun-
tries. For instance, although palm oil plantations significantly diminish 
local biodiversity, 10 per cent of the world’s permanent cropland – in 43 
developing and emerging countries – is cultivated by palm oil plantations 
(Koh and Wilcove, 2008), and large quantities of the palm oil produced 
are exported to developed countries. European long- distance fishing opera-
tions in the exclusive economic zones of West African countries serve as 
another example. Most of the fish is directly exported to Europe, with 
African countries receiving only little compensation for access by European 
fishers (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: 62–63). Increasingly, 
emerging countries, like China, also import fish from developing countries, 
while people in developing countries themselves largely rely on local fish 
products (FAO, 2014: 3). One might argue that the producer countries 
retain political responsibility for the uses of their lands and waters. This, 
however, overlooks the fact that such poor countries are frequently eco-
nomically dependent on agricultural exports, logging, and fishing right fees 
for economic growth. Their development trajectories take place within the 
context of a world economic system in which they operate first and fore-
most as natural resource exporters, and their opportunity to develop eco-
nomically through environmentally harmful activities is fuelled by demands 
from developed countries. Developed countries, and also to some extent 
emerging countries, are thus not innocent bystanders but rather co- 
contributors to biodiversity loss in developing countries. Therefore they 
ought to take up a significant share of the costs of conservation measures 
in developing countries.6
 As far as it goes, I think that the CPP’s proposition that developing, 
emerging, and developed countries bear different degrees of responsibility 
for conservation funding in developing and emerging countries is right. 
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However, the reach of the CPP is restricted in two respects. First, it does 
not discriminate on the basis of whether or not the environmental harm 
results from a morally wrong act. Some environmental resource use is 
clearly indispensable for people to lead a decent life and thus, although it 
may cause environmental harm, should not be considered as anybody’s 
fault. In contrast, to the extent that resources are wasted or overused for 
what is clearly a luxurious lifestyle, the resulting environmental harm 
should be understood as a fault that needs to enter the determination of 
the responsibility for funding environmental policies (this draws on Henry 
Shue’s (1993) account of responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions). This 
logic also has strong appeal for biodiversity conservation. Some biological 
resource use is necessary for people everywhere to meet their livelihood 
needs. In many developing countries, these subsistence uses alone may lead 
to significant resource overexploitation, because the poor directly depend 
on local ecosystems. Where people have no choice but to overexploit 
natural resources for their daily needs, this often leads to a downward 
spiral of increasing poverty and decreasing environmental quality (Millen-
nium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005: 63). For example, in many forest 
regions in developing countries, bush meat is the major source of protein 
but as poor people hunt it at unsustainable levels, some forests become 
“virtually devoid of animal life”, thereby bringing the entire forest eco-
system into imbalance (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, 2010: 63). Such overexploitation should not count towards developing 
countries’ moral responsibility for conservation costs. Certainly, in devel-
oping countries and even more so in emerging economies, the resource-
intensive lifestyle of the elites and emerging middle classes is another 
important factor for biodiversity loss (e.g. through the intensification of 
agriculture or loss of land). Yet if only these latter contributions to 
environmental harm are to be considered as (morally) wrong and as there-
fore needing to enter the determination of conservation funding responsib-
ility, all non- fault-based biodiversity loss remains unaccounted for.
 Similar problems arise, second, with regard to past environmental harm. 
Holding states responsible according to their past contribution to an 
environmental problem is normatively problematic insofar as it holds these 
states’ current citizens responsible for acts they did not commit and over 
which they had no (political) control. After all, it was their ancestors and 
not they who degraded the environment for most of history (Caney, 2005: 
756; Gosseries, 2004: 41–42). Against this, states usually represent some 
form of legal and institutional continuity and one might therefore expect 
them to take over responsibility for past faults that have occurred under 
their jurisdiction (Zellentin, 2015: 259). The problem that this burdens 
those people alive today who had no say over past decisions remains, 
however (Caney, 2006: 468). Essentially, it is unfair to expect those 
who have not caused a problem to fix it (Shue, 1999: 536).7 Regardless of 
these objections, biodiversity loss in developing countries has accelerated 
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tremendously over the past decades (for forests, see e.g. FAO, 2012: 9), 
and accordingly in the lifetime of the current generation, so that it can be 
held responsible for significant shares of biodiversity loss. Of course, this is 
by no means to imply that the accumulated loss of past centuries should be 
left unaccounted for.
 These considerations are not intended to undermine the CPP; its strong 
intuitive appeal can hardly be denied. In this sense, the CPP is appropriate 
for dealing with those environmental burdens that have occurred in the 
lifetime of the current generation and that are not essential for immediate 
livelihood purposes. For all other causes of environmental degradation, 
which Simon Caney (2010: 213) calls the ‘remainder’, a complementary 
principle is needed.
The ability to pay principle
I suggest that the remaining costs should be covered by the ‘ability to pay 
principle’ (APP), according to which the rich states should bear the costs of 
environmental policies (Caney, 2005: 767–772; 2010: 213–218; Page, 
2008: 561–562). Any international environmental agreement that asks the 
poor states to cooperate in solving environmental problems but overlooks 
the radical economic inequality among nations is grossly unfair (Shue, 
1999: 544). The deeper justification for such an approach is that humane 
policies must take into account the actual living circumstances of people 
and should be guided by the ideal of a minimum level of wellbeing below 
which nobody may fall (Shue, 1999: 537, 540–544; Page, 2008: 559). 
Therefore, if a state cannot guarantee the material basis of life for large 
parts of its population, economically strong states are obliged to support 
it, which includes bearing the (financial) burden of international environ-
mental policies. Imposing these obligations is justified because, and to the 
extent that, rich countries are able to divert some of their resources to 
addressing environmental damage in other countries without undermining 
the well- being of their own citizens (Caney, 2005: 769–770; Miller, 2007: 
255; Page, 2008: 561). A crucial question, of course, is when countries 
should be considered unable to pay for environmental policies. Here, I 
follow Henry Shue’s (1999) sufficientarian argument that the minimum 
that constitutes the threshold for the ability to pay is all people having the 
“essentials for at least a bit more than mere physical survival – for at least 
a distinctively human, if modest, life” (540–541).
 Translating APP into international conservation policies means that the 
least developed countries should clearly be exempted from conservation 
finance requirements, because they are struggling to guarantee the majority 
of their citizens the bases for a decent livelihood. For all other countries 
the APP is open to progressive rates of payment. Thus, the richer a state, 
the more it can legitimately be asked to contribute to meeting the costs of 
mitigating global environmental change (Shue, 1999: 537–538; Caney, 
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2010: 213). Beyond the sufficientarian threshold this thus allows for very 
modest contributions from slightly better off developing countries. Julian 
Culp (2014) has, moreover, presented a forceful normative argument that 
rising powers do indeed have some ability to pay for the alleviation of 
global poverty (even if within limits). Overall, however, just as with the 
CPP, the bulk of financing responsibility lies with the rich developed states.
 The key counter- intuitive drawback of APP is that it does not at all take 
fault into account as a basis for determining responsibility to pay. It 
thereby ignores one of the most fundamental moral considerations that 
people hold, that is, that those actors who do harm should be held respons-
ible for it (Caney, 2010: 213–214). There is thus a normative tension here, 
and one that cannot, I think, be perfectly solved. On the one hand, the 
sources of harm should matter in the allocation of responsibility, while on 
the other hand, a clear commitment to humane living conditions demands 
that some actors ought to be exempted from financing responsibilities. For 
the share of financing responsibilities unaccounted for by CPP, I neverthe-
less argue that the priority should be placed on the ability to pay, even if 
that undermines intuitions about fault- based responsibility. It is not an 
option to leave costs unaccounted for by avoiding conservation action, 
since that would further destroy the basis of human life. In such a scenario 
it is ultimately the smaller injustice to make the rich pay even if some of 
the harm is not their fault whereas it seems morally intolerable to make the 
poorest pay and further undermine their livelihood bases. The APP thus 
leaves the advantaged to pay, and they have less cause to complain because 
they can still have an affluent life (Caney, 2010: 214).
 The CPP and APP taken together largely correlate with regard to their 
overall arguments, concerning which groups of states should bear more or 
less responsibility for conservation finance. The least developed countries 
should be exempted from conservation funding requirements. All other 
countries should be subject to progressive rates of funding in accordance 
with their contribution to the problem as well as with their ability to pay 
and assuming that these two criteria are to some degree correlated. More 
specifically, this means that those developing countries that are not among 
the least developed might be asked to contribute some funding, emerging 
economies some more, and the bulk of funding for international conserva-
tion objectives should be attributed to the developed states. Within each of 
these groups of states, the more detailed allocation of responsibility should 
ideally follow a delicate balance between fault- based considerations and 
social wellbeing- based considerations, but it is practically impossible to 
translate this into a formula of responsibility. This is especially so given the 
many scientific uncertainties that still exist regarding processes of biodiver-
sity loss and which do not allow for a precise ascription of fault. Neverthe-
less, the general benchmarks outlined here should be sufficient in the 
empirical analysis to assess whether the international conservation regime 
around the CBD has adopted normatively satisfying financing rules.
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Funding responsibilities in the biodiversity regime
The CBD and the Strategy for Resource Mobilization
The CBD is a framework convention that provides the overall structure for 
international cooperation in biodiversity conservation and stresses the 
importance of national implementation. In this spirit, it addresses financing 
only very briefly and in very general terms. Its preamble acknowledges 
“that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the 
first and overriding priorities of developing countries”. This is, therefore, 
the overall normative guidance that the financing rules of the regime 
should live up to. More concretely, the key substantive provision with 
regard to financing is Article 20. First, it demands each signatory party to 
contribute financial resources for the achievement of the objectives of the 
Convention “in accordance with its capabilities” (United Nations 1992: 
Art. 20.1). In light of the developing countries’ restricted financial capabil-
ities, the developed countries are asked to provide developing countries 
with new and additional funding that covers the “agreed full incremental 
costs” of their measures and activities to implement the Convention obliga-
tions (United Nations 1992: Art. 20.2).8 Moreover, the Convention states 
that the “extent to which developing countries will effectively implement 
their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under 
this Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology” 
(United Nations 1992: Art. 20.4). The interpretation of this article is con-
tested. It can either be a description of causal relations, or it can be inter-
preted to mean that financial and technical support to developing countries 
is a legal requirement for their implementation of the Convention (Loft, 
2009: 66). In either case, a substantial share of the responsibility for biodi-
versity funding lies with the developed countries. In providing funds they 
should, moreover, “take full account of the specific needs and special situ-
ation of least developed countries” (United Nations 1992: Art. 20.5). 
Beyond that, the CBD does not specify any more concrete rules for sharing 
financial responsibility.
 The weak guidance by the CBD accounts for the high policy relevance 
of the biennial COPs, as they explicitly serve to develop the regime further 
and – wherever possible – arrive at more substantial agreements. Provi-
sions on funding are dispersed throughout the various substantive pro-
gramme areas (e.g. agricultural, forest, or mountain biodiversity) under the 
CBD. Eventually, the Strategy for Resource Mobilization brought together 
and complemented these dispersed provisions at COP 9 in 2008. The Strat-
egy’s objective is to increase both international financial flows and 
domestic funding in order to secure the effective implementation of the 
Convention and to halt biodiversity loss (Decision IX/11). As such, it is a 
crucial attempt at putting the realization of the CBD’s obligations on a 
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more solid financial footing. Since then, each COP has reviewed the 
Strategy and sought to develop it further. Hence, the following analysis 
focuses on this strand of COP decisions because it consistently draws 
together the core principles of biodiversity finance under the CBD. Specifi-
cally, in line with my research question, I single out those stipulations that 
address states’ obligations to fund conservation in developing countries. 
Moreover, at COP 10 in 2010, parties adopted the so- called Aichi Targets, 
which further specify the objectives of the Convention, including some 
quantified targets, such as halving the loss rates of natural habitats by 
2020 (Decision X/2). These targets are currently the main reference point 
for decisions on financing.
 Overall, the COPs have further established the particular responsibility 
for developed countries to fund conservation in developing countries. A 
first key, but non- specific, provision is that developed countries should 
increase biodiversity- related development assistance for developing coun-
tries (Decision IX/11B Para. 3.2) and promote measures such as debt- for-
nature swaps (Decision IX/11 B Para. 3.8). Only at COP 11 in Hyderabad 
in 2012 did parties agree on a basic quantitative framework for biodiver-
sity funding for the achievement of the Convention’s objectives and Aichi 
Targets. Taking the average of 2006 to 2010 annual biodiversity- related 
international financial flows as a baseline, developed countries were asked 
to double this funding for developing countries by 2015 and maintain this 
level at least until 2020 (Decision XI/4 Para. 6–7). This objective was 
recently reaffirmed at COP 12 in 2014 (Decision XII/3 Para. 1).
 In addition to these financing requirements for developed countries, 
attempts have been formulated to make developing countries bear a share 
of the burden. First, one key objective of the Strategy for Resource Mobil-
ization, which is reiterated in subsequent decisions, is to substantially 
increase domestic biodiversity funding. This should happen “as appro-
priate” (Decision IX/11 Annex Para. 3.7) or for countries “with adequate 
financial resources” (Decision X/3 Para. 9). This increased reliance on 
developing country funding has been given a further boost, as COP 12 has 
complemented COP 11’s quantitative funding targets with an extra para-
graph calling for domestic resource mobilization to meet identified 
biodiversity- related funding needs (Decision XII/3 Para. 1e). Second, the 
Strategy calls for developing country contributions through South–South 
cooperation as a complement to North- South cooperation (Decision 
IX/11B Para. 6.2; reiterated in Decision XII/3 Annex IV Para. 12). South–
South cooperation is generally considered to be a particularly efficient way 
of delivering technological support and capacity building to developing 
countries. However, in the context of the CBD COP decisions, it explicitly 
also includes the provision of loans and grants by developing countries 
(CBD, 2012a: 44).
 The obligations established by the CBD and COP decisions are only 
partially mirrored in the actual provision of biodiversity funds. Detailed 
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estimates of the resources required for meeting the Convention’s objectives 
are not readily available (see also CBD, 2012b: 6; Parker et al., 2012: 18). 
A rough assessment by the CBD Secretariat assumes that the global costs 
for meeting the Aichi Targets will be in the range of US$150 billion to 440 
billion a year (CBD, 2012b: 12). Given a persistent deficiency in countries’ 
reporting of their biodiversity- related expenditures, it is also difficult to 
assess the actual amount of funding (Waldron et al., 2013: 12144). 
Clearly, however, most funds for biodiversity conservation come from 
domestic government sources (Parker et al., 2012: 34). A recent estimate 
suggests that, globally, domestic funding accounted for approximately 21.5 
billion dollars annually from 2001 to 2008, with the bulk of this domestic 
spending clearly taking place in developed countries (Waldron et al., 2013: 
12145). Nevertheless, in both developed and developing countries, even in 
those with major biodiversity, environmental protection expenditures 
remain insignificant in national budgets (CBD, 2010: 12). International 
biodiversity aid has recently been estimated to be around US$1 billion per 
year (Waldron et al., 2013: 12145), with some recent increase being 
reported against the 2006–2010 baseline (Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, 2014: 123). South–South cooperation for biodiversity 
purposes has been estimated to fall in the range of US$200 million per year 
(CBD, 2012a: 44). Even if all of these numbers are rough estimates, they 
clearly suggest that the funding available will not be sufficient to meet con-
servation targets (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
2014: 123). Many of the most severely underfunded countries are develop-
ing countries that are host to a significant proportion of globally threat-
ened biodiversity. Here, a modest increase in absolute funding could 
generate relatively large impacts for conservation (Waldron et al., 2013: 
12147).
Normative justice assessment
What, then, do the written policies and actual funding trends suggest with 
regard to the just allocation of funding responsibility in the international 
conservation regime under the CBD? The CBD is rhetorically much more 
strongly rooted in an ability to pay logic than in a contributor pays logic, 
as evidenced notably by the clear emphasis that countries’ financial 
responsibilities depend on their capabilities (United Nations 1992: Art. 
20.1). Nevertheless, its overall differentiated funding provisions are in line 
with the distribution of responsibility that I have derived above from a 
combination of the CPP and APP. Both my normative proposal and the 
CBD’s policies justify the exemption of least developed countries from 
funding obligations. By highlighting the specific needs of least developed 
countries, the CBD clearly establishes that these countries should be the 
primary recipients of support. On the other end of the spectrum, the CBD 
affirms the special responsibility of the developed countries, as they are 
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required to cover developing countries’ incremental costs of implementing 
the Convention. Given the overall convergence of the CBD’s financing 
requirements with the normative justice principles developed above, is it 
irrelevant that the CBD does not seem to incorporate fault- based con-
siderations? I believe the answer is no, because within the broad lines of 
responsibility established by the CBD, the single states will still have to 
decide how much exactly they will contribute to the global goal of biodi-
versity conservation. For reasons of justice, such a decision should also be 
influenced by the morally relevant contribution of the respective state to 
biodiversity loss.
 Looking, then, at the specification of the funding rules through the COP 
decisions, the normative assessment is ambivalent. On the one hand, the 
decisions rightly reaffirm the special funding responsibility of the developed 
states – and what is more, they do so without recourse to weakening lan-
guage (i.e. expressions such as ‘as appropriate’ etc.). The 2012 decision to 
double the flow of biodiversity- related funds from developed to developing 
countries gives the previously vague language about developed countries’ 
obligations much more force. Moreover, the decision has been appreciated 
by developing countries as a necessary step to make progress in halting 
biodiversity loss (Tsioumani, 2012: 298). On the one hand, in light of the 
estimated funding needs, even a doubling of current international transfers 
will not be enough. Developing countries in particular have asked for a 
further increase in international support for meeting conservation targets 
(ENB, 2014: 24). Developed countries point to the recent financial crisis 
and global economic downturn to reject further funding commitments. But 
NGOs have strongly – and in my view, rightly – highlighted that the finan-
cial crisis does not limit developed countries’ ability to pay, as they could 
easily free money by abandoning environmentally harmful agricultural 
subsidies (CBD Alliance, 2014a: 2). From the point of view of the norm-
ative principles I have discussed in this chapter, the empirically observable 
lack of funding for conservation is thus particularly the fault of the 
developed countries.
 At the same time, the COP decisions reveal a normatively problematic 
attempt to shift responsibility from developed to developing and emerging 
countries. Moreover, while this was initially still tied to appropriateness and 
fit with countries’ capacities, the most recent complementation of the quant-
itative international funding targets with domestic resource mobilization 
requirements and the call for South–South cooperation lacks such reserva-
tions. Thereby, developing countries especially are accorded too much 
responsibility. Yet South–South cooperation does not appear to me to be a 
generally unjust policy principle. Rather, I have argued above that, in light 
of their economic capacities and their contribution to global biodiversity 
loss, emerging countries should indeed bear some (limited) responsibility for 
global conservation funding. An example of such a justified South–South 
cooperation is the so- called “Hyderabad Pledge” through which India, in 
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2012, allocated an additional US$50 million over the next two years for the 
implementation of the CBD in India and to support capacity building in 
other developing countries (ENB, 2012: 21–22). It would, however, be more 
problematic if South–South financial transfers were required between much 
poorer countries. From a normative point of view, the limits of South–South 
cooperation should be clear, whereas observers of the field currently see a 
push by developed states to expand such forms of funding. NGOs and devel-
oping countries are thus understandably wary that developed countries are 
trying to shift their responsibility to developing (and emerging) countries 
(ENB, 2012: 6; CBD Alliance, 2014b: 2; Lovera and Wulf, 2014: 2).
Conclusion
This chapter started from the observation that, while biodiversity conser-
vation is a global benefit, it carries with it considerable costs, especially in 
developing countries where most biodiversity is concentrated. This connec-
tion raises the question of who should bear the costs of conservation in 
developing countries. I initially illustrated that, to different degrees, all 
states have contributed to biodiversity loss but that poverty-related as well 
as past overuse cannot be used as a basis for holding them responsible for 
conservation funding. Thus, while the contributor pays principle provides 
a first important reference point for allocating responsibility among states 
in line with their overuse of biodiversity, the principle leaves some costs 
unaccounted for. This remainder, I argued from a normative justice per-
spective, should be covered by the ability to pay principle, that is, accord-
ing to a country’s economic capacity. The two principles largely point in 
the same direction, so that, overall, least- developed countries should be 
exempted from funding obligations for biodiversity conservation and all 
other countries should be subject to progressive rates of funding obliga-
tions with the bulk of the funding responsibility resting with developed 
countries. In the empirical analysis, I found that the provisions of the CBD 
strongly confirm this normative position, even though they are predomi-
nantly grounded in a country’s ability to pay and leave aside questions of 
fault. Yet the decisions in the context of the 2008 Strategy for Resource 
Mobilization have increasingly shifted responsibility towards the emerging 
and developing countries through requirements of domestic resource 
mobilization and South–South cooperation without specific attention to 
the principles underlying either the CPP or APP. Especially insofar as these 
decisions are increasingly insensitive to these countries’ limited financial 
capacities, this is a problem of justice. In practice, these problems related 
to the allocation of responsibility among groups of states are exacerbated 
by a generally too low level of spending. In particular, developed countries 
provide far too few funds to meet the needs for global conservation. It is 
foreseeable that biodiversity loss will thus continue, and with it, human 
wellbeing will be further put at risk.
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 According to my normative and empirical discussion, an obvious reform 
requirement for subsequent COPs would be that developed countries reas-
sume more funding responsibility. However, this does not seem realistic at 
the moment. Instead, besides the burden shift to developing and emerging 
economies, an additional trend is the call for the involvement of the private 
sector in biodiversity financing. Recent COPs have increasingly called for 
private sector contributions for global conservation purposes (e.g. Decision 
IX/11 Annex Para. 2.6, 3.4; Decision XI/4 §14). To date, these make up 
only for a small share of global funding for biodiversity. Estimates suggest 
that US$0.5 billion (Waldron et al., 2013: 12145) to 3 billion (Barbut, 
2011: 189) a year are raised for biodiversity from private sources. Never-
theless, this practice has received fierce criticism, especially from NGOs. 
They fear that developed states use private funding to cast off some of their 
own responsibility and that, through private funding, private interests will 
enter conservation policies (e.g. Lovera and Paul, 2010: 7; CBD Alliance: 
2012, 1). The responsibility of the private sector for bearing the costs of 
environmental conservation has so far hardly been taken into account in 
normative environmental justice theory. Simon Caney (2006: 467–468) 
has suggested, but not further elaborated on, the idea that one might con-
sider holding corporations responsible in addition to states because, even 
within a particular legal context, corporations have some of their own 
room for manoeuvre. Weighing this argument against the concerns brought 
forward by NGOs will be an important further step for empirical and 
normative research if we want to be better able to assess whether the 
adopted policies can be justified or should be reformed.
Notes
1 I would like to thank Tobias Weise and two reviewers for their comments on 
earlier versions of this chapter. Funding by the German Research Foundation 
(DFG grant no. DI1417/2–1) is gratefully acknowledged.
2 According to the standard definition, biological diversity covers genetic, species, 
and ecosystem diversity (United Nations, 1992) but most conservation policies 
primarily address species and ecosystem diversity. Ecosystem services are stand-
ardly defined as the “conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, 
and the species that make them up, sustain and fulfill human life” (Daily, 1997). 
In fact, what people need for their livelihoods are ecosystem services rather than 
biodiversity directly. I nevertheless refer to the underlying concept of biodiversity 
as this terminology better captures the object of conservation policies.
3 The third CBD objective comprises fair and equitable access and benefit- sharing 
(ABS) from the commercial utilization of genetic resources. For reasons of space, 
I leave this aside, although some of the financing provisions discussed in the fol-
lowing also apply to ABS provisions.
4 Note that when I refer to developed countries in the following, these are by and 
large to be understood as OECD countries. This roughly coincides with the list 
of developed countries adopted by the parties to the CBD (Decision XIII/18). 
Note that the USA are not a party to the CBD. Justice would thus require them 
to live up to their responsibilities through other (multilateral or bilateral) chan-
nels. I generally refer to all other countries as developing countries and only 
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differentiate further between emerging economies and least developed countries 
where this serves to make my argument more nuanced.
5 In the climate justice debate, this principle is better known as the ‘polluter pays 
principle’.
6 Climate change, of course, is another important factor contributing to biodiver-
sity loss and is also mainly caused by developed countries (IPCC, 2013). For 
reasons of simplicity, I do not discuss regime overlap here and argue for the time 
being that all responsibility for climate change should be dealt with in the 
context of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
7 On a more general level, this argument is problematic in that it would also pro-
hibit reparations after wars – which are, however, generally accepted (Neumayer, 
2000: 188–189). The issue of why the responsibility ‘inherited’ from past genera-
tions should differ across policy fields certainly needs more discussion. Prelimi-
narily, I posit that it makes a moral difference whether the harm committed by 
past generations was intentionally violent or whether it is an unintended con-
sequence of a well- intended activity, such as economic development.
8 Incremental costs in this sense are the extra costs that countries incur by imple-
menting the Convention. On the particular difficulty of determining the incre-
mental costs of biodiversity conservation, see Biermann (1998: 249).
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